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All that the possessor of the luxury desires, is, to have a means of showing that
he has acquired the command of a certain amount of the exertions of other
men.
—John Rae, Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy
Rae’s “Accumulation”
Many of Thorstein Veblen’s ideas in The Theory of the Leisure Class ([1899] 1998) are
found in John Rae’s Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy:
Exposing the Fallacies of the System of Free Trade, and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the
“Wealth of Nations” ([1834] 1964). Rae was born near Aberdeen in Scotland in 1796 and
emigrated to Canada in 1821, to Boston and New York in 1848, and then to the Sand-
wich Islands in 1851; after a life of teaching, headmastering, writing, inventing, farming,
and financial straits, he died in New York City in 1872. He was a freethinker and linguist
who worked on the evolution of human language in general and the Polynesian language
in particular. Rae influenced Nassau Senior, John Stuart Mill, W. Stanley Jevons, Eugen
von Böhm-Bawerk, Alfred Marshall, Irving Fisher, Frank Taussig, and Joseph
Schumpeter (Mixter 1905, xxxii; Edgell and Tilman 1991, 731).1
Rae’s subjects were capital formation—accumulation as opposed to prodigality
([1834] 1964, 118–29, 199, 206; Mixter 1902)—and technological progress through
knowledge and invention (Spengler 1959). Accumulation is of “instruments” of slower
or quicker return according to the labor put into their formation, their capacity of
return, and the “length of time . . . elapsing between their formation and exhaustion”
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(Rae [1834] 1964, 100–01, 278), as well as by their efficiency and absolute durability
(109–17). Instruments include not only tools but also houses and arable fields (86–89,
170–171). (Veblen’s “accumulation” is closer to mere “acquisition” [(1899) 1998,
25–41, 230]). For Rae “knowledge” and “provident forethought” distinguish us from
“inferior animals,” and together these cause a better future (Rae [1834] 1964, 81;
Veblen [1899] 1998, 10, 20, 74, 93, 227). The genesis of economic stratification is that
frugal people become richer than prodigal ones (Rae [1834] 1964, 198–207).
Rae took as human givens not only concern for offspring but also “the interests of
society” and the ability “to provide for the wants of futurity” ([1834] 1964, 81, 89,
119–125, 158-160). These emotions aid the effective desire of accumulation, which sat-
isfies future “real wants” (265, 271, 289, 290). Within terms of the central category of
time, a cost is “the sacrifice of some smaller present good” and a benefit is “the produc-
tion of some greater future good” (118, 121, 136, 138). By building a well-insulated
dwelling, for instance, with good cupboards, this greater good is the fuel, food, wearing
apparel, and metabolized body energy which is thereby not “wasted” (200–03, 313–19);
for Veblen also, to say the least, waste is a crucial category ([1899] 1998, 15, 59, 83–85,
91, 97–101, passim).
Because it is truistic that “all men prefer a greater to a less” and the future good or
saving is obviously greater, the time factor must be invoked to explain prodigality, or
nonfrugality. Not only do we not live forever but the exact date of our demise is uncer-
tain, and thus this “desire of accumulation” is contravened by our natural preference for
present pleasure (time preference, discounting the future)—“to spend is easy, to spare,
hard.” That capital which does get formed is thus a function of a person’s net factor of
“the effective desire of accumulation” (Rae [1834] 1964, 118–21, 129, 206–07). Strength-
ening the hand of present over future enjoyment even more are both our covetous
glances at the “rank immediately above” us (which we perceive as “rolling in superfluous
extravagance”) and our desire for the “articles . . . necessary to our condition” or
“rank” (Rae [1834] 1964, 120; Veblen [1899] 1998, 1–3, 22–34, 140–41). Indeed,
“merely personal considerations” can yield no more than a weak desire of accumulation
(Rae [1834] 1964, 120; Veblen [1899] 1998, 89). Providing for some comfort in our
own old age motivates us to some extent, but Rae is asking (128–29, 80–81), like
Kenneth Boulding (1973), why we consider posterity at all.
“But man’s pleasures are not altogether selfish”; Rae’s empirical wisdom is that a
person is also moved by “love” of others, “the conjugal and parental relations, the claims
of his kindred, his friends, his country, or his race” ([1834] 1964, 121–22). This is equiv-
alent to Veblen’s “group solidarity” of the “peaceable savagery” phase ([1899] 1998, 7,
33, 219; [1914] 1964, 36) or to his “non-invidious impulses” serving the “generic life
process” ([1899] 1998, 16, 259, 275, chap. 13), “parental bent” ([1914] 1964, 11, 25), or
“other features of human nature . . .alien to . . . conspicuous consumption,” without
which no saving whatsoever would occur ([1899] 1998, 91). Thus for Rae the “uncer-
tainty and worthlessness of future goods” is counterbalanced and a degree of effective
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accumulation is after all achieved by these “social and benevolent affections” (122, 142)
Further help comes from our “intellectual powers” (Veblen’s “idle curiosity”?) because
they strengthen invention (122, 275–76).
Vanity
Accumulation is thus the advancement of “the wealth of society, the capital and
stock of communities,” and it both enables the “consumption of utilities” and provides
“additional supplies for the wants of futurity”; Rae’s basic cleft is between “utilities” and
“luxuries” ([1834] 1964, xv, 292, 275, 222, 238; also Boulding 1949–50). The main
“check” on the “social affections and . . . intellectual powers” that promote accumula-
tion is the “purely selfish . . . principle . . . of vanity,” and Rae’s term for “the expendi-
ture occasioned by the passion of vanity” is “luxury.” Vanity is “the mere desire of
superiority over others” by whatever criteria; “a perfect being” can achieve de facto supe-
riority purely through “pleasure in the good he does,” but it is the (vain) pleasure in “sur-
passing others” that moves the rest of us (Rae [1834] 1964, 265–66, 271–72, 290–91;
Edgell and Tilman 1991, 735–36). Vanity is also the “pride” moving a man to rise in the
world, “placing himself on an equality with those to whom he was once inferior” (325);
for Veblen it is “to rank high” in “invidious comparison” with our “competitors”
([1899] 1998, 31–34, 16–17, 25–27), recalling Rae’s “desire . . . to rank high in the esti-
mation of the world” (125, 120) and “It is invidious to run to expenses which others
cannot follow” (282).
Veblen likewise contrasted the desire for “sustenance” ([1899] 1998, 103),
“self-preservation” (110), “serviceability” (154), “physical necessities” (205), “the generi-
cally useful” (219), “subsistence” (24), “naïve” consumption (25), and so on, with emula-
tion, which is “the stimulus of an invidious comparison which prompts us to outdo
those with whom we are in the habit of classing ourselves” (103, 31). Similar to Rae’s
“real practical utility” ([1834] 1964, 338), he also opposed “economic” to “aesthetic and
ethical” serviceability (262–63). And his discussion of noninvidiousness parallels Rae’s
social affections and shows the mistake of emphasizing his sarcasm and coolness: in con-
trast to consumption due to “the human proclivity to emulation” which—like Rae’s dis-
sipating laborers’ “abilities to spend” (326)—fulfills only a “secondary utility as evidence
of relative ability to pay,” there are goods “consumed as a means to the fuller unfolding
of human life,” to the end of “the fulness of life . . . taken in absolute terms” (154,
24–26, 102–04).
These two categories of consumption are in terms of motivation, rather than the
goods themselves. One is relative to others; the other is “absolute” or, better, relative to
nature—“against the non-human environment” rather than the “human environment”
(Veblen [1899] 1998, 220). Rae said that while many goods satisfy “real wants” ([1834]
1964, 289, 292), luxuries, seen in terms of the economy as a whole, “give no absolute
enjoyment, it is all relative” (290, 275). John Maynard Keynes later contrasted “abso-
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lute” needs for health and survival with “relative” ones “in the sense that we feel them
only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows” (1930,
326). Veblen’s corresponding two-tiered analysis is in terms of “higher” versus “lower”
wants ([1899] 1998, 25, 103), or “physical want” versus “spiritual need” (85, 168).2
This dichotomy between absolute and relative, or intra- as opposed to
intersubjective (Fullbrook 1998), is sociological, while the dichotomy in terms of needs
and wants (Sanne 2002), or between subsistence and conspicuous consumption,
requires physiological criteria, as in Veblen’s “subsistence minimum . . . required for the
maintenance of life” ([1899] 1998, 107, 25–26, 69, 92) or John Hobson’s “biological
utility” or “organic human standard” (1929, 309, 337). Better than dozens of later writ-
ers who build on some such distinction, Rae and Veblen avoided the conflation of sub-
jective and objective criteria. Good overviews are McAdams 1992 and Jackson and
Marks 1999. In the interests of thoroughness it should be added that Rae’s taxonomy
was actually three-tiered—necessaries, conveniences, and “amusements,” or luxury
([1834] 1964, 12, 118, 253, 258, 272, 275)—presaging Marshall’s “necessaries, comforts,
and luxuries” ([1890] 1916, 67).
Of course vanity or emulation also come in nonpecuniary varieties. Rae mentioned
“excelling in virtue” or even vice ([1834] 1964, 266, 122), while Veblen granted “invidi-
ous comparison in other respects than opulence; as . . . in the manifestation of moral,
physical, intellectual, or aesthetic force” ([1899] 1998, 97). Like “knowledge of dead lan-
guages . . . and fancy-bred animals,” though, much of this is reducible to the pecuniary
strength evidenced by leisure (43–45, 25, 91, 223). But both were mainly interested in
wealth, and other roads to status are indeed less relevant for economics (or justice, or
environment problems).
For Rae, what counted was “to have what others cannot have” ([1834] 1964, 266),
whereas for Veblen it was to own what “other persons . . . are compelled to do without”
([1899] 1998, 130) or, in a word, his delicious “spiritual need . . . of pecuniary decency”
(85, 126). Rae’s examples, like Cleopatra’s drinking a precious pearl dissolved in water
or Romans’ eating nightingales’ brains (an example from Pliny via Adam Smith), under-
line the costly and wasteful character of such consumption (266–67). Veblen’s some-
what more plebian examples are “carpets and tapestries, silver table service, waiter’s
services, silk hats, starched linen, many articles of jewellery and dress” (99); these
objects, as well as household furniture, lend themselves intrinsically to “honorific costli-
ness” (131). And while for Rae it is true that “mere costliness” and having “what others
cannot have” do heighten the pleasure attending the noncompetitive consumption of,
say, wines and meats themselves, the motive of vanity is stronger than this pleasure from
the object itself (266–68). Veblen concurred (38), and both, using examples of spoons,
metals, gems, and jewels, knew that scarcity and price lend higher distinction than
either serviceability or beauty (Rae, 269–73, 275, 307; Veblen, 126–30, 169).
768 Blake Alcott
Display
The kind of superiority that Rae examined was social, not secret; it must be shown
and, if possible, acknowledged by people “accustomed to see and be seen” ([1834] 1964,
287). When “articles” are chosen to show superiority they must, in order to be capable
of “gratifying this passion” of vanity, be “conspicuous” or “apparent” (267, 270, 287,
310); luxury objects give enjoyment because they “display superiority” (289, 271). The
contrast is with things that “supply some real want,” or things that become cheap, incon-
spicuous, and therefore unfit to “supply the demands of vanity” (289, 286). For such
goods Veblen gives us the lovely term “humilific” ([1899] 1998, 155), and if the vintage
Veblenism is “conspicuously wasteful honorific expenditure” (103), his “conspicuous
consumption” is a household word. Rae, however, while often combining “wealth and
honor” (209) lacked an explicit concept of “wealth-vanity” to correspond to Veblen’s
“pecuniary emulation” (34, 110).
To this common and central term (conspicuousness) Rae preferred luxury ([1834]
1964, 271–272, 252). This too conveys “visibility” (Veblen [1899] 1998, 16, 103, 112,
122) because if luxe is “light,” and the light either shining on or emanating from an
object serves its display, then luxury is indeed a good concept for consumption over and
above basic wants. Rae thus translated Heinrich Friedrich von Storch’s “le luxe
d’ostentation” as “the desire to show”; for Storch, “luxury objects” must “display or
attest the wealth” of the owner or consumer; display gratifies “the desire to appear rich”
and thus superior to others (270–71; Veblen, 67–85, 73–74).
To further denote the exact things signifying possession of “a certain amount of
wealth” or “such a rank in society,” Rae used “inscription” and “mark,” or “marks of dis-
tinction” ([1834] 1964, 287, 307), the latter term being common both in ethology and
in more recent consumption literature. Again, the job that objects have of “marking
superiority” can’t be done by the unseen timber in your house or your fuel coal but
rather by dress, furniture, marble chimneys, wines, and liquors (267–68). (For further
examples see Rae, 200, 289; Veblen [1899] 1998, 74–75, 112; Frank 1985, 1999.)
“Opulence” is also employed by Rae for that which sets one above (270), and Veblen’s
core theory is that the leisure class must show its “ability unproductively to consume . . .
thereby putting in evidence the ability to sustain large pecuniary damage without
impairing his superior opulence” (63).
Veblen’s vocabulary of display includes “marks of expensiveness” ([1899] 1998,
132), “badge or insignia of honor” (44), “suggestion of leisure” (170), “signs of expendi-
ture” (187), and more. Rae’s “propensity to show” ([1834] 1964, 276) is Veblen’s “pro-
pensity for emulation” (110), or “propensity for display of expenditure” (168). For
Veblen wealth, leisure, and the ability to waste must be “manifest” (38, 91), “put in evi-
dence” (36, 38, 61, 187), or, in language tantalizingly close to that of sexual selection
theory (Darwin [1859] 1950, 75–77; 1871), “advertised” (85–88) or “displayed” (86,
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167–68).3 Indeed, for Charles Darwin, display was a decisive clue for this theory ([1871]
2003, 221–22, 314–19, 394–402, 567, 572–73).
For Rae, consuming what the vulgar masses consume lowers one’s status; “costli-
ness” or “dearness” itself and the “parade of riches” explain the character and quantity
of goods possessed or consumed, a view he supported with a quotation from Smith, who
observed also that “scarcity” and “great labor” make up an object’s desirability ([1834]
1964, 268–70). Or, “it is not the thing itself,4 but merely the quantity of labor embodied
in it that vanity prizes” (285). This specific focus on labor-costliness is implicit in Veblen
since labor is such a huge element of price. It is also explicit, as when he contrasts
machine-made with hand-made goods ([1899] 1998, 127, 158–66). What’s more, if
labor’s “irksomeness” (17–18) consists of a time-cost as well as an energy or annoyance
one, Veblen’s insistence that wealth means having time as well as goods—leisure as “the
non-productive consumption of time” (43)—is an insight that goes farther than Rae.5
Exclusivity is explicit in both Veblen ([1899] 1998, 130, 235) and the work of Rae,
who prosaically noted that “a very large share . . . of the expenditure of the wealthy con-
sists of luxuries,—articles, the sole gratification afforded by which is, that they alone can
afford to possess them” ([1834] 1964, 274). Certain consumption is “prohibited” for
lower classes (269) or, in Veblen, is allowed only on the “sufferance” of the higher ones
(72). It is a short step to Harvey Leibenstein’s “snob” and “Veblen” effects wherein
demand varies “non-additively” with others’ demand and with price (1950). In illustrat-
ing this point with pearls—that when progress renders any hitherto expensive thing
cheap, this effect is lost—Rae employed Veblenian humor (286).
Cost and Waste I
Once Veblen established the concept of status and its expression through owner-
ship ([1899] 1998, 25–34, 46–47), his main economic concept was waste (15, 27,
116–20, 154–60, 175–81). Both leisure and consumption “for the purposes of reputa-
bility,” have the “common element” of waste, and the pecuniarily decent life follows
“the broad, fundamental canon of conspicuous waste” (85, 91). Repeatedly, he exam-
ined “usefulness,” “utility,” and “serviceability” on one hand, contrasted with “futility,”
“idleness,” and the merely pecuniary or nonindustrial on the other (15–16, 24, 95,
128). Conspicuously consumed goods must above all be costly, “pecuniarily above
reproach” (119, 126). This is waste, “expenditure which does not serve human life or
human well-being on the whole” (97). In his later analysis of “pure waste” in gold, tim-
ber, and oil production, Veblen pointed to oil spills and “duplication of work and
equipment” ([1923] 1964, 177, 199), described in detail for the case of the Oklahoma
fields by Angie Debo as “enormous . . . tragic waste” (1949, 58–63, 69).
Rae also viewed the matter in terms of waste and nonutility. Because vanity
demands the new and changing, it “destroys before its time, as Mr. Say complains, what-
ever it lays its hands on . . . ‘destroyed . . . before having ceased to exist, and without hav-
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ing supplied any real want’” ([1834] 1964, 271). He had another category of “loss to the
society” or “pure economic loss,” or, simply, “waste”; much industry and effort is
“expended in vain” from the point of view of “the whole society as a body” (290,
307–308, 312–19, 338). (“Wasted” and “in vain” are common-usage synonyms.)
Thus such consumption is societal waste, and the “social and benevolent affec-
tions” represent it as “hurtful” (Rae [1834] 1964, 122, 275). Albeit without taking a
stand himself, Rae described at length antiquity’s attribution of immorality and “the suf-
fering of others” to “the pursuit of wealth,” drawing as well on St. Paul and Shakespeare
(125–128), a tradition upheld in our day by, for example, Schumacher 1999 and Orr
1999. Vanity consumption “supplies no wants” (290) and indulgence in “acknowledged
extravagances and real luxuries” makes one “guilty of inflicting an injury on the commu-
nity” (282). For Veblen, similarly, “emulative efficiency” is “not directly serviceable to
the community” ([1899] 1998, 262); invidious comparison succeeds group solidarity
(27–28, 32–34, 219; also Rae, 96–98). Always movingly concerned about the future,
Rae said that vanity consumption “brings no addition to the absolute capital [and] gen-
erates no provision for future wants” (290) and that ostentation is prodigality, an enemy
of accumulation (121, 123, 199, 206, 273). Paralleling both writers very closely are
Boulding’s analysis of waste and stocks (1949–50) and Richard McAdams’ argument
that “Competitive consumption is a market failure” (1992, 69, 48–62).
However, like Veblen, Rae exonerated the individual for his vanity. Even in its
“absurdities” and “follies,” “no blame can attach to . . . compliance with the vain cus-
toms of the society”; it is “the business of the poor man . . . , too, to avoid a display of
poverty” ([1834] 1964, 281). “The gentleman, the tradesman, the lady, the servant girl,
must alike obey the laws which the strength of this principle imposes on the society”
(287). Veblen would say that these customs or institutions have “prescriptive force”
([1899] 1998, 41, 105), and he likewise insisted that his term “invidious” is in no way
intended to deprecate but is merely descriptive of “the process of valuation of persons in
respect of worth”; this “rating and grading” offers each of us, to boot, a gauge of the
“degree of complacency” with which we may regard ourselves (34). He also bends over
backward to deny the deprecation that “the speech of everyday life” has for “waste”; for
him it is “a technical term” (97–101). For “the person incurring the expenditure,” an expen-
diture “on the ground of invidious pecuniary comparison” is not wasteful (99, my ital-
ics). During this deep bow to “economic theory proper,” of course, in which utility is
proven by preference, with no questions asked, his tongue is securely in cheek (also
Veblen [1914] 1964, 1; Gilman 1999).
In his chapter “Of Waste, or Pure Economic Loss,” Rae specified a further category
of economic losses to society, namely the cheating of debtors, simple theft, war, and
deceit in salesmanship and advertising, in other words, “successful or unsuccessful
attempts to pass off commodities for what they are not” ([1834] 1964, 314). Extrava-
gance is the cause of “artifice and fraud” and “fraud and violence” (326), recalling
Veblen’s “force and fraud” as “prowess” ([1899] 1998, 14, 231). Not only is this the
John Rae and Thorstein Veblen 771
“business” or “predatory” category in Veblen’s dichotomy between it and industry (28,
208–09, 237–41, 259) but it constitutes as well the more current category of defensive
expenditures which has taken on importance in measuring real welfare by subtracting
such expenditures from gross domestic product (GDP). Daly and Cobb’s index (1989)
of sustainable economic welfare (ISEW) is one example. The spirit of this thought is cap-
tured, in turn, by Veblen’s priceless characterization of the lawyer, who is “exclusively
occupied with the details of predatory fraud, either in achieving or in checkmating chi-
cane” and to whose profession “no taint of usefulness . . . attaches” (231).
Both men were looking at what is before and after preferences: at the motives or
nature of them and their consequences or effects, for example, their hurtfulness to
society. Veblen time and again contrasted wealth for display with our endeavors
both for plain old “physical comfort” ([1899] 1998, 25–26, 102–03, 205) and for the
“generically useful” (219) or “generic life process” (334)6 or “fulness of life” (100); a
good’s utility is judged by its “efficiency as means to this end” (154), and the instinct
of workmanship always resurfaces to fight predation and emulation (15, 93, 98).
When Rae wrote that “if we inspect the dwelling-houses and furniture of rigid econ-
omists, we generally perceive that they have an air of both durability and efficiency”
([1834] 1964, 200), Veblen’s parents’ farm comes to mind; Rae’s straightforward
assertion is that an “indirect . . . effect . . . of luxury . . . is always to dissipate a part of
the national funds proportioned to its strength” (292; also 126, 325–26).
EdwardBellamy, for his part, taxonomized this societal waste into thirteen catego-
ries ([1887] 1917, 225–44; Edgell and Tilman 1989, 1010–14).
Cost and Waste II
The pursuit and display of wealth, then, assuming scarcity, is detrimental for society
and by some criteria wasteful after all; material inequity and future want result, and if it
is individually “rational,” perhaps also tragedies of the commons. But a further, differ-
ent question is possible: what is the situation of the individual? Is the societal or eco-
nomic waste of luxury and pecuniary decency also waste in terms of the individual’s
economy of costs and benefits? During the last decades of the nineteenth century, evolu-
tionary thought was teaching that preserved “derivations of structure or instinct” must
be “profitable” (Darwin [1859] 1958, 389, 128, 170–74); were, for instance, in addition
to the males, female deer and elephants to grow immense horns and tusks, this “would
be a great waste of vital power” (Darwin [1871] 2003, 503; also 216, 496 on danger,
221–22 on energy expenditure, 338–39, 403, 514–15 on consumption of organized
matter; also Ghiselin 1974; Gans 1991). Hobson later noted that “[g]etting and spend-
ing, we lay waste our powers” (1929, 309), also stressed by Juliet Schor (1992), Gary
Cross (2000), and others, who ask why we might be so stupid as to work ourselves to
death just to outdo the Joneses, who are trying to outdo us. My suggestion here is that it
is this cost-benefit ratio that is often captured by Veblen’s “efficiency”: by “industrial”
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efficiency and workmanship for the behavioral, economic realm ([1899] 1998, 15, 93,
110–11, 241, 259) and by “physical efficiency” for the internal economy of the organ-
ism (58, 69, 73, 203-05).7 In terms common to economics and biology (utility, effi-
ciency, waste, futility), Richard Dawkins elucidated this “economy assumption” with
the examples of salmon, bone calcium, birdsong, firefly flashes, trees’ height, chee-
tah-antelope races, elephant seals, work experts, and model T kingpins, all from the
point of view of DNA, not of groups or even individuals (1994, 103–24).
Are the invidious, vain expenditures of time, effort, and material—high enough to
be visible to others—wasteful for the individual, “too high,” higher than benefits? Ear-
lier, Veblen had defined conspicuous consumption as “displaying costly goods that
afford no return to their owner, either in comfort or in gain” ([1894] 1997, 282). Yet in
spite of this, and of course aside from competitive expenditure’s not serving “human life
or human well-being on the whole,” it is not waste “from the standpoint of the individ-
ual consumer” because it was chosen ([1899] 1998, 97–98). This is close to evolutionary
biology’s working assumption that species-wide behavior could very well be adaptive.
But to the extent that he was here joking, he was implying that perhaps, after all, costs
exceed benefits, pecuniary emulation is stupid, maladaptive. At least for the “lower
strata” he is clear that conspicuous consumption endangers their subsistence and energy
economy: they endure “squalor and discomfort” and “this category of consumption [is]
not given up except under the stress of the direst necessity” (84–85). Merely factoring in
status-driven pecuniary utilities ignores exactly this part of the story (in addition to
ignoring societal waste). To be sure, however, Veblen’s guiding question is not the evo-
lutionary biological one but rather the social one of the “economic conscience” (98).
Rae was also looking at luxury in contrast to real wants, sustenance, capital accumu-
lation, provision for the future, and the common good, but of course without the idea
that what has survived natural selection/elimination is usually adapted to conditions.
But luxury does entail costs. In his example of Cleopatra’s drinking the dissolved pearl,
Rae says it must have tasted “disagreeable”; similarly, “a dish of nightingale’s brains
could scarcely be a very delicious morsel” ([1834] 1964, 266). In fact, it is the very dis-
agreeable or at best neutral taste of these expensive things which, for Rae, proves that we
consume them from some other motive other than just normal “pleasure” or “real
wants”—this is his derivation of vanity. Another of his examples goes even further, namely
that from Pliny of Roman men with many heavy rings on their fingers, “rather loading
than adorning them” (277). And an example taken from Smith claims that, “in the wan-
tonness of plenty,” even great power and authority will be sacrificed for “frivolous and
useless . . . diamond buckles” or other “trinkets and baubles” (274–75). Like Darwin
([1871] 2003, 573 ff.), he cited the “privations” that “savages” incur in order to orna-
ment themselves in terms of the pain and expense of cuts, tattoos, and European
imports; they also voluntarily relinquish “provisions . . . made for the future” (Rae, 276).
Finally, just as Veblen exempted “no class of society, not even the most abjectly poor”
([1899] 1998, 85) from conspicuous consumption, Rae asserted that vanity expenditure
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“falls on all classes of society,” including “those who have difficulty in procuring
absolute necessities” (271).
Veblen’s own examples of perhaps overly costly consumer behavior are the “squalor
and discomfort” suffered to buy “the last trinket” of the poor ([1899] 1998, 85), the
“infirmities” and “dissipation [of] dram-drinking, ‘treating,’ and smoking” (70, 89–90;
Rae [1834] 1964, 326), the wearing of uncomfortable, unprotective, even “incapacitat-
ing” clothing (170–72, 185)—in short, going “ill clad in order to appear well dressed”
(168), “costly entertainments, such as the potlatch or the ball” (75), the “mutilations”
and “debility” of the “constricted waist’” and “deformed foot of the Chinese” (147–49,
172), the “Polynesian chiefs, who, under the stress of good form, preferred to starve
rather than carry their food to their mouths with their own hands” (42), and, finally, a
French king who burnt to death rather than shifting his chair himself (43).
The mere acquisition of leisure class manners takes “strenuous discipline” and
“laborious drill”—in short, “pains” (Veblen [1899] 1998, 49–50); “achievements of eti-
quette” are “difficult and costly” (76), and winning invidious comparisons entails an
“arduous” learning of “the right kind of goods” to consume (74–75). Social duties are
“irksome” (65), a man’s workless wife requires his “assiduity” (81), and the “strain” of
emulative consumption is in general “cumbrous” or “onerous” (65–66, 103, 111). The
modern, leisure class scheme of life, which reduces to “waste, futility, and ferocity,” has
“pathological consequences” (70, 149); for “conspicuous decency” we pay with “com-
fort and fulness of life,” and for pecuniary decency we give up “indolence and good-fel-
lowship” (205, 351). Finally, were waste not necessarily defined in terms of life, we
could, as Veblen did in the book’s darkest passage (96), call this waste of life.8
I believe that Rae and Veblen were here onto something important for understand-
ing conspicuous consumption, itself important for social justice and environmental
quality. In terms of survival (Rae’s sustenance, Veblen’s subsistence), the conspicuous
expenditures of the peacock’s tail, the deer’s antlers, the colors of birds and butterflies,
and animals’ “antics” in general had stumped Darwin, who then found their cause in
same-sex combat and opposite-sex preference for certain traits. Rae and Veblen chose to
look at human behavior and consumer goods, from antiquity to the Gilded Age, that
was similarly puzzling (and odious), a perfect Darwinian example being Veblen’s “deca-
dent book,” which is “costly and ill adapted to its ostensible use” ([1899] 1998, 164–65).
They found its cause in vanity, emulation, status, and repute. But two questions then
remain open. Why do we want status—why do we compete for rank, position, standing?
And why is this so often on the basis of wealth—why is status expressed by blue collar and
silk stocking (Hamilton 1973, 203; Brekke et al., 2003)?
Doing any justice to these questions would go far beyond this article. Yet it seems to
me that in the two works examined here, status seeking itself is taken as a given. How-
ever, at least in Veblen, its pecuniary form is not. To be sure, Rae was open to the influ-
ence on behavior of “institutions” and “habits” ([1834] 1964, 95–96), and he hinted at
“barbarian” or “savage” hunting societies preceding agriculture and pastoralism
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(142–44), but where there are tools, the correlation between ownership of them and
position on the “social scale” is self-evident (Mixter 1905, 235). More explicitly, Veblen
imagined a “peaceable savage,” “primitive,” “perhaps sedentary,” “ante-predatory”
phase of culture where material classlessness reigns ([1899] 1998, 6–7, 16–21, 219,
351). But with the phase of “economic surplus” (20, 25, 205), perhaps even the earlier
phase of “barbarism” (3–8), come emulation and the regime of status. That the rich, not
the poor, set the standard, is likewise a given (104).
In his discussion of stratification according to material wealth, Rae only noted that
people differ in “vigor of mind and body, as well as skill” ([1834] 1964, 98) and in their
dispositions toward constructing instruments (129, 198–201). (When he added that
vanity sometimes aids the “accumulative principle” (325), I think he meant that for-
tunes begin with somebody’s working hard.) Very roughly put, Veblen’s much fuller der-
ivation of specifically pecuniary emulation relies on the concepts of predation, trophies,
exploit, esteem, and ownership ([1899] 1998, 22–34, 44, 73, 349). It may be worth men-
tioning that Bellamy ([1887] 1917) assumed that rank and emulation are here to stay
(68, 96–98, 123–31, 164–65, 170–71, 187–88, 197–98, 222, 259), but, by assuming
material nonscarcity and moral improvement, eliminated its pecuniary variety from his
utopia.
Moot and controversial questions remain, of course, as to the depth of Veblen’s
explanatory chain and his views on heredity and human nature, but his support of the
premises of struggle within scarcity ([1899] 1998, 14, 24–25, 113, 220; Rae [1834] 1964,
96–97, 323–24) and of natural selection/elimination theory (13, 15, 188–89, 212, 215,
225, 246, 335) is beyond doubt. At any rate, the search for explanations of invidious
pecuniary comparison remains topical. Michael Boyles and Rick Tilman, for instance,
asked whether evolutionary theory (as sociobiology), has illuminated the “genesis of . . .
power, class, and status” (1993, 1210–11). In spite of many attempts to extend the expla-
nation back to Darwinian reproductive success, they find in the negative, but the ques-
tion is on the table.9
During the late 1890s sexual selection theory was definitely on the table. Alfred
Russel Wallace, Darwin, Thomas H. Huxley, and many others had debated it for years
(Cronin 1991). In 1896 George Santayana reported that “[o]f late we have even learned
that the forms of many animals are due to the survival by sexual selection of the colours
and forms most attractive to the eye” (5). Rae’s editor Charles Mixter devoted a footnote
to the fact that Rae’s remarks on the indirect utility of female dress were “written before
the discovery of the principle of sexual selection” (1905, 252). And Veblen’s silence on
sexual selection is all the more puzzling because Bellamy, who influenced him,
embraced it explicitly, even audaciously: women’s power to mold men is Godly, improv-
ing within a mere three generations their efficacy, morality, and even their propensity
for intergenerational justice, while selecting against their instincts for pecuniary prow-
ess ([1887] 1917, 267–70). At any rate, one yearns to listen in on a conversation between
Darwin and Veblen on their common topic: competition, conspicuousness, decoration,
antics, status, and desirability.
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Geoffrey Hodgson has recently noted the parallels between Veblen’s idea of con-
spicuous waste and the “‘costly’ signaling between animals . . . to indicate, for example,
fitness and availability to mate”; he referred to Amotz Zahavi and Ashivag Zahavi’s
handicap principle—that costliness proves fitness (1997)—but did not explicitly mention
sexual selection (1998, 188–89, 194). He is also one who is asking questions of the
heritability of behavior-guiding mechanisms (2001), suggesting that “habits,” whether as
feelings or institutions, are at least partly in human nature. Another is Edward
Fullbrook (1998), whose explanatory chain leads to the nature of human psychology,
positing, albeit without reference to evolution, an intentional theory of mind and our
“existential lack.”
Rae and Veblen gave us germs of the view that conspicuous consumption is costly
for the individual in the way Darwin’s peacocks’ tails and deer’s antlers were, that it is
noncontributory, superfluous (Veblen [1899] 1998, 63, 155–56), or even detrimental to
basic survival, and that it is hurtful and wasteful for (yet strangely tolerated by) society; in
terms of natural selection, it makes little sense. But it exists and persists and thus, in the
spirit of human ethology, the question must be faced: Is it an adaptation? Is it sexually,
or otherwise socially, selected, thus indirectly enhancing reproductive success? For Rae
it met one criterion of adaptations, namely human universality ([1834] 1964, 283, 129),
and the case could be made that for Veblen, this is true once the predatory, pecuniary
stage of society has been reached. For newer work on the possible adaptiveness of status
consumption see Low and Heinen 1993, Buss 1994, Boone 1998, Hrdy 1999, Morrison
1999, Miller 2000, and Jackson 2002.
Insatiability
Pertinent to both equitable distribution and environmental quality is Veblen’s
insight that, because it is motivated by relative standing (status, rank, superiority), con-
sumption will increase unlimitedly. His exposition is masterful and well-known:
Because we are comparing ourselves with each other, it is not enough to reach the “nor-
mal pecuniary standard of the community.” Our “chronic dissatisfaction” cries for an
increasing “pecuniary interval” between us and others, and the “present pecuniary stan-
dard is the point of departure for a fresh increase of wealth” ([1899] 1998, 31, 90; Daly
1974; Scitovsky 1976). For Veblen, assuming a certain surplus above subsistence (20,
25), such an increase is realistic. But no matter how high or fairly distributed the “com-
munity’s wealth, . . . the desire for wealth can scarcely be satiated. . . . If, as is sometimes
assumed, the incentive to accumulation were the want of subsistence or of physical com-
fort, then the aggregate economic wants of a community might conceivably be satisfied
at some point in the advance of industrial efficiency”; but since the “ground” of this
“race for reputability” is “invidious comparison, no approach to a definitive attainment
is possible” (32). Because the “need of conspicuous waste” is emulative, then despite
“increased industrial efficiency” we don’t work less but consume more (see Schor 1992);
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the “increment of output” to meet emulative consumption is thus “indefinitely
expansible” (110–11, 102). The sky is the limit.10
Rae started but did not finish this argument. He began with the point that the exact
form of a particular person’s “manifestation of . . . luxury” depends on his tempera-
ment: those leaning toward benevolent affection are extravagant in “sumptuous enter-
tainments, and luxuries of the table,” while those given to the intellectual powers
indulge in “expensive buildings and decorations” ([1834] 1964, 279). In the altruisti-
cally inclined, furthermore, vanity gets steered toward frugality and thus toward “the
welfare of others” and posterity, a combination bestowing great esteem (120–28). This
recalls Veblen’s jibe at charitable work, wherein he perceived the presence of “extrane-
ous motives” ([1899] 1998, 339–40); as well, his taxonomy of exhibitions of “reputable
waste” is fuller than Rae’s, covering architecture, art, philanthropy, and leisure in the
form of sports, spelling ability, and the knowledge of occult sciences (65, 259–63,
338–43, 363–67, 394–99).11
Rae then quoted Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu in support of the
observation that vanity consumption increases with urbanity, population density, and
anonymity, because “in the country, everyone is known” and deception impossible
([1834] 1964, 280). Correspondingly, Veblen noted that country gossip assures that
“everybody’s pecuniary status is known to everybody else”; in the country “home com-
forts and the leisure indulged in” count as consumption, but in the town or city, “adver-
tisement” is far more necessary ([1899] 1998, 88–89). Contrasting examples are given by
Knut Hamsun ([1917] 1978, 230–34, 285, 324–27). Rae also touchingly believed that
city people have few options but consumption, whereas a country person has the ability
and means to make or improve “instruments” like mending a fence, cultivating a plot,
or “procuring food for his cow or his pig” (280).
Further following Montesquieu, where we are surrounded by numerous strangers,
“vanity redoubles, because there are greater hopes of success. As luxury inspires these
hopes, each man assumes the marks of a superior condition. But, by endeavoring thus at
distinction, every one becomes equal and distinction ceases: as all are desirous of
respect, nobody is regarded” (Rae [1834] 1964, 280). The competitive spiral begins
anew at this higher absolute level. Again, the “industry employed for luxuries” is “in
vain. . . . It gives no absolute enjoyment, it is all relative; as much as one is raised by it,
another is depressed, the superiority of one man being here equivalent to the inferiority
of another” (290).
This insatiability is banal in its role as assumption in neoclassical economics. But
Veblen, and Rae with Montesquieu’s help, looked behind the empirical fact of it, again
using pecuniary emulation and vanity to explain it. For justice, environmentalism, and
even psychological health, this fact—that happiness by means of material wealth is rela-
tive rather than absolute—is however not banal but bad news. The observed upward spi-
ral has led many authors to bemoan the “irrationality” of the consumption “rat-race,”
“treadmill,” “zero-sum game,” “religion,” and so on (Duesenberry 1949; Easterlin 1973,
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9–10; Scitovsky 1976, 107–20; Leiss 1976, 7, 9, 29, 85, 100, 127; Schor 1992, 49,
122–25; Frank 1985, 17–30, 1999, 67–73, 111). However, if status seeking is a given,
this behavior in the realm of wealth is no more irrational than that of a team’s wanting
to top the standings. The fact that, seen as a whole, the standings are a zero-sum game is
irrelevant.
Rae did not make the point in so many words. He did say, however, that “[p]eople
who regard appearances . . . can scarce expect that any improvement will materially
diminish their yearly outlay for dress, for themselves or families” ([1834] 1964, 287).
Bear in mind that improvement, successful efforts of invention, and increase in the
facility of production (289) are Rae’s terms for Veblen’s industrial efficiency ([1899]
1998, 32, 110, 241). This is because lower prices do not lower the “proportion of their
revenues” that people spend to maintain their “rank”; if improvement cuts prices by
half, then “the quantity carried about must be doubled, or recourse must be had to some
other material” (287). Rae quoted Adam Smith: “When by improvements in the pro-
ductive powers of manufacturing art and industry, the expense of any one dress comes
to be very moderate, . . . the rich . . . will naturally endeavor to . . . distinguish themselves
. . . by the multitude and variety of their dresses” (270). Finally, “[s]hould the best flannel
cost only two pence a yard, it would still be worn by all who now wear it, and by many
who do not” (287). Other things, or more of the same, get consumed.
Regarding goods, though, that are “beyond the reach of vanity,” greater efficiency
in their production is “really felt”; iron, quarrying stone, bricks, flour, soap, glass,
leather, and fabrics are thus subject to “real improvement” (Rae [1834] 1964, 289).
When cheapness renders things less suitable in showing superiority, yet their use
remains necessary, either “a greater quantity” is necessary, or else one must only “con-
sume them when they are most scarce,” as with green peas at Christmas or fish from very
far away (287). For Rae, to be sure, most commodities exhibit a certain “strife between
the two principles” of “vanity,” or “luxury,” and “utility” (286, 272, 310), equivalent to
Veblen’s caveat that consumable goods “may be useful and wasteful both,” and “gener-
ally show the two elements in combination” ([1899] 1998, 100; Hamilton 1989). How-
ever, for goods apt to be used conspicuously, like “articles of furniture, of diet, and the
equipage SUVs, Mercedes (Joplin 1970) of the rich,” a “greater or less part of the
effects of improvement, is absorbed by vanity in them all, and consequently lost” (288),
just as for Veblen “pecuniary emulation . . . stands ready to absorb any increase in the
community’s industrial efficiency” (110–11).12 Rae’s “lost” also reminds one of
Veblen’s belief that fully half the monetarily measured economy is wasted and has noth-
ing to do with the “collective good” ([1914] 1964, 193, 344, 350; [1899] 1998, 226–31).
Fashion
Veblen makes the questionable assertion that “[n]o explanation at all has hitherto
been offered of the phenomenon of changing fashions” ([1899] 1998, 173). Indeed,
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Marshall for instance seems to have contented himself with condemning—because of its
wastefulness—“the baneful influence through almost every rank of society” of “the evil
dominion of the wanton vagaries of fashion” ([1890] 1916, 288, 88). Like many after
him (Foley 1893, 465, 466; Veblen [1899] 1998, 152–53; Scitovsky 1976, 137–38,
282–83), Marshall also fell back on the nonexplanatory observation that we want “vari-
ety for its own sake” (86). But he made a good start by saying that variety in dress has
both “natural” and “conventional” causes—roughly Veblen’s “naïve” versus “honorific”
consumption (25, 70–74, 102–03)—and he hints that variety in housing may have to do
with the fact that it gives both “shelter” and “social distinction” (87–88; Veblen [1894]
1997).
For Rae, too, fashion covers food, jewelry, precious metals, tattoos, clothes, feasts,
and much else ([1834] 1964, 268–78) and is “in a state of ceaseless revolution” (271).
The lace and colors of the country girl’s bonnet are, again in an example of Storch’s,
“foreign to its utility” (271). The pleasure of the thing itself—its beauty or taste or tex-
ture—is “entirely distinct” from the pleasure deriving from its “rarity.” Yes, the orna-
ments and sculptures in the dwellings of the rich really are beautiful, but, mainly, they
are displayed (272–74). The exact mixture of “necessaries and conveniences” on one
hand, and luxuries on the other, varies between the social classes (275). The pattern of
most of Rae’s examples is that invention and efficiency change both the nature and
price of the supply, but the need for superiority stays, and therefore whatever serves this
need must change (278).
Caroline Foley (1893) began similarly to Veblen by noting that “a residuum of vari-
ableness in wants remains not accounted for” in the fashion literature (461), and
although she has understanding for its therefore being called “irrational,” she is sure
that it is not: “An errant instinct obtruding into the lines of motivated conduct is not
unnaturally judged to be irrational, and the philosophy that identified the irrational
with the shifting and impermanent has not died out since the day when it was put into
the mouth of Nature attacking Fashion” (460). To relocate fashion in the realm of the
rational, she explained it first by “love of distinction, imitation, and the effort after
equalisation” (461). The motive for “social distinction” is “emulous within each caste,
or class, or smaller group” (465, 463); “rainments” are “social symbols” just as for
Veblen “no line of consumption” shows the canon of waste more aptly than “expendi-
ture on dress” ([1899] 1998, 167). Then there is the motive for “change”—the variety,
novelty, and waste implied in Shakespeare’s “The fashion wears out more apparel than
the man” (465, 466). Fashion cannot be defined as either “necessaries, comforts, or lux-
uries, but rather as a coefficient of any of these,” greatest when “nature ceases to be
preemptory” (462), as when, in Veblen, the “niggardliness of nature” loses its strictness
(24).
Her survey of the literature quoted, among others, Rae himself, Joseph Fourier’s
characterization of fashion as “la passion papillonne,” Thomas Macaulay, Storch, and
John Locke on snob effects and Veblen effects, Jean-Baptiste Say on “unreal wants,”
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Henri Baudrillart on four types of luxury (de luxe again, “not indispensable”), Darwin on
the universality of fashion, and John Taylor, “the water poet,” on exhaustion, overuse,
and nonsustainability (1893, 461, 462, 463, 466, 468). Finally, she noted that dress
must be “inconvenient” (467; Veblen [1899] 1998, 172), a point much more fully elabo-
rated by Veblen in his examples of the walking stick (171, 265), the corset (149, 172),
the high heel shoe, “feminine bonnets,” and “the man’s high hat” (171)—again, being
simultaneously ill clad and well dressed (168; Rae [1834] 1964, 201, 203, 307). Veblen’s
inconvenience and discomfort show leisure and ability to pay by showing that one is
“incapable of useful effort” (148–49, 182–83). Insofar as fashion and much other visible
consumption are thus successfully explained by distinction or status, much consump-
tion literature of the twentieth century here falls behind Veblen, Foley, and Rae in
regarding it as irrational.13
Taste
Both Rae and Veblen applied two criteria for beauty or taste. Rae’s first is that of
the “beauties of feature or form . . . quite independent of their cost,” which adhere to
their simplicity or utility, like fabrics protective against heat and cold, the clean linen of
the peasant, flowers, and even art works that are “well-executed,” although here the bor-
der to beauty based on cost and vanity is hard to determine; this aesthetic experience is
“real enjoyment” ([1834] 1964, 272–73, 282). But this standard of “real beauty” loses
out in real life against a second one based on expensiveness (283), and many objects,
such as “pearls, as ornaments, probably derive nearly their whole value from their scar-
city” (286), an opinion echoed exactly by Veblen with the examples of gold and gems
([1899] 1998, 129, 130). For “dresses worn in public,” for example, cheapness detracts
from beauty (Rae, 289, 309), and very generally, “enjoyment” lies in “opulence”
(270–71).
Similarly, Veblen’s first category is of “popular taste” ([1899] 1998, 138), “mid-
dle-class tastes” (82, 138), “unsophisticated . . . intrinsic beauty” (128–30), of an
“untrained sense” (149), and “beauty in the naïve sense” (150); these “underlying norms
of taste are of very ancient growth, probably far antedating the advent of the pecuniary
institutions that are here under discussion” (150–51). He spoke of a “taste for effective
work” and a “distaste for futile effort” (15; [1914] 1964, 1). By this criterion beautiful
things are “inexpensive” and straightforwardly suggest their serviceability ([1899] 1998,
151) and “the generic” (153). There is, however, an inherent “antagonism” between
“native taste” in what is “beautiful or becoming,” which abhors wastefulness, and the
taste that has developed due to the “requirement of conspicuous waste” showing leisure
and wealth (176–77). This “pecuniary and cultural beauty” guided by the “canon of
pecuniary decency” may not be “bona fide” (149), but, as in Rae, it wins out over the
simpler, “decorative and mundificatory character” of household beauty, which yields to
the standard of “wasted effort” (82; Gilman 1999, 708). A pre-existing “popular sense of
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beauty or serviceability” is at least supplemented by the sense of beauty depending
“closely upon the expensiveness of the articles” (126–30). The doctrine is that of “pecu-
niary beauty” (133, 145, 153–54, 178).14
However, there are limits. For Rae, following the example of the “Roman moralists
and satirists,” just as the “benevolent affections” see vanity’s “hurtfulness,” the “intellec-
tual powers” represent vain expenditures as “absurd”—like Veblen’s “inanities” and
“absurdities” ([1899] 1998, 94, 163); both “diminish the sway of this passion” ([1834]
1964, 269, 275). Unlike Veblen, he reserved the term “invidious” for that which goes
too far—“to run to expenses which others cannot follow” or make others feel “too much
outshone” (282). There are two lines, above one of which lies “acknowledged extrava-
gance,” and below the other of which lies “sordid parsimony” (282). This top end of
extravagance is also aesthetically displeasing: a “very costly dress” reveals “want of taste”;
or, a “disagreeable feeling” is caused by “the view of a profuse expenditure of animal
power, bringing about only a small effect”—in other words, an efficiency criterion of
beauty (283). For Veblen our conflicting aesthetic results from the instinct of workman-
ship, which has “an abiding sense of the odiousness and aesthetic impossibility of what
is obviously futile” (93) and sees that “advertisements” or displays can be “cruder,” as
with a “loud dress” (186–87). Indeed, perhaps his ubiquitous concept of “decency”
implies that a certain restraint is the mark of perfection in evidencing wealth through
taste. At any rate, both writers offer us incipient objective criteria of beauty, in contrast,
for example, to the subjectivism of George Santayana ([1896] 1988), and tying aesthetics
and waste together is an idea with potential.
The Greater Good
Rae’s example of too much horsepower claims the ugliness of disproportionality
and sheer waste, the “absurdity” detected in it by the intellectual powers. This sense of
absurdity is of course pervasive in Veblen. But I suggest that for him the outcome of this
tension between popular taste and the “instinct of workmanship” on one hand ([1899]
1998, 93, 99, 158; [1914] 1964), and the canon of conspicuous, “honorific” waste on
the other ([1899] 1998, 91–101, 140, 159, 259) is also very sad. The “régime of status”
and waste has superceded that of “charity,” “good-fellowship,” and “solidarity”—of
“non-invidiousness” (334–38, 218–21). Veblen’s deliciously ambiguous disclaimer that
he is using the term “waste” in any but a technical sense (97–101) is more than amusing.
Emulation is hurtful, a view supported by Nils Gilman’s (1999, 702–04) treatment of
Veblen’s “vitalism.”
Again, just as Rae upheld “improvement and accumulation” ([1834] 1964, 285,
312), Veblen upheld workmanship, efficiency, industry, serviceability, and the generi-
cally humanly useful ([1899] 1998, 154, 219, 259, 334; 1914, 154–55). The “instinct of
workmanship” favors “productive efficiency” and “whatever is of human use” ([1899]
1998, 93). This is “production” as opposed to “acquisition,” the “industrial” as opposed
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to the “pecuniary,” or the “non-invidious” as opposed to the “invidious”; the former
serve the “collective interest” through workmanship and “industrial efficiency” (99,
208–09, 227, 342; Mixter 1902) while the latter are “business.” The leisure class is
defined as the “propertied non-industrial” class, and so-called “industrial captaincy”
exposes itself as merely predatory, astute, financial, and mercantile, concerned only with
ownership (209, 230–31). Like Rae, for whom business was “representing things to be
other than what they are” and “is so much dead loss to the community” ([1834] 1964,
312, 326), Veblen saw that it is only the contrasting noninvidious, industrial “feature of
human nature” that makes “saving” (accumulation for the future) possible, however
high the wages of the working classes might be (91; Duesenberry 1949).
Rae, to be sure, found a pinch of social benefit in vanity insofar as the rich man’s
monuments to himself exhibit “substantial . . . materials and workmanship” and thus
“durability,” and men of public affairs both should and do “pay . . . attention to the con-
cerns of a distant futurity” through durable public works ([1834] 1964, 283–84). How-
ever, he quoted Smith’s opinion that from the point of view of vanity small public
works, “having nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility,” would appear
merely “mean and paltry” (284). For Veblen, too, architectural good works arise from
surviving “non-invidious interests” but must also flatter the donor by showing some dec-
orative, expensive “honorific waste” ([1899] 1998, 348–49). The theme that small useful
works get neglected was developed by Paulette Olson (1998, “My Dam Is Bigger Than
Yours”) in her cogent application of conspicuous consumption theory to nations and
their “interests of the collective good fame” (Veblen, 227). As shown in the sections on
waste, Rae’s main thrust is that the common good lies in accumulation of capital, or
even economic growth, and that luxury, vanity, and dissipation thwart this (Rae, 318;
Edgell and Tilman 1991, 742).
Conclusions
Rae’s apex to his chapter “Of Luxury” is that “[t]o the loss thus occasioned by vanity
the term dissipation may be applied. Its amount cannot . . . be easily ascertained, nor is it
necessary for our purpose that it should. It is sufficient to observe, that, in all societies
which have hitherto existed, it has been considerable; and that it seems to be deter-
mined, in every society, by the strength of the selfish, and weakness of the intellectual
powers and benevolent affections; and, consequently, that it is inversely as the strength
of the accumulative principle” ([1834] 1964, 290).
To irrationalize, and thus perhaps trivialize, conspicuous consumption means to
ignore the nineteenth century contributions of John Rae and Thorstein Veblen. Their
sociology of relative standing, achieved through putting wealth into evidence, with its
attendant high social as well as personal cost as well as the corollary of inherently unlim-
ited consumption, is indispensable for even addressing the hoary problem of social ineq-
uity as well the newer one of high environmental impact. Future work must extend the
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explanatory chain, and in particular test the thesis that insatiable consumption behavior
could be, in the strict Darwinian sense, sexually and socially selected.
Notes
I first read of John Rae and Thorstein Veblen in Leibenstein 1950.
1. This John Rae is not the journalist of the same name, born in 1845, who wrote, for instance, a
biography of Adam Smith; nor is he John Rae, M.D., who wrote on his arctic explorations.
2. This is the reverse of today’s usage of “need” and “want.”
3. Thorstein Veblen divined our age of visibility run amok, of neon signs high above the tree-
tops, the single word FOOD as big as your house: “In order to impress . . . transient observers,
and to retain one’s self-complacency under their observation, the signature of one’s pecuniary
strength should be written in characters which he who runs can read” ([1899] 1998, 87).
4. Rae detached aptness for vanity consumption from the good itself, presaging a huge literature
on the social meaning of consumption (Baudrillard 1988; Leiss 1976; McCracken 1988;
Campbell 1995), but he does insist on the element of costliness.
5. Veblen’s perhaps puzzling emphasis on leisure as opposed to consumption—as witnessed by
the book’s title, its placement of the leisure chapter before that on consumption, by the con-
cept of “vicarious leisure” (59–66), as well as by the primacy of the “great economic law of
wasted effort” (83)—carries a fuller flavor than our present-day emphasis on material con-
sumption or, absurdly, money as such.
6. When Veblen used “generic,” was he arguing from the good of the species?
7. Another example is Alfred Marshall’s computation of the costs of luxury expenses for the
poor; these render “their wages . . . less than are practically necessary for efficiency,” i.e., for
their ability to work and reproduce, and this he even defines as “waste.” Just as Veblen said
that what starts out as wasteful becomes a “habitual expenditure” ([1899] 1998, 99), Marshall
said that things like tobacco, alcohol, and “fashionable dress” become “conventionally neces-
sary” and thus rational and nonwasteful after all ([1890] 1916, 70) .
8. Rae’s and Veblen’s examples suggest that some consumption acts are indeed purely ceremo-
nial or honorific, often even hurting the consumer or at least contributing nothing to his sur-
vival and comfort. In a contrasting view, Hamilton took eating caviar as an example of
something mainly ceremonial or honorific but having “some nutritional value” and showing
that “[b]oth aspects of behavior are always present” (1989, 1101; also Leiss 1976, 57–64, 101).
9. Wilson 1975, Alcock 1998, Chagnon and Irons 1979, Trivers 1985, Betzig et al. 1988,
Barkow 1989, etc.
10. For a contrary view see Hamilton 1973, who saw competitive consumption as socially condi-
tioned rather than deeply psychologically caused (201, 205) and therefore more amenable to
change, in which case wants are really finite. Expanding “levels of living” are “technology mak-
ing its own necessity” (205). Perhaps revealingly, his three examples of consumption—reliev-
ing a toothache, eating lunch, and fixing a flat tire (205)—come from the realm of basic,
perhaps nonsocial, at any rate nonstatus consumption. See also the work of Christer Sanne
(2002), for whom status signaling “does not presuppose commercial markers,” which are
“arbitrary” (285).
11. Zahavi and Zahavi 1997, Boone 1998, and Miller 2000 made this point about the altruistic
nature of much conspicuous spending and its nature as a biological adaptation.
12. In 400 pages Veblen broke his rule ([1899] 1998, x) against quotations and source citation
once, and that is here. The honor goes to John Stuart Mill—but of course without mention of
book or page—who said that “hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet
made have lightened the day’s toil of any human being” (Veblen, 111). For my part, honor
also goes to William Stanley Jevons ([1865] 1965). He saw the plausibility of thinking that
John Rae and Thorstein Veblen 783
more efficient use of coal will decrease its use (137), and indeed efficiency advances due to
invention were in his time being made; but “It is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that
the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is
the truth. . . . Every. . .improvement of the engine, when effected, does but accelerate anew
the consumption of coal” (140, 152–53).
13. In an overdue appreciation of Caroline Foley, Edward Fullbrook (1998) offered a demonstra-
tion that economics has not yet satisfactorily met her challenge of theoretically integrating
nonadditive, intersubjective demand (Rae [1834] 1964, 306–307).
14. Rick Tilman noted that “Veblen, contrary to his own functionalist aesthetic, studs his writ-
ings with latinates and mordant wit” (1985, 892). Combining Veblen’s broad theory of waste
with Geoffrey Miller’s applications of the theory of sexual selection (2000) could elucidate
this phenomenon.
References
Alcock, John. Animal Behavior. Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates, 1998.
Barkow, Jerome. Darwin, Sex, and Status: Biological Approaches to Mind and Culture. Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1989.
Baudrillard, Jean. The Consumption Society: Myths and Structures. London: Sage, 1988.
Bellamy, Edward. Looking Backward: 2000–1887. 1887. Reprint, Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1917.
Betzig, Laura, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, and Paul Turke, eds. Human Reproductive Behavior: A Darwinian Per-
spective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Boone, James L. III. “The Evolution of Magnaminity: When Is It Better to Give Than to Receive?” Human Na-
ture 9, no. 1 (1998): 1–12.
Boulding, Kenneth. “Income or Welfare.” The Review of Economic Studies 17 (1949–50): 77–86.
———. “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth.” In Toward a Steady-State Economy, edited by Herman E.
Daly. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973.
Boyles, Michael, and Rick Tilman. “Thorstein Veblen, Edward O. Wilson, and Sociobiology: An Interpreta-
tion.” Journal of Economic Issues 27 (1993): 1195–1218.
Brekke, K. A., Richard B. Howarth, and Karine Nyborg. “Status-Seeking and Material Affluence: Evaluating
the Hirsch Hypothesis.” Ecological Economics 45 (2003): 29–39.
Buss, David. The Evolution of Desire. New York: Basic Books, 1994.
Campbell, Colin. “The Sociology of Consumption.” In Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies, ed-
ited by Daniel Miller. London: Routledge, 1995.
Chagnon, Napoleon, and William Irons, eds. Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior. North Scituate,
Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1979.
Cronin, Helena. The Ant and the Peacock: Altruism and Sexual Selection from Darwin to Today. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991.
Cross, Gary. An All-Consuming Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
Daly, Herman E. “The Economics of the Steady State.” American Economic Review 64, no. 2 (1974): 15–21.
Daly, Herman E., and Clifford W. Cobb. For the Common Good. Boston: Beacon, 1989.
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. 1859. Reprint, London: Watts & Co.,
1950.
———. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 1871. Reprint, London: Gibson Square Books, 2003.
Dawkins, Richard. River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life. New York: Basic Books, 1994.
Debo, Angie. Oklahoma: Foot-Loose and Fancy-Free. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949.
Duesenberry, James S. Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1949.
Easterlin, Richard A. “Does Money Buy Happiness?” The Public Interest 30 (winter 1973): 1–10.
784 Blake Alcott
Edgell, Stephen, and Rick Tilman. “Veblen’s Intellectual Antecedents.” Journal of Economic Issues 23, no. 2
(1989): 1003–1027.
———. “John Rae and Thorstein Veblen on Conspicuous Consumption: A Neglected Intellectual Relation-
ship.” History of Political Economy 23, no. 4 (1991): 731–744.
Foley, Caroline A. “Fashion.” The Economic Review 5 (1893): 458–474.
Frank, Robert H. Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985.
———. Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess. New York: Free Press, 1999.
Fullbrook, Edward. “Caroline Foley and the Theory of Intersubjective Demand.” Journal of Economic Issues 32
(1998): 709–731.
Gans, C. “Efficiency, Effectiveness, Perfection, Optimization: Their Use in Understanding Vertebrate Evolu-
tion.” In Efficiency and Economy in Animal Physiology, edited by Robert W. Blake. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
Ghiselin, Michael. The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
Gilman, Nils. “Thorstein Veblen’s Neglected Feminism.” Journal of Economic Issues 33 (1999): 689–711.
Hamilton, David. “What Has Evolutionary Economics to Contribute to Consumption Theory?” Journal of Eco-
nomic Issues 7 (1973): 197–207.
———. “Veblen as the First Professor of Marketing Science.” Journal of Economic Issues 23 (1989): 1097–1103.
Hamsun, Knut. Segen der Erde (Markens grøde). 1917. Reprint, München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag/List,
1978.
Hobson, John Atkinson. Wealth and Life: A Study in Values. London: Macmillan, 1929.
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. “Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class and the Genesis of Evolutionary Economics.” In
The Founding of Institutional Economics: The Leisure Class and Sovereignty, edited by Warren J. Samuels. Lon-
don: Routledge, 1998.
———. “Darwin, Veblen, and the Problem of Causality in Economics.” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23
(2001): 385–423.
Hrdy, Sarah Blaffer. Mother Nature: A History of Mothers, Infants, and Natural Selection. New York: Pantheon,
1999.
Jackson, Tim. “Evolutionary Psychology in Ecological Economics: Consilience, Consumption, and Content-
ment.” Ecological Economics 41 (2002): 289–303.
Jackson, Tim, and N. Marks. “Consumption, Sustainable Welfare and Human Needs—With Reference to UK
Expenditure Patterns 1954–94.” Ecological Economics 28 (1999): 421–442.
Jevons, William Stanley. The Coal Question. 1865. Reprint, New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965.
Joplin, Janis. “Lord, Won’t You Buy Me a Mercedes Benz?” Pearl, 1970.
Keynes, John Maynard. “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren.” In Collected Writings, Vol. IX, Essays in
Persuasion. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1971–73. Originally published in 1930.
Leibenstein, Harvey. “Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 64 (1950): 183–207.
Leiss, William. The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the Problem of Needs and Commodities. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1976.
Low, Bobbi S., and Joel T. Heinen. “Population, Resources, and Environment: Implications of Human Behav-
ioral Ecology for Conservation.” Population and Environment 15, no. 1 (1993): 7–42.
McAdams, Richard H. “Relative Preferences.” The Yale Law Journal 102, no. 1 (1992): 1–104.
McCracken, Grant. Culture and Consumption. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1988.
Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics. 1890. Reprint, London: Macmillan, 1916.
Miller, Geoffrey. The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature. New York:
Doubleday, 2000.
Mixter, Charles W. “Böhm-Bawerk on Rae.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 16 (1902): 385–412.
———. The Sociological Theory of Capital: Being a Complete Reprint of the New Principles of Political Economy, 1834, by
John Rae, M:A. New York & London: Macmillan, 1905.
Morrison, Reg. The Spirit in the Gene. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999.
John Rae and Thorstein Veblen 785
Olson, Paulette. “My Dam Is Bigger than Yours: Emulation in Global Capitalism.” In Thorstein Veblen in the
Twenty-first Century, edited by Doug Brown. Cheltenham, U.K.: Elgar, 1998.
Orr, David W. “The Ecology of Giving and Consuming.” In Consuming Desires: Consumption, Culture, and the
Pursuit of Happiness, edited by Roger Rosenblatt. Washington: Island, 1999.
Rae, John. Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy: Exposing the Fallacies of the System of
Free Trade, and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the “Wealth of Nations.” 1834. Reprint, New York: Au-
gustus M. Kelley, 1964.
Sanne, Christer. “Willing Consumers—or Locked In? Policies for a Sustainable Consumption.” Ecological Eco-
nomics 42 (2002): 273–287.
Santayana, George. The Sense of Beauty. 1896. Reprint, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
Schor, Juliet. The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure. New York: Basic Books, 1992.
Schumacher, Ernst Friedrich. Small Is Beautiful. Point Roberts, Wash.: Hartley & Marks, 1999.
Scitovsky, Tibor. The Joyless Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Spengler, Joseph J. “John Rae on Economic Development: A Note.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 73 (1959):
393–406.
Tilman, Rick. “The Utopian Vision of Bellamy and Veblen.” Journal of Economic Issues 19, no. 2 (1985):
879–898.
Trivers, Robert. Social Evolution. Menlo Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1985.
Veblen, Thorstein. “The Economic Theory of Woman’s Dress.” In Culture, Social Norms and Economics, Vol. I,
edited by Mark Casson. Cheltenham, U.K.: Elgar, 1997. Originally published in 1894.
———. The Theory of the Leisure Class. 1899. Reprint, Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1998.
———. The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts. 1914. Reprint, New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1964.
———. Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America. 1923. Reprint, New York:
Augustus M. Kelley, 1964.
Wilson, Edward O. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975.






Gretenweg 4, CH 8038 Zurich, Switzerland
Received 21 July 2004; received in revised form 11 February 2005; accepted 2 March 2005Abstract
In The Coal Question William Stanley Jevons [Jevons, W.S., 1865/1965. The Coal Question: an Inquiry Concerning the
Progress of the Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal-mines. 3rd edition 1905, Ed. A.W. Flux. Augustus M.
Kelley, New York.] maintained that technological efficiency gains—specifically the more beconomicalQ use of coal in
engines doing mechanical work—actually increased the overall consumption of coal, iron, and other resources, rather than
bsavingQ them, as many claimed. Twentieth-century economic growth theory also sees technological change as the main
cause of increased production and consumption. In contrast, some ecologically-oriented economists and practically all
governments, green political parties and NGOs believe that efficiency gains lower consumption and negative environmental
impact. Others doubt this defficiency strategyT towards sustainability, holding that efficiency gains dreboundT or even
dbackfireT in pursuing this goal, causing higher production and consumption. Because many environmental problems
demand rapid and clear policy recommendations, this issue deserves high priority in ecological economics. If Jevons is
right, efficiency policies are counter-productive, and business-as-usual efficiency gains must be compensated for with
physical caps like quotas or rationing.
D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The paper briefly presents today’s dreboundT debate
and refers to the relevant literature (Section 2). It then
goes into Jevons’ (1865) theoretical arguments (Sec-
tion 3), his analogy with the employment effects of
increased labor efficiency (Section 4), and his empir-
ical arguments (Section 5). Open questions in today’s0921-8009/$ - see front matter D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.03.020
E-mail address: blakeley@bluewin.ch.debate are how to reconcile the environmental effi-
ciency strategy with growth theory, whether empirical
or theoretical work is more urgent, how to integrate
consumer behavior into a formal rebound theory, and
why the matter is dparadoxicalT (Section 6). The con-
clusion (Section 7) is that since greater efficiency,
ceteris paribus and given latent demand, must raise,
not lower, environmental impact, efficiency policies
are wrong.
Throughout defficiencyT denotes the ratio of physi-
cal inputs to physical outputs—rather than to54 (2005) 9–21
B. Alcott / Ecological Economics 54 (2005) 9–2110dservicesT, dunits of consumptionT, ‘economic activity’,
or monetary gross product.1 Furthermore, it means
technological changes rather than institutional or or-
ganizational ones which lower other kinds of input
like time and human effort per unit of output.2
dConsumptionT means the using up rather than the
duseT of resources (Boulding, 1949; Princen, 1999,
p. 355) and covers pollution as well as resource
destruction.3 A further assumption is that consump-
tion is proportional to environmental impact as under-
stood in the I =PAT equation (impact a function of
population, affluence, and technology). No mention is
made of the capital and junking costs of efficiency
improvements themselves, and the problem of com-
paring outputs over time (paper letters to e-mail, or
horse to plane) is ignored.2. The current rebound debate
Although previous writers like Hotelling (1931, p.
64) and Domar (1962, p. 605) noted that efficiency,
sales, and resource use rise hand in hand, the present
debate was re-opened by Brookes (1979) and Khaz-
zoom (1980) and continued by Lovins (1988), Saun-
ders (1992, 2000), Schipper and Meyers (1992),
Howarth (1997), Wirl (1997), Schipper and Grubb
(2000), Brookes (2000), and Binswanger (2001). Re-
garding household appliances and explicitly assuming
positive price elasticity of demand,4 Khazzoom’s in-1 I believe embodied energy, recycling, and product durability are
subsumable under either technological or dconsumerT efficiency, and
that both the sufficiency strategy of doing without some affluence
and the ddecouplingT of services from input are logically separate
issues.
3 The debatable suggestion here is sink problems are reducible to
source problems: Bad water, air, soil, food, and space would be
simply good water, air, soil, food, and space used up. Even green-
house gases would use up the dgoodT of a life-supporting climate.
Pollution, degradation, assimilation, degeneration, and dwasteT
could be parsimoniously defined in terms of consumption.
4 In the debate, price elasticity of supply is universally ignored
(Schipper and Grubb, 2000, p. 369).
2 For example, economies of scale, trade, education, legal secu-
rity, property rights, low transaction costs, Taylorite factory-floor
measures, management hierarchies, etc. One writer indeed defines
rebound as b. . .the overall effects of technical, organisational, and
social progress which increase the efficiency of the economy and
give room for more consumptionQ (Sanne, 2000, p. 494; also
Moezzi, 2000).sight was that b. . .changes in appliance efficiency
have a price content. . .. [W]ith increased productivity
comes a decline in the effective price of commodities,
and that in the face of lower effective prices, demand
does not remain stagnant. . .but tends to increaseQ
(Khazzoom, 1980, pp. 22, 23). For example, a more
fuel-efficient car enables one to drive more.5 This
universally acknowledged phenomenon is called
dreboundT (or feedback, take-back, snap back, or re-
spending). A distinction is made between the some-
what measurable ddirectT, dmicroT, or downT rebound
effect for goods and services produced more efficient-
ly and the elusive dindirectT, dsecondaryT, deconomy-
wideT or dequilibriumT rebound effects concerning all
other goods and services, present and future, using the
same inputs.
To define it one needs the notion of engineering
savings. This is the difference between two ratios, the
first stating energy/material input per unit of product or
service before, the second after, a technologically
achieved lowering of input per unit output. Multiplying
pre-change demand times this percentage difference
yields a physical quantity: when car kilometers and
tons of steel can be had for 20% less energy input than
before, then 0.20 times the amount previously con-
sumed yields the real amount of energy that could be
saved. Such gains immediately lower consumption of
inputs of material and energy for these outputs; but by
both doing more and becoming cheaper, demand for
them in turn increases, and output or consumption rise
again. If this demand rise is large enough more people
consume more; no dsavingsT really occur, and we have
a paradox. The environmental efficiency strategy—
lowering the dTT factor in the I=PAT equation in
hopes of thereby lowering dIT—must come to terms
with this paradox, first identified as such by Jevons.
Rebound analysis thus shows that holding demand
constant is gratuitous. The dsavingsT is theoretical
only, because lower costs heighten demand.
dReboundT is nevertheless defined as the ratio between
the engineering savings in percent and new and old
quantities of units consumed, corrected for the effi-
ciency change. If the ratio of post-change demand5 One concise version is that after efficiency gains b. . .the amount
of product or service usually does not stay the same. Because the
equipment becomesmore energy efficient, the cost per unit of product
or service. . .falls which, in turn, increases the demand for the product
or serviceQ (Binswanger, 2001, p. 120; also Howarth, 1997, p. 2).
B. Alcott / Ecological Economics 54 (2005) 9–21 11times the post-change input–output ratio to pre-
change demand times the pre-change input–output
ratio is greater than 1, one speaks of dbackfireT or
dboomerangT (Khazzoom, 1980, p. 23; Wirl, 1997, pp.
28–29; Saunders, 2000, pp. 439–40). In judging
rebound’s size some bank on empirical study while
others focus on theory.6 Both sides abandon pure
empiricism, however, by claiming that after a rise in
efficiency absolute consumption is higher than, or
lower than, it would have been otherwise, i.e. without
the efficiency change (Khazzoom, 1980, pp. 22, 31;
Brookes, 2000, p. 356; Howarth, 1997, p. 3; Schipper
andGrubb, 2000, p. 370; Moezzi, 2000, pp. 525–267).6 Empirically measured rebounds range from less than 1% to
several hundred percent, but never zero or less than zero (Khaz-
zoom, 1989, p. 158; Greene, 1992, pp. 136–137; Wirl, 1997, p. 46;
Greene et al., 1999, p. 27; Greening et al., 2000, p. 392; Berkout et
al., 2000, p. 431). Some call them insignificant (Lovins, 1988;
Schipper and Grubb, 2000; Howarth, 1997; Greening et al.,
2000), others significant (Khazzoom, 1987, 1989; Brookes, 1979,
1990, 2000; Greenhalgh, 1990; Greene, 1992; Saunders, 1992,
2000; Sanne, 2000, 2002). Others ignore rebound while asserting
or implying that efficiency is environmentally advisable (Stern et
al., 1985; Schmidheiny, 1992, pp. 35–36, 40–41; Goodland, 1992,
p. 10; Mikesell, 1992, p. 87; Holdren, 1992, p. 42; von Weizsa¨cker
et al., 1997; Vincent and Panayotou, 1997).
7 Schipper and Grubb’s formal presentation: dWe define benergy
savingsQ as the product of a future activity level and the difference
between the energy intensity at that time compared to the present
level. If E is the energy use for a particular activity, then: E =A I,
(1) where A is the level of activity and I the corresponding intensity.
After energy saving is implemented, A changes to AV and I to IV, and
the new energy use is EV=AV IV. (2) If IV is less than I, energy
saved is AV (I IV). [A (I IV) would be my dengineering
savingsT.] But EV might be larger than E because over the time
that I fell to IV, A grew by a greater relative amount to AV. Now, the
decline in I itself could cause an increase in AV to AW, so that
EW= IWAW. We shall look for a rise in AV relative to incomes or
output if I falls as a sign of an important feedback effect or
structural change bcausedQ by lower energy intensities or costsT
(p. 369). In this formulation the term denergy savedT assumes either
that AV is less than A or that if it is greater than A, it is nevertheless
not high enough to boost EV above E. Furthermore, if I correctly
understand dA grew by a greater relative amountT, their own position
is that the ddecline in I itselfT causes A to fall dby a greater relative
amount toT Aj, yielding an Ej smaller than E. They accurately
portray the dbackfireT position thus: d If saving energy is to lead to
greater, not less energy use than otherwise, then either. . . the
activities and output for which the savings were made must increase
by more than the savings decreased energy use of the overall mix of
output must evolve in a two way towards greater, not lower uses
than otherwiseT(Schipper and Grubb, 2000, p. 383).3. Jevons’ theoretical view
The first chapter of Jevons’ much-cited book
(1865, to which all page citations hereafter refer)
bears the title bThe Opinions of Previous Writers.Q
Taking this to heart, what exactly did Jevons say? His
460-page argument is unequivocally for backfire. His
concern not only for England’s material and intellec-
tual prosperity, but also for posterity, prompts his
question of the coal supply’s duration. Since coal is
progress, and it will eventually run out, his answer is
pessimistically bittersweet (pp. 11–13, 136, 156, 200–
201, 274, 460). His theoretical argument that coal-
efficiency heightens coal consumption relies on the
concepts of profitability (Chs. VII, VI, IX), new
inventions and uses (Chs. VI, VII), and consumer
behavior (Introduction, Chs. IX, X). He also briefly
offers the analogy that labor efficiency causes higher
levels of employment (p. 140). His detailed but nec-
essarily indecisive empirical argument correlates effi-
ciency increases and consumption increases (pp. 145–
154, 386–391, Chs. XI and XII).
3.1. Almighty coal
His Frontispiece is from Adam Smith: bThe pro-
gressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty
state to all the different orders of society; the station-
ary is dull; the declining melancholy.Q He embraced
the progressive state for its civilization, amelioration
of society, international power, and material wealth
(pp. 33, 232, 454–460; Ch. VI) and knew it depended
on coal (pp. 1–3, 9, 37, 274–76). Without coal fuel
bwe are thrown back into the laborious poverty of
early times;Q to not use the fuel blavishly and boldlyQ
means bsafe smallness, . . .dullness and degeneration,Q
a stationary period bdevoid of intellectual nobilityQ
(pp. 2, 459, 456–457). The Lord Chancellor ought
to sit no longer on a bag of wool, but rather a bag of
coal (p. 126). Thus it was with banxietyQ that geolo-
gists, coal miners, statesmen, and economists were
asking the bsolemn questionQ as to the bdurationQ of
coal supplies (pp. 3–6, 412, 454, Ch. XII). Today we
ask the oil and pollution questions out of the same
anxiety. On the way to his answer Jevons presaged
today’s themes of limits to growth (pp. 196–200, 419,
427, 454–55), duty to posterity (pp. 4, 373, 455),
renewable and non-renewable resources (p. 201), liv-
9 According to Greenberg, a similar position had been held a
generation before Jevons by Richard Jones, namely that denergy
efficiency—whether biological or technological—constituted the
true determinant of wealthT (Greenberg, 1990, p. 713). Also pre-
saging some of Jevons’ ideas were Lauderdale (1804, pp. 161–165
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energy costs of getting energy (pp. 7, 49, 62–63, 72,
77, 196, 198, 200), entropy (p. 412), the sad loss of
forests (pp. 37, 183, 249–250, 286, 369–80), and
sustainability (p. 454).
Jevons’ detailed discussion of British and foreign
coal-field geology, mining technology, transportation,
and prices leads him to take other researchers to task
for overestimating coal’s duration—whether 365, 610,
1727, or many thousands of years (Ch. II, pp. 273–75,
280–848). Their bcompendious statementsQ were well-
founded except that they overlooked the fact of rising
annual demand, or consumption! (p. 19). Two excep-
tions were John Holland and Edward Hull, Jevons’
main source, who nevertheless reassured b. . .the pub-
lic at large. . .that for a long period to come British
commerce is not likely to languish, or British house-
hold fires to smoulder, for want of that prime neces-
sary of British life—COALQ (Hull, 1905, p. 281; Ch.
XXXIII; Hull, 1861, pp. 1–6, 236–37, 241–45;
Jevons, pp. 23–31, 195–200, 267–274). Jevons
insisted that b. . .the quantity of coal existing is a
less important point in this question than the rate at
which our consumption increases, and the natural
laws which govern that consumptionQ (pp. 25, 34–36).
What determines this all-important rate of consump-
tion’s increase? Always based on assumptions about
coal quality, mine depth, and mining costs (pp. 88–89,
132, 156, 230–32, 274, Ch. IV), three factors were
population growth (pp. vi, 9–10, 194–200, 275, 457),
newly found or invented applications (pp. 141–142,
152–53, 176, 196, 457–458, Ch. VI), and our wish to
consume (p. 25, Ch. IX). But bdiscoveryQwas constant-
ly rendering coal ba more and more efficient agent. . .Q
(p. 8; also 136, 387–88). The bone of contention was
whether this raises, or lowers, total consumption.
3.2. Chapter VII: bof the economy of fuel Q
bAnd we ought not at least to delay dispersing a
set of plausible fallacies about the economy of8 While even Jevons’ projections ran in the order of many centu-
ries, British politics today seems comfortable with the fact that
North Sea oil and gas will last another decade or two. On energy
alternatives to coal, Jevons, to his posthumous misfortune, acknowl-
edged but underestimated petroleum (pp. 184–185), while Hull bet
on electricity (Hull, 1905, pp. 387–393, 434–435).fuel. . .which at present obscure the critical nature
of the question, and are eagerly passed about
among those who like to believe that we have an
indefinite period of prosperity before usQ (p. 4). In
the dark shadow of future coal shortage many saw
the efficient use or beconomyQ of fuel as a chance to
bsaveQ it and postpone the day of reckoning. Think-
ing of Percy (p. 36), Waterston (p. 22), and Hull (pp.
29–30; Hull, 1861, pp. 238–240) Jevons wrote, bIt is
very commonly urged, that the failing supply of coal
will be met by new modes of using it efficiently and
economically. The amount of useful work got out of
coal may be made to increase manifold, while the
amount of coal consumed is stationary or diminish-
ing. We have thus, it is supposed, the means of
completely neutralising the evils of scarce and costly
fuelQ (p. 137). Countless efficiency strategists today
join in with Percy, Waterston, Hull, and Mundella
(1878).
After granting the question the status of a
bparadoxQ (also Wirl, 1997, pp. 29, 36, 112; Giampie-
tro and Mayumi, 1998, p. 24), Jevons’ dissenting
opinion was that bIt is the very economy of its use
which leads to its extensive consumptionQ (p. 141).
Due to invention and improvement b. . .the economy
of coal in manufacturesQ advanced constantly (pp. 8,
152), but bIt is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose
that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a
diminished consumption. The very contrary is the
truth. . ..[E]very. . .improvement of the engine, when
effected, does but accelerate anew the consumption of
coalQ (pp. 140, 152–53). Lowering the input /output
ratio causes neither less input for the same output, nor
the same input for more output, but more input for
more output.9184–185); Say (1820, pp. 137, 143, 151) and John Rae (1834), who
influenced Jevons through William Edward Hearn (1864) and who
posthumously enjoyed Schumpeter’s highest praises (Schumpeter
1911, pp. 12–13) (pp. 19, 23, 292, 258–59 (rebound); 86–87, 115–
117, 261–62, 365 (new uses); 164–65, 263 (profit and new capital)
226–229 metallurgy; 242 (pre-efficiency invention); 245–248 (coa
and steam); 245, 258–59, 323 (Jevons’ social growth); 259 (baking)
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in the bartsQ of mining, metallurgy, and engines over
some 300 years, as coal and iron out-competed wood,
water, wind, human, and horse power (also Cipolla,
1962, pp. 40–52; Clapp, 1994, pp. 161–71; Sieferle,
2001, pp. 61–67, 103, 115–27). The key case was
Savery’s steam engine of 1698. Intended to pump
water out of (coal) mines, the machine however still
bwastedQ too much heat; without an intervening piston
bit was so uneconomical that, in spite of the cheapness
of coals, it could not come into common useQ (pp.
114–119).10 That is, the coal-burning steam engine
would have to become more efficient before it could
consume coal. Once improved, this engine bas it were
in an instant, put every coal-field, which was consid-
ered lost, within the grasp of its owners. Collieries
were opened in every district. . .Q (p. 120). Other
materials like iron also saw efficiency gains, as with
the bsubstitution. . .of [lighter] wrought-iron for cast-
iron. . .[which] effected a general economy and ad-
vance in the employment of machine powerQ (pp.
129–130, 372). But what is this vague bgeneral econ-
omyQ which causes rebound greater than unity in the
consumption of iron as well as coal?
3.3. The paradox solved
bNor is it difficult to see how this paradox arisesQ
(p. 141).11 The key to his argument is efficiency’s
effects on profitability, price, and demand: bEconomy
multiplies the value and efficiency of our chief mate-
rial. . .[and] renders the employment of coal more
profitable, and thus the present demand for coal is
increased. . .. [If] the quantity of coal used in a blast-
furnace, for instance, be diminished in comparison
with the yield, the profits of the trade will increase,
new capital will be attracted, the price of pig iron will
fall, but the demand for it increases and eventually the
greater number of furnaces will more than make up
for the diminished consumption of eachQ (pp. 156, 8,10 When even endosomatic energy input (Cipolla, 1962, p. 39) is
too inefficient, the possibility is that consumption ceases.
11 Lucky Jevons. Today it is a btheoretical riddleQ (Wirl, 1997, p.
29) commanding with good reason special journal issues (Energy
Policy 28, vols. 6–7; Energy and Environment 11, vol. 5). Rebound
is like the bLoch Ness monsterQ sighted by Schipper and Grubb
(2000), or rather not sighted.141; also Jevons, 1871, pp. 254–57). Any given blast
furnace gives way to an improved one, and the num-
ber of furnaces and the amount of steel rise absolutely.
Jevons thus makes rebound theoretically plausible,
but he has not yet proven that the amount of coal
consumed must bmore thanQ make up for engineering
savings.
The solution for Jevons lies somewhere in this step
from efficiency to profitability, a term both broadly
synonymous with productivity and more narrowly
covering producers’ margins. He notes that bit is a
maxim of trade, that a low rate of profits, with the
multiplied business it begets, is more profitable than a
small business a high rate of profitQ (p. 141). The costs
of pig iron and even coal fall, upping sales; otherwise
no new capital (no new production capacity) is
attracted to these sectors, which, however, it manifest-
ly is. This brief argument stays inconclusive, and he
immediately adds that the greater demand stems as
well from bnew activity in most other branchesQ (pp.
141–42; see below).
One contemporary rendering of this dprofitabilityT
argument states that bAn improvement of energy effi-
ciency of capital implies that [the producer] can (a)
shift the production factor mix in the long run, and (b)
reduce the unit production costs, creating a margin for
price setting. . .. [A] lower sales price may generate
additional demandT (Berkout et al., 2000, p. 426). A
fuller version states that b. . .efficiency gains and cur-
rent incentives often work directly and indirectly
against resource conservation. Many factors contrib-
ute to this counter-intuitive [paradoxical] result, in-
cluding the price and income effects of technological
savings. Improved energy or material efficiency may
enable firms to raise wages, increase dividends or
lower prices, which leads to increased net consumption
by workers, shareholders or consumers respectivelyQ
(Wackernagel and Rees, 1996, pp. 127–28).12
3.4. New uses, other consumption
Jevons sensed his argument’s incompleteness:
Profitability causes new demand that is claimed to12 Joseph Schumpeter, using Lauderdale’s example of the loom
also described how efficiency and/or new combinations are condi
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b. . .such is not always the result within a single
branch. . .[and therefore] it must be remembered
that the progress of any branch of manufacture
excites new activity in most other branches, and
leads indirectly, if not directly, to increased inroads
upon our seams of coalQ (pp. 141–142). Khazzoom
similarly first acknowledges that bimproved efficien-
cy may. . .result in some reduction in energy con-
sumption,Q but adds that bAn improvement in the
efficiency of one appliance influences not only the
demand for own end-use, but also the demand for
other end-uses. This follows from the fact that end-
uses compete for the same overall budget. . .Q (Khaz-
zoom, 1980, pp. 23, 35). Again, current literature
distinguishes between micro and indirect or macro
rebounds, the latter being an income effect leaving a
bconsumer surplusQ which we use not only to up-
grade quality; bthe associated increase in the real
income allows [us] to raise all kinds of demands
including the demand for the service in questionQ
(Wirl, 1997, pp. 41, 20, 26–27, 31, 197; also Wack-
ernagel and Rees, 1996, pp. 128–29; Schipper and
Grubb, 2000, pp. 367, 386; Saunders, 2000, pp.
445–48). It is because inputs are thus freed for
new uses that single-sector studies are seriously
inconclusive.
bAgain, the quantity consumed by each individual
is a composite quantity, increased either by multiply-
ing the scale of former applications, or finding whol-
ly new applications;Q any given benterpriseQ has
limits, bBut the new applications of coal are of an
unlimited characterT (pp. 196–197). bOld applica-
tions of coal have been extended, and yet admit of
great extension, while new ones are continually
being addedQ (p. 199). Inventions in iron production,
like hot-blast smelting, or in metallurgy, like rela-
tively light-weight wrought iron, yield bcheap ironQ
(pp. 125, 129–30, 405). This b. . .materially lowered
the cost of iron, and, therefore, has led to its em-
ployment for many purposes. . .previously unknownQ
(p.154; also 152–56, 245, 368–78). Cheap iron in
turn raised the demand for coal (p. 372). He quotes
Williams that bWhatever, however, conduces to in-
crease the efficiency of coal, and to diminish the cost
of its use, directly tends to augment the value of the
steam-engine, and to enlarge the field of its oper-
ationsQ (p. 144). Although some new technologiesare bof purely organic origin, . . .many of the more
important substitutions are due to coal. . .. With fuel
and fire, then, almost anything is easyQ (pp. 134–
136). One opinion in today’s debate holds that al-
though backfire can happen in bthe iron/coal exam-
ple of Jevons. . .[such examples] appear to be rare
exceptionsQ (Schipper and Grubb, 2000, p. 385).
One neo-classical model today holds that techno-
logically baugmentedQ labor and capital mean
b. . .more consumption per workerQ (Saunders, 1992,
pp. 136–37; 2000, pp. 440, 445, 448). For instance,
one study of the replacement of kerosene with solar
power for lighting (an efficiency gain even after
deducting embodied energy costs) found that this
leads both to lighting for more hours, to using the
bsavedQ kerosene for cooking, and indeed to a
b. . .whole range of behavioral responses of the end-
users that follow any technical efficiency improve-
ment all of which may, however, not be traced empiri-
callyQ (Roy, 2000, p. 433). Jevons’ perhaps hyperbolic
conclusion is that bmodes of economy which, in
reducing the cost of a most valuable material, lead
to an indefinite demandQ (p. 390).
Jevons’ detailed history of technology covers met-
allurgy, pumps, plows, coal-cutters, cotton factories,
engines, roads and canals, railroads, bridges, water
pipes, photography, ice machines, screw steam-ves-
sels, smelting, refining, and forging (pp. 382–386;
also Sieferle, 2001, pp. 115–124). He looks as well
at bsubstitutionsQ and binterdependenceQ between
types of energy and material (p. 385). From this
emerges a question about the definition of efficiency.
We substitute ba cheaper for a dearer [in the same
process], a new for an old processQ (p. 136). The
former are straightforward efficiency gains, as when
coal is lighter and more heat-efficient than wood, or
coke bears more ore weight in the furnace than char-
coal. But some new processes and products perhaps
do not themselves represent efficiency gains, but rath-
er add new denominators, rather like moving targets
for calculations of efficiency ratios. He accordingly
first posits something new, and then calls efficiency
gains bsubsequent steps in. . .improvementQ (p. 119).
His example is an invention for bdetermining the
longitude of a ship at seaQ (p. 113). It is not an
improvement in a preceding instrument, although it
does improve the efficiency of shipping. Railroads
were new and open to subsequent gains, but the
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of profit and new uses together, Jevons repeats, bBut
no one must suppose that coal thus saved is spared—
it is only saved from one use to be employed in
others, and the profits gained soon lead to extended
employment in many new formsQ (p. 155). If effi-
ciency indirectly enables new things, his thesis gains
plausibility.
3.5. The consumer
But why are new applications of material resources
bof an unlimited characterQ (p. 197)? Why are price
elasticities of demand positive, why is demand not
saturated? These stupid questions arise because till
now, the discussion has concerned production. Jevons
has shown only that greater economy enables higher
consumption; real rising consumption also requires
consumers. His short chapter bOf the Natural Law of
Social GrowthQ fills this gap by examining the tenden-
cies of population and consumer desires to increase
and includes his opinion that bWe are getting to the gist
of the subjectQ (p. 194). He first notes that bcoal itself is
limited in quantityQ (p. 198), that a bvague but inevi-
table limit. . .will stop our progressQ (p. 200), and that
bWe cannot, indeed, always be doubling the length of
our railways, the magnitude of our ships, and bridges,
and factoriesQ (p. 196). Whether this last opinion
would survive a visit to the USA or western Europe
today is debatable, but bour environmentQ or b the
powers and capabilities of. . .inorganic natureQ have
belasticQ yet binexorableQ limits, subject moreover to
diminishing returns (pp. 194–98).
These limits contrast, however, with organic nature,
including humans. Invoking Malthus and Spencer, his
claim is that population and consumption btend to
increase. . .[in] geometrical ratioQ (p. 193; also 245–
247; Malthus, 1798, pp. 20–26, 30, 56, 71). His sem-
inal version of the I =PAT formula is that societyTs
consumption consists of bthe number of people, and
the average quantity consumed by eachQ (p. 196). His13 Jevons’ full-blown theory of new discoveries has three
bconditions of inventionQ: first a bpurposeQ or bneedQ, then a
bprincipleQ of knowledge, and thirdly bthe material, power, and
skill for embodying this principle in a. . .construction.Q A steam-
engine is such a construction—the thing with a price, input costs,
and profitability (pp. 112–19, 148–49; Hearn, 1864, pp. 168, 187).argument is that bIf children do as their fathers did. . .Q
then bmultiplicationQ and average consumption both
rise; bIf our parents doubled their income, or doubled
the use of iron, or doubled the agricultural produce of
the country, then so ought we, unless we are changed
either in character or circumstancesQ (pp. 193–94, 232,
275). The bpurposesQ and bneedsQ driving invention (p.
113) come from our reservoir of unmet demand when-
ever costs go down. These are, then, the bnatural laws
which govern. . .consumptionQ (p. 25) and a bnatural
law of growth, or multiplication in social affairsQ (p.
275). Not only our numbers, but also our bsocial
advanceQ tend to grow bad infinitumQ (pp. 194, 195;
also Hearn, 1864, pp. 68, 100–102, 123–133, 178–185;
Wackernagel and Rees, 1996, p. 127). We choose more
output over less input and more free time. With cheap
coal and bskill in its employment, . . .[the English] are
growing rich and numerous. . .Q (pp. 199–200).
Given widespread poverty, population growth, new
products, and competitive consumption,14 sizeable
latent demand need not be belabored. As an assump-
tion, though, or factor in a consumption function, it
should be made explicit. Brookes, for instance, writes
that b. . .it has been claimed since the time of Jevons
that. . .for a resource to find itself in a world of more
efficient use is for it to enjoy a reduction in its implicit
price with the obvious implications for demandQ
(2000, pp. 356–57). Obvious or not, a proof of back-
fire is impossible without this demand. Both previous
consumers and marginal consumers (Wirl, 1997, pp.
19–20, 29–32; Brookes, 2000, pp. 360, 362) must be
invoked—or denied, as in one argument against sig-
nificant rebound that explicitly assumes saturation
(Grubb, 1990, pp. 39–43, 187, 242). Were we only
seeking to lower the costs in our cost / benefit ratios,
efficiency would save resources; when we seek as well
to raise benefits, rebound is positive and maybe N1.
3.6. The clincher?
Jevons’ strongest theoretical point arises from his
musings over Savery’s failed and Newcomen’s some-
what more efficient but still voracious and noncom-14 Thorstein Veblen’s analysis of efficiency, emulation, and status
consumption offers a psychological explanation for Jevons’ position
(Veblen, 1899, pp. 25, 32,73, 99, 110–11, 156–63, 208, 227, 241,
342; also Alcott, 2004).
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carried near its mathematical maximum of efficiency,Q
coal-burners had a hard time (p.177). Brindley’s opin-
ion of the Newcomen engine was that b. . .unless the
consumption of coal could be reduced, the extended
use of this steam-engine was not practicable, by rea-
son of its dearness, as compared with the power of
horses, wind, or airQ (p. 143). (Note that replacement
of labor by capital, of endosomatic by exosomatic
input, also continues at today’s higher technological
levels.) With the Savery engine, though, b. . .as he
allowed the steam to act straight upon the water,
without the intervention of a piston, the loss of heat
was tremendous. Practically, the cost of working kept
it from coming into use; it consumed no coal, because
its rate of consumption was too highT (pp. 143, 118).
That is, had efficiency not led to lower and lower
brates of consumptionQ, we would consume no coal!
Jevons is asking his deconomyT adversaries what
would have happened to population and consumption
had the steam engine not progressed from Newcomen
to Watts and further. Is 1865’s level of production then
even conceivable (pp. 152–54, 265–79)? The same
question today is: If we assume a fuel technology
frozen at Watt’s thermal efficiency of about 4%—
even imagining any number of institutional and fac-
tory-floor efficiency gains—is it plausible that 6 bil-
lion people would be living at today’s affluence
(Brookes, 2000, p. 359)? Or, remember that suppor-
ters and opponents of Jevons both compare a scenario
with and without technological efficiency gains, oppo-
nents claiming that absolute consumption is higher in
the scenario without them. But if in this scenario we
assume the same increase in population and affluence
that has really obtained, then at Watt’s level of mate-
rial/energy intensity charcoal, coal, oil, and gas would
all be long gone. But positing that not only T but also
PA remain the same begs too many questions. Both
sides must explain the real rise in population-times-
affluence. For this Jevons can invoke technological
efficiency gains; his opponents cannot. Only if today’s
PA is remotely possible at dWattT technology is the
low rebound position plausible. Jevons insisted that
b. . .it cannot be supposed we shall do without coal
more than a fraction of what we do with itQ (p. 9;
Brookes, 2000, p. 359).
A corollary is that if beconomyQ lowers total con-
sumption, diseconomy or efficiency losses shouldraise it. Take an efficiency decrease and compute
engineering losses by keeping demand constant and
multiplying by the higher input–output ratio. Input
prices rise, lowering demand again in a sort of reverse
rebound. The anti-Jevons position (Schipper and
Grubb, 2000) would then say yes, consumption did
go down, but less than it would have (botherwiseQ)
without the efficiency decrease. Curiously, though, no
one would deny that straightforward price increases
lower consumption. Thus, for Waterston et al. to
believe that economy bsparesQ fuel, they must also
believe that as inputs become more costly, we con-
sume more of them.4. Analogy: the economy of labor
Jevons’ brief argument from analogy concerns
time or labor efficiency. bAs a rule, new modes of
economy will lead to an increase in consumption
according to a principle recognised in many parallel
instances. The economy of labor effected by the in-
troduction of new machinery throws labourers out of
employment for the moment. But such is the increased
demand for the cheapened products, that eventually
the sphere of employment is greatly widenedQ (p.140;
also Petty, 1675, pp. 249–250; Cipolla, 1962, pp. 65,
105; Khazzoom, 1980, p. 23; Clapp, 1994). Seams-
tresses for instance have higher wages due to the
sewing machine (p. 140). In agriculture of course
bLabour saved is rendered superfluous. . .because the
area of land is limited and already fully occupiedQ but
other economic sectors then absorb this labor (pp.
243–244). In coal mining or the iron trade, he notes
that although bhand labour is still further replaced by
mechanical labourQ (p. 153), population and employ-
ment in towns and around collieries rose greatly (pp.
130–131, 213–218, 277–278).
Khazzoom also offers this analogy, substituting
blabor made redundantQ for benergy savedQ (both tem-
porarily) (Khazzoom, 1987, p. 87; Khazzoom, 1980,
p. 23). Greenberg relates the calculations of Owenite
John Brooks in 1836 that the mechanical and chem-
ical power of Great Britain and Ireland was doing the
work of 600,000,000 people; it in no way follows,
though, that even a thousandth of a percent of this
number was therefore bout of workQ (Greenberg,
1990, p. 711). Her study of early 19th-century atti-
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cludes that ever more productive machines were
seen to supplement, rather than supplant, human
power (pp. 699–703, 712). In light of the huge pop-
ulation increase over the last two centuries, it seems
that neither human beings nor fossil fuels, in spite of
huge productivity increases, remained unemployed.15
Again, regarding time/labor input, the anti-Jevons
dsavingsT position must claim that without labor effi-
ciency gains rises in work and population would have
been even greater!
One reason that the case of labor efficiency was
brecognisedQ was perhaps Say’s well-known proof in
his fourth Letter to Malthus (1820). He endorses
Malthus’ argument that technological improvement
lowers cost and that both consumption and employ-
ment in the newly more efficient or bquickly
producingQ industries rise above previous levels, e.g.
in textiles and printing (pp. 127–129). He criticizes
Sismondi, whose logic failed to appreciate that effi-
ciency raises purchasing power, scathingly predicting
that his diagnosis of unemployment would earn him
the ridicule of posterity (pp. 138–144). He then adds
to Malthus’ argument: Even if demand is saturated for
the more efficiently produced product, what is today
called an income effect bcostlesslyQ augments con-
sumption (pp. 129–130, 135, 151). He quantifies the
example of efficient, mechanical flour milling, where-
by the laid-off grain-grinders must and will do some-
thing else (pp. 133–134, 140).
Thus foreshadowing Jevons’ argument from new
applications, he says that people will make and buy
new products as efficiency improvement enables
bprogressQ to spread to other industries (pp. 137, 143,
151). Say’s observation is that after any sort of effi-
ciency gains, at least the same amount of flour, work-
ers, energy, ability, and tools remain (pp. 137, 140).
Paralleling Jevons’ dprofitabilityT argument, he notes
that capital gets formed only if greater production
ensues—and capital formation is a fact (pp. 146–150;
also Schumpeter, 1911, pp. 208–215). By taking the
long view (pp. 132–133, 142–144), surpassing single-
sector analysis, and taking the marginal consumer se-
riously, Say demonstrates growth effects of the perfec-15 Another analogy is with agricultural input and output per square
meter: Do efficiency gains mean we take land out of cultivation?tionnement dTles arts. He even hints that the matter is
paradoxical: the augmentation of bemployment and
populationQ is survenue (p. 142).5. Jevons’ empirical argument
The duration of coal sources depends for Jevons’ not
only on how much there is and at what depth, but also
on consumer behavior; this derives in turn from our
numbers, our wanting to consume at least as our ances-
tors did, and how economically we used these sources.
Tables throughout the book show that bIn round numb-
ers, the population has about quadrupled since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, but the consump-
tion of coal has increased sixteenfold, and more. The
consumption per head of the population has therefore
increased fourfoldT (pp. 196, vi, 457). Covering all
sectors of the British economy, his figures show large
rises in both pig iron and coal consumption (pp. 246,
262–265, 280). He then establishes a correlation be-
tween this and rises in efficiencies. In terms of pounds
of coal per horse power per hour, he traces the more
than tenfold increase in steam engine efficiency from
Newcomen andWatt toWoolf and Elder (pp. 145, 261–
271; also Greenberg, 1990, pp. 703–705). Or in smelt-
ing: The foregoing decrease in coal use per ton of pig
iron bto less than one-third of its former amount, was
followed, in Scotland, by a tenfold total consumption,
between 1830 and 1863 in Scotland. . .Q (pp. 154, 387–
388). Efficiency and total consumption had risen to-
gether, moreover, the latter more than the former. His
opponents today reply that this proves nothing: Other
factors cause the growth, and but for the greater econ-
omy, even more would have been used up.
While efficiency gains were attested by all, Mun-
della was one who disputed their effects in raising
consumption, claiming that although from 1869 to
1876 efficiency and pig iron production both went
up, consumption of coal bused in its ManufactureQ
went down (1878, pp. 90, 112). He identified efficien-
cy gains through better furnace construction, use of
waste heat, and in general hotter and better blasts
(Bessemer and Siemens), concluding that bThere is
no evidence showing that the economy of fuel in the
making of pig iron, and the consequent reduction in
price, has led to the manufacture of more iron, by
which more coal would have been consumed, as Mr.
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112, 89). In his reply to Mr. Mundella’s bfairestQ
treatment of the subject, Jevons stuck to his guns.
But the only numbers he crunched concerned whether
coal consumption rises 2.5% or 4% every year, reit-
erating his point that at neither rate could the increase
go on forever (Mundella, pp. 118–119).
Mundella’s argument raises three questions still
haunting the debate. 1) The time period considered:
While his text looks at 1869–1876 only, and its 5%
fall in coal consumption bin the manufacture of pig
ironQ (p. 90), his supporting Table F covers 1840–
1876, showing a fourfold hike (p. 112); he believed
that the trend had recently reversed. 2) He was only
looking at coalTs consumption bin [pig iron] Man-
ufactureQ! Actually, the Table’s caption records
bCoal used in its ManufactureQ whereas the Table
itself leaves out the word bitsQ (p. 112). His Tables
B, C, and D showed, in fact, large overall use
increases from 1660 to 1876 (pp. 109–111). But
whatever the numbers, his single-sector study is ig-
noring new uses and thus today’s income, substitu-
tion, or general equilibrium effects. 3) He restricts
himself to Britain (while Jevons at least devotes
Chs. XIII–XVI to the international scene).16
Since correlation does not prove causality, both
sides need theory. Note that Mundella does concede
the link between beconomyQ and bthe consequent
reduction in price,Q but not the rebound step to raised
demand (p. 112). Jevons’ reply to Mundella also re-
emphasized Cairne’s thesis bthat the cost of produc-
tion was not the cause, but the effect of the efficiency
of productionQ (1878, p. 118). In sum, Jevons estab-
lishes growth of population, agricultural and manu-
factured goods, and coal consumption alongside
higher beconomyQ or productivity. Today as well no-
body doubts such worldwide increases over, say, 250
years. One treatment for instance both attests to these
statistics and warns of the complexity of the concept
of bglobal energy intensityQ (Smil, 2003, pp. 6–7, 49,
65–81). But to establish the causal arrow, I think
Jevons is asking in his chapter on bsocial growthQ16 My father’s belief that dfigures can’t lie, but liars sure can
gure,T is assumed to apply to neither side. Domar (1962, p. 602)
rote, bLike politics, empirical work is the art of the possibleQ.
17 More accurately: explanations of the exact size or scale of the
economy, whether growing or shrinking.fi
wwhy we seek efficiency in the first place. Surely to
consume more easily and cheaply, but also to con-
sume more.6. Discussion
Jevons’ view is compatible with later produc-
tion functions and theories of economic growth17
that attribute much to technological change as op-
posed to mere changes in labor productivity or pop-
ulation size (itself in need of explanation). One
version sees btwo obvious candidatesQ to explain
growth, namely btechnological progress and increas-
ing returns to scale . . .. I reckon that technological
progress must be the more important of the two in
real economies. . .. The natural rate of growth [in the
model] is now the sum of the rate of population
increase and the rate of technological progressQ
(Solow, 1970, pp. 33–35, 38; also Schumpeter
(1911); Schurr (1982, 1985). One list of terms for
this strong factor ranges from boutput per unit of
inputQ through befficiency indexQ, and btotal factor
productivityQ to bmeasure of our ignoranceQ and bthe
ResidualQ (Domar, 1961, p. 709). Anticipating the
rebound concept, the same author states that a
brapid growth of [Kendrick’s technological progress]
Index in any industry reduces the prices of its
output, and thus stimulates salesQ (Domar, 1962, p.
605). Notwithstanding the difficulty of deriving an
absolute quantity (consumption) from a ratio (effi-
ciency), the theoretical question is whether the view
that rebound is lower than 1 is also compatible with
this consensus.
Recall that today’s debate compares paths of total
consumption with, and without, technological efficien-
cy change—far more explicitly than in Jevons’ treat-
ment (Saunders, 1992, p. 135; Schipper and Grubb,
2000, p. 370). In the anti-Jevons position, both paths
posit growth, even the one with frozen technology.
But what, then, is to cause this posited growth
(Brookes, 2000, p. 359)? Population? Institutional
efficiency gains of all sorts? Schipper et al. (1996)
indeed name exactly these three effects—population,
B. Alcott / Ecological Economics 54 (2005) 9–21 19structure, and intensity—conceding that although the
intensity effect lowers the costs of benergy servicesQ,
growth is mainly due to bstructuralQ effects (1996, pp.
192, 174). Another analysis (of US data from 1929 to
1970) concludes with the calculation that the
bKhazzoom–Brookes hypothesis. . .must assert that
improvements in energy efficiency were responsible
for a full 29% of the increaseQ in GNP during a
particular span of 41 years, but that bClaims of this
sort, however, seem palpably implausibleQ (Howarth,
1997, pp. 2–4). But the author offers us neither a
criterion of dplausibilityT nor a clear identification of
the factors that do account for GNP growth. Note that
whatever they are, these factors must be extremely
strong: they must not only do without technical prog-
ress, but must also compensate for it. Thus, while
growth proponents and neutral analysts universally
know that both technological and institutional effi-
ciency must figure in the recipe,18 some who do not
welcome the environmental impact of growth claim
that efficiency will, ceteris paribus, reduce the size of
the material economy.
Regarding empiricism, Jevons early on tells us that
he bmust also draw attention to principles governing
this subject, which have rather the certainty of natural
laws than the fickleness of statistical numbersQ (pp. 6,
198–99). Of course the book then delivers pages of
fickle numbers, but they do not suffer any worse from
methodological problems than today’s: 1) limitation to
certain time periods; 2) limitation to certain sectors;
and 3) limitation to certain countries or groups of
(usually OECD) countries. Following Jevons quite
strictly, most researchers lament these acknowledged
inadequacies while continuing to conduct micro stud-
ies (Grubb, 1990, pp. 195, 235; Howarth, 1997, p. 4;
Greene et al., 1999, p. 28; Brookes, 2000, pp. 358,
365; Greening et al., 2000, p. 392; Binswanger, 2001,
p. 124). Short of studies of two non-trading econo-
mies alike in every respect except technological
change, the debate still seems heavily dependent on
theory.
Another open question concerns how, exactly, to
integrate into a formal theory the consumer’s high
price elasticities of demand—be these bnaturalQ or18 For instance, the mainstream in Switzerland today does not
doubt that the country’s bilateral agreements with the EU will put
it back on the path of 2% annual growth.somehow more contingent. Marginal consumers
must at any rate be added. And finally, what is so
paradoxical about this matter? Perhaps that if an
efficiency gain causes a drop in the price of an input
of 10%, and this input makes up 10% of product cost,
then costs are down a mere 1%. Many (single-sector)
studies indeed compute rebounds of 15% to 50%. Or
perhaps that individually, if I replace my open fire-
place with a ceramic stove, I simply cut less firewood
back of my house, dsavingT time and wood. The macro
result remains thus dcounter-intuitiveT.7. Conclusions
Jevons writes with the same uneasiness we feel
today about overburdening the planet and exhausting
its resources. Is greater material or energy efficiency a
remedy, as many optimists and some environmental-
ists believe? bThis is a question of that almost reli-
gious importance which needs the separate study and
determination of every intelligent personQ (p. 14). He
reluctantly answered with dNo.T Today ecological
economics must give advice on this surely not unan-
swerable question—the more so if Impact is growing
rapidly—but a firm consensus is lacking. Certainly,
theoretical work must see whether the environmental
defficiency strategyT is reconcilable with standard
growth theory. One certain conclusion, though, is
that if Jevons is right, then efficiency policies are
simply counter-productive. Even taxes on fuel or
CO2 will be compensated by efficiency increases,
and moreover they face the problem that tax revenue
also gets spent on material and energy (Wackernagel
and Rees, 1996, p. 20).
By enabling population and affluence to rise, both
business-as-usual and policy-induced efficiency gains
are partial causes of environmental stress. Indeed,
efficiency, sufficiency, and population strategies all
face the problem that the I =PAT equation is transitive:
all right-side factors influence each other, leaving
impact the same or higher. This enhances the attrac-
tiveness of directly lowering impact through rationing
and quotas, whether of resources or emissions (as in
the dKyotoT agreement) (Daly, 1973, pp. 337ff., 1996,
p. 15; Wackernagel and Rees, 1996, p. 129; Brookes,
2000, pp. 363–64; Rudin, 2000). Politically unfash-
ionable though they may be—Jevons himself denied
B. Alcott / Ecological Economics 54 (2005) 9–2120that bthe consumption of coal can be kept down in our
free system of industry. . .Q (p. 136)—ecological eco-
nomics should once again take resource rationing
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Quotas1. Introduction“The institutions [of a steady-state economy]…seek to
induce…a change toward resource-saving technology and
patterns of living, and to a greater reliance on solar energy
and renewable resources.” — Herman Daly (1974, p.18)
In the I=PAT equation the causes of environmental impact are
population, affluence, and technology. “Environmental strategies”
here denotes groups of policies to lower resource consumption1 I define consumption as ‘using up’ (German Verbrauch) rather
than ‘use’ (Gebrauch) – i.e. as ‘takingwith’ or destruction – following
Boulding (1949–50; 1992, 117, 129; also Princen, 1999, 355) – ander B.V. All rights reservedand emissions,1 and are classified under these three headings.
While population strategies are seldom discussed, much atten-
tion shines on theT factor, specifically the technological efficiency
strategymeant to raise the ratioof affluence to theenvironmental
goodsusedup in theeconomicprocess— through technologyper
se as well as measures such as environmental bookkeeping, life
cycle analysis,mandated capital efficiency, renewable resources,
recycling, legal standards, taxes, and ‘consumption efficiency’.
More broadly, the T factor is an ornery variable includingconjecture that pollution is reducible to consumption of goods
such as clean air or water.
.
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emissions toxicity, risk, and institutions.
Affluence is consumption (depletion) or emissions (pollu-
tion) per person; the sufficiency strategy attacks this affluence (A)
factor, seeking to lower per capita resource consumption in
hopes of thereby lowering total – or aggregate – consumption
or impact (I). Of course, humanism demands restricting this
strategy to those who are consuming at least enough for their
health, reproduction, longevity and education. Lowering the
affluence of the poor would after all mean more sickness,
death, and armed conflict. The strategy thus envisions cuts in
material and energy consumption within the ‘affluent’ target
group that are large enough to reduce total impact even if
(hopefully) the poor consume more. In this it is thus distinct
from the strategy to lower MIPS (Material Input Per unit of
Service) (Hinterberger et al., 1996). MIPS computations assume
that the denominator (whether expressed as monetary GDP,
services, utility, ormaterial consumption) remains constant or
rises while the numerators of resource inputs are minimised,
whereas sufficiency intends a lower output, a smaller denom-
inator, lower global demand. The ‘factor four’ blueprint –
doublingaffluencewhilehalving impact – similarly foreseesno
doing without (Von Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Schmidt-Bleeck,
1994; Grubb, 1990).2
One analysis illustrating the application of I=PAT and setting
the stage for the sufficiency strategy is that of Ekins, which
computes how much technological improvement is needed if 1)
sustainability requires halving impact, and 2) population will
double and affluence quadruple by 2040 – T would have to
decrease 93% (1991, 250; Goodland and Daly, 1992, 131). The
obvious difficulty of this leads Ekins to place hope in frugality:
“The environmental crisis, the crisis of unsustainability, must be
laid squarely at the door of northern industrial consumer
lifestyles and their imitations now in nearly all the countries of
the ThirdWorld.” (249; [seemy] Section 4.1) Rather than appeal to
ethical duty he envisions the double benefit of less impact aswell
as, since money doesn’t buy happiness, a better family life and
better health without “stress and pollution”. (253; Section 4.3)
In Section 2 I define and describe the strategy. Section 3
shows that like the efficiency strategy it triggers a consump-
tion rebound: Whereas input–output efficiency constitutes an
income effect and can lower prices of material-energy inputs,
‘lighter lifestyles’ of the wealthy constitute an autonomous
demand reduction that lowers prices. In both cases new
demand emerges, in the case of sufficiency that of new or
marginal consumers who take up the ‘slack’ left by the
previous consumers’ environmentally motivated frugality.
This rebound is plausible if there is latent demand and if
supply functions are relatively price inelastic. Section 4
identifies four questionable strands in arguments for the
strategy: the North–South dichotomy, intragenerational ethics,
selfish reasons for sufficiency, and emphasis on personal
rather than political behaviour. Section 5 discusses 1) some
concepts necessary for quantification of strategy goals and2 It is thus incorrect to conflate the efficiency and sufficiency
strategies, as when the MIPS strategy is called “a nature–human
model of doing without” or when “factor four” or “factor ten”
strategies are characterised as “being maximally sufficient at the
existence minimum” (quoted by Luks, 2000, 61).possibilities; 2) the costliness of co-ordinating changes in the
independent variables on the right side of I=PAT; and 3)
quotas as opposed to taxes.2. The sufficiency strategy
Although the plan to lower impact by consuming less consists
mainly of exhortation, and seldom of legal restrictions on
consumption,3 I nevertheless call this body of thought a
‘strategy’, both because a sizeable advocacy literature exists
and because, however weak themeans of achieving it presently
are, the goal of humanity's livingmaterially moremodestly is a
clear and, for many, appealing vision. First I define the strategy,
then describe it in the form of a literature survey.
2.1. Definition
Starting with what it is not, the strategy is distinct from the
correction of policies or institutions that make us consume
more than we would like: e.g., settlement and zoning policies
and poor public transportation bless us with unwanted hours
behind the steering wheel (Røpke, 1999; Sanne, 2002). It is
also not the correction of externalities and market failures
that favour consumption by rendering natural resources ‘too
cheap’; i.e., it has nothing to do with welfare economics’ op-
timality. Finally, it is not the same as consumption efficiency,
by which is meant behaviour that achieves a given level of
utility with less (energy) input: e.g., boiling only the amount of
water needed for the cup of coffee, switching off unneeded
lights, or carpooling. (Hannon, 1975; Etzioni, 1998, 630;
Prettenthaler and Steininger, 1999; Princen et al., 2002, 67;
Nørgard, 2006, 96) Sufficiency, in contrast, means doing
without the cup of coffee, getting by with dimmer lighting,
and not taking the car. That is, assuming that ‘environmental
concern’ is left out of the utility function, sufficiency implies
lower utility or welfare. (Section 4.3)
Two concepts are needed to define sufficiency behaviour.
First, it presupposes purchasing power: Those who are to alter
their behaviour towards less consumption must be able to
consume. Their purchasing power either remains unused or is
itself reduced through working and earning less. The second
concept is environmental motivation: We all limit consumption
at some point, for many reasons. I am however confining the
definition to the costs of non-consumption that are voluntar-
ily traded for the benefits of believing one is relieving human
pressure on planetary resources and thus benefiting other
(present or future) humans or other species.
2.2. Literature survey
Using the method of ostensive definition, several quotations
from the literature advocating sufficiency follow. One para-
digmatic statement is, “The North should stabilize its rate of3 Even the neglected population strategy often goes beyond
education and propaganda to subsidise sterilisations, birth
control technology, and abortions, or proscribe one-child families
During wars many societies ration (Simms, 2005), but today we
are merely ‘encouraged’ to live more lightly..
5 Other literature on the social, ethical, aesthetic, and psycho-
logical, rather than environmental, costs of consumption in-
cludes Rae (1834), Mackenzie (1892), Smart (1892), Veblen (1899),
Galbraith (1958a), Baudrillard (1970), Linder (1970), Hirsch (1976),
Douglas and Isherwood (1979/96), Mason (1981), Frank (1985,
1999), McCracken (1988), Schor (1992), Fine and Leopold (1993),
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free up ecological space… [by] reducing Northern throughput
growth and decreasingNorthern consumerism”; wemust both
“adjust... consumption patterns and reduce the environmen-
tal impact of each unit of consumption...” (Goodland and Daly,
1992, 131, 142; Section 4.1) This argument is partly from in-
tragenerational equity: “Less consumerism... in the North
could be invested in much-needed poverty alleviation and
growth in the South” (133; Section 4.2). As an argument from
environmental quality it is moreover implicitly intergenera-
tional: If the rich North would at least “stabilize” its resource
consumption, global resource destruction and waste will fall.
The call is for “remolding consumers’ preferences and steering
wants in the direction of environmentally benign activities”
and for less consumption by “rich countries,…whosematerial
well-being can sustain halting or even reversing throughput
growth…” (Goodland et al., 1992, xii, xv).
Elsewhere the same authors observe that “OECD over-
consumers” cause both intragenerational inequality and our
global “hurtling away from environmental sustainability”,
attesting “the wasteful and destructive practices being pur-
sued by Northern consumption and pollution patterns” and
noting in support of the sufficient lifestyle that “affluence and
overconsumption do not increase welfare” (1996, 1005, 1015,
1009; Section 4). “Sufficiency” is thus a concept “which needs
dissemination” and which they define as “doing more with
less”4 and “emphasizing quality and non-material satisfac-
tions.”’’ (1009) Their question is: “[C]an humans lower their per
capita impact (mainly in OECD countries) at a rate sufficiently
high to counterbalance their explosive increases in population
(mainly in low-income countries)?” (1011) Daily and Ehrlich
similarly advocate the “…de-development of the overdeve-
loped countries,… that is, controlling runaway consumption
in order to reduce the physical throughput of their economies”
(1996, 1000).
In I=PAT terms, Princen holds that “Consumption or, more
precisely, overconsumption, ranks with population and tech-
nology as a major driver of global environmental change”
(1999, 348). After decades of research into “…production,
overall human or economic activity, equity, technology, or
population”, he urges a “comprehensive research agenda on
consumption and environment…” (349, 352). He envisions “…
peoples’ choices not to purchase or to seek less consumptive,
less material-intensive means of satisfying a need”, and
where needs cannot be met non-materially, this can be done
less impact-intensively (354). He relies on a conventional
concept of “normal” or “background” consumption and goes
on to identify harmful ways of “material provisioning”,
variously termed “excessive or maladaptive consumption”,
“problematic consumption”, or the “overconsumption” harm-
ful to our species and the “misconsumption” harmful to the
individual. He diagnoses the “inability of individuals to meet
their needs in a given social context” (356–358) and pleas for
lower consumption by “us Northerners and Southern elites”
who can indeed change to embrace “thrift, frugality, and self-
reliance” (360, 361).
Røpke's starting point is likewise that “…growing con-
sumption in the North contributes substantially to environ-4 In contrast, I classify this within the efficiency strategy.mental problems, and considerations about the need to
change lifestyles are popping up in official publications”
(1999, 401). Consumption patterns must change, through
mainfold concrete measures (417–418), toward less environ-
mental intensity. However, this move towards “labour-inten-
sive goods and services: theatre and music performances,
courses in new skills, lectures on interesting topics, art
objects, high quality clothes and houses made as handicrafts,
child care, and massage treatments — is not likely to take
place…”, and therefore there is no way around consumption
reduction (401–402). However, this environmentally and dis-
tributionallymotivated desire to “halt the forces behind… ever
growing consumption” is hard to fulfill due to causes lying in
the domains of economics, socio-economic institutions, socio-
psychology, history, and socio-technology (402, 416). Like
others including Schor (1992, 1999a, 1999b; Veblen, 1899, 111)
she attests the prima facie reasonableness of gaining free time
through consuming and working less (403), concluding that
while “voluntary curtailment of consumption in the rich
countries is… first of all an ethical issue,” we should avoid
“too much moralizing” (416–417).
Building on both Røpke and Agenda 21, Sanne identifies
“reduc[ing] consumption in rich countries” as a “condition for
sustainable development. This turns the searchlight on the
consumer as the principal lever of change” (2002, 273; Section
4.4). “Household consumption in industrial societies like the
UK must decline” and the fact that “consumption comes in
packages… calls for an analysis of activities and aggregate
consumption as it is realized in lifestyles” (274). “The
predicament of overconsumption can only be overcome if
the values behind present lifestyles change;…the green claim
in this spirit is that we should combine the trend towards
higher efficiency with a sense of sufficiency” — the “‘ethical
question of ‘living lightly’” (275). Not just as consumers, but
also as “citizens in the political process” (275), we are subject
to “economic…, cultural, and social…structural forces driving
consumption” (276, 284). He then advocates several institu-
tional and lifestyle measures to further sustainable consump-
tion and liberate consuming agents “locked-in by...
circumstances” (282–286). A similar analysis by Spangenberg
and Lorek sees “householdsmaking a difference” and uses the
concept of “consumption clusters” to compute “low-impact
affluence” in the interests of “eco-sufficiency” (2002, 134, 139).
Further recent works zeroing in on consumption’s negative
environmental5 impact are Rosenblatt (1999) and Princen et al.
(2002). Earlier, Jevons endorsed the sufficiency strategy to save
coal (1865, 138), and Scitovsky's analysis of addictive “status
consumption” in our “joyless economy” touched on environ-
mental problems (1976, 144, 283–284), as did that of Leiss (1976,
98–99, 139). But the ecological critique of consumption began
in earnest with Meadows et al. (1972), Schumacher (1973) and
Daly (1973) and has been continued by Johnson (1985), DurningCross (1993, 2000), Ramstad (1998), Waller and Robertson (1998),
Kasser (2002), and Brekke et al. (2003).
6 T also includes 1) organizational efficiencies like economies o
scale, Taylorite factory-floor rationality and transportation infra-
structures; 2) institutional ones like property rules, honesty
security, and trade; and 3) further cultural ones (Swaney, 1991
Durham, 1992). No one claims that increasing these efficiencies
lowers resource consumption; indeed, they are seen to contribute
unequivocally to economic growth.
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Jackson and Marks (1999). Ways of manipulating people into
consuming less are dealt with by Cook and Berrenberg (1981),
Ornstein and Ehrlich (1989), Meadows et al. (1992), Gardner
and Stern (1996), Siebenhüner (2000), Brown and Cameron
(2000), and Ekins (2004).
However, there is no better statement of both the efficiency
and the sufficiency questions than the early one of Galbraith
(1958b). In the dayswhen environmental protectionwas called
‘conservation’, he wrote that our
…gargantuan and growing appetite has become the point of
departure for all discussions of the resource problem…. [W]e
have been busily assessing reserves of various resources and
measuring the rate of depletion against the rate of discovery.
We have become concerned with the efficiency of methods
of recovery…. [T]he high rate of resource use has stirred
interest in the technology of resourceuseand substitution….
[I]nzvestment in…innovation may well substitute, at more
or less constant rates, for investment in orthodox discovery
and recovery. Thismeans, in less formidable language, that if
a country puts enough of its resources into researching new
materials or new sources of materials, it may never be short
of the old ones. (90–91)
He was one of the first to move beyond efficiency to
sufficiency:
If we are concerned about our great appetite for materials,
it is plausible to seek to increase the supply, to decrease
waste, to make better use of the stocks that are available,
and to develop substitutes. But what of the appetite itself?
Surely this is the ultimate source of the problem. If it
continues its geometric course, will it not one day have to
be restrained? Yet in the literature of the resource problem
this is the forbidden question. (92)
Presaging present challenges to consumer behavior and
moves away from exclusively working on production efficien-
cy, he notes that for instance the President's Materials Policy
Commission began its report
by stating its conviction that economic growth was
important and, in degree, sacrosanct. “First, we share the
belief of the American people in the principle of Growth.” (It
is instructive to note the commission’s use of a capital G. A
certain divinity is associated with the word.) Growth in this
context means an increasing output of consumers’ goods
and an increase in the plant by which they are supplied.
Having startedwith this renunciation, the commissionwas
scarcely in a position to look critically at consumption in
relation to the resource problem, and it did not (93).
His pioneering critique of high consumption’s low correla-
tion with satisfaction concludes that “if conservation is an
issue, then we have no honest and logical course but to
measure the means for restraining use against the means for
insuring a continuing sufficiency of supply and taking the
appropriate action. There is no justification for ruling con-
sumption levels out of the calculation” (98).3. The sufficiency rebound
This section seeks to render plausible the most important
weakness of the sufficiency strategy, namely that its effec-
tiveness is reduced by a rebound effect. To explain the sufficiency
rebound stemming from autonomous frugal behaviour, it is
necessary to describe the rebound concept in terms of its
original domain, namely (energy) efficiency. This detour is
justified moreover because the sufficiency literature often
welcomes greater technological energy efficiency (T) but
regards it as insufficient to lower impact, thus giving rise, in
the first place, to the complementary sufficiency strategy (A).
Using basic economic concepts familiar from the efficiency
rebound literature, the assertion is that due to ensuing price
drops, frugal behavior causes new consumption by others.
3.1. The efficiency rebound
While sufficiency means lowering A on the right side of I=
PAT, efficiency would lower T, not in point of toxics or risk,
but rather of material and energy inputs per unit of
production. This technological ratio measures for instance
the amount of energy put into a lumen, a ton–kilometre, a
heated cubic metre of air, or tonne of steel, as well to material
inputs likemetals, stone, glass, and plastics (all with their own
energy costs), and lower ratios constitute technological efficiency
increases.6 The belief that these relieve environmental pres-
sure is too widespread to need documentation.
However, the efficiency strategy has an Achilles heel first
elaborated by Jevons (1865, Chs. VII–XII) and known as the
backfire problem or simply as ‘Jevons’ Paradox’ (Giampietro
and Mayumi, 1998, 24–25; Alcott, 2005). Khazzoom's modern
formulation of the problem assumed positive price elasticity
of demand and observed that “...changes in [household]
appliance efficiency have a price content…[;] with increased
productivity comes a decline in the effective price of com-
modities, and... in the face of lower effective prices, demand
does not remain stagnant... but tends to increase” (1980, 22, 23;
Brookes, 1978). Holding the number of consumed units
constant then multiplying by the lower input–output ratio
achieved by new technology per unit yields the theoretical
quantity engineering savings (Binswanger, 2001, 122). Rebound
is then the percentage of this ‘savings’ not realized due to
income and price effects. If for example more efficient motors
mean that a given number of driven kilometers is newly
possible at less expense, this is the same as increased income
or purchasing power — which can then be spent on further
energy inputs even with no lowering of energy's relative price.
New demand for energy can also stem from the relative fall
in energy's price when demand drops initially following the
input-efficiency increase. In terms of production functions, if a
unit of energy can produce more, energy's new relative powerf
,
;
9 Also Sachs, 1988; Lovins, 1988, 158; Schmidt-Bleeck, 1994, 189;
Daly, 1996, 219–222; Goodland and Daly, 1996, 1009; Gardner and
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Saunders, 1992). Binswanger sums up the effects of efficien-
cy gains: “Because the equipment becomes more energy
efficient, the cost per unit of product or service that is pro-
duced with this equipment falls which, in turn, increases the
demand for the product or the service” (2001, 120; Howarth,
1997; Birol and Keppler, 2000).7
The demand-stimulating effects of the more efficient use
of any kind of input was identified by many classical
economists including Say, who attributed greater overall
wealth to the more productive use of “power” (energy):
But whence is derived this…larger supply of wealth, that
nobody pays for? From the increased command acquired
by human intelligence over the productive powers and
agents presented gratuitously by nature…. A power…
before known and available is directed with superior skill
and effect, as in the case of every improvement in
mechanism, whereby human or animal power is assisted
or expanded. (1803, 101; 295; Malthus, 1820, 49, 53–56; Rae,
1834, 29, 166, 171, 261–262; Mill, 1848, 133–134, 751)
In terms of costs of production rather than income effects,
Domar similarly noted that “[A] rapid growth of [Kendrick's]
Index [Total Factor Productivity] in any industry reduces the
prices of its output, and thus stimulates sales…” (1962, 605;
Hotelling, 1931, 137).
Estimates of the size of efficiency rebound vary wildly from
nearly zero (Lovins, 1988) to insignificant (Grubb, 1990; Von
Weizsäcker et al., 1997; Howarth, 1997; Greening et al., 2000;
Schipper and Grubb, 2000; 4CMR, 2006) to greater than 100%,
when it is called ‘backfire’ (Brookes, 1990, 2000; Greenhalgh,
1990; Giampietro andMayumi, 2000; Rudin, 2000; Dahmus and
Gutowski, 2005; Hanley et al., 2006; Herring, 2006). As rebound
approaches 100%, both the effectiveness and cost-effective-
ness of the strategy sink; if backfire pertains, the efficiency
strategy is even environmentally counterproductive.8 Analo-
gously, heated 19th-century debates concerning labour effi-
ciency eventually led to a consensus that backfire indeed
obtains: So-called ‘productivity’ increases do not in the long
run cause unemployment. (Say, 1820; Malthus, 1820, 281, 287;
Mill, 1848, 756–757; Jevons, 1865, 140; Sraffa, 1951, lvii–lx;
Greenberg, 1990; Alcott, 2005, 16–17) A further, similar rebound
or ‘feedback’ effect is identified by Kaufmann, in what is
perhaps a fatal challenge to the entire concept of the ‘material
intensity’ of a good, service, or expenditure: When labour or
capital are substituted for energy, these also have energy
costs, which “offsets some fraction of the direct energy
savings and reduces the amount of energy saved by price-
induced microeconomic substitution.” (1992, 49) Wages, for
instance, are used to demand material and energy.7 Also special issues of Energy Policy (28 (6/7) 2000) and Energy &
Environment (11 (5) 2000).
8 See further Cipolla, 1962, 49, 99; Pimentel et al. 1973, 1994;
Schurr, 1982, 5; Rosenberg, 1982, 75 and 1994, 166–167; Saunders,
1992, 2000; Clapp, 1994, 161–171; Giampietro and Mayumi, 1998,
20–24; Wirl, 1997, 19–32, 41, 112, 197; Berkout et al., 2000, 426; Roy,
2000, 433; Moezzi, 2000, 524, 528; Sieferle, 2001; Smil, 2003, 68–81;
Luks, 2005, 50–52.3.2. “Efficiency is not enough”
Sanne bolsters his argument that consumption per capita
among the affluent must be lowered by agreeing with Jevons:
Higher efficiency due to technological improvement may…
create a rebound effect: saving energy or natural resources
per unit of production results in lower costs which
encourage increased consumption. In the end, a growing
volume of activity will offset the initial gain, like futile
attempts to catch one’s own tail.” (2002, 275)
It follows that if the environmental efficiency strategy is
thus only weakly effective, or even counter-effective, the
sufficiency strategy recommends itself all themore (assuming
it is to some degree effective). Yet even many who attest the
efficiency strategy's effectiveness regard it as insufficient for
lowering impact to a sustainable level. In Ekins' view, for
instance, “The energy performance of technology can be
affected by regulation or, for example, minimum standards,
but it is not clear that this will be sufficient to achieve the large
cuts in carbon emissions that are necessary without comple-
menting changes in personal behavior in both market and
non-market choices” (2004, 1897). Smil likewise, echoing
Galbraith (1958b), advocates going “beyond higher efficiency”
to include changing “attitudes regarding the material con-
sumption and the stewardship of the biosphere” (2003, 332,
368). For Princen “A productive efficiency is an undeniably,
unassailably good thing”, but we have too long focused on that
agenda to the neglect of the consumption problem (1999, 360–
361).9
Schor's (2005, 310–312) disaffection with the efficiency
strategy includes the observation that technological solutions
are popular because they promise a “free lunch” and because
they are “apolitical… [Section 5.2]; intelligent design and
technological innovation” shall bring us (in the curt formula
of Factor Four) double the prosperity for half the resources. Her
main problem with technological approaches, though, is that
“…they fail to address increases in the scale of production and
consumption, sometimes even arguing that such increases
are not unsustainable, if enough natural-capital-saving tech-
nical change occurs;…[but] increases in scale have outpaced
technological improvements.” Note that Jevons' backfire
theory predicts this scale increase; technology can save
‘natural capital’ only per unit of output, not overall.10
Schor goes on to adopt the Veblenian position that “in
addition to the impact of rising income…competitive consump-
tion” or “luxury fever (Frank, 1999)” increases consumptionStern, 1996, 253; Bogun, 1997, 212; VonWeizsäcker et al., 1997, xvi,
244, 258, 292–295; Carley and Spapens, 1998, 51, 108; Røpke, 1999,
416–417; Sanne, 2000, 2002, 275; Siebenhüner, 2000, 19; Princen et
al., 2002; Robinson, 2004, 379; Jackson, 2005, 20.
10 The ‘technical progress’ of neo-classical growth theory is in
large part greater efficiency in the use of material/energy as well
as labour inputs. (Solow, 1957; 1970, 33–38) However, since this
school of thought defines growth in monetary or utility terms,
rather than biophysical ones, it does not necessarily support
Jevons' position.
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than it would have beenwithout energy efficiency increases, the
conclusion is mistaken that “technological change is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient condition for achieving sustainability”
(310). A correct conclusion is that the less efficate the efficiency
strategy proves to be – and especially if technological efficiency
is part of the problem due to rebounds greater than unity – the
more necessary are the further strategies of sufficiency,
consumption efficiency, population limits, energy taxes, or
quotas.
Further writers warn of backfire. Røpke for instance writes:
Obviously, the environmental benefits of a change in
consumption practices in one area can easily be counter-
balanced by increased consumption in other areas, if
overall growth is not limited [Sections 4.2 and 4.3]. For
instance, a successful policy to reduce private motoring
would imply the saving not only of energy, but of money
[the income effect], which could be converted into
extended weekends by plane to interesting places entail-
ing increased energy consumption...” (1999, 401)
Reijnders similarly attests that “improvements in technology
may be counterbalanced by increases in affluence and/or
population”, but then contradictorily asks whether “improve-
ment of technology is sufficient” to lower impact to a
sustainable level (1998, 17).
3.3. The sufficiency rebound
The position that efficiency is ‘not enough’ for sustainability
thus makes sense only if the efficiency rebound is less than
100%, i.e., only if efficiency does not contribute to physical
macroeconomic growth. This subsection claims, however,
that the sufficiency strategy likewise suffers in point of
efficacy: In constituting a drop in demand, it initially lowers
prices, and this in turn raises others’ demand, so that in theFig. 1 –Fossil fuel demand OEend some of what was ‘saved’ through non-consumption is
consumed after all — merely by others. Analogous to the en-
gineering savings theoretically achievable through technical
change, the environmentally motivated drop in consumption
is here called sufficiency savings and is likewise only theoretical;
marginal consumers (Inhaber, 1997, xii; Wirl, 1997, 32) take up
the slack left by the newly frugal people who have left the
market. The analysis in this subsection holds for consumption
of raw materials (metals, energy); whether it applies equally
well to other consumption items such as food, water, or
clothing is an open question.
The description of the sufficiency rebound in terms of price
and income changes is simpler than that of the efficiency
rebound. The chain of economic events here under discussion
starts with an autonomous reduction in demand for or
consumption of natural resources. In economic terms it
amounts to a change in consumers' ‘tastes’ wherein they
exchange, on average, some materially-derived utility for the
emotional or ethical utility of reducing their own pressure on
the environment. Instead of thinking in terms of small
increments, imagine an overnight behavioural change:
Moved by the desire to ease up on the environment OECD
consumers decide to buy, say, 20% less fossil fuel than before.
This sufficiency shift initially leaves 20% of their purchasing
power unused; because these ex-consumers, ceteris paribus,
work less, at this point in the dynamic demand is destroyed.
The sufficiency rebound then amounts to a passive, rather
than intentional, transfer of purchasing power to marginal
consumers. Themechanism at work is that of price reductions
of goods, services, and energy inputs themselves.
Fig. 1 shows, in terms of classical economics' laws of supply
and demand, the results of a leftward sufficiency shift in the
OECD demand function from D0 OECD to D1 OECD. The graph
shows Q0 WORLD (=Q0 OECD+Q0 OTHER) and P0 (World price) given
by the intersection of Swith D0 WORLD (itself the sum of D0 OECD
and D0 OTHER). Holding both World supply function and price
constant, then the sufficiency lurch, entailing as it does aCD, non-OECD and World.
Fig. 2 –Possible new equilibrium.
11 Market globalisation and the global nature of depletion and
emissions damage lessen the usefulness of country studies.
(Saint-Paul, 1995; Brown et al., 1998, 114; Cleveland and Ruth,
1998, 44–45; Dahlström and Ekins, 2006) In the efficiency-rebound
literature this is often acknowledged (Grubb, 1990, 195, 235;
Greenhalgh, 1990, 298; Hinchliffe, 1995, 94; Howarth, 1997, 4;
Greene et al., 1999, 28; Roy, 2000, 433; Greening et al., 2000, 392;
Saunders, 2000, 439; Binswanger, 2001, 124; Rhee and Chung,
2006).
12 Also Harris, 1984, 40; Krautkraemer, 1998; Cleveland and
Kaufmann, 2003. Most literature unfortunately starts with price
rises like those of the mid-1970s.
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quantities Q1 WORLD and Q1 OECD, both of which are less than
the original Q0 quantities.
That is, the sufficiency shift in the OECD demand function is
such that by definition ΔQOECD=a reduction or (theoretical)
‘sufficiency savings’ of 20% of Q0 OECD: Prices fall and non-OECD
(‘Other’) demand rises; to what height depends on non-OECD
price elasticities of demand; technology and S are held constant.
The imagined overnight demand reduction by OECD con-
sumers shifts the world demand function of which it is a part
from D0 WORLD to D1 WORLD. The intersection of S and D1 WORLD
yields the new lower price P1. For non-OECD countries (DOTHER),
the new, lower price (P1) yields Q2 OTHER which is greater than
Q0 OTHER. Part of the resource savings realized by the OECD
consumers is thus ‘taken back’ or wiped out by the classical
economic behavior of others. At this price OECD countries
consume Q2 OECD. (Note that there is no Q1 OTHER because there
was no shift in Other's demand function. Note further that at
(the lower) price P1, D1 OECD would yield some increase in
consumption, namely Q2 OECD minus Q1 OECD; but we have
assumed this away: regardless of price, OECD consumers
consume 20% less than before.) Total consumption Q2 WORLD
(given by the intersection of D1 WORLD and S) now results from
the 20% reduction in consumption of the OECD countries plus
the increase in consumption of other countries. The sufficien-
cy rebound is Q2 OTHER minus Q0 OTHER. The theoretical quantity
‘sufficiency savings’ (Q0 OECDminusQ1 OECD) is exactly the same
as the theoretical quantity Q0 WORLD minus Q1 WORLD. The
overall effect, or real savings (Q0 WORLD minus Q2 WORLD), is
smaller:Worldwide real savingsmustbe lower than the savings
initially achieved by a successful sufficiency strategy.
Wackernagel and Rees attest this same rebound in terms of
nations as consumer units (and without mentioning price
changes):
Indeed the very integration of the global economy
mitigates against any individual country adopting the
ecological alternative: the marginal global benefits result-
ing from one nation's restraint would quickly be dissipated
by non-cooperating countries, all of which have open
access to the ecosphere (1997, 22).
In conclusion, insofar as the sufficiency strategy expects
consumption to remain at the level reached by subtracting the
OECD frugality alone (‘sufficiency savings’) it is unrealistic.
3.4. Empirical measurement
Whether anynetworldwide real savings results – i.e. howclose
Q2 WORLD is to Q0 WORLD – depends on many things, but the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the rebound itself are
only 1) any amount of latent demand by marginal consumers
and 2) any amount of supplier profit (any upward-sloping
supply function). That is, price elasticitiesmustmerely benon-
zero. When the utility curve of anyone is such that a purchase
happens at the incrementally lower price, and the profit
situation of any producer is such that supply continues at
this price, the level of consumption cannot remain at the level
computed by subtracting the foregone consumption of newly
frugal people, but must rebound.But how could one measure sufficiency rebound? Assum-
ing that the sufficiency behavior itself were measurable – the
previous section simply assumed a 20% reduction in con-
sumption [Section 5.1] –what would be themagnitudes of more
demand and/or less supply of fossil fuels worldwide? Quan-
tification would have to estimate the initial price fall and the
slopes of the respective supply and demand functions,
predicting the new equilibrium. Fig. 2 shows extreme cases
of low and high sufficiency rebound, its size being some
function of the ratio of the two elasticities (see also Larsen and
Nesbakken, 1997). Keep in mind that the appropriate scope or
scale of empirical studiesmust be the world economy, not any
individual country or group of countries such as the OECD.11
First, howwould producers react? Although estimates of the
price elasticity of supply vary widely, much opinion holds that
rents and profits in the fossil fuel sector are large enough to
tolerate a considerable price fall (Katzner, 1987, 555; Wirl, 1991,
242; 1994, 79; Shim and Siegel, 1995, 322; Noreng, 2002, 9–10, 14;
Salameh, 2003, 1090;Horn, 2004, 269, 271, 275; but seeKaufmann
andCleveland, 2001; Noreng, 2002, 8–9; Smil, 2003, 87) Second, is
a historical worldwide demand curve feasible? Research is
found for instance in Smil's analysis of total consumption of
electricity and fossil fuels over long periods, showing rising
quantities alongside (despite?) falling relative energy prices in
terms of purchasing power (2003, 6–10, 82–84, 149–153; also
Schurr and Netschert, 1960, 156; Cleveland et al., 1984, 896;
Cleveland and Kaufmann, 2003, 486). Variability in elasticity
estimates seems to depend on scale of study and economies
studied. Also relevant is the cause of the price decline— in our
case a sufficiency shift as opposed to technological efficiency
increases, quantity of remaining reserves, or political (e.g. OPEC)
decisions.12
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Is a sufficiency rebound greater than unity possible? Some
writers mention the possibility that, per unit of affluence at
the margin, the consumption of the poor could be more
environmentally damaging that of the rich. (Khazzoom, 1980,
26; Goodland and Daly, 1996, 1013; Schipper, 2000, 353;
Binswanger, 2001, 126; Shi, 2003, 32, 38–39). A bus ride in
Colombia might burn more fuel per kilometer than one in
Switzerland, or – eschewing the North/South imagery – a
museum visit might use up fewer resources than a hungrier
person's eating a meal. In terms of Environmental Kuznets
Curves,13 the sufficiency shift might move the world economy
to a position where consumption rises more steeply over
against income.
Deciding whether the strategy is efficate or counter-
productive thus entails testing for the theoretical conditions
for a sufficiency backfire, using worldwide data. However,
Section 3 has merely attempted to enrich the discussion with
the concept of the sufficiency rebound, whose existence is a
certainty. While efficiency rebound is conceptually established
and increasingly corrected for (4CMR, 2006; Allan et al., 2006),
post-frugality rebound is as yet unacknowledged. Discussions
concern motivations for frugality, psychological and social
barriers to it, how to sell the idea, and how to garner the same
number of consumer satisfaction units in spite of it but now
we should examine interdependencies within the affluence
(A) factor itself — the necessary rise in the affluence of
marginal consumers.4. Weaknesses in argumentation
Section 3 showed that the strategy cannot be effective to
the full extent of the original ‘sufficiency savings’. Yet since
it remains possible that the strategy is to some degree
effective, i.e., that rebound is lower than 100% of sufficiency
savings, the next four sections explore weaknesses either
in the arguments for the strategy, or in estimates of the
attainability of the initial, voluntary change in behaviour
towards frugality.
4.1. ‘North’ and ‘South’
Most expositions of the sufficiency strategy conflate the
categories of rich and poor with those of North and South or
developed vs. developing countries. As Leiss paradigmatically
wrote,
The one-third of the human population in the industrially
developed nations currently uses 90% of the available
resources; it is the exponential increase of their demands,
not those of the human population as a whole, which is
the real and immediate cause of the emerging global
crisis…. It is the unforgivable squandering of resources in13 The vertical axis (dependent variable) of such curves must be
in absolute rather than per capita units (Opschoor, 1995; De Bruyn
and Opschoor, 1997; Luzzati and Orsini, in press).the developed countries…that currently determines the
general direction of the global ‘political economy’ and that
constitutes the source of potential future disasters for the
entire human population.” (1976, 98, 99)
He quotes Paul Ehrlich: “The most serious population growth
occurs among the affluent whites of the USA, and their
analogues in Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan.
These people are the prime looters and polluters of our
planet.” (139)
‘North’ is here surrogate for ‘rich’, and since for ethical
reasons the strategy aims only at the rich, the target becomes,
as expressed by Sanne, “Northern consumption as overcon-
sumption and unsustainable” or the “Western consumption
pattern” (2002, 282, 274). Daly and Goodland similarly write
that because rich countries consumemore per capita, wemust
“look at consumption patterns in the North” (1996, 1015).
Røpke, incidentally avoiding the mistake of arguing in per
capita terms, writes that “the growing consumption of the
North constitutes an important part of global environmental
problems” (1999, 399, 401). The implicit syllogism is that the
rich consume more than the poor; the rich are (predominant-
ly) in the North; therefore Northern consumption must be
lowered (also UNCED, 1993, Ch. 4; Hinterberger et al., 1996, 85;
Homburg and Matthies, 1998, 121; Kasser, 2002, 92).
However, openness between economies means that suffi-
ciency-induced lower prices are known everywhere. Goods,
services, fossil fuels, and people cross borders increasingly
unhindered. Marginal consumers taking up the slack are
wherever there is purchasing power. Higher demand in recent
years from ‘developing’ economies supports this view. Yet the
relevant metric for environmental impact is only the total
amount of depleted resources or ambient amounts of emis-
sions: Nature does not ‘care’ which countries pollute, or what
per capita pollution is. “Because of the universal nature of
world trade, the concept of ‘carrying capacity’ is difficult to
apply to a nation or region.” (Bartlett, 1994, 26) We should thus
follow Princen in adding “southern elites” and the “rich in
developing countries” to the rough concept of ‘Northern’ (1999,
360), or Myers in writing neutrally of “affluent communities”
(1997, 53; Spangenberg and Lorek, 2002, 127).
For the economics of global consumption and pollution the
terms ‘Western’, ‘Northern’, and even ‘developed’ are largely
gratuitous, as recognized by both Ayres (2000) and Opschoor
(2000) in questioning the value of computing national or
regional ‘ecological footprints’, and the simpler taxonomy of
relatively rich and relatively poor is preferable. One strategy
framed accordingly in worldwide terms is that of “contrac-
tion and convergence”, whose premise is that the atmo-
sphere is a limited global commons and that “Anything less
than a global deal cannot solve climate change” (Simms,
2005, 167, 173); while rich people have a moral “ecological
debt” – taking more than their fair share – there will always
be “…the problem of uncontrollable greenhouse gas emis-
sions from free-riding countries.” (173) Poor free-riders can
also ruin the deal, and it is not sufficient for the rich to
consume less; rather, everybody must be democratically
mutually coerced.
While emissions do not carry source labels, politics may
require that rich nations reduce first. (Goodland and Daly,
14 Because the emissions of most poor countries are not capped,
the Delhi version of the Kyoto agreement undoubtedly results in
higher consumption in the remaining nations, a step for equality
but not one for lowering impact.
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rich nations must morally “take the lead” towards sufficiency.
(UNCED, 1992, Ch. 4) A country that involuntarily lives
‘sufficiently’ cannot be expected to adopt the role of a follower,
just as it is unproven that the poor emulate the rich in
‘overconsumption’. The paternalism and the donning of the
hair shirt implicit in this concept of ‘leadership’ do not support
the case for sufficiency.
4.2. Sufficiency is morally good
Yet not only could voluntary ‘Northern’ frugality under certain
conditions result in a rich, overconsuming ‘South’. Even when
‘rich’ is not equated with ‘North’, the common claim that the
rich are responsible for negative impact is ambiguous, as
when Spangenberg and Lorek write that “…there is a
consensus that particular responsibility for the level, compo-
sition and impact of consumption” rests with this “class” of
affluent consumers (2002, 128): ‘Responsible’ means both
‘causally efficacious’ and ‘morally culpable’. (also Siebenhü-
ner, 2001, 23) In the first, causal or non-normative sense that
the rich are consuming the lion’s share, the claim is
tautological. The concepts of marginal consumers and suffi-
ciency rebound in Section 3 imply furthermore that the
affluent are easily replaced by the slightly less affluent, who
would then in their turn assume this ‘responsibility’ ad
infinitum.
In the ethical rather than biophysical sense, on the other
hand, the claim that the rich should consume less is
straightforward and arguable as a moral assertion (also
Goodland and Daly, 1996, 1009). Both for traditionally ethical
reasons of human equity and on the newer ethical grounds of
environmental concern, Smil too writes that “…shaping the
future energy use in the affluent world is primarily a moral
issue....” (2003, 370), while Greenhalgh sardonically observes
that “The fear of environmental damage... has introduced an
ethical or moral dimension into the argument [over continued
economic growth]. Excessive or wasteful consumption and
associated pollution which it causes is sinful; frugality is a
virtue” (1990, 293).
The exact bearing of the moral goodness of frugality on the
fight to lower impact, however, is not clear. Let us distinguish
three ethical goals: 1) intragenerational equality or justice,
especially alleviation of poverty; 2) intergenerational justice;
and 3) the preservation and health of non-human species and
the biosphere in general. Let us further distinguish the ethical
motivation for frugality from its consequences. Judged accord-
ing to motivation, voluntary frugality is on all three counts
‘good’. But unless eschewed consumption is accompanied by
an explicit transfer of purchasing power either to present
poorer people or in general to future people does the
envisioned good consequence of greater intra- or intergenera-
tional equality actually happen. (Pearce, 1987) Without this
explicit transfer, the beneficiary of the income effect could be
an affluent neighbour who heats his swimming pool more
often. As Robinson notes (albeit concerning efficiency rather
than sufficiency), it is “…easy to imagine cases where the
gains from such approaches are appropriated disproportion-
ately by those who already are well-off…” (2004, 379) When
combined with a gift to a poorer person conditions are at leastfulfilled for intragenerational ethical behavior. But a personal
shift to frugality guarantees neither less impact, nor more
present equality, nor more intergenerational equality. More-
over, even explicit transfers fall short of sustainable impact to
the extent that either higher population results, or the
consumption patterns of the poorer recipients are somehow
environmentally more detrimental than those of the previous
consumers. (Siebenhüner, 2000, 19; Section 3.5). Brown and
Cameron similarly make
…an important conceptual distinction between prosocial
values and proenvironmental values: Individuals may be
prosocial (altruistic and cooperative) but not proenviron-
mental (value sustainability of environmental resources).
It is possible, however, that a well-developed pro-environ-
mental position must include prosocial values involving:
(1) altruistic motivations to sacrifice personal gain by
limiting resource consumption in order to promote
environmental integrity; and (2) cooperative orientations
to use only one's fair share of resources and to act in ways
to ensure that others are allowed their fair share. In effect,
prosocial values may be necessary, but not sufficient
conditions for guaranteeing proenvironmental values.’
(2000, 38–39)
One way of acting on proenvironmental values, that of frugal
personal behavior, is in any case weakened by the sufficiency
rebound.
The other two goals above – more equal distribution
towards future humans and less impact on non-human
nature – thus require further conditions. The view that “…
justice implies sustainability” (Pearce, 1987, 13) is true only if
“justice” is meant intergenerationally. Put otherwise, a per-
fectly just present distribution of resources is consistent with
crassly unsustainable consumption of resources as well as
crass disregard for future people. Intratemporal equality, at a
too-large scale of the economy, can amount to unjust inter-
temporal material standards of living. And again, the suffi-
ciency rebound weakens any connection between avoided
consumption on anybody's part and sustainability. Pearce is
right, though, that leaving all future generations a quantity
and quality of resources necessary for life is more or less the
same as respecting biophysical constraints in the present.
Judged both by motivation and consequences, one type of
ethically good transfer from rich to poor is the purchase of
emissions certificates held by poorer countries in ‘Kyoto’
schemes. But since the latter can and do buy fossil fuels with
the proceeds,14 such transfers in the name of equity do not
ipso facto reduce impact. Thus it is true that “Wasteful
consumption in rich countries must be reduced to allow for
needed growth in poor countries…”, but it does not follow that
“more equitable and efficient patterns of energy use… close
the gap between rich and poor and reduce environmental
damage comparedwith that which will result if current trends
continue”. (Ehrlich, 2000, 322) Intragenerational equity and the
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reasons Princen writes, “If the problem is one of inequity, no
analytic advantage is gained by calling it consumption. Adding
the environment and calling the problem consumption only
muddles the longstanding debates of North and South, haves
and have-nots, rich and poor, powerful and powerless, to
include environmental inequities.” (1999, 352) Or as Pearce
says, “…the design of an economy such that it maximizes
some measure of social (human) welfare but subject to
biophysical constraints will assist in, but will not be sufficient
for, attainment of the notion of extended justice.” (1987, 10) In
other words, a sustainable human economy could be pres-
ently unjust as well as indifferent to non-human nature.
For Goodland and Daly poverty reduction “will require
considerable economic growth, as well as development, in
developing countries. But global environmental constraints
are real, and more growth for the South must be balanced by
negative throughput growth [sic.] for the North if environmen-
tal sustainability is to be achieved.” (1996, 1004). But since this
“balancing” could leave impact unaffected, this conflates
ethical goals with sustainability. Lower A and T among the
rich is necessary but not sufficient for lower-impact-cum-
justice, and even “large-scale transfers to the poorer countries”
(1004) do not suffice because, again, “sustainability” and
“intragenerational equity” (1005) are not the same. The
sufficiency strategy does not suffice to solve conflicts between
the humanist goal of present-daymaterial equality and that of
sustainable (eternally reproducible) impact.
4.3. Two birds with one stone
Many arguments for living lightly, downshifting and shrinking
one's environmental footprint appeal not to ethics or envi-
ronmentalism but to one's own good. Riding a bicycle is not
only environmentally friendly but healthy; working and
spending less, eating less, and in general possessing less
leaves us with more free time, less noise, less stress, less body
weight and less local pollution. In the early 1960s I eaves-
dropped on the discussions of business executives ‘dropping
out’ of the ‘rat-race’; in the late 1960s ‘everybody’ acquired this
wisdom, captured by Etzioni's diagnostic term for the costs of
a high-consumption lifestyle – “affluenza” (1998, 626). Insights
from this line of thought, appealing to one's selfish interests,
are mobilized in socially marketing the sufficiency strategy;
two birds can be brought down with one stone.
The knowledge thatmaterial wealth doesn’t buy happiness is
as old as the hills (De Botton, 2000, 56–72, 97–99; Easterlin, 1973;
Hirsch, 1976;Argyle, 1987;Diener et al., 1993; Kasser, 2002; but see
Veenhoven, 1991) FromThoreau on, environmentally concerned
writers have regarded this argument as an ally in pursuing
environmental goals— recently Boulding (1949–50, 1966), Linder
(1970), Scitovsky (1976), Schor (1992), Durning (1992), Goodland
and Daly (1996), Orr (1999), Princen et al. (2002), Sanne (2002) and
Jackson (2005). In bolstering an argument for rationing, one
author argues:
Research shows that people's happiness rises along with
conventional wealth only up to the point that our needs for
basics like adequate warmth, food, clothing, and shelter are
met. After that our well-being depends on other things likefriendships, opportunities for creativity and the quality of our
family relationships. This means that with better awareness
of what really gives us a sense of well-being, by ignoring the
adverts, we could actually consume less and be happier.
(Simms, 2005, 187)
Simms backs his case up with evidence from World War II
Britain, where both legal and voluntary frugality left people
fitter (155–164).
While pointing out the personal, selfish advantages of
riding one's bike, or the aesthetic beauty of natural landscape,
or the disadvantages of breathing dirty street air are useful
parts of the story, there are some difficulties with this
argument. First, the jury is still out concerning this hypothesis
that, above a certain level, greater affluence does not mean
greater happiness: Much ‘luxury’ consumption fulfills deep
psychological desires, e.g. for prestige, thus contributing to
‘happiness’. Second, even if the thesis is somehow true,
evolutionary forces may interfere with our doing what we
rationally see as our own good; the everyday examples of
overeating and unrequited love suffice for illustration. Evolu-
tionary forces seeking ‘status’ or ‘display’ or ‘conspicuous’
consumption may indeed be virtually ineradicable; and the
bad consequence for the environmental sufficiency strategy is
that since the purported benefits of such prestige consump-
tion are relative to others' consumption, the sky is the limit (see
Veblen, 1899; Ornstein and Ehrlich, 1989; Konrad, 1990; Low
and Heinen, 1993; Morrison, 1999; Frank, 1999; Jackson, 2002;
Alcott, 2004).
Third, the argument maintains that the great majority of
human beings has for centuries or millenia acted to its own
detriment — a strong claim based on no discernable theory
that challenges evolutionary theory at its roots. On this view
materialistic, ‘overconsuming’ behaviour is not selfish after
all, but rather anti-selfish and pathological also. Again, from
the vantage of human ethology, this claim that we systemat-
ically act in certain ways even though costs outweigh benefits
bears the burden of proof. Alternatively, one must claim for
instance that those with economic and political power force
us, in their own interest and perhaps subtly through advertis-
ing, etc., to ‘overconsume’ (Galbraith, 1958a; Packard, 1959;
1960). Some authors recognise that they owe us an explana-
tion of why, judged on these apparently simple, selfish
criteria, we choose to live so stupidly (Schor, 1999a,b, 138;
Frank, 1999, 7; Cross, 1993, 2000). Others offer selfish reasons
for frugality apparently without this awareness (Mirrlees,
1991, 64; Ekins, 1991, 253, Princen, 1999, 357; Kasser, 2002). At
the least, sufficiency strategists who enlist this argument for
environmental ends must 1) offer a more careful rendering
of the hoary concept of human welfare than hitherto, and
2) explain ‘overconsumption’.
4.4. The political vs. the personal
The sufficiency strategy is most often conceived as a sum of
individual behavioural changes. The view of Meadows et al. is
representative: People who “care about other people” thereby
contribute to staying within the limits; they advocate “fifty
simple things you can do to save the planet” such as to “buy an
energy-efficient car [and] recycle your bottles and cans”
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19; Durning, 1992; Orr, 1999; Green Media, 2007; Union of
Concerned Scientists, 2007). To the extent that the personal is
local, the slogan ‘Think globally, act locally’ captures this
philosophy. British politician Gordon Brown similarly asserts
the necessity that
…decisions made by national governments must be
matched by individual actions. We all have a responsibility
to do what we can to tackle environmental degradation. So
I believe what we do as a community nationally and
internationally must be matched by a new sense of
personal responsibility.’ (2006, 2)
This regards the personal and the political as equally
valuable, but I hope to have shown that personal behavioural
change is at most a necessary condition for sustainability and
that it is thus questionable whether it adds significantly much
to “decisions made by national governments.”
The position of this paper, that personal responsibility
resulting in changed consumption behaviour is not an alter-
native to collective measures, is seemingly shared by Sanne
(2002). He clearly distinguishes between the consumer and the
citizen and advocates collective, non-personal measures like
“halting (or reducing) production volumes— as radical greens
propose...” (285), just as we as citizens already force ourselves
to pay taxes, go to school, and obey traffic lights and public
smoking bans (275, 281 [but see 273]; Sagoff, 1988). Indeed, the
income tax is a good example of such mutually agreed-upon
mutual coercion: No one argues that we should want to pay
them, but we politically agree to — i.e., provided everybody
elsemust.Worldwide reduction of affluence, to be achieved by
world citizens, thus requires a philosophy of ‘Think globally,
act globally.’ Only prescribed caps leaving no room for free-
riders or marginal consumers to take up slack are not subject
to an affluence rebound (also Ornstein and Ehrlich, 1989; De
Young, 1993; Stern et al., 1995; Milbraith, 1995; Gardner and
Stern, 1996; Siebenhüner, 2000). In spite of these reservations,
however, there is truth in the sufficiency strategy's insight
that one can say of any person who newly lives lightly, ‘One
down, 6,499,999,999 to go.’5. Discussion
Three further questions to be briefly discussed are: 1) What
amount of depletion-and emission-reduction is possible and/
or expected by those who urge greater frugality? 2) What can
be said more generally about the advisability of strategies
aiming indirectly at impact by altering population, affluence,
and technological factors as opposed to strategies, like the
Kyoto Protocol, that aim directly at impact? 3) Finally, how are
consumption taxes to be classified?
5.1. Quantification
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 raised questions on measuring rebound;
different ones arise concerning measurement of the theoret-
ical sufficiency savings itself, of which rebound is a percent-
age. As established earlier, these are limited by the ethicalcriterion that only the rich shall cut consumption. But
definitions of ‘rich’ and ‘sufficient’ are needed in order to
quantify both the number of people targeted by the strategy as
well as how much per person counts as ‘over’-consumption.
Indeed, without some criterion based on the traditional
distinction between needs as opposed to mere wants, no
consumption is less necessary or justified than any other, and
the sufficiency appeal simply targets those who may feel
altruistic. That is, the whole concept of sufficiency would lose
meaning. To better define and measure this building block of
the strategy design, a rich literature is available: In addition to
the classical economists and the 19th-century socialist
tradition of Owen and Ruskin, as well as Maslow (1943),
Baudrillard (1970), and Kasser (2002), writers who have
pursued this in the economics tradition are Hobson (1929),
Max-Neef (1995), or Jackson and Marks (1999). For overviews
see McAdams (1992) and Brekke et al. (2003, 30, 38).
Common ostensive definitions of dispensable or at least
negotiable consumption include that of meat, cosmetics, air
travel, large houses, and SUVs, and it is not difficult to
calculate amounts of joule inputs, or emissions, per unit of
these physical outputs. Alternatively, computations could be
monetary, in terms of purchasing-power-parity; perhaps
corrected by a material-intensity co-efficient. As is required
of any global environmental strategy, this calculated amount
of maximum possible sufficiency savings would then have to
be measured against a level of impact deemed to be the
maximum consistent with sustainability — e.g., perhaps 450
ppm for CO2 (Wackernagel and Rees, 1997; Hinterberger et al.,
1996, 84–88). It is beyond the limits of both my knowledge and
this paper to cite any rigorous research quantifying sufficiency
savings (before price changes and rebound). But at the least it
seems mistaken to talk merely of curbing the demand of
“humanity” (Wackernagel and Silverstein, 2000, 394).
Quantifications of sustainable consumption, yielding some
maximum per capita affluence at a given population, could
however challenge our humanistic belief that large numbers of
people can live not only healthily but comfortably. Only such
an honest comparison of quantified sufficient consumption
with quantified sustainable consumption can help us to judge
whether hopes for thiswin–win situation between ecology and
economy are justified. Gordon Brown for instance claims:
We can and should demonstrate that economic growth,
social justice and environmental care can and must
advance together. For years no international concensus
has been possible that recognises how our global duty of
stewardship to the environment can be discharged while
delivering economic and social progress. (2006)
However, political acceptability aside, all environmental strate-
giesmust face the empirical possibility and emotional dilemma
that some combination of population and affluencewould have
tobe lowered to intragenerationallyunacceptable levels if justice
toward future humans and other species is to be achieved.
5.2. Right-side vs. left-side strategies
The I=PAT identity, implyingas itdoes that changes inaffluence
or technology directly change impact, holds only aggregately —
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However, any change in population, affluence, or technology
changes the other two factors: Agricultural technology allows a
larger population, higher affluence can lower (or raise) the birth
rate, high consumption (P×A) makes us use more efficient
technologies, etc. Bartlett for instance writes,
Reductions in the rates of consumption of resources and
reductions in the rates of production or pollution can shift
the carrying capacity in the direction of sustaining a larger
population…. When resources are used more efficiently,
the consequence often is that the ‘saved’ resources are not
put aside for the use of future generations, but instead are
used immediately to encourage and support larger popu-
lations.’ (1994, 21, 23; Jevons, 1865, 9, 196, 200, 457, Ch. X;
Cipolla, 1962, 49–53, 94–95, 105; Giampietro, 1994; Daly,
1996, 220; Smil, 2003, 55)
Due to these interdependencieswemust therefore abandon
I=PAT and write I= f(P,A,T). Moreover, Section 3.3 showed
shifts of demand among consumer groupswithin the affluence
term A. That is, the sufficiency rebound is described by A1=
f(A2): A value-induced reduction in the affluence of person 1
enables the affluence of person 2 to rise, and the ‘sufficiency
savings’ does not necessarily ever ‘get over to’ the left side of
the equation to lower impact.
‘Direct’ or ‘left-side’ strategies do exist, exemplified by
the UNFCCC attempt to set global greenhouse-gas emissions
caps within which country caps are politically allocated,
leaving each political unit to decide on the most desirable
and/or economically efficient mixture of population, afflu-
ence, and technological measures. Once the exo-market
country caps have drawn the ‘Plimsoll line’ of each economy,
then adjustments in the right-side factors follow with little
further detailed regulation, perhaps through tradable
rations. (Fawcett, 2004, 1077–1078; Ophuls, 1977; Pearce,
1987, 17; Daly, 1991, 42; Røpke, 1999, 401)
On the other hand, in the absence of overall caps on the
system right-side strategies must depend on and integrate
flanking or complementary strategies regarding the other right-
side factors. Perhaps it is possible to compute a super-strategy of
simultaneous and co-ordinated changes between and within all
three factors, effectively lowering I. But aswithall environmental
strategies, the costs of design, administration, transaction and
implementation must be scrutinized in order to measure cost-
effectiveness.15 The intuition here is that direct measures – by
definition effective – are likely to show the better cost-effective-
ness ratio than indirect ones, in line with Daly's suggestion that
“…throughput [be] controlled at its input (depletion) rather than
at thepollutionendbecausephysical control is easier at thepoint
of lower entropy” (1974, 20).1615 The project of balancing life-cycle efficiency, renewable
energy, green taxes, sufficiency, and population control has been
criticized as tinkering and social engineering (Sachs, 1988; Rudin,
2000). But it does provide us with lessons of how to maximize
welfare once limits are politically set.
16 Analogously, within smaller political units, it is infrastructure
limitation which most cost-effectively lowers impact: Road traffic
can be controlled by laws limiting parking spaces and air traffic by
airport runway capacity.5.3. Taxes
Taxes, for instance on fossil fuels, in effect force us to increase
technological and consumption efficiency as well as lower our
personal sufficiency standards. In common with other right-
side measures, however, these resource or depletion taxes
only contingently lower impact. Again, when we react by
making production more efficient or consumption more
sufficient, prices (including the tax) fall and some of the effect
is “taken back” (Pearce, 1987, 14). Eco-taxes would accordingly
have to be periodically raised. Moreover, when the govern-
ment refunds the revenue or spends it itself, a tax rebound
results because demand is thereby generated for, among other
things, the taxed fossil fuels. Hannon, therefore, while
discussing the possible energy savings of large “consumption
shifts”, writes that “…the amount of net energy savings might
be small because of the respending effect…. In any event,
there is a limit to the savings that can be realized by such life-
style changeswhich preserve the national income” (1975, 100).
The concept of the sufficiency rebound shows that such limits
to savings also exist when the changes do not preserve the
national income.
Wackernagel and Rees accordingly maintain that the
environment can “afford cost-saving energy efficiency…only
if efficiency gains are taxed away or otherwise removed from
further economic circulation” (1997, 20; Greene, 1992, 118;
Binswanger, 2001, 131). The purchasing power newly in the
hands of government, or restored to citizens through refunds
or lowering other taxes, would somehow have to be destroyed
or perhaps invested in renewable resources.17 For these
reasons Hannon prefers left-side measures: “Another method
that would conserve energy, and that is more fundamental
than taxation, would be energy rationing through the use of
coupons” (1975, 101). This subsection merely suggests that
such tax rebound problems be formally integrated not only
into the ‘double-dividend’ debate but into environmental
policy generally — to date seldom the case (e.g. Goodstein,
2003; Parry and Williams, 2004; Sterner and Isaksson, 2006).6. Conclusions
The environmental sufficiency strategy of greater consumer
frugality has become popular in ecological economics, its
attractiveness increasing alongwith awareness that notmuch
can be done to stem population growth and that energy-
efficiency measures are either not enough or, due to backfire,
part of the problem. Concerning the strategy's feasibility,
effectiveness, and common rationale, several conclusions can
be drawn.
• The consequences of the strategy's frugality demand shift –
price reduction and the ensuing consumption rebound – are
not yet part of mainstream discussion.
• Contrary to what is implied by the strategy's advocates, the
frugality shift cannot achieve a one-to-one reduction in17 One reviewer made the neglected point that higher fossil fue
prices increase the pressure on biomass, e.g. forests.l
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consumers increase their consumption.
• The size of the sufficiency rebound is an open question.
• The concepts of ‘North’ and ‘South’ are not relevant to the
consumption discussion.
• Even if the voluntary material consumption cuts by the rich
would effect some lowering of total world consumption,
changing human behaviour through argument and exhor-
tation is exceedingly difficult.
• While our moral concern for present others is stronger than
that for future others, this intragenerational equity is in no
way incompatible with non-sustainable impact.
• Since savings effected by any one country or individual can
be (more than) compensated by other countries and
individuals, the relevant scale of any strategy is the world.
• No single strategy to change any given right-side factor in
I= f(P,A,T) guarantees any effect on impact whatsoever.
• Right-side strategies in combination are conceptually com-
plicated and perhaps more costly than explicitly political
left-side strategies directly lowering impact.
• Research emphasis should be shifted towards measures to
directly lower impact both in termsof depletion and emissions.
Lower consumption may have advantages on the individ-
ual, community, or regional level. There is for instance some
truth in the view of Diogenes that happiness and quantity of
consumption do not necessarily rise proportionally. Living
lightly can offer not only less stress and more free time but
also the personal boon of a better sense of integrity, fulfilling
the Kantian criterion that one’s acts should be possible
universally (worldwide). Locally it could mean cleaner air,
less acid rain, less noise, less garbage, and more free space.
And in the form of explicit, guaranteed shifts of purchasing
power to poorer people it would enable others to eat better or
to buy goods such as petrol and cars.
However, given global markets and marginal consumers,
one person’s doing without enables another to ‘do with’: In the
near run the former consumption of a newly sufficient person
can get fully replaced. And given the extent of poverty and the
temptations of luxury and prestige consumption, this near run
is likely to be longer than the time horizon required for a
relevant strategy to stem climate change and the loss of vital
species and natural resources.
Efficiency and sufficiency strategies both offer relatively
painless solutions to non-sustainability.18 The former is
praised by ‘negawatt’ advocates not only as a free lunch, but
one you are paid to eat. The latter appears to many of its
addressees tolerable— switching off a few lights, riding a bike,
or eating less meat, and here, too, a lunch you are paid to eat
comes in the form of various health and happiness benefits.
Supply-side or other impact-side strategies, on the other hand,
are hard. They confront us with the neglected question of the
carrying capacity of the planet. But strictly following sustain-
ability logic by capping extraction and/or emissions – ‘cost’
what it may – collides with our hopes and humanism.
Efficiency deals with the ‘how’, the material and social
technology, of our wealth-making; sufficiency speaks to us18 The business community welcomes efficiency (but not suffi-
ciency) research.at the border between our needs and our (mere) wants, and to
our inborn desire for justice. Neither addresses the taboo of
population size. Both strategies distract us from the insight
that nature limits us.Acknowledgments
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Contrary to conventional wisdom, more efﬁcient use of energy may actually through rebound effects
lead to greater instead of less total consumption of energy—or at least to no diminution of energy
consumption. If so, energy efﬁciency strategies may serve goals of raising economic growth and
afﬂuence, but as an environmental or energy policy strategy could backﬁre, leading to more resource
use in absolute terms rather than less. This, in turn, could in the long run hamper economic growth, for
instance if resource scarcity crowds out technical change. The hypothesis that rebound is greater than
unity (‘backﬁre’) predicts the observed real-world correlation between rising energy consumption and
rising efﬁciency of energy services, however difﬁcult it may be to deﬁne a precise holistic metric for the
latter. The opposing hypothesis, i.e. that rebound is less than unity and that energy efﬁciency increases
therefore result in less energy consumption than before, requires on the other hand strong forces that do
account for the empirically observed economic growth. This paper summarises some of the discussions
around the rebound effect, puts it into perspective to economic growth, and provides some insights at
the end that can guide future empirical research on the rebound topic.
& 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. The economic consequences of energy efﬁciency change
In order to slow down the depletion of non-renewable energy
sources and to reduce emissions from the combustion of fossil
fuels, policies are often propagated that aim at increasing the
energy efﬁciency of production processes. The claim that energy
efﬁciency increases necessarily lead to reduced energy consump-
tion has been questioned, as has the notion that such increases
will always have a positive impact on economic growth.
Obviously, the discussion presented here for the case of energy
could easily be extended to other resources that are the target of
conservation policies (e.g. water).
This paper investigates the relationship between changes in
energy efﬁciency and total energy consumption of an individual
entity (ﬁrm, household) and a collective economic entity
(economic sector, national or world economy). Is there a causal
connection? While some rebound effect is universally agreed to
follow efﬁciency increases, is the size of this total rebound large
enough to speak against efﬁciency as a resource-saving strategy?ll rights reserved.
nted at the 5th International
pectives into Energy Future’’
: +492418092206.
e (R. Madlener).Note that our dependent variable—the amount or quantity of
energy used—is often taken as the explanatory or independent
variable, correlated with growth of GDP, to address an entirely
different question, viz. to explain growth [1–3]. Here, we are
interested in the role of technical change and the substitutability
between goods and services in shaping the relationships between
energy consumption and energy efﬁciency (or rebound), energy
efﬁciency (or rebound) and economic growth, and economic
growth and energy consumption, respectively. Fig. 1 depicts the
three dimensions considered in our rebound discussion, all of
which are affected in important and often ambiguous ways by
technical change and the substitutability of input factors of
production.
One argument combining efﬁciency, energy consumption and
GDP growth is for instance that increased efﬁciency in the use of
energy inputs contributes to economic growth and since this, in
turn, implies greater energy consumption, then efﬁciency itself
implies some increase of energy consumption [4]. Yet if
‘dematerialisation’ obtains, then some net decrease of energy
consumption could occur.
1.1. Some deﬁnitions
Before entering the discussion any further it is useful to deﬁne











Fig. 1. Dimensions considered for the discussion of energy rebound and economic
growth.
Fig. 2. Lower input factor costs due to an efﬁciency increase by De enable an
outward shift in the supply function. Source: [7], modiﬁed.
R. Madlener, B. Alcott / Energy 34 (2009) 370–376 371quantity of energy that could be saved after a certain increase in
energy efﬁciency, if the quantity of goods and services demanded
or consumed were held constant. As light bulbs, cars and steel-
making machinery use less and less energy input per output (e.g.
lumens/m2, tonne-kilometres or tonnes of steel), respectively, we
could—from a conservationist’s perspective—deliberately opt to
produce and consume no more of these outputs, or indeed other
outputs, yielding real ‘calculated’ savings in energy in any given
time period.
Rebound is the additional energy consumption enabled by
energy efﬁciency increases, i.e. after energy input per unit of
output has gone down, and provided the efﬁciency increase
implicitly led to a reduction in the price of producing the output.
We can afford to buy more energy-using outputs if costs per unit
of output have fallen, resulting in an income effect: after enjoying
our usual quantities of light, car travel and steel our budget is not
used up; the quantities to consume have become cheaper per unit,
and we can buy more of the same products, or other products,
which also require energy inputs for their production and
consumption. Because the relative prices of lighting, car- (actually
tonne-) kilometres and steel have fallen there is also a substitution
effect: all other things being equal, we will consume more of those
goods and services that are now produced in a more energy-
efﬁcient way. Finally, if the initially lowered demand for energy
inputs—holding production and consumption quantities constant—
leads to a fall in the unit price of energy, a general price effect leads
to the substitution of energy for other factors of production. In
other words, the energy efﬁciency increase can also be regarded as
an outward shift in the production possibilities frontier (i.e. a
higher output can be achieved with the same input or, conversely,
less input is needed for the same output level). The energy ‘freed’
from producing the previous level of output of goods and services
is available, at no higher cost, for some additional production.
A few points are worth noting here. First, consumer prefer-
ences may also change due to improvements in energy efﬁciency,
such that demand shifts to higher levels of comfort, or other
quality attributes. Second, we may decide to substitute energy for
time (using faster means of transport, eating more fast food, etc.).
Third, changes in the capital costs of energy-related services have
an important inﬂuence on the size of the rebound effect, and
capital grants paid by government may actually inﬂate the
rebound effect, as consumers do not have to bear the full cost of
the purchase decision [cf. 13, pp. 6–7]. Fourth, we are only con-
cerned here with technical change that affects energy efﬁciency,
i.e. with energy rebound.
Rebound is commonly measured as a percentage of engineer-
ing savings; if it is greater than 100% this is usually referred to as
backﬁre, so named because the modern discussion of reboundbegun by Brookes [5,6] and Khazzoom [7] asked whether newly
enacted government policies to save energy through efﬁciency
caused real energy savings, or—because of rebound greater than
unity—might actually ‘backﬁre’. If backﬁre exists, this would
result in more energy consumption than before the (policy-
induced) increase in energy efﬁciency. The 19th-century discus-
sion of this paradox started and also ended with William Stanley
Jevons’ book The Coal Question, which expounded the backﬁre
position [8,9]. This ‘Jevons’ paradox’ is of course not to be
confused with the ‘energy paradox’, the latter of which is related
to the high implicit discount rates found empirically for many
energy efﬁciency investments, and which attests the fact that
economic actors often do not invest in energy efﬁciency measures
or technologies, even though it appears to be in their economic
interest to do so (seemingly irrational behaviour).1.2. Shift of the supply curve
Khazzoom [7] described the increase in output offered at a
given price level that is caused by efﬁciency-induced cost
reductions (shift of the supply curve S to the right, due to an
increase in efﬁciency from e1 to e2). This results, ceteris paribus, in
greater demand Q2 at the new equilibrium point B for the more
efﬁciently-produced goods and services than before at demand Q1
(in equilibrium A; see Fig. 2).
Since of course energy input per unit of economic output has
fallen, demand for energy inputs does not necessarily rise above
its previous level (backﬁre), but Khazzoom’s point was that real
savings must be lower than engineering savings. In his opinion
calculations that are based on the engineering facts alone ‘‘y
overlook the fact that changes in [e.g.] appliance efﬁciency have a
price content.’’ [7, pp. 21–22]. For further rigorous statements and
deﬁnitions of rebound see, e.g., Wirl [10, p. 31], Birol and Keppler
[11, pp. 460–463], Schipper and Grubb [12, pp. 369–370],
Binswanger [13, p. 120], Sorrel and Dimitropoulos [14], and the
synopsis provided in Herring [15] and Herring and Roy [16].1.3. Taxonomy
When consuming the previous quantity of output after a cost-
neutral energy efﬁciency increase, some unused purchasing
power thus remains, i.e. is freed for additional consumption.
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Baptiste Say more than 200 years ago:
But whence is derived this [y] larger supply of wealth, that
nobody pays for? From the increased command acquired by
human intelligence over the productive powers and agents
presented gratuitously by nature [y]. A power [y] before
known and available is directed with superior skill and effect,
as in the case of every improvement in mechanism, whereby
human or animal power is assisted or expanded [17, p. 101].
We have counted some 28 different terms for rebound effects
in the literature. While we accept the basic classiﬁcation into
income, substitution and price effects, we further categorise the new
‘rebound’ demand as follows:1. by the same consumer for the same product or service;
2. by the same consumer for a different product or service;
3. by a different consumer for the same product or service;
4. by a different consumer for a different product or service.A ﬁfth category is the case of consumers’ choosing leisure
instead of additional consumption, reducing their purchasing
power (e.g. by working less) to a degree proportional to
engineering energy savings. Here rebound would be zero (if
macroeconomic effects of leisure can indeed be neglected), and
the efﬁciency increases have enabled real resource savings with
no loss of afﬂuence.
The literature separates this demand into ‘direct’ (roughly,
categories 1 and 3) and ‘indirect’ rebound (categories 2 and 4),
together constituting ‘economy-wide’ or simply ‘total’ rebound
(e.g. [16, p. 196]). A special problem is presented by new products
or services or whole new industries, e.g. railroads in the 19th
century or lasers in the 20th century, that are partially enabled by
efﬁciency increases in extant products and industries [8,18,19],
but for simplicity we ignore these here. Note that category ﬁve is
always possible, i.e. were all humans to ‘reap’ energy efﬁciency
beneﬁts in the form of less work and less purchasing power, rather
than greater consumption, this would lead to a 100% realisation of
the potential (or theoretical quantity) engineering savings. A zero
price elasticity of demand would describe this situation. Human
history, psychology and poverty indicate that this is very unlikely.
Given any positive value of the elasticity, rebound must thus be
greater than zero.2. Various approaches
How can one go about answering the question of whether total
energy consumption ends up less, greater, or the same due to
energy efﬁciency increases? We identify four different approaches
here that can be used.
2.1. Economic/technological history
Jevons [8] rendered it at least plausible that without the efﬁciency
increases in steam engines and metal smelting the demand for coal
could never have reached mid-19th-century levels. That is, if we
assume that energy technology had remained at efﬁciency levels of,
say, the year 1800, how much (increase in) annual energy consump-
tion is imaginable now, 200 years later? Rosenberg sums up this
argument for the plausibility of backﬁre as follows:
The Bessemer process was one of the most fuel-saving
innovations in the history of metallurgy. However, the
innovation made it possible to employ steel in a wide varietyof uses that were not feasible before Bessemer, bringing with it
large increases in the demand for steel. As a result, although
the Bessemer process sharply reduced fuel requirements per
unit of output [a ratio], its ultimate effect [seen from an
economic, not just an engineering, perspective] was to
increase, not to reduce, demand for fuel [18, p. 166; additions
in square brackets by the authors].
Neither should one neglect the perhaps special case of the
history of efﬁciency improvements in obtaining energy, known as
the energy return on (energy) investment, or shortly EROI. [1]
Without these increases, some law of diminishing returns—
deeper mines and drill-holes, for instance—would have rendered
energy more and more expensive rather than ever-cheaper, as has
been the case. Related to the gradual improvement of technology
over time are the two phenomena ‘lock-in’ and ‘path-dependency’
[20,21], respectively, both of which explain part of the more
general issue of drag or inertia imposed on the turnover of the
capital stock. Note, however, that the replacement rate of old
against new capital stock as well as EROI are usually not part of
the discussion about the size of rebound effects, since the two
relevant measures for the assessment are (1) changes in the
technical efﬁciency with which particular goods and/or services
are provided and (2) total consumption levels.2.2. Microeconomic aspects
Applying the microeconomic approach analysing prices, sub-
stitution and income effects, numerous empirical studies have
investigated direct rebound (additional demand for a good or
service that can be more efﬁciently produced with the new
technology). For instance, after buying an energy-efﬁcient Toyota
Prius automobile, do people then either buy or keep additional
cars, and does the weight of the household’s entire car ﬂeet
perhaps increase [22]? One could also ask whether a more energy-
efﬁcient car is driven more than the previous one [23]. Studies in
the UK attest, for instance, that after a house is insulated or
obtains a more efﬁcient space-heating system, people do tend to
heat more (i.e. higher temperatures or additional, previously
unheated rooms) [24]. A useful survey of such direct rebound
studies can be found in [25], from where it can be learned that
direct rebound effects identiﬁed were in the order of 10–30%
(0–50%) for residential space heating (cooling), o10–40% for
residential water heating, 5–12% for lighting, 0% for residential
appliances, and 10–30% for automobiles, 0–2% for ﬁrm’s lighting,
and 0–20% for ﬁrm’s process uses. It is worth mentioning that a
reduction in the cost of any good or service due to energy
efﬁciency increases also has an important bearing on marginal
consumers, i.e. those that could not previously afford the energy
service concerned.
Microeconomics illustrates why this topic is still a paradox: if
driving a kilometre in a car with a more energy-efﬁcient engine
leaves unused budget, perhaps we buy more ‘driven kilometres’.
But since petrol inputs are only part of the costs of driving a
kilometre, and since each kilometre is driven more efﬁciently, the
new demand for petrol would seem to necessarily be lower than
that saved in driving the customary number of kilometres [26].
However, a construct or measure such as a ‘driven kilometre’ is
rather artiﬁcial, and we must also examine the induced substitu-
tion and price effects, as well as take the embedded energy and
capital costs of the change to greater efﬁciency of the capital stock
into account (note that we abstract from changes in labour input
and quality or comfort here, and only consider energy and capital
inputs). In microeconomic terms, the size of rebound depends
upon the efﬁciency elasticity of demand for energy [27], a
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of energy price times the price elasticity of energy demand.
The viability of this approach would be enhanced by fulﬁlling
two conditions: First, the system boundaries of empirical studies
must be expanded to world scale; since many energy markets and
emissions are international, and since embedded energy and
material are increasingly traded globally, country or OECD studies
alone are insufﬁcient for a complete picture [28–30]. Second, the
goal must be to measure total rebound, i.e. indirect as well as
direct effects: the increased ‘purchasing power’ of the budget can
be used to purchase any products whatsoever, and can be shared
by people who were previously not in the market at all. The
rebound from more efﬁcient automobile motors can just as well
be additional demand for air travel. Tracing indirect effects with
the tools of microeconomics, however, proves to be extremely
difﬁcult [26,31]. Moreover, estimates of total rebound vary wildly.
For instance, while for the UK 4CMR [32] arrives at a ﬁgure of 26%
and Allan et al. [33] closer to 40%, for others it is clear that backﬁre
might be the case [8,34,35]. On whether rebound is greater or less
than unity, the jury is still out.2.3. Macroeconomic aspects
With statistical methods one could test the hypothesis that, in
aggregate and over time, technological efﬁciency increase is a net
contributor to the size of energy consumption and its growth. The
long-term increase of energy consumption needs no documenta-
tion. On the other hand, although few doubt it, are we so sure that
energy efﬁciency has increased also if measured with physical
metrics? How, indeed, can we measure changes in energy
efﬁciency in the aggregate non-monetarily [36]?
Jevons [8] was the ﬁrst writer to show that large and obvious
energy efﬁciency increases were accompanied by energy con-
sumption increases; he traced efﬁciency increases in steam
engines and steel (or pig-iron) production, then compiled
statistics on coal consumption. Greenhalgh [28] shows engineer-
ing efﬁciency gains of over 20% for household appliances in
Denmark between 1977 and 1986, alongside rising electricity
consumption. Rudin [37] does the same for US energy use in
commercial buildings (8% more efﬁcient from 1979 to 1995) and
cars (30% from 1967 to 1997). Smil [38], likewise, analysed
changes in energy efﬁciency with changes in energy consumption
(also [39]). Recently, Herring [15] maintains a (positive) causal
relationship between lighting efﬁciency and electricity consump-
tion. In aggregate terms for the US economy during the entire 20th
century [4, pp. 340 and 351] show a strong correlation between
technical efﬁciency increase and exergy consumption.
However, correlation is not causality, and for testing the
hypothesis rigorously it would be ideal to have a metric for energy
efﬁciency levels that is valid in different time periods and in
different countries (or at different scales). But again, given the
global nature of many environmental problems (e.g. climate
change) and the global nature of the market for fossil fuels, for a
more comprehensive assessment and understanding of rebound
effects we need to study world statistics as well. Second-best
would be metrics for well-deﬁned products, industries or sectors,
whose efﬁciency change could be measured in percentages, and
then some average for the whole world economy calculated.
Recent work by Ayres and associates [4,40,45] makes important
strides in measuring efﬁciency changes in terms of exergy and
work at point of use, yet it remains difﬁcult to measure aggregate
global output as physical work, heating, endothermic change,
lighting and produced electricity.
To measure both ‘economic growth’ and ‘output’ as the
numerator in input–output efﬁciency (or as denominator forenergy ‘intensity’), one must decide between ﬁnancial, utility or
welfare, and physical metrics. Taking GDP as the metric—i.e.
economic output in monetary terms divided by energy input—has
many disadvantages. It is well known that GDP fails to measure
many economic activities, ranging from unpaid work to bartered
goods, and also resource depletion and loss of environmental
services [41] where the true costs are not reﬂected in the price.
Moreover, the prices of the goods that GDP counts are also
inﬂuenced by factors not pertaining to changes in efﬁciency and
costs of production, but rather consumer tastes, quality changes,
and even politics [38,42,43].
Taking human utility—or welfare, or services—as the quantity
against which energy inputs are measured also has problems. For
instance, if a second person rides in a car, utility is virtually doubled
while energy input stays virtually the same. But this is not a
technological efﬁciency change, although it is often regarded as a
measure of something like economy-wide energy efﬁciency or
productivity. Welfare, too, is subject to many inﬂuences. The energy
efﬁciency policies we wish to scrutinise, however, typically involve
energy inputs comparedwith some physical, environmentally relevant
output, like lumens per m2, tonne-kilometres or tonnes of steel.
To ﬁnd a physical metric has proven difﬁcult. Even on the input
side, is it rigorous enough to measure inputs of energy in tonnes or
Joules of different kinds of oil or petrol, of coal, or of natural gas?
Or should we measure instead exergy inputs [44]? Ayres and Warr
[45], for instance, refer to an exergy/energy ratio, i.e. the
conversion of useful energy to useful work. But since work is
understood in terms of energy, how do we distinguish between an
input and an output Joule of exergy? And since exergy is energy of
higher quality, or greater availability to do work, what are the
inputs into the ‘transformation’ process increasing this quality, or
is it simply meant to describe, for instance, low-entropy petrol as
opposed to high-entropy crude oil?
On the output side, can the weight (or mass) of consumable
and durable goods, including the (energy-using) stock of capital
goods actually doing the work, serve as an aggregate metric?
Radetzki and Tilton [46] consider this, but because of qualitative
differences in products ﬁnd it necessary to ‘weight’ these weights.
Among others, Dahlstro¨m and Ekins [29] attempt to weight
physical characteristics—e.g. chemical elements, weight, waste,
shape, and recycled tonnage—by economic value, attempting to
integrate traditional material ﬂow analysis with value chain
analysis. But here the danger of conﬂating physical and subjective
economic characteristics is very great (see also [47,48]). The quest
for an all-encompassing, purely physical measure of efﬁciency is a
precondition for rigorous statistical analysis, but seems still far off
in current research.
A further element largely ignored in discussions on the size of
energy rebound effects is time. In many situations it has economic
value if goods or services can be provided in less time. As an
example, if we extract from the same amount of energy the same
amount of useful work in a shorter time span, we create some
additional value. With some exceptions (e.g. [13]), most rebound
assessments, however, remain silent about this time value of
energy (work over time equals power), and only address work over
energy. Since, however, the time freed by the energy efﬁciency
increase is available for further production and consumption, thus
of course increasing economic growth, the entailed additional
energy consumption must be booked under rebound. (The same
argument can be put forward for exergy considerations.)2.4. Economic growth theory
Early economic growth models incorporating technical change
as an exogenous factor attempt to explain the role of technical
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Growth models including energy and material alongside capital
and labour reduced the statistical residual signiﬁcantly [1,50].
Newer research has accounted for this very large ‘technical
change’ residual in the earlier studies by means of a KLEC
production function (capital, labour, energy and creativity). By
including both amounts of energy and our creativity in using
energy more efﬁciently, not only is product ion output much more
fully explained but it is also shown that energy’s contribution to
product ion output far exceeds that of its share in the monetary
value of inputs as represented in the national accounts [51].
Energy efﬁciency, as part of the technical progress in neo-
classical growth theory, is conventionally seen as a driver of
economic growth. A commonly found argument in standard
growth theory literature is that technical change and factor
substitution can effectively de-couple economic growth from the
demand for resources and environmental services, i.e. raise
‘efﬁciency’ measured against the monetary quantity GDP [52].
Depletion of ﬁnite energy and other resources and environmental
degradation is not seen as a signiﬁcant barrier to economic
growth, since there will always be more abundant substitutes
(either natural resources or human-made capital).
In the 1990s, however, endogenous growth theorists have
started to formally include concerns about environmental and
resource factors limiting growth in standard growth models
(e.g. [53,54]). Doing so, endogenous growth theory enables new
insights about the relationships between resource scarcity,
technical change, and economic growth, and hence constitutes
a great leap forward compared with standard neo-classical growth
theory. A further development of endogenous growth models
to also account for rebound effects renders hope that in the future
the relationship between economic growth, technical change
and resource use (and eventually the size of various rebound
effects on the macroeconomic level) can be better modelled and
understood.
There are diminishing returns to the ability of technology to
reduce the amount of human-made and natural capital that is
required to extract resources. Technical change can offset
diminishing returns, either by a shift to more productive or less
resource-dependent technologies, or by employing technologies
that use new or more abundant resources. Resource scarcity or
depletion often increases the use of human-made capital to
extract a unit of natural resource, so that additional costs occur
that have to be included. Microeconomic analysis typically ignores
macroeconomic and global effects of substitution, thus under-
estimating thermodynamic limits, complementarity, irreversibil-
ity, waste, and scale (impact of trade) [55]. Technical change may
thus alleviate scarcity limits, but on the other hand can be
crowded out by resource scarcity. Such technical change enables
greater rates of extraction than at the previous, lower level of
efﬁciency in obtaining the mineral or fuel resources.3. Insights concerning rebound studies and research needs
The following 12 observations are claimed to be insights that
can guide further research into the empirical analysis of rebound
effects. Not all of them follow directly from the foregoing, and for
reasons of space we explain them only brieﬂy.1. Evaluations of government energy efﬁciency programmes are
ﬂawed because they usually take only engineering quantities
into account, i.e. they implicitly and untenably assume that
rebound equals zero, and lack a global perspective. The chapter
on energy efﬁciency policies in a recent UK report, for
instance, does not mention the rebound effect at all [56].This practice should be abandoned forthwith and efforts
redoubled to provide more evidence about the size of indirect
rebound, and to settle the question of backﬁre. Another recent
UK study has made signiﬁcant strides toward this goal [27].2. The models of energy consumption in such assessment
studies should also avoid treating GDP and population as
fully exogenous, because this begs the question of whether
(and to what extent) energy efﬁciency contributes to
economic and population growth. It should also be kept in
mind that energy consumption may rise as well due to other
kinds of growth-enhancing efﬁciency gains (organisational,
institutional), but this should not be booked under energy
rebound (lack of a technical change component).3. Two concepts are crucial for rebound studies: that of
engineering energy savings, of which rebound is a percentage,
and that of the purchasing power increase (income effect),
which must result from efﬁciency increases. How efﬁciency
affects the price of energy is, on the other hand, more difﬁcult
to determine. Perhaps price remains constant while at the
new equilibrium demand is greater [57]. Ultimately, what
consumers want are energy services, not energy per se, the
costs of which may be reduced by energy efﬁciency improve-
ments.4. The common concept in the rebound literature of ‘energy
services’ should be reconsidered, because every good and
service requires energy inputs—just as, perhaps, they require
capital, labour and non-energy material inputs as in an
ordinary production function Q ¼ f(K,L,E,M). The concept
furthermore can lead to the conﬂation of physical and utility
criteria.5. Tractable though it may be, measuring direct rebound
compared with engineering savings calculations is insufﬁcient
as a basis for policy advice. The ultimate goal must be the
measurement of total rebound, i.e. direct and indirect
rebound—demand for goods or services other than the newly
more efﬁciently supplied one, demand by additional con-
sumers who enter the market at the new, lower prices, and
demand for totally new products or services which (at least
partly) result from energy efﬁciency increases.6. Any rebound analysis must apply both to business-as-usual or
‘autonomous’ energy efﬁciency increases [58] as well as
policy-induced ones.7. For statistical analysis, some physical metric or metrics
enabling a rigorous deﬁnition and measurement of macro-
level energy efﬁciency change (e.g. at the national or global
level) must be found.8. Energy efﬁciency increase enables (but does not always
implicate) greater energy consumption; hence our analyses
must include ‘the consumer’. That is, saturation or any
deliberate decision to abstain from additional consumption
(sufﬁciency strategy) does lower rebound, rendering large
rebound effects, and the more so backﬁre, by no means an
unavoidable consequence.9. Further concerning ‘the consumer’, increases in energy
efﬁciency are no panacea for either energy conservation or
economic growth and welfare; demand saturation and
substitutability of input factors matter a great deal, and both
of them change over time, as do our needs and wants. An
interesting topic in this respect is status signalling, i.e.
situations where an individual communicates (honest or
bogus) information about his/her status to other individuals
that the others do not have [59,60]. Often it is the (perceived)
relative consumption levels among consumers that determine
needs and wants, and that impact the (perceived) status of an
individual. As an example, someone may own a bigger car or
house than the neighbours in order to signal to others a higher
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today are resource-intensive, making saturation or even a
decline in total material or energy consumption less likely.10. Perhaps we can learn from the history of increased labour
efﬁciency. A consensus reigns that ‘labour-saving’ innovations
did not save labour at all, but enabled, indeed, ever-increasing
population and employment. If we discover the mechanisms
responsible for this, can they shed light on the economic
processes following energy efﬁciency increases [61–63]?
Moreover, greater time efﬁciency in production, even holding
the amount of useful work gained per unit of energy input,
can free time for further production and consumption [13].11. For policies to save energy resources it is important to
determine, and to take into account, the approximate
magnitude of total rebound. As rebound increases, energy
efﬁciency policy becomes ever more ineffective as well as
cost-ineffective, reaching counter-productivity beyond a level
of 100%. The difﬁcult debate over the paradoxical backﬁre
issue, while of great theoretical interest, is thus not strictly
pertinent to judging the effects of political measures mandat-
ing or encouraging greater efﬁciency.12. Future research should begin with a broader and more
accurate concept of efﬁciency itself. Efﬁciency is both less
input for the same output or more output for the same input.
While the latter case seems to well describe human history,
where natural resources freed from one task are committed
either to other tasks or to population growth, the former
obtains only if people choose leisure and reproduce at no
more than replacement rates. Embracing both types of
efﬁciency change means studying economics as well as
engineering, and raises the likelihood of policy-relevant new
insights that actually help to curb energy consumption.Not only is there at present no viable methodology for
measuring indirect or economy-wide rebound, but these two
concepts are themselves poorly deﬁned. Microeconomic tools can
describe the elasticities to be discovered, but data at aggregate
levels to estimate such elasticities are lacking. We know that
technological efﬁciency increases expand the production possibi-
lities frontier—we are enabled to consume both more end product
and more inputs, whether of energy, materials or labour. We know
that over the last 200 or more years energy consumption has risen
and real energy prices have fallen; and it is safe to assume that
technological efﬁciency has also risen. But whether this correla-
tion reﬂects causality is undetermined. In deciding whether to
prescribe or subsidise energy efﬁciency improvements beyond
those that take place as business-as-usual, it is of crucial
importance to know the size of the economy-wide (global)
rebound. Otherwise, energy efﬁciency policies become ineffective,
or even counterproductive, as rebound rises, with important
implications for policy design and the achievability of, say, energy
supply security or greenhouse gas mitigation targets.Acknowledgements
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Historical Overview of the Jevons Paradox in the Literature 
by Blake Alcott 
This is Chapter 2 in the book edited by myself, John M. Polimeni, Kozo Mayumi & Mario Giampietro: The 
Jevons Paradox and the Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements, 2008, Earthscan, London, ISBN 978-
1-84407-813-4, issued in paperback in 2009 retitled The Myth of Resource Efficiency: The Jevons 
Paradox. I’ve made a few minor changes to the 2009 text now in August 2012. 
 
Epigraph 
[In] a stationary condition of capital and population… the industrial arts might be as 
earnestly and successfully cultivated, with this sole difference, that instead of 
serving no purpose but the increase of wealth, industrial improvements would 
produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labour. Hitherto it is questionable if 
all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human 
being. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and 
imprisonment, and an increased number of manufacturers and others to make 
fortunes. 




For William Stanley Jevons's immediate predecessor Mill, according to the 
above epigraph, the legitimate effect of 'industrial improvements' such as 
efficiency increases would be less work per capita. This is, after all, enabled by 
labour-efficiency increases at the same level of affluence. In the same manner, 
today's environmental strategy of technological efficiency holds that the 
legitimate effect of energy-efficiency improvements is less energy consumption 
at the same or an even higher level of affluence. Jevons asked, and to his 
satisfaction answered, the question of whether energy efficiency by itself leads 
to this hoped-for result or whether it leads to the same or even a higher rate of 
energy-resource consumption. He titled the seventh chapter of his 1865 book 
The Coal Question 'Of the Economy of Fuel', which confronts us with the 
'paradox' that less fuel consumption per unit of equipment causes greater total 
consumption (p141). Fuel can be 'saved' per unit while not at all being 'spared' 
for posterity's use (p155). 
 
The fuel in question was the coal to which Britain owed its affluence, power and 
civilization; the worry was that supplies, especially easily-mined ones, were 
dwindling fast. Some experts advised not to worry because coal's use in steam-
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engines, smelting and so forth was becoming more and more efficient, a view to 
which Jevons objected by means of his 460-page argument that 'it is the very 
economy of its use which leads to its extensive consumption' (p141). And while 
today's fuel worries concern pollution somewhat more than depletion, the 
paradox remains. Why otherwise would virtually all governmental bodies, green 
lobby groups and the greater part of public opinion favour efficiency increases 
to reduce our rate of overall consumption? 
Yet many academics take Jevons's part in doubting this. 
 
To his brief statement of his thesis Jevons cheekily added, 
Nor is it difficult to see how this paradox arises… It needs but little reflection to see 
that the whole of our present vast industrial system, and its consequent 
consumption of coal, has chiefly arisen from successive measures of economy. 
(pp141-142) 
Today however the solution of the paradox is requiring a great deal of reflection, 
of which the present book is a part. The revival of Jevons's argument by 
Leonard Brookes (1978 and 1979) and Daniel Khazzoom (1980), both of whom 
doubted the environmental efficacy of the efficiency standards for cars, 
refrigerators, houses and light bulbs that were being enacted in the decade that 
saw the Club of Rome report1 and OPEC fuel price hikes, opened a heated 
debate. In Khazzoom's words, 
changes in appliance efficiency have a price content… [W]ith increased 
productivity comes a decline in the effective price of commodities, and… demand 
does not remain constant… but tends to increase. (1980, pp22-23) 
While this new/old insight that efficiency increases trigger some additional input 
consumption – known by the cute technical term rebound – was readily 
acknowledged by all, a school of thought emerged regarding it as 'insignificant' 
(Lovins, 1988, pp156-157) or 'small' (Schipper & Grubb, 2000, pp367-368, 394-
386), meaning that greater efficiency would indeed bring net resource savings. 
Empirical attempts to measure economy-wide rebound have failed, and 
theorists have indecisively argued the pros and cons of Jevons's extreme and 
very important thesis that rebound is not only significant but in truth greater than 
the savings theoretically possible when equipment becomes more efficient and 
demand stays constant. 
 
                                            
1
 Meadows et al., 1972. 
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This rebound of more than 100 per cent of theoretical 'engineering savings' is 
called backfire because in this case environmentally motivated efficiency 
measures are counterproductive. As we will see Jevons's economist 
predecessors made Khazzoom's point of rebound's necessity in countless 
passages in their treatises on the principles of political economy. Concerning 
Jevons's backfire thesis, however, they were largely silent: the question had not 
yet arisen. Nevertheless, some of their time-tested insights can aid today's 
search for a definitive answer to how much energy consumption results from 
greater energy efficiency – an assistance sorely needed in a debate plagued by 
rudimentary difficulties of definition, taxonomy and methodology (Sorrell and 
Dimitropolous, 2006) 
 
Some of the open questions are as follows: 
 What is energy efficiency? While energy inputs are perhaps easily 
defined and measured, with what outputs are they to be compared? Are 
these in physical, monetary or welfare units? 
 What is the strict definition of rebound? Of what, exactly, is it a 
percentage? 
 What would a proof of backfire even look like? What, for that matter, 
would a proof that greater efficiency begets real savings look like? 
 Do we even need the concepts of theoretically possible savings, rebound 
and backfire, or can we, for example, describe a production function then 
note that if a factor such as energy becomes relatively more productive, 
demand for it goes up, perhaps more than it would have otherwise? 
 Can one fully trace consumers' reactions to their increased purchasing 
power (income effect) resulting from lower prices? 
 Can we, for instance, measure efficiency elasticities of price and then 
price elasticities of demand for both the goods and services and the 
primary energy inputs themselves? 
 Many approximations exist for direct rebound, in other words the energy-
consumption increase entailed by increased consumption of goods and 
services produced more energy-efficiently. But of what use is this in 
measuring indirect rebound and then the environmentally relevant 
quantity total rebound? 
 Is macroeconomic empirical work – regression analysis with energy 
consumption as the dependent and energy efficiency as an independent 
variable – even possible? (see Polimeni, this volume) 
 At what scale is such work fruitful? Are studies limited to sectors, 
countries or groups of countries (usually OECD) helpful? 
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 Can standard models of energy consumption continue treating 
population size and GDP as wholly exogenous, or are they themselves 
partly a function of energy efficiency? 
 Can we assume that human beings will continue to multiply and 
consume rather than take 'efficiency dividends' in the form of less 
reproduction, work and production? 
 What is the experience of the last three centuries with increasing labour-
input efficiency? Have these caused less population and employment, in 
other words was rebound less than 100 per cent?2 
 
Discouraged by this state of affairs in rebound research, I took inspiration from 
the title of Jevons's first chapter, 'The opinions of previous writers', and turned 
to the classical political economists. To be sure, the writers Jevons surveyed by 
name were not the 'old-timers' of political economy but rather geologists, 
politicians and mining engineers. Nevertheless, it seems clear that it was the 
economics texts of the 19th century that gave Jevons much confidence in his 
thesis and that discouraged challenges by later economists.3 By The Coal 
Question's posthumous third edition of 1906, petroleum had certainly taken the 
pressure off coal just as coal had taken the pressure off wood (Jevons, pp183-
185; Hearn, 1864, pp194-195), but how could succeeding economists resist the 
chance to wrestle with a paradox unless the consensus saw the question as 
settled?4 For Thorstein Veblen, for instance, it was sure knowledge that latent 
demand would lap up every efficiency gain (1899, pp32, 110, 241), and Harold 
Hotelling wrote that the goal of resource conservation, traditionally, was 
pursued by either proscribing production or prescribing inefficiency (1931, 
p137). 
 
                                            
2
 In our epigraph Mill is stating that labour-'saving' production processes have led to greater 
demand for labour: with α as an efficiency coefficient, αL↑ ⁭ → L↑⁭. With this passage from Mill 
Karl Marx opened his chapter 'Machinery and Modern Industry' (p323) and Thorstein Veblen 
broke for the only time his rule of not quoting or citing anybody (1899, ppx, 111). Jevons's claim, 
taking E for fuel and β as its efficiency coefficient, is that E = f(βE), namely βE↑ → E↑. 
3
 The only challenge known to me is that of Mundella (1878). 
4
 After granting the physiocrats a germ of truth concerning the priority of land-product surplus, 
Smith allows himself a joke at their expense (and perhaps that of the present elucidators of 
Jevons' paradox): '[A]s men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what 
surpasses the comprehension of ordinary people, the paradox which it maintains, concerning 
the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has not perhaps contributed a little to increase 
the number of its admirers.' (1776, IV.ix.37-38) 
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With due respect for the efficiency conundrum – how can per-unit efficiency be 
outweighed by the the sheer number of consumed units? – but with the 
reassurance that a paradox is only an apparent contradiction, let us examine 
the main works of William Petty (1675), Richard Cantillon (1755), Adam Smith 
(1776), Jean-Baptiste Say (1803), Lord Lauderdale (1804), David Ricardo 
(1817), Jean Simonde de Sismondi (1819), Thomas Robert Malthus (1820), 
John McCulloch (1825), Richard Jones (1831), Charles Babbage (1832), John 
Rae (1834), John Stuart Mill (1848), William Hearn (1864) and Karl Marx 
(1887).5 Jevons mentions, and extremely favourably, only Babbage, Mill and 
Hearn, but all dealt explicitly with efficiency and named it as a cause in their 
explanations of the increases in population and wealth so palpable in Europe 
and North America. Efficiencies of varied provenance were increasing: of the 
individual labourer, of the organization of production, of the institutions of 
society, and of the technology of using tools, mills, machines, energy and 
materials, the last constituting Jevons's and our realm of interest. Although for 
them the increase in demand for labour, land, coal and metals was no less 
palpable, on our question of whether this increase in wealth entailed an 
increase in consumption of these inputs to wealth, they shed only indirect light. 
Yet because their and Jevons's analyses contain all the concepts in today's 
debate, they offer a chance to clear up our thinking. To be sure, today's bone of 
contention – whether greater consumption of inputs is due to (Brookes, 2000, 
p356; Moezzi, 2000, pp525-526) or despite (Howarth, 1997, p3; Schipper & 
Grubb, 2000, p370) efficiency increases – was not buried for us until Jevons's 
book of 1865. 
 
Our 'previous writers' did, however, close in on the gist of our subject in their 
lengthy debate over labour as opposed to energy efficiency. Alongside energy, 
space and materials, no production can do without the input of working hours, 
and it was indeed in terms of labour productivity that 'progress' in the 'arts' of 
agriculture and manufacture was defined, as when Jevons refers to the labour-
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 edition 1821), Sismondi (2
nd
 edition 1827), Malthus (2
nd
 edition 1836) and 
Jevons (3
rd
 edition 1906). These dates are understood and omitted in all references. If other 
writings by these authors are cited, the date is given in the parentheses, for example (Malthus, 
1798) or (Say, 1820). 
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saving invention of gunpowder (p105). Their examples of the making of pins, 
books, stockings, metal and flour were expressed in terms of output per worker 
or per man-hour, and analogous to energy inputs one could and did argue that 
such 'progress' meant unemployment. In his curt rejection of this argument 
(p140), Jevons was standing on an explicit controversy involving not only 
Luddites, Owenites and industrialists but also Say against Sismondi and, with 
more ambiguity, Malthus and McCulloch against Ricardo (and also, later, Marx, 
Part IV, Ch. XV). Note that in terms of today's debate the position taken by 
Sismondi that work efficiency causes less total work is analogous to today’s 
position that energy efficiency effects a rebound of less than unity: 
unemployment, that is, of either labour or fossil fuels. If labour inputs are really 
saved, ceteris paribus, by increasing the efficiency of their use, then any growth 
in work-hours (including population) must be due to other factors. The contrary 
position, taken by Say, holds that  those immediately and distressingly laid off 
will find work, albeit usually not in their former occupation. Employment increase 
can even 'backfire': saving work per unit creates more work overall – our 
paradox. 
 
This chapter is not organized chronologically but according to concepts and 
arguments used in today's debate. Statements by the 'old-timers' are enriched 
with references to similar contemporary ones. The categories are: 
 What is output/input efficiency? 
 How is the output numerator defined? 
 Do efficiency increases cause wealth increases? 
 How does efficiency change affect prices and profitability? 
 Do efficiency increases amount to a societal free lunch? 
 Is rebound proven? 
 Do consumers choose further consumption or indolence? 
 Is backfire proven? 
 How do we deal with population growth? 
 Is there technological unemployment? 
 What would resource and labour consumption be if technological 
efficiency had not increased? 
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Jevons' own conslusions and arguments have been analzyed previously (Alcott, 
2005) and are here spread throughout the text. 
 
Please keep these methodological points in mind: 
 We are asking whether lower energy or labour inputs per unit of 'product' 
cause lower input consumption economy-wide; our independent variable 
is thus a ratio. Our dependent variable, on the other hand, is a total or 
absolute amount, namely of resource depletion or emissions – the values 
of interest to the environmental problem since, metaphorically speaking, 
the environment does not 'care about' ratios of outputs and inputs or of 
consumption or pollution per person or per unit of GDP or per rich or 
poor nation.6 The formal problem confronting all rebound measurement is 
that it is impossible to derive an absolute number from a ratio or change 
in a ratio; without further factual information, an 'extensive' number 
cannot be deduced from an 'intensive' one. (Giampietro & Mayumi, 2000, 
pp183-187, 191, and this volume) 
 
 Must we seek necessary connections? In our case this would involve 
assumptions regarding human nature and the particularities of human 
societies, mainly whether or not consumers, including marginal ones, are 
satiated. Absolute saturation regarding all goods and services would 
mean rebound of zero; the income effect would disappear because 
people would choose to earn and spend less and theoretical 
'engineering' savings would equal real savings. But with any positive 
price elasticity of demand we have some additional consumption. Thus 
we must always compute or judge the probability that consumers will 
keep doing more-or-less like their parents did (Jevons, pp192-196).7 
 
 A long-time world-wide regression analysis would have to include data 
on energy efficiency, energy consumption and energy prices. The latter 
two can be traced with some certainty,8 but, as we shall see, efficiency 
presents severe data and definitional difficulties. Since products and 
activities come and go, over time the 'output' part of our ratio is a moving 
target (Rosenberg, 1982, 1994; Giampietro & Mayumi, this volume) Must 
we resort to that workhorse GDP, or can we find physical output metrics 
like 'useful work' or 'exergy' or tons or volumes, perhaps unaggregated? 
We would also have to control for other factors like non-technological 
                                            
6
 Most Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) studies suffer the fatal flaw of showing ratios on the 
vertical axis; for critiques see Jänicke et al., 1989; Opschoor, 1995; De Bruyn & Opschoor, 
1997; Alcott, 2006, Section 3.5; Luzzati & Orsini, 2007; Giampietro & Mayumi, this volume. 
7
 This belongs to our ceteris paribus just as did Malthus' two 'postulata' for his principle of 
population, namely that we need food and that there is passion between the sexes. (1798, p19) 
And it was Malthus who insisted that following a labour-efficiency increase we could always 
choose 'indolence' (p258). 
8
 See for example Jevons, pp85, 91, 256; Schurr & Netschert, 1960; Cleveland et al., 1984; 
Schurr, 1985; Smil, 2003, pp6-14, 22-34, 82-88. 
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efficiency increases9 and partially-exogenous population and wealth.10 
Nevertheless, few would deny that technological efficiency has 
increased, and regression analysis offers undisputed insights (Polimeni, 
this volume). 
 
 Direct rebound is a pet subject of study, but in and of itself is not relevant 
for environmental policy, which needs to know total, or 'economy-wide', 
rebound adjusted for trade of embodied energy. If nevertheless 
computed, researchers owe us a demonstration of how to use it in 
calculating total rebound. At the minimum, the ambiguity in much 
literature as to which rebound is being discussed must be eliminated 
(Greening et al., 2000, pp390-392; Berkout et al., 2000, pp425-431). 
 
 
Please recall the urgency of this policy question. Depletion and pollution 
concerns are both inexorable and ethically binding. Among Jevons's many 
emotional passages are those where he attests the 'religious importance' of the 
coal question, where he laments living off 'a capital which yields no annual 
interest' or where he quotes Drayton concerning the fuel voracity of the iron 
industry: 'These iron times breed none that mind posterity' (pp14, 412, 373, 
136). Moreover, Jevons advocated using coal-given prosperity for posterity and 
for a sort of soft landing at coal's limits (ppxlvi-xlvii, 4, 37, 156, 184, 195, 200, 
232, 274-275, 455; Boulding, 1966). Running out of fossil fuels can, however, 
be spread over a long time horizon or ameliorated by using them as embodied 
energy in renewable energy installations. But two other sets of concerns stand 
no postponement: first, and obviously, our present and intensifying planetary 
greenhouse with its welfare consequences; second, and today often ignored, 
the side-effects of the machines and infrastructure that enable and embody 
energy efficiency: noise, accidents, public ugliness, local air pollution, overuse 
of freshwater, monotonous work, and so on. The community of ecological and 
environmental economists should waste no more time in delivering a decisive, 
policy-useful judgment on this question: is efficiency part of the solution or part 
of the problem? 
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 For example stemming from education, training, increased effort, Taylorite factor-floor 
organization, free trade, scientific norms, private property and further cutters of transaction 
costs. 
10
 For empirical sectoral correlations see Jevons (pp193-194, 232, 275, 154, 387-388); 




What is efficiency? 
 
Like all cost-cutting efficiency increases, energy efficiency until recently 
exclusively served the goals of higher profits and greater average affluence. 
Insofar as the costs of the efficiency introduction itself could be amortized, they 
are the business-as-usual maximization of material well-being. This fact is today 
often downplayed or ignored when energy efficiency increases are singled out 
to serve the contrasting environmental goal of lowering the yearly rate of energy 
consumption and/or pollution. In whichever way they are perceived, though, 
they are the starting point and logical centre of our investigation. As such they 
warrant careful definition and taxonomy. 
 
Throughout the following examination of our authors' definitions of efficiency it is 
axiomatic that efficiency denotes a ratio. The numerator is output and the 
denominator is (energy) input. 'Efficacy', 'effectiveness' or more ambiguously 
'power' denote in contrast the causation of a given amount of output regardless 
of cost or input. Ontologically, the thing that is more or less efficient is the input. 
In classical parlance, power resided in the inputs labour and nature, measurable 
in terms of what a certain amount of these could produce; the classical 
production function was Q = f(βM, M, αL, L), where M was material/energy, L 
was labour and the Greek letters were productivity co-efficients.11 The 
ubiquitous classical concept of 'productive power' thus implies, like the Latin-
based term efficiency, both a 'making' and an 'out of something'. The inverse of 
efficiency is intensity as in the 'material intensity of production' common in 
today's environmental-efficiency discussion (Schmidt-Bleeck, 1994; 
Hinterberger et al., 1997; von Weizsäcker et al., 1997). The ratio describes, 
moreover, the amount of input per unit of output. Finally, we are not 
investigating consumption efficiency – for example boiling only the amount of 
                                            
11
 The causes of efficiency however lie perhaps ontologically in capital or organization: the 
piston, the hot blast and the factory system changed, not coal or iron ore or human beings. Yet 
classically capital was usually reduced to labour and land, as insisted upon also by Schumpeter 
(1911, pp20-21, 29, 37, 210-219); this historical topic is the subject of work in progress. See for 
example Smith, II.iii.25ii, 33-34; Say, p293; Rae, pp91, 256, 258; Mill, pp100, 154, 182. 
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water needed for the cup of coffee or driving in low gears (Hannon, 1975, p96; 
Etzioni, 1998, p630; Prettenthaler & Steiniger, 1999; Norgard, 2006)12 
 
Of a certain area of land William Petty asked, 'How many Men will it feed?', 
implying an output/input ratio of food over square metres and holding food per 
Man constant; he offered data on the agricultural productivity of 'improved 
Acres' (1675, pp286-288). Cantillon likewise employed this agricultural 
paradigm either as rice/m2 or as yield/seed (1755, pp26, 128). Departing from 
the spatial metric, Petty also attested differences in transport efficiency for 
'bulkey Commodities' between 'Water Carriage' and 'Land Carriage', a given 
output of bulk-times-distance achieved by less (water) or more (land) input of 
time and endo- or exosomatic energy (pp255, 293-294). Using the examples of 
flour grinding and printing, his 'Arithmetick' showed, for instance, that a mill, 
after deducting the labour embodied in its construction, 'will do as much Labor, 
as Four Men for Five Years together' – an efficiency increase of 20 times; with 
printing a factor of 100 results; the wagon means that 'one Horse can carry 
upon Wheels, as much as Five upon their backs' (pp249, 256). 
 
Petty's endeavour is to explain why different European nations of similar size 
and population have different levels of wealth. Like Malthus (1824, p265), Mill 
(p100) and Solow (1957), his explicans turns out to be not such absolute 
quantities of land or people but their productivity ratios: England was more 
efficient and therefore richer than France or Holland. Would that we could today 
use the method of Petty and Solow for our explicandum of energy inputs,13 a 
path open to us only if GDP is a good proxy for output; however, both the 
'dematerialization' of GDP* and the difficulty of identifying what it is that GDP 
measures weaken the GDP metric. A godsend would be a time series of two 
non-trading countries similar in all respects except level of technological 
efficiency. 
 
                                            
12
 Sufficient or frugal consumer behaviour, like consumer and production efficiency, also suffers 
from rebound (Alcott, 2007). 
13
 Saunders in passing quotes Solow that 'it’s hard to break the habit,... "factor-augmenting" 
does not mean "factor saving"' (1992, p131). 
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Presaging today's computations of theoretical 'engineering' savings, Petty even 
reckons the monetary savings from innovations (pp255-257). If costs of 
production fall then society, left with at least the same amount of flour, printed 
matter and transport as before, has purchasing power left over.14 Petty explicitly 
attests huge labour savings (pp306-308), but his only remark bearing on labour 
rebound is that as a result of 'improvement' of 'Art' many millions could work, 
but aren't 'disposed or necessitated to labour' (pp249, 307). This hints at a 
normative issue that confused the discussion between Say, Sismondi, 
McCulloch, Mill and Marx: given that work is basically a painful, irksome cost, 
'unemployment' would be a good thing, and like today regarding energy inputs, 
we should hope for low or no rebound.15 But in the absence of political means to 
spread work equitably, by bestowing purchasing power work becomes a good 
thing. 
 
As his title and Introduction reveal, Smith's explicandum was wealth or 
'produce', usually defined materially (I.v, I.viii.21, IV.ix.38, V.ii.e.10).16 His 
favourite explanatory variable was the intensive one of 'productive Powers [of 
Labour]', itself mainly explained by a number of variables, including division of 
labour, dexterity, work organization and machines, themselves explained by the 
'propensity in human nature… to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another' (I.i, I.ii.1). The only other factor raising 'produce' is an increase in 
labour's quantity (I.intro.3-4, II.iii.32, IV.ix.34-36). Productive power is 'the 
quantity of work [produce such as nails], which… the same number of people 
are capable of performing' and its increase is 'improvement' (I.i.5, I.i.6). 
Surrounded by increasing population and production, it is not surprising that 
Smith does not define efficiency the other way around as a constant output with 
less input: the fact was that number of pins rises (by a factor somewhere 
between 240, 4800), not that society spends fewer hours making pins (I.i.3). 
Smith also framed productivity in other terms, attesting, for example, the greater 
                                            
14
 As shown later, this income effect for consumers, if expressed monetarily, could be balanced 
by a 'loss effect' for producers. 
15
 Say spoke for all economists before and since in attesting the disutility of work: 'labour… 
implies trouble (une peine)' (p85; also Smith, 1776, I.v.4, I vi.2; Mill, p25). Veblen made fun of 
our seeming love of 'irksome' labour (1899, ppix, 18-19, 110). 
16
 Also Say, pp61-62; Rae, pp1, 15, 21. 
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efficiency of water over land transport, his ratio being that of tons 'carried'/man, 
and, as with his pins, the waters between London and Leith are plied more often 
(I.iii.3, I.xi.b.5). Jevons later showed that canals lowered coal prices, a case of 
greater transport efficiency raising coal consumption (pp121-122, 166). 
 
Smith's denominator was sometimes space (land, soil), with output as food or 
wool (I.xi.b.2-6, 15, IV.ix.5-6; see also Say, p295), and sometimes mines 
(thinkable in m3) of varying 'fertility' (I.v.7, I.xi.c.10-11). The productivitiy of the 
soils and mines in turn partially determine the efficiency of labour*. Again, 
output quantity is a function of both the productivity and quantity of the material 
and labour inputs, capital bein able to increase both productivities. In Say the 
material factor is the agens naturels or services productifs, with 'agency' 
denoting the 'power' and the power's strength determining the agent's 'fertility' 
or 'fecundity' – here with no reference to labour inputs (pp40, 63-77, 101, 127, 
301, 395). Jevons similarly asserted that 'power' was 'in' coal – and that it was 
power that had through 'increased… efficiency' become cheap' (pp145-146, 
186). In contrast to later neo-classical neglect of material as a productive factor, 
he held that 'in our successes hitherto it is to nature we owe at least as much as 
to our own energies' (p318). Similarly, coal and oil, as well as coal mines and oil 
'fields', have varying inherent fertility in both chemical terms and terms of ease 
of access. Ricardo confirmed this ambiguity in the concept of material efficiency 
by noting that 'improvements in agriculture are of two kinds: those which 
increase the productive powers of the land, and those which enable us, by 
improving our machinery, to obtain its produce with less labour' (p80; see also 
Smith, I.xi.d.1; Mill, pp724-725). 
 
As the pin and nail examples show, Smith by no means neglected 
manufacturing, for example the 'woollen manufacture', where the ‘working up’ of 
a 'quantity of materials' was facilitated by 'a variety of new machines' (I.xi.o.12, 
II.intro.3). His usual denominator was labour input (I.ix.34-35, I.xi.p.4): for land 
of given fertility, then, greater produce results only from the greater 'efficacy of 
human industry [= labour, not manufacture], in increasing the quantity of wool or 
raw hides' (I.xi.m.14). Note especially that often 'improvement' was expressed 
13 
 
as less labour input for 'any particular piece of work' (I.xi.o.1); this formulation 
holds output constant and is the version of the ratio found in Ricardo, for whom 
'economy in the use of labour' or labour's 'abridgement' – by means for instance 
of engines – meant lower or at least not higher 'charges of production' (pp25, 
26, 41, 69, 397). But more often Smith's ratio change held input constant over 
against a 'great increase of the quantity of work [= produce, not labour]' (I.i.5); 
with good farm capital and the 'best machinery', the same amount and quality of 
labour made a 'much greater quantity of work' (II.ii.7; I.viii.3, I.xi.o.12).17 
Malthus's rendering of efficiency change likewise described 'a machine in 
manufactures…, which will produce more finished work with less expenditure 
than before' (p145). 
 
As with the question of whether a glass is half full or half empty, it matters 
whether we define efficiency increase as 'less input per unit of output' or 'more 
output per unit of input'. Although technically equivalent, the former biases our 
thinking by holding output constant and looking at what could be saved while 
the latter biases it by highlighting increased output with perhaps no saving. A 
simple example is replacing an open fireplace with a ceramic stove: one can 
heat the same amount of space to the same temperature, thus really saving 
firewood, or use the same amount to heat more rooms warmer.18 Starting one's 
chain of thought with the resources still available (lying fallow) for more 
economic activity after such an efficiency increase is conducive to perceiving 
large rebound; in Hearn's words, greater efficiency 'sets free a quantity of 
commodities…or…materials' (p271). 
 
Say's denominators were both labour and materials like land, water, mines, 
wind and other agens naturels. In some cases 'tools and machines… enlarged 
the limited powers of our hands and fingers'; in China tools for 'drilling, in lieu of 
the broad-cast, method [of sowing] raises the productivity of land' (pp86, 394). 
In other cases 'useful machinery' is 'strengthening and aiding the productive 
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 Occasionally Smith explicitly inserted 'capital' as input, thus adding K and γK to the production 
function, with some given amount yielding 'greater produce' (IV.ix.6; see also Mill, pp100, 154). 
18
 This example reveals further outcomes complicating rebound research: 1) the 'saved' 
firewood can be used for building and is thus not saved; 2) the time 'saved' cutting and stacking 
wood can be spent for other earning and consumption. 
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powers of nature', the category within which today's energy efficiency efforts fall 
(p357). He insisted on the equivalence of ratios with higher numerators (output) 
and those with lower denominators (input): 
Every saving in the cost [les frais] of production implies the procurement, either of 
an equal product by the exertion of a smaller amount of productive agency 
[Qsame/expenseless], or of a larger product by the exertion of equal agency 
[Qmore/agencysame], which are both the same thing. (p301; see also pp86, 88, 201, 
204, 395) 
However, while he sometimes thus underlines the 'saving of productive agency' 
(p395), Say’s excitement is aroused by the opposite case, namely 'to obtain a 
larger produce from the same quantity of human labour.—And this is the grand 
object and acme [le comble] of industry' (p86). 
 
Note that one of his examples describes an increase of labour efficiency (αL↑) 
whereby one man mills as much as ten men previously when a windmill by 
means of sails (capital or K) is substituted for a tread-mill (pp74-75)19 While this 
is clearly an increase in labour efficiency, a case of 'capital enlarging 
productiveness' (p77), it is not an increase in wind efficiency (βM↑) – unless 
starting from zero. Similarly, the first internal combustion engine did not 
increase the economy of fuel but only the economy of transport in terms of time 
and labour. Therefore, innovation seems not always subsumable under 
efficiency. Say does hint at a distinction between an invention – effecting the 
first-time use of a natural resource – and a new 'process' to 'produce… an old 
[product] with greater economy', for example a new 'method of reducing the 
friction of bodies' (pp329, 433).20 Another, endearing example was the use of 
sulphuric acid to destroy the 'mucilaginous articles of vegetable oils', which 
could then be substituted for expensive fish oil, an efficiency increase, in the 
broadest sense, that 'placed the use of those lamps… within the reach of almost 
every class' (p116). Here the production of lumens became more efficient, but 
not that of vegetable oils in producing lumens, because these were not before 
used. Brindley, on the other hand, observed that the Newcomen engine wasn't 
efficient enough for coal to replace 'the power of horses, wind, or air' (Jevons, 
p143). This seems to be a case of increased efficiency in the use of an 
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 Also Jevons, p177. 
20
 Also Jevons, pp119, 159, 389. 
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exosomatic energy source, already stutteringly in use, substituting for others 
whose efficiency potential had been exhausted. 
 
In discussing rebound we should take this distinction between innovation and 
technological efficiency seriously: When cutting-tools change from steel to 
ceramics to carbide (diamonds) these raise cutting efficiency but are not more 
efficient uses of a given material (Rosenberg, 1982, pp3-4, 65). Malthus's more 
abstract formulation distinguishes between the invention of machines and the 
more efficient or 'best' machines' replacing less efficient ones (pp145, 170, 
229). With Rae the distinction is straightforward – between 'new arts' and 
'improvement in the arts already practiced' (p15; see also pp224, 253). His 
examples include the plough itself as opposed to better ploughs, macadamized 
as opposed to stone roads, and better steel tools (pp87, 114, 226-228, 259). He 
moreover traces the steam engine's invention, improvement and connection 
with coal mining in terms almost the same as Jevons's (Rae, pp245-248; 
Jevons, pp142-153.21 Hearn wrote that 
By [improvement] I mean not the discovery of natural agents previously unknown 
or unused; but the knowledge of new combinations of agents already known… 
Those improvements which increase the efficiency of the actual agent [coal] are… 
distinct from those inventions the utility of which consists in the abridgment of 
human labour, and the substitutions for it of physical forces. (pp99-100)
22
 
First, for instance, India rubber was used to do new things, then became more 
efficient through vulcanization and sulphur treatment; coal likewise was first 
found and substituted for charcoal, then made more efficient through the hot-
blast in smelting (pp100-102). 
 
The point is that greater resource consumption caused in the first place by 
inventions should not be booked under rebound. That said, Malthus has a point 
that inventions sometimes 'are the natural consequence of improvement and 
civilization' (p281). In other words, efficiency increase can cause inventions and 
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 Rae then offers a full-blown analysis in terms of the varying 'capacities' and speed of returns 
of tools and machines, a function of their cost of production, their durability, and their efficiency 
(pp87-110), closely resembling that of Malthus (pp71-73). See the analysis of Spengler (1959). 
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 Also Jevons, p188; Schumpeter, 1911, pp297-306. Jevons likewise gives many examples of 




new uses.23 At any rate, once more, identifying which efficiency changes to 
measure is vexed both by new products and by better-'quality' products that 
may even constitute efficiency decreases*. Rae lamented that while of course 
'wealth' had vastly increased since Henry VII, there had been 'not only an 
increase, but a change' (pp18-19; Giampietro & Mayumi, this volume) 
 
For 'efficiency' Malthus uses not only 'productiveness' and 'fertility' but also the 
'facility' or 'difficulty' of producing or obtaining output, again almost always in 
terms of labour input. At times he emphasizes 'saving of labour' or 'relief from 
labour' in producing 'a given effect' (pp128, 152, 170), at times a greater 
produce (pp63; 1824, pp281-283), and once simultaneously greater 'finished 
work' with 'less expenditure' (p145). Referring to Say, who had written that 'a 
landed estate may be considered as a vast machine for the production of grain, 
which is refitted and kept in repair by cultivation; or a flock of sheep as a 
machine for the raising of mutton or wool' (Say, p86 note, p318 note), Malthus 
writes: 
The Earth has been sometimes compared to a vast machine, presented by nature 
to man for the production of food and raw materials; but, to make the resemblance 
more just, as far as they admit of comparison, we should consider the soil as a 
present to man of a great number of machines, all susceptible of continued 
improvement by the application of capital to them, but yet of very different original 
qualities and powers. (pp144-145; see also pp66, 111, 115, 168; McCulloch, p278) 
Say also repeatedly talked of the 'spontaneous gifts of nature' like air, water, 
light, fire, gravity, pressure and steel (pp63, 71, 75, 86, 286, 362), all 
susceptible to improvements through 'industry' which must 'awaken, assist, or 
complete the operations of nature' (pp63-64; 74, 86; Smith, II.iii.3). 
 
Undoubtedly impressed both by Say and what he observed in rural Canada, 
Rae likewise repeatedly described the material factors of production and their 
'productive powers' (pp10-12); he saw 'fire and water transformed into our 
obedient drudges' (p14); our 'instruments… draw forth stores' of materials, and 
'improvement in their construction… put additional stores within reach of the 
nation' (pp19, 68); a 'North American Indian' improves a 'wild plumb tree' or 
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dams 'a very scanty brook' (p83). The doctrine perceives an efficiency ratio in 
that 
the knowledge of the civilized man, compared with that of the savage or barbarian, 
gives him the power of constructing a much greater number of instruments out of 
the same materials… (p99) 
Just as Petty and Smith had distinguished between the quantity of labour and 
its productivity,24 Rae's analysis of 'the action of matter upon matter' separated 
the 'amount of materials' from 'the efficiency of these materials' (pp112-113), 
but he is additionally discussing the effect of our 'instruments' on matter's 
efficiency rather than their greater or lesser inherent natural power (pp87-110). 
'Instruments' roughly mean capital, in other words anything man-made for the 
purpose of future production, including fields and even food (in classical terms 
'circulating capital').25 
 
More than our other authors, Rae thus analyzes material rather than labour 
inputs (p99). He also conceptualizes the costs of efficiency, once even defining 
efficiency as the total production of an instrument (until its 'exhaustion') divided 
by the cost of making it measured in units of labour; this is 'the ratio of the 
capacity… to cost' (pp259, 173, 354-355).26 Smith had already made the 
pertinent point that the 
expence which is properly laid out upon a fixed capital of any kind, is always repaid 
with great profit, and increases the annual produce by a much greater value than 
that of the support [depreciation] which such improvements require. (II.ii.7) 
With an example of more durable pots and pans taken from Smith, Rae shows 
that in spite of (because of?) their 'becoming more expensive articles', they 
'augment… national capital… with advantage to society' and are 'preferred by 
good economists' (p21). The relevance of the (energy) costs of energy 
efficiency to rebound is disputed. One solution is simply to deduct these from 
the savings theoretically possible during the operation of the more efficient 
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 'When we want to double the produce of a field we cannot get it by simply doubling the 
number of labourers' (Jevons, p195; also Smith, I.intro.1 & 5, I.viii.57, II.intro.4, II.iii.32, IV.ix.34; 
Say, pp70-71, 303; Mill, pp154, 413-414). 
25
 Like McCulloch (pp92-95) Rae took this idea to what he admitted to be an extreme, defining 
his key concept of 'instruments' to include almost everything having social ontology (resulting 
from man), including not only tools as conventionally understood but also fields, horses and 
even food as means of maintaining human capital (pp86-88, 115). Although Mill adopted this 
broad definition for capital he, like Rae, knew it was too broad for 'general acceptance' (Mill, 
pp153, 10). 
26
 Petty's comparable example had been that 'a Mill made by one Man in half a Year will do as 
much Labor, as Four Men for Five Years together' (p256). 
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instrument – thus lowering the quantity of which rebound is a percentage 
(Jevons, p446).27 
 
Rae also distinguishes between 'efficiently' and 'effectually' (in the sense of 
merely getting a job done well), as when the threshing machine not only saves 
labour but separates grain better than the flail method (p20). This again raises 
the question of the changing quality of the output in our numerator. Otherwise 
Rae's treatment closely follows Say's, for example in emphasizing the 
equivalence of ratios with lower inputs and those with higher outputs (pp66, 92, 
131, 259). If anything, his bias is toward the latter: adding to manufacturing 
capital will 
effect an increase in the productive powers of the community; that is, they give 
those powers the capability of producing the same quantity of an article at less 
expense, which certainly must be allowed to be an increase of them. (p70) 
This language comes close to a description of an outward shift of a community's 
production possibilities frontier. This is the key assertion of and proof of 
rebound, if not backfire: we are enabled to produce and consume more without 
more effort, time or material. Whether backfire obtains depends then on 
consumer behaviour or, in fancier language, the efficiency elasticity of demand. 
 
Rae and Malthus, whose Principles' last edition appeared two years after Rae's 
treatise, were describing the phenomenon that is the starting-point of our 
investigation: the human ability to get more out of the same amount of nature. 
Rae's fellow Scotsman McCulloch had a few years earlier written, in the usual 
terms, that division of labour 'saves labour', but also that 'the invention and 
improvement of tools and engines' caused a rise in our variable – 'the quantity 
of raw materials which the same number of people can work up…' (pp96, 99). 
His term for output* is here materially expressed, moreover in terms of raw 
material rather than material objects. McCulloch also introduced the method of 
assuming an overnight economy-wide increase of efficiency then deriving the 
consequences (pp166-167; Mill, pp723-725). But whereas today researchers at 
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 'Life cycle' aspects as well as recycling are thus reducible to our output-input efficiency, as 
demonstrated by Rae in showing that a more expensive but more durable hat saves labour 
input for the wearer over time (pp200-201). He also gives examples of thick sturdy walls for 
buildings and good steel for tools, which both increase heating or cutting efficiency and last 
longer (pp109, 114). 
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Strathclyde, Scotland, similarly assume an 'efficiency shock' of five percent 
(Allan et al., 2006, pp5, 36), McCulloch's was by a factor of ten!28 Say later got 
rhetorical mileage out of assuming 'that machinery should be brought to 
supercede human labour altogether' – a labour-efficiency 'shock' of 100 per cent 
(p88). 
 
Finally, Mill's characterization of efficiency reminds one of economic or 'Pareto' 
efficiency. His causal chain is from an 'extension of the market' (here 
exogenous) to more 'division of labour' to 'a more effective distribution of the 
productive forces of society' (pp87-88, 281). In a passage quoted by Hearn 
(p68) the doctrine presented to Jevons was that 'any improved application of 
the objects or powers of nature to industrial uses, enables the same quantity 
and intensity of labour to raise a greater produce' (Mill, p106).29 However, 
greater consumption is merely enabled: equally enabled is a real saving of 
labour and material inputs. We choose between them. 
 
Mill's numerous descriptions of productiveness epitomize the classical analysis 
(pp93, 99, 106, 118, 129, 153-154, 710, 724).30 Yet notwithstanding his famous 
defense of the stationary state (pp752-757), one discerns his preference for the 
growing economy in his remark that the 'increased effectiveness [efficiency] of 
labour… always implies a greater produce from the same labour, and not 
merely the same produce from less labour' (p133, emphasis added). He also 
claimed that 'no one would make or use ploughs for any other reason than… 
the increased returns, thereby obtained from the ground' (which could pay the 
plough-maker) (p31). That society as a whole – macroeconomically – could 
choose the version 'same output less input' is impossible. This reflects the 
normative position persisting to the present day of the unassailability of 
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 Of course while McCulloch was asking after the effects on quantity of output (Q), believing 
'the power of production… a thousand or million times increased' (p167), the Strathclyde group 
was asking after the effects on the quantity of consumed input once it is used five percent more 
efficiently. 
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 Also Malthus, 1824, p303; McCulloch, p99; Sanne, 2000, p487. 
30
 Mill added precision to Ricardo's (p80) two types of agricultural improvements, naming some 
that 'have not the power of increasing the produce', but only diminishing labour (Mill, p180); 
these cannot raise total output of the farm – here the ratio is output/farm – just as some factory-




economic growth, epitomized by Smith's sentiment that Jevons chose for his 
frontispiece: 
The progressive state is in reality the chearful and the hearty state to all the 
different orders of society. The stationary is dull; the declining, melancholy. 
(I.viii.43) 
As shown later, Malthus stood alone in objecting that we could indeed choose 
'indolence' (pp258, 267-268, 283, 284, 320, 337). 
 
More neutrally, Mill presents his parsimonious theory of production: 
We may say, then, without a greater stretch of language than under the necessary 
explanation is permissible, that the requisites of production are Labour, Capital, 
and Land. The increase of production, therefore, depends on the properties of 
these elements. It is a result of the increase either of the elements themselves, or 
of their productiveness. The law of the increase of production must be a 
consequence of the laws of these elements… (p154) 
These laws enable both extremes: less work and less resource consumption to 
the full extent of the 'engineering savings' (Alcott, 2005, p10); or an increase of 
production and consumption so great that in the end even more work and 
material resources are put into the economic process. Other laws, of human 
nature and of desires, consumption and reproduction rather than production, 
determine exactly where, between these extremes, we end up (Jevons, pp25, 
191-201; Princen, 1999; Sanne, 2002; Alcott, 2004) 
 
What is output? 
 
Energy economics literature offers many terms for our numerator: GDP, units of 
'service', goods and services, various physical aggregates, 'product' and, 
vaguest of all, 'economic activity'. In measuring 'eco-efficiency' Reijnders names 
five metrics for efficiency: 'a product (such as the automobile), a service (e.g., 
transport over a certain distance at a specified speed), an area of need (e.g., 
clothing), a sector of the economy (e.g., energy supply and demand), or the 
economy as a whole' (1998, p14). Let us distinguish three broad categories – 
money (GDP), utility and matter. 
 GDP's well-known weaknesses include both ignoring large parts of the 
economy and valuing some losses as gains (Daly & Cobb, 1989, pp401-
455). Specific problems* in energy models are elaborated by Rosenberg 
(1982, pp23, 55), Jänicke et al. (1989, pp14, 391), Schipper & Meyers 
(1992, p54), Kaufmann (1992, p54) and Cleveland & Ruth (1998, p35); 
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Smil 'deconstructs' the concept of energy intensity in monetary terms. 
(2003, pp66, 71-78, 81).31 This contemporary monetary metric of choice 
was not available to Jevons and his predecessors. 
 
 The utility or services concept dominating the rebound literature posits an 
'energy service' such as a 'passenger-kilometre'. However, as soon as 
two people ride in a car, efficiency would then have doubled with no 
technological change whatsoever, and when a heavy car replaces a 
lighter car efficiency would stay the same in spite of a technological 
change especially relevant to environmental impact. Utility moreover 
ignores waste, an anthropocentric concept referring to tons of gases and 
materials; at best, integrating them is a complicated exercise in 
computing and deducting 'externalities'. Should these be excluded from 
our numerator, or not? For an incisive account of this concept's 
difficulties see Ayres (1978, pp50-67). Furthermore the common concept 
of 'energy services' is invalid: since every service (and good) involves 
embodied and/or operational energy input, any distinction over against 
'non-energy services' must be arbitrary.32 
 
 A physical metric (including waste) could be in tons, volume, chemical 
elements, heat, exergy, work defined in terms of force and direction, or 
non-aggregated lists of products. Jevons used the metric 'useful work' 
per pound of coal, expressed in 'foot-pounds', and defines 
thermodynamic efficiency (pp137-138, 148, 186).33 A manageable 
literature has taken up this challenge, usually with the hope of 
aggregation34 and sometimes attempting to integrate physical and 
utility/monetary metrics.35 Also, probably all of the technological efficiency 
changes striven for in efficiency policies are susceptible to physical 
definition: instead of a 'passenger-kilometre' a ton-kilometre, instead of 
'heating comfort' a certain temperature rise in a given volume of space 
over a given time and instead of a kilowatt hour the amount of primary 
energy involved. A remaining problem is that, due to the first law of 
thermodynamics, output always equals input, leaving us without a ratio! 
Perhaps only a list of consumer and capital goods (and their utilization 
rates) remains, and an aggregated physical metric is impossible. 
 
 
After ironically speaking of 'the mass of solid goods and useful services', Joan 
Robinson sought a non-monetary metric for technical progress, choosing the 
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 Also Robinson, 1954, p18; Radetzki & Tilton, 1990, p21; Manne & Richels, 1992; Saunders, 
2000a, p442; Alcott, 2006, Ch6. 
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 See Howarth, 1997, p3; Wirl, 1997, p14; Berkout et al., 2000, p427; Saunders, 2000b; 
Binswanger, 2001, pp120-121; Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2006, p3. 
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 Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2006, pp3-9. 
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 For example Ayres, 1978, pp53-66; Birol & Keppler, 2000, p461; Ayres & van den Bergh, 
2005, pp102-103; but see Weisz et al., 2006, p681. 
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 For example Cleveland & Ruth, 1998, p35; van den Bergh, 1999, pp551, 559; Dahlström & 
Ekins, 2006, pp509, 515-518. 
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capital/labour ratio with capital physically measured as the 'value of a stock of 
goods in terms of commodities' or 'equipment, work-in-progress [and] materials' 
and labour measured in terms of time (1956, pp19, 122, 65). She concluded, 
however, that 'index-number ambiguities' are insoluble (pp64-65, 115) and that 
'economics is the scientific study of wealth, and yet we cannot measure wealth' 
(p24).36 The classical economists similarly suffered in defining wealth. Its genus 
was material objects or 'produce' for Smith (I.viii.3-9, 21 & 23, IV.ix.38, 
V.ii.e.10), Malthus (pp20-28, 294) and Mill (pp48-49, 55). Ricardo also regarded 
'riches' in terms of the ubiquitous physical concept of 'necessities, conveniences 
and enjoyments' (sometimes 'luxuries' or 'amusements') which had nothing to 
do with exchange values in terms either of money or other objects (pp275-276). 
Rae criticized Smith's various definitions* and tended to treat wealth and capital 
synonymously and as physical commodities and instruments (pp387-388, 14, 
18, 21, 171). But all acknowledged some differentia specifying their (use or 
exchange) value to us. In Lauderdale's typical phrase wealth was 'the 
abundance of the objects of man's desire… [including] lands, houses, shipping, 
gold and silver coin, wares, merchandise, plate, furniture, etc.' (pp146, 42; see 
also Malthus, p29; 1824, pp258-259). In avoiding Lauderdale's criticism (p152) 
of Smith's emphasis on durable objects, Mill chose with questionable ontology 
'permanent utilities… embodied in human beings, or in any other animate or 
inanimate objects' (p48). 
 
If the definition of output* must include some quality or value element, let us 
ponder Say's reaction to his insight37 that was to become the first law of 
thermodynamics. He said that we confront a 
mass of matter [not]… capable of increase or diminution. All that man can do is, to 
re-produce existing materials under another form, which may give them a utility 
they did not before possess, or merely enlarge one they may have before 
presented. So that, in fact, there is a creation not of matter, but of utility; and this I 
call production of wealth…. [Production is] creation, not of substance, but of utility, 




Moreover 'creating matter… is more than nature itself can do' (p65). More than 
the others, Say thus emphasized utility rather than goods themselves and 
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 Also Solow, 1957, pp316-317; Rosenberg, 1982, pp23, 55; Victor, 1991, pp204-206. 
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 And Cantillon's (p2). 
38
 Also McCulloch, pp61-63; Rae, pp15, 81-83; Mill, pp25, 27, 46. 
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posited such a thing as 'immaterial product' (pp62, 119-124). But he also held 
that 'the ratio of the national revenue, in the aggregate, is determined by the 
amount of the product, and not by its value' and never denied that some 
material was necessary for utility to adhere to: the services of musicians and 
lawyers, for instance, required their food and education as well as wear and tear 
on their capital (pp295, 122, 124; see also Malthus, 1824, pp258-259; 
Costanza, 1980). 
 
If we include usefulness in our definition, how do we deal with unwanted objects 
and waste, both of which affect the environment? While Mill's idea of waste was 
physical, including 'diving-bells sunk in the sea' and the use of too many horses 
and men to plough a field (pp8, 51-52), and Hearn gave the example of close 
parallel mine-shafts (p208), Rae's chapter 'Of Waste' deals with the economic 
inefficiencies of fraud, trade restrictions, transaction costs and so forth – making 
the point in a very different way that less efficiency means less production and 
consumption* (pp313-319). Among the classical economists there was 
moreover some debate as to whether only anthropogenic objects counted as 
wealth, or also 'air, water, and light' (Say, p63; Mill, pp8, 153), opening up the 
water/diamonds discussion over use value as opposed to exchange value and 
scarcity. Jevons, incidentally, counted waste-reduction as an increase of 
'economy' (pp30, 271-272). 
 
A large contemporary literature thus discusses various metrics for 
'environmental' (or energy) efficiency in terms of desirable output.39 The attempt 
is to abandon purely quantitative measures and introduce the 'quality' of energy, 
as when 'exergy' is taken to measure input (Ayres & Warr, 2005). Similiarly, 
following a general exposition of energy and its transformations, Jevons offered 
this definition of efficiency: 
Now it will be easily seen that the resources of nature are almost unbounded, but 
that economy consists in discovering and picking out those almost infinitesimal 
portions which best serve our purpose. (p163; see also p170) 
He elsewhere uses the ratio of 'useful work' to 'power' (pp186-187), thus risking 
conflation of physical and utility criteria just as Ayres & van den Bergh do when 
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 Also Ayres, 1978, pp39-66; van den Bergh, 1999; Birol & Keppler, 2000, p461; Schipper & 
Grubb, 2000, p369. 
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insisting on counting high-entropy 'process waste', the difference between 'work 
done by the economic system [and] the exergy of all inputs'* (2005, p103). For if 
exergy is already defined anthropocentrically as useful or available energy and 
can, unlike energy, be destroyed (Ayres, 1978, p52), it itself becomes a 
(desirable) output. Even taking mass instead of energy in both numerator and 
denominator, where the output is mass 'embodied in the physical output 
(finished products)' (Ayres & van den Bergh, 2005, p103) does not escape the 
fact that to identify 'finished products' we need some anthropocentric criterion.40 
 
McCulloch, after acknowledging the law of the conservation of matter, laid down 
the principle: 
And hence we are not to measure consumption by the magnitude, the weight, or 
the number of the products consumed, but exclusively by their value. Large 
consumption is the destruction of large value, however small the bulk in which that 
value may happen to be compressed. (p 390; also p61) 
But can environmental studies ignore what is produced but has no value?41 All 
oxidized molecules, unless they are recycled by means of further energy inputs, 
as with CO2 sequestration, must count as 'final' output. Space heating can be 
defined by the time needed for the space to return to (lower) ambient 
temperature from that desired, but the higher-entropy energy is nevertheless 
part of output. Lumens rather than 'lighting services' can be measured, but light 
pollution and heat as a 'by-product' are also output. Steel cannot be made 
without producing 'scrap'. While a 'first-law' ratio must be one to one, 'efficiency' 
must be variable, perhaps leaving no way around some concept of utility: We 
must measure inputs only over against the output we like. While GDP thus 
aggregates unsatisfactorily, physical or combined physical/utility metrics have 
not yet been found. 
                                            
40
 The terms for mass and measure in German are very close (Masse, Mass); 'pound' in English 
is both weight and money, as is peso in Spanish (Smith, I.iv.10). 
41
 Mill distinguishes between the 'absolute waste' of 'unproductive labour' lacking even the utility 
of 'pleasurable sensation', and the relative waste of 'productive labour' when for instance 'a 
farmer persists in ploughing with three horses and two men… when two horses and one man 
are sufficient' (pp50-51; also p28; Say, pp42-43, 121, 404; Alcott, 2004, pp770-776). 
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Correlation of efficiency and output increase 
 
Whatever 'output' turns out to be, Jevons's immediate predecessor Mill captured 
the classical conclusion that, formally, productiveness is equivalently lower 
land/labour inputs and 'increased produce', what everyday observation showed 
was a 'greater absolute produce' or a 'long succession of contrivances for 
economizing labour and increasing its produce' (pp180, 189, 706; Smith, 
I.xi.g.20, II.iii.33).42 By 1865 Jevons could write: 
When we turn from agriculture to our mechanical and newer arts, the contrast is 
indeed strong, both as regards the numbers employed and the amounts of their 
products. But the subject is a trite one; every newspaper, book, and parliamentary 
return is full of it: factories and works, crowded docks and laden waggons are the 
material proofs of our progress. (p244; see also pp187-188) 
But as Rae lamented, 'all we see is the sum produced by [change], the fact of 
the increase being more easily ascertained than the manner of it' (p19). Thus, 
while in dozens of passages all writers previous to Jevons tied increased 
efficiency to increased product, they seldom formally declared necessary 
connection. Mill for instance claimed, 
It will be seen, that the quantity of capital which will, or even which can, be 
accumulated in any country, and the amount of gross produce which will, or even 
which can, be raised, bear a proportion to the state of the arts of production there 
existing; and that every improvement, even if for the time it diminish the circulating 
capital and the gross produce, ultimately makes room for a larger amount of both, 
than could possibly have existed otherwise. (p98) 
'Room is made', production possibilities increase, but there is no claim of 
universal causality. 
 
Jevons praised Hearn's Plutology as 'both in soundness and originality the most 
advanced treatise on political economy which has appeared’ (p168 note). 
Hearn, himself explicitly building on Rae (see, for example, Ray, p260) and 
Justus von Liebig (1851), described the shift in the production possibilities 
frontier as follows: 
It is self-evident, as Mr. Mill has observed, that the productiveness of the labour of 
a people is limited by their knowledge of the arts of life; and that any progress in 
those arts, any improved application of the objects or powers of nature to industrial 
uses, enables the same quantity and intensity of labour to raise a greater produce. 
(p68, emphasis added; see also p184) 
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 Mill implies a broader array of formal expressions for efficiency when talking of greater 
produce 'without an equivalent increase of labour' (p180): the term 'equivalent' implies 
elasticities, in other words efficiency also increases, for example, in the extreme case where 
both input and output go down, but the former percentage-wise more than the latter. 
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Jevons then contributed two new thoughts: for 'labour' he substituted 'coal'; and 
he asked the further question, not of the effects of efficiency on produce, but on 
input consumption. The doctrine is on the one hand curiously conditional but on 
the other insistent that growth is impossible without improvement in the 'arts' – a 
conclusion reached by later growth theorists by statistical means. (see, for 
example, Solow, 1957 and 1970) 
 
Remember that the classical concept of efficiency included individual, 
organizational and institutional as well as material or technological types, often 
attested in one and the same passage.43 Seminal statements of 'economic' 
efficiency also appear explicitly, wherein what the society does produce is 
compared to what it could produce given a certain natural fertility and a certain 
technology (Smith, I.ix.15; Say, pp166, 380; Malthus, pp266, 304). And 
although not to my knowledge discussed in classical economics, remember that 
land and labour inputs are mutually dependent; that is, all terms on the right 
side of Q = f(βM, M, αL, L) influence each other, rendering reduced-form 
expressions inadequate. 
 
Petty already gave a version of classical 'growth theory' in seeing 'greater 
consumptions' not only of food but of 'Coaches, Equipage, and Household 
Furniture' due to 'improved Acres' and population density – and even a growth 
of postage due to transport efficiency (pp287-305; Smith, I.xi.c.7). Cantillon 
presaged Malthus's principle of population and the concept of carrying capacity 
using as examples both people and mice: population followed sustenance, itself 
a function of land and mine fertility as well as the energy and labour of the 
population (pp43-44, 46, 62, 128). He conceived labour in terms of both its 
quantity and efficiency r*, but in any case greater population and greater 
consumption entailed each other. As shown later, this idea that people are also 
produced – fully conceptualized by later writers – is crucial for the discussion of 
the Jevons paradox; models of (energy) consumption or of wealth in general 
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 For example Petty, pp256, 261-264, 300; Smith, I.xi.o.1, IV.ix.17 & 34-35; Say, pp127, 286, 




that treat population entirely exogenously necessarily significantly 
underestimate rebound.44 
 
If wealth was 'necessaries, conveniences, and amusements' or the goods 
affording these (Smith, I.intro. 1-4, I.v.1 & 9; IV.i.17-18), no writer except 
Ricardo failed to both attest and laud their growth.45 Rae for instance made the 
empirical claim that the wealth of Great Britain was ten times what is was under 
Henry VIII (pp14, 18). Smith saw the gradual spread of 'universal opulence' 
(I.i.10) or at least 'almost universal prosperity' (I.xi.g.20) and by mid-century for 
Mill economic growth was axiomatic: 
Production is not a fixed, but an increasing thing. When not kept back by bad 
institutions, or a low state of the arts of life [technology], the produce of industry 
[labour] has usually tended to increase; stimulated not only by the desire of the 
producers to augment their means of consumption, but by the increasing number 
of consumers [population]. Nothing in political economy can be of more importance 
than to ascertain the law of this increase of production. (p153) 
Jevons reported many statistics on the increase of both per capita wealth and 
population since the 18th century (ppvi, 196-200, 457). He moreover both 
extolled and feared for Britain's prosperity and greatness: the 'Age of Coal' 
enabled 
[a] multiplying population, with a constant void for it to fill; a growing revenue, with 
lessened taxation; accumulating capital, with rising profits and interest. This is a 
union of happy conditions which hardly any country before enjoyed, and which no 
country can long expect to enjoy… It is the very happiness of civilisation… [Without 
coal] we must… sink down into poverty [and] begin a retrograde career. (see pp2, 
11, 231, 201, 454-460; emphasis original) 
He quotes Baron Liebig that civilisation 'is the economy of power' (p142; see 
also p156). And since for Jevons the greater economy of coal increased not 
only affluence but its quicker exhaustion, 'We have to make the momentous 
choice between brief but true greatness and longer continued mediocrity' 
(p460). The discussion today likewise contains the political hope that energy 
efficiency is the key to both happy prosperity and sparing natural resources. 
Now, as then, we should not ignore our normative assumptions. 
 
That the correlation between consumption and efficiency reflected causality 
was, to be sure, denied by no one. Clarity has reigned from Petty onward on the 
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 See Smith, I.viii.18, 23, 39, IV.ix.12; Malthus, pp61, 130, 180; Mill, p33; Jevons, p213; 
Giampietro, 1994. 
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 For example Smith, I.viii.21, IV.ii.9, IV.ix.38; McCulloch, p99; Rae, p7; Mill, p159. 
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point that quantities of land, labour or capital do not suffice to explain the size of 
the wealth of a nation.46 The causal factor for greater wealth, produce, riches, 
returns and surpluses was higher productive powers of land and labour, often 
aided by invention and machines.47 Mill even asserted that 'improvements,… by 
the very fact of their deserving that title, produce an increase of return' (p93) 
and elsewhere equated 'the magnitude of the produce' with 'the productive 
power of labour' (p413). Today also this seems self-evident. 
 
Even for Malthus, despite his observation that we could always choose to really 
save through indolence or non-consumption, the doctrine was that 'the 
increased powers of labour would naturally produce an increased supply of 
commodities' (p63, emphasis added). Say said that although lower input and 
greater output are mathematically 'the same thing' both are 'sure to be followed 
by an enlargement of the product'; for both producers and consumers 'every 
thing saved is so much gain' (pp301, 357). It was Rae who, while concurring 
with the standard causal chain from increased capital through increased division 
of labour to increased wealth, shifted the emphasis from organizational to 
technological efficiency: it is 'the intention of the inventive faculty', which creates 
and improves instruments, to increase 'necessaries, conveniences, or 
superfluities' and make 'larger returns', 'supplies', 'absolute capital and stock', 
'revenue' and 'supply for future wants' (pp67, 258-260; Brewer, 1991). For him 
the 'effective desire of accumulation' was necessary but not sufficient for the 
'increase of stock and capital', which also required 'augmentation', that part of 
growth occuring 'through the operation of the principle of invention' (pp205-209, 
264 and Chs. VI & VII; see also Malthus, p339). And since invention results in 
higher efficiency a causal arrow goes from efficiency to 'larger provision… made 
for the future wants of the whole society' (p165). Since instrument formation 
means cost and 'sacrifice' in the present, without 'some future greater good… 
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 For example Cantillon, pp19, 62-63; Smith, II.iii.32, IV.ix.34; Malthus, p252; Rae, pp12-13; 
Marx, p358; Solow, 1957. 
47
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the instrument… will not be formed', yet this results only from greater 
efficiency*. (pp19, 110-118, 171)48 
 
If pressed, no classical economist would have claimed that he was describing 
mere correlation rather than causality. And since all wealth requires material 
inputs, in any description of the 19th-century economy rebound is certain and 
low rebound out of the question. Without efficiency increases and given only 
certain quantities of material resources and labour, not much more in the way of 
food or any other goods can come into existence; and unless we enjoy these 
(labour-)efficiency increases wholly and exclusively as the less work and more 
leisure that they enable, there is some consumption that wouldn't be there 
without the 'improvements'. And this consumption depends on labour and 
material inputs. Until Jevons, however, the doctrine did not attest backfire. 
Before surveying classical views on the magnitudes of this new consumption of 
goods and services, and their inputs, let us relate their descriptions more 
closely to today's debate by introducing the term prices and the price falls that 




In 1815, Ricardo wrote to James Mill, 'I know I shall soon be stopped by the 
word price, and then I must apply to you for advice and assistance' (Sraffa, 
1951, pxiv). And no classical economist failed to warn of conflating money and 
wealth, with the term 'value' leading an ambiguous life between the two.49 But 
being economists, our previous writers could not avoid monetary terminology 
altogether. While prices can be physically expressed as exchange value in 
terms of other commodities, the monetary metric is convenient. Thus all of them 
presaged the point made by Khazzoom in re-opening the debate over the 
Jevons paradox that efficiency increases have a 'price content' (1980, p22). In 
Smith's analysis for instance 
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It is the natural effect of improvement… to diminish gradually the real price
50
 of 
almost all manufactures… In consequence of better machinery, of greater 
dexterity, and of a more proper distribution of work… a much smaller quantity of 
labour becomes requisite for executing any particular piece of work; and though, in 
consequence of the flourishing circumstances of the society, the real price of 
labour should rise very considerably, yet the great diminution of the quantity will 
generally much more than compensate the greatest rise which can happen in the 
price. (I.xi.o.1; I.viii.57; Jones, p238; Marx, p379) 
Although Smith here succumbs to the tendency to exogenize a vague 
'flourishing circumstances of the society' (a rise in GDP), the point is well made 
that because improvement more than compensates rising input prices, output 
prices fall. He then considers rising and falling prices of 'rude material' and 
metal inputs together with a comparison of output prices over three centuries 
(I.xi.o.2-13; see also Barnett & Morse, 1963) 
 
In Malthus's formulation, 'We all allow that when the cost of production 
diminishes, a fall of price is almost universally the consequence' (p60; see also 
pp87-88, 145).51 Favourite empirical examples were cottons in general and 
stockings in particular.52 Printed goods likewise had experienced a palpable, 
undeniable 'reduction in price' per copy (Say, pp302, 88). Rae liked the example 
of more efficiently produced, cheaper bread (p259; see also Mill, p181), while 
Mill liked Say's 'still stronger example' of playing cards (p123). Babbage's 
example of riveted tanks showed an extreme price fall (p100). Malthus even 
distinguishes between 'a fall of price necessary… to prevent a constant excess 
of supply contingent upon a diminution in the costs of production' and one 
following 'an increased supply of commodities'*, albeit itself due to 'the 
increased powers of labour' (pp56-57, 63).53 
 
The necessity of this step from efficiency increase to price fall – and then on to 
consumption increase – lies in producer behaviour. '[C]ompetition of producers 
brings the price of the product gradually to a level with the charges of 
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 Roughly, 'real', 'inherent' or 'natural' prices were long-term and determined by costs of 
production, while 'market' prices were shorter-term results of supply and demand only; 'nominal' 
prices were in terms of money (gold and silver). See Mill's 'necessary price, or value' (p471). 
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 Also Jevons, pp120, 140, 154, 156, & ch V. 
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 For example Say, pp300, 303; Ricardo, pp25, 52; Malthus, pp281-282; McCulloch, pp117, 
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discussed simultaneously: 1) why and how wealth increases, 2) how it is distributed between 
rent, wages and profits, and 3) how supply, demand and price interact in the short term. 
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production', wiping out temporarily high profits (Say, pp395, 93). Of course 
patents must first run out or secrets be divulged, but eventually 'The grinding of 
corn is probably not more profitable to the miller now than formerly; but it costs 
infinitely less to the consumer' (Say, p89). For Rae, still in monetary terms, each 
of 
the venders of a commodity wishes to sell as much as possible, and as he can do 
so most readily by underselling his neighbors, the price gradually falls under a free 
competition, until the dealers in it receive only the profits that the effective desire of 




Mill also pointed to producers' 'power of permanently underselling' which can 
'only… be derived from an increased effectiveness of labour' (p133; see also 
p495). Jevons relied on this argument from profitability (pp8, 141, 156) and 
names the 'series of inventions' by Bessemer, Gilchrist and Thomas as 'modes 
of economy which, in reducing the cost of a most valuable material, lead to an 
indefinite demand' (p390). 
 
Rae solves the profits 'paradox' thus: 'Now I apprehend that high profits 
springing from improvement, can never lessen the sale of goods either at home 
or abroad, for they do not occasion a rise in their price, but rather a fall in it' 
(p263). Domar's later version is that 'a rapid growth of [Kendrick’s] Index [total 
factor productivity] in any industry reduces the prices of its output, and thus 
stimulates sales' (1962, p605).55 Malthus once chastises Ricardo for ignoring 
this point and in effect assuming that profits stayed high – 'at cent per cent' 
(p291). Moreoever, whatever the profit-maximizing price policy of a monopolist 
is, even monopoly profits get spent because, in Say's terms, producers are also 
consumers (p89; see also Smith, I.xi.o.4; Ricardo, pp386-387, 392-394). This 
fact casts doubt on today's view that rebound is low in sectors where 'market 
failures' are high (Grubb, 1990b, pp783-785; 4CMR, 2006, pp5, 14).56 
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The classical axiom is that prices of output are the sum of the prices of inputs or 
charges of production (Ricardo, p397). Say talks of 'a real fall of price, or in 
other words, a reduction in the price paid to productive exertion' (p303, 
emphasis added).57 Output and input prices are exactly proportional. Supply 
costs fall, prices fall, effective demand rises, number of units sold rises; these 
are today's 'price and income effects' of efficiency increase.58 Rebound is then a 
function of this new quantity sold (Q) after deducting another quantity no longer 
sold (Qs) of units, if any, for which the newly more efficiently produced item is 
substituted. 
 
As for price elasticity of demand, Malthus writes that 'The increase in the whole 
value of cotton products, since the introduction of the improved machinery, is 
known to be prodigious', offering the empirical evidence of 'the greatly 
increased population of Manchester, Glasgow, and the other towns where the 
cotton manufactures have flourished' (p192; see also pp281-282; Rae, p292). 
Say observed the same for 'Amiens, Rheims, Beauvais,… Rouen and all 
Normandy', where there had first been 'loud remonstrances' over the 
annihilation of local industry, and gives further examples of 'prodigious' price 
falls (pp147-148, 300-304); he then can't resist imagining prices' falling to zero, 
which would at once be 'the very acme of wealth' and the death of political 
economy as a science (p304). Finally, Mill makes the empirical macroeconomic 
claim of falling prices over two centuries, 'accelerated by the mechanical 
inventions of the last seventy or eighty years' (p182). All these economists were 
describing, via price falls, a very high 'efficiency elasticity of demand' (Sorrell & 
Dimitropoulos, 2006, p7). But demand for what? For the newly cheaper good? 
For everything, as described in the next section? For our topic of interest, 
material and labour inputs? 
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 Say indeed calls 'prix' a measure of 'valeur' and 'valeur' a measure of 'utilité' (p62). But if 
prices reflect utility and utility is very different from costs of production, then prices confuse 
environmental analysis. Utility is not an environmentally relevant concept. If Mill is right, 
however, that prices in their long-run movement to 'natural price' reflect utility to perhaps 1 per 
cent and efficiency (or difficulty or cost of production) to 99 pre cent* (pp462-464), then this 
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But as long as we are thinking in monetary terms, what happens to the total 
amount of money paid for the goods now cheaper per unit? This is the new 
price per unit times the new quantity (P x Q) as opposed to the new quantity 
physically measured (Q) and was termed by Say 'le montant total' or sum total 
(p450).  He gives a descriptive example of (direct) backfire in the 'art of printing': 
By this expeditious method of multiplying the copies of a literary work, each copy 
costs but a twentieth part of what was before paid for manuscript; an equal 
intensity of total demand, would, therefore, take off only twenty times the number of 
copies; probably it is within the mark to say, that a hundred times as many are now 
consumed. So that, where there was formerly one copy only of the value of 12 
dollars…, there are now a hundred copies, the aggregate value of which is 60 
dollars, though that of each single copy be reduced to 1-20 [one twentieth]. (p302; 
see also Rae, pp216, 249-250) 
Taking price and costs as equal and substituting 'labour time' or 'material 
amount' for 'dollars', we can estimate input consumption. Substituting 12 hours 
of labour for 12 dollars, if the price elasticity of demand is in a ratio of 20:100, in 
the end 60 hours of labour are demanded and labour input demanded is higher 
than it would have been without the efficiency increase. Say could analogously 
describe 'direct backfire' regarding energy efficiency today. 
 
Still referring only to manufactured goods made cheaper, rather than the whole 
economy, Malthus writes that by means of 
the introduction of improved machinery, and a more judicious division of labour in 
manufactures… not only the quantity of manufactures is very greatly increased, 
but… the value [price, cost] of the whole mass [P x Q] is augmented, from the 
great extension of the demand for them both abroad and at home, occasioned by 
their cheapness… The reader will be fully aware that a great fall in the price of 
particular commodities… is perfectly compatible with a continued and great 
increase, not only in the exchangeable value of the whole produce of the country, 
but even in the exchangeable value of the whole produce of these particular 
articles themselves. (pp135, 314)
59
 
While Khazzoom's demonstration of rebound assumed any positive price 
elasticity of demand (1980, p22), Malthus describes a very high elasticity. The 
point, in Say's words, is that 'every real reduction of price, instead of reducing 
the nominal value of produce raised [P x Q], in point of fact augments it' (p303). 
P x Q for product or sector X increases following productivity-induced price falls. 
Following Say that work is done by nature (for example fossil fuels) as well as 
human beings, in other words it commits 'productive exertion' (pp40, 63, 74-75, 
90, 245 note; Rae, pp246, 256-258), we have, for any X, PLabour and PMaterial 
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both as costs and prices. Q x PMaterial after an efficiency increase is compared 
with that before, but where Q rises by any amount, direct rebound is proved. 
The relative degrees of growth of Q and PMaterial determine the size of this direct 
rebound. 
 
But what happens in sectors not affected by productivity increases? Or, how 
can the 'value of the whole mass' (economy-wide) increase unless money 
supply increases? If it doesn't, less demand would have to accrue to goods that 
did not enjoy a productivity increase.60 And monetarily, the consumer's gain is 
perhaps equal to the producer's loss. Monetary analysis also entails identifying 
cases where substitution of the newly cheaper good for another good occurs 
then measuring both the price and the substitution elasticities. Should rebound 
research discard the veil of money and deal only with the ratio of Q to joules, 
with each unit q measured physically – rather than compare ratios of P x Q to 
joules before and after an efficiency shock, as with the concept of energy 
intensity of a unit of GDP? 
 
Mill's heroic attempt to sort out the concepts of price, use value, exchange value 
and their application to particular goods as opposed to the whole mass (pp455-
459) relegates 'price' to goods' relationship to money and 'exchange value' to an 
economic discourse dispensing with 'money', namely to 'the command which [a 
good's] possession gives over purchaseable commodities in general' (p457).61 
He also made the point that 'if inventions and improvements in production were 
made in all commodities, and all in the same degree, there would be no 
alteration in [relative exchange] values' (p710). But Say (pp303-305) and 
Malthus (p135), even when using the term 'exchange value', were talking not 
sectorally of the 'values' or prices of things relative to each other but of the 
'whole mass', conceivably tradable for other things in other countries. Criticizing 
his predecessors in all but name, Mill concludes that 'All commodities may rise 
in their money price. But there cannot be a general rise of values' (p459). 
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Mill has a point. If, as Malthus somewhat circularly said, 'exchangeable value is 
the relation of one object to some other or others in exchange' (p51), then the 
concept of exchange is of no use in analyzing the growth of wealth. And to the 
extent that prices are an abstract proxy for millions of exchange values, 
monetary concepts are likewise perhaps inapplicable. In Malthus's words, 
When it is said that the exchangeable value of a commodity is determined by its 
power of purchasing other goods, it may most reasonably be asked, what goods? It 
would be absolutely impossible to apply all goods as a measure. (p97 note) 
This does not prevent Malthus elsewhere from talking of 'the increase in the 
exchangeable value of the whole produce estimated in labour' (p192) and even 
of the value of money expressed in labour (p144 note). And after listing 
shortcomings of any metric of value, which remind one of today's criticisms of 
GDP, he opines that we can't do without one, if only to compare the total 
products of different economies (pp247-248, 255-256). Such difficulties in 
integrating concepts of exchange and price with the 'value of the whole mass' 
arise in Rae's struggle with the paradox that a limited amount of exchange 
value in terms of prices coexists with greater wealth [deflation], and he 
concludes that the relevant magnitude was the physical increase in 'absolute 
capital and stock' (pp259-260).62 
 
Whatever happens economy-wide, price falls and underselling of more energy-
efficient goods raises their relative attractiveness. Jevons used the common 
classical phrase that coal 'commands' iron and steam (p2; see also Martinez-
Alier, 1987, p161); whatever is more cheaply or powerfully commanded – 
products requiring iron and steam – enjoy higher demand. If I can commute to 
work by bicycle, bus, horse, car or on foot, more efficient motors give the car 
the edge. This implies high economy-wide or total rebound and even backfire 
even if economy-wide Q or P x Q does not increase* – a pure 'substitution' 
effect distinct from income effects and the derived categories of 'direct' and 
'indirect' rebound. 
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 Efficiency and its consequences can be grasped physically. Smith resorts to this method in 
solving the paradox that 'improvements in… productive powers' are accompanied not only by 





The purely physical perspective shows us that the actual amount of coal or oil 
for a steam engine, car or light bulb over its 'lifetime' drops, enabling us to ask 
after the price or exchange-value effects on the inputs themselves rather than 
the outputs such as a pair of stockings: the initially lower demand at constant 
output lowers the price of the input, in turn raising demand for it relative to all 
else. Combining this aspect with the income effects discussed in the next two 
sections, Burniaux et al., for instance, write, 
There is a link between technical progress, output prices and real income… [T]he 
rise in energy productivity tends to lower the relative price of energy, thereby 
generating a substitution effect from non-energy towards energy goods. In the 
aggregate the increase in autonomous energy efficiency also generates a real 
income gain that leads to higher consumption of both energy and nonenergy 
goods. The net result is that emissions do not decrease in the same proportion as 
the AEE [autonomous energy efficiency] increase because the energy 
conservation effect is partly compensated by the relative price and income effects. 
(1995, p246; Hearn, p99) 
The size of this input-price-determined rebound depends also on the price 
elasticity of supply, for example of petroleum. At any rate, empirical work must 
analyze energy prices as well as efficiency change and change in the 
consumption of 'outputs'.63 
 
Societal income effect 
 
Smith's 'invisible hand' is not all that invisible but a name for the mechanism 
starting with efficiency increase, in other words with dexterity, division of labour, 
trade and machines 'directing… industry in such a manner as its produce may 
be of the greatest value' – a 'greatest value' variously called 'wealth', the 'annual 
revenue of the society', its 'power of purchasing', or 'the exchangeable value of 
the whole annual produce of its industry'. (IV.ii.4, 9, I.iv.13, I.vi.17, II.ii.21) This 
revenue or purchasing power – concepts closer to consumption than to 
production – was divided between labour/wages, capital/profits and land/rents, 
raising the allocative question which for Ricardo was the defining explicandum 
of political economy (pp 5, 347).64 While the others likewise devoted much effort 
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 Saunders shows that backfire is consistent with constant prices when the productivity of 
energy rises in the a production function with capital, labour, energy and material (1992). 
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 The term 'purchasing power' is explicitly found in, for example, Smith, I.v.3, I.xi.m.19-20, 
II.ii.21; Malthus, pp42, 49, 53, 80; McCulloch, pp171, 177; Mill, pp67, 458. 
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to this issue,65 their main concern was the question of scale, or the size and 
growth of production and consumption (Daly, 1992). Malthus even castigates 
Ricardo by name, writing that 'to estimate rent and wages by the proportion 
which they bear to the whole produce, must, in an inquiry into the nature and 
causes of the wealth of nations, lead to perpetual confusion and error' (p164). 
More politely, Say remarks of landowners and capitalists, 'The world at large 
may be content to comprehend, without taking the trouble of measuring, their 
respective shares in the production of wealth' (p74 note). 
 
Rae conceptualized this crucial distinction with the terms 'acquisition' and 
'augmentation' (sometimes 'accumulation'); the former is a mere shift of wealth 
from one person, group or nation to another, the latter a rise of the total (or per 
capita average) amount of produce (pp11-12, 24, 260, 264, 307; Say, p85; 
Malthus, p35; Mill, p62). Following Say (Say, pp70, 117-118) he names this 
'creating wealth', claiming that 'the ends which individuals and nations pursue, 
are different. The object of the one is to acquire, of the other to create' (Rae, 
p15). 'As individuals seem generally to grow rich by grasping a larger and larger 
portion of the wealth already in existence, nations do so by the production of 
wealth that did not previously exist' (p12). Not Smith's invisible hand, but the 
state or 'community' must promote and encourage 'progress of art', the 
'discovery of new arts' and the 'discovery of improvements in the arts already 
practised in the country [efficiency]' (pp15, 12). 
 
The clearest description of the augmentation of societal income is Say's:  
[T]he aggregate utility will be augmented; the quantum of products procurable for 
the same [total] price will be enlarged… But whence is derived this accession of 
enjoyment, this larger supply of wealth, that nobody pays for? From the increased 
command acquired by human intelligence over the productive powers and agents 
presented gratuitously by nature. A power has been rendered available for human 
purposes, that had before been not known, or not directed to any human object;… 
or one before known and available is directed with superior skill and effect, as in 
the case of every improvement in mechanism, whereby human or animal power is 
assisted or expanded. (p299) 
He sharpened this concept of greater wealth that nobody pays for by expanding 
his system boundary to include the whole world, describing sales between 
nations as mere acquisitions in Rae's sense* and insisting that 'the general 
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stock of wealth, existing in the world… can only be enlarged by the production 
of some new utility' (p305, emphasis added; see also p318). Malthus later 
described this shift of the societal supply curve caused by lower costs of 
production as a change in the 'conditions of supply… advantageous to the 
consumer' (1825, p303).66 Mill as well identified this rise in 'general purchasing 
power', caused for instance by 'an invention… made in machinery, by which 
broadcloth could be woven at half the former cost'; for him, simply, 'all… 
improvements make the labourers better off with the same money wages…' 
(pp457-458, 751). 
 
'Wealth, that nobody pays for'? Is there a free lunch after all? (Jones, pp288-
289) Evidently yes, once inventors, research-and-development and embodied 
inputs are deducted as costs. The point is that the source of this lunch is 
efficiency. This productiveness inheres either in nature, as with increased 
dexterity or education of humans and the substitution of naturally better 
materials, or in our ways of organizing themselves and their materials by 
'forming' or 'transforming' matter for utility (Cantillon, p2; Say, pp62, 65, 387; 
McCulloch, p61; Rae, pp81-83).67 Virgin land, virgin mines and population 
growth can bring greater output for constant input per unit, but efficiency brings 
this result even when the limits of these things are reached, or closely 
approached. 
 
Once Say had fingered this win-win process he defended it with sarcasm 
against Galiani and Forbonnais, whose idea that one's gain must be another's 
loss underpinned the 'systems of all the short-sighted merchants' (pp16, 31 note 
and 70). More didactically and again reflecting the struggle with the term 'value' 
he wrote, 
If different commodities have fallen in different ratios,… they must have varied in 
relative value to each other… There is this difference between a real and a relative 
variation of price [valeur]: that the former is a change of value, arising from an 
alteration of the charges of production; the latter, a change, arising from an 
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 Also Mill, pp477-487; Khazzoom, 1980, pp22-24. 
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 Ecological economics parts company with Say when he declares these 'spontaneous gifts of 
nature…, neither procurable by production, nor destructible by consumption' to lie outside the 
realm of political economy (pp63, 86). In the frequent classical emphasis on exchange, as in 
environmental economics' emphasis on allocation, one sees that new biophysical facts, and 
limits, necessitate a re-definition of political economy (Boulding, 1966; Daly, 1992). 
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alteration of the ratio of value of one particular commodity to other commodities. 
Real variations are beneficial to buyers, without injury to sellers; and vice versâ; 
but in relative ones, what is gained by the seller is lost by the purchaser, and vice 
versâ. (p304; see also Mill, pp457-458) 
His summary: 
In commercial, as well as manufacturing industry, the discovery of a more 
economical or more expeditious process, the more skilful employment of natural 
agents, the substitution, for instance, of a canal in place of a road, or the removal 
of a difficulty interposed by nature or by human institutions, reduces the cost of 
production, and procures a gain to the consumer, without any consequent loss to 
the producer, who can lower his price without prejudice to himself, because his 
own outlay and advance are likewise reduced. (p101; see also pp89, 301) 
He later offers a numerical example expressing purchasing power in terms of 
'the quantity of his own particular product' instead of money: once stockings are 
made cheaper, a sugar tradesman can get the same number of stockings as 
before for less sugar (p300). He then assumes simultaneous price falls of sugar 
and stockings, asking whether we are now 
authorized to infer, that this fall is a positive fall, and has no reference or relation to 
the prices of commodities to one another? that commodities in general may fall at 
one and the same time, some more, some less, and yet that the diminution of price 
may be no loss to any body? (pp300-301) 
 
McCulloch also argued against the claim that consumers' gains might be 
balanced by producers' losses, and in his own jibe at Ricardo also saw win-win 
cases where 'profits… would have risen, without their rise having been 
occasioned by a fall of wages' (p372). Distribution is here not the issue.* 
Malthus also empirically attests rising profits and, moreover, lest anyone fear 
slacking demand, capitalists' rising expenditures 'in objects of luxury, 
enjoyment, and liberality' (p293). While arguing that labour efficiency causes 
unemployment, Sismondi had ignored this point that demand for labour 
originates from profits as well (Sismondi, vol 2, pp335, 322-324). Jevons later 
added that even when profits through competition fell to their minimum, there is 
a net gain to society (1871, p254). 
 
This possibility that suppliers' profits as a total amount of purchasing power 
could fall seemed real. Charles Babbage 'strongly pressed upon the attention' of 
the manufacturer to very carefully 'ascertain how many additional customers he 
will acquire by a given reduction in the price of the article he makes' lest profits 
turn to losses, adding that falling prices would force firms to make further 
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efficiency gains (pp98-99; see also Say, p87).68 Old goods produced more 
expensively, for instance, must be sold at a loss (albeit a gain for the consumer) 
(Say, pp305, 390; Ricardo, p274; Malthus, p282).69 The profits of the producers 
of material inputs – for example of energy or mining companies – could also fall 
since they experience at least initially lower demand and must lower prices; 
however, the rebound caused by lower input prices in the longer term restores 
profits. 
 
Smith was describing this economy-wide income effect of newly enabled, 
costless prosperity by writing for instance that 'all things would have become 
cheaper in reality'; 'improvements in mechanicks… are always regarded as 
advantageous to every society'; the surpluses of 'the country', division of labour 
and trade with 'the town' raise the revenue of both (I.viii.4, II.ii.7, III.i, IV.vii.c.88, 
IV.ix.51; IV.ix; Mill, pp119-122). For Rae 'all instruments at the period of their 
exhaustion return more than the cost of their formation' (p118) and 'good 
bread… produced… with half the labor and fuel… would not benefit the bakers 
exclusively, but would be felt equally over the whole society' (p259). Efficiency 
is like corn – one seed yields 100 seeds. Jevons likewise later wrote that profits 
falling to their minimum means that everything is cheaper, and that 'either the 
labourers themselves, or the public generally as consumers, gather all the 
excess of advantage' (1871, pp254, 257, emphasis added). Finally, Mill quoted 
Rae's description of the contrasting 'stationary state' society of China (Mill, 
pp168-169) and referred to the free increase of wealth caused by 'improvement' 
as an 'increased means of enjoyment' (p724). 
 
If we now make the attempt to approach rebound while ignoring prices, as 
suggested in the last section, we can for instance assume that before an 
efficiency increase production is 10X, at 10 joules/X, equaling 100 joules of 
input. If afterwards there are 12X, at 9 joules/X, this equals 108 joules of input, 
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 Say also noted that efficiency is the result of a profusion of taxes (p473), a point likewise clear 
in today's debate wherein Pearce, for instance, notes that through efficiency some of the effect 
of eco-taxes is 'taken back' (1987, p14). 
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 A friend of mine who wholesaled slide rules once had to throw away several thousand slide 
rules with the advent of calculators – a process difficult to integrate into this gain/loss calculus 
and again raising the question of undesired output or waste. 
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in other words backfire. Our writers often claimed that this is the normal case: 
we can produce not only 10 per cent more X if efficiency increases 10 per cent, 
but 20 per cent. Is this something coming from nothing? It is easy to accept that 
11X are produced, using 99 joules of input, in other words rebound of 100 per 
cent. But whence the twelfth X? Seen monetarily, the source can only lie with 
increased purchasing power due to X's price fall, with purchasing power seen 
as an income effect, or taken away from rival factors of production like labour, 
or due to a price fall of the input joules when the supply function for joules does 
not shift. 
 
One argument for the possibility of backfire thus does not depend on the 
concepts of societal income effect or even growth of total output: if a given 
factor of production becomes more powerful, to use the classical term, demand 
for that factor will increase relative to rival factors of production whose 
productiveness remains the same (Marx, p354; Brookes, 1990, 2000; 
Saunders, 1992, 2000). Brookes writes, 
The market for more productive fuel is greater than for less productive fuel, or 
alternatively… for a resource to find itself in a world of more efficient use is for it to 
enjoy a reduction in its implicit price with the obvious implications for demand [for 
fuel]. (2000, p355) 
Jevons similarly concluded his chapter 'Of the Economy of Fuel' by asserting 
necessary rises in both input and output consumption: 
And if economy [efficiency] in the past has been the main source of our progress 
and growing consumption of coal, the same effect will follow from the same cause 
in the future. Economy multiplies the value and efficiency of our chief material; it 
indefinitely increases our wealth and means of subsistence, and leads to an 
extension of our population, works, and commerce, which is gratifying in the 
present, but must lead to an earlier end. Economical inventions are what I should 




Again, if we interpret the societal income effect monetarily we encounter the 
paradox that a consumer with a new park of efficient appliances pays less to the 
electricity supplier, lowering his income, purchasing power or consumption. 
Where a high price elasticity of demand is claimed (for example Say, p302, or 
Malthus, p192), we could encounter a bookkeeping quantity 'that nobody pays 
for': if before an efficiency event 36 units are sold at £2 each, P x Q = £72, and 
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where price elasticity of demand is 1, 7 x £1 also = £72. If price elasticity of 
demand is 2, then 144 units sold yields £144. Whence the additional £72? If 
withdrawn from sectors previously favoured we must deduct this from rebound. 
Again, it seems clearer to simply realize that more output is here at the same 
cost in physical inputs. If societal purchasing power is £1,000,000 and newly 
more efficiently produced things are now £1,000 cheaper, we have a monetary 




One conclusion till now is that efficiency-induced consumption of output, 
entailing as it does some input, proves rebound. Before looking more closely at 
classical descriptions of high rebound, some taxonomy is useful.71 Increased 
society-wide purchasing power results from the increased efficiency of 
producing an average unit of a good of type X, as opposed to Y, representing all 
other goods. At this moment, as Malthus said, 'there must be a considerable 
class of persons who have both the will and power to consume more material 
wealth than they produce…' (p319). This new demand can be 
1. for additional X by consumer A, a previous consumer of X; 
2. for some Y by consumer A; 
3. for additional X by a new 'marginal' consumer B; 
4. for some Y by consumer B, who after consuming some X retains some 
'consumer surplus'; and  
5. for leisure – in the extreme, all consumers choose to lower their 
purchasing power to the full extent of engineering savings. 
Aside from these variations of the income effect, a more efficient production 
factor is substituted for another one – a 'substitution' effect. 
 
The first and second cases are called 'direct rebound', today's workhorse 
example being that if my new car uses less petrol per kilometre, my existing 
purchasing power allows me to drive more kilometres; this is Khazzoom's 'own' 
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price elasticity of demand (1980, p22). The total cost of the car including its use 
has dropped, freeing income. 
 
The second case is in Malthus's words 'distinct from' the first and pertains when 
'the commodity to which machinery is applied is not of such a nature that its 
consumption can extend with its cheapness' but 'there would be a portion of 
revenue set free for the purchase of fresh commodities' (pp282-283). Given 
higher purchasing power, when the price elasticity of demand for the newly 
cheaper good is low, indirect rebound results (even with high efficiency elasticity 
of price). In unfairly claiming that Malthus missed this point McCulloch offers a 
clear description of it: 
Suppose the price of cottons were reduced in the proportion of ten to one; if the 
demand for them could not be extended, it is certainly true, that nine-tenths of the 
capital and labourers engaged in the cotton manufacture would be thrown out of 
that employment: But it is equally certain, that there would be a proportional 
extension of the demand for the produce of other branches of industry. It must be 
remembered, that the means by which the purchasers of cottons formerly paid for 
those that were high-priced, could not be diminished by the facility of their 
production being increased and their price reduced. They would still have the same 
capital to employ, and the same revenue to expend. (pp177-178, 188) 
The indirect rebound of the second a 
nd fourth categories above is likewise in Say's remark that: 
A new machine supplants a portion of human labour, but does not diminish the 
amount of the product; if it did, it would be absurd to adopt it. When water-carriers 
are relieved in the supply of a city by any kind of hydraulic engine, the inhabitants 
are equally well supplied with water. The revenue [purchasing power] of the district 
is at least as great, but it takes a different direction… [I]nferior charges of its 
production [mean that] the revenue of the consumers is benefited. (pp86-87) 
Say's translator Prinsep is explicit: Our revenues are enlarged by lower costs of 
production of X, and we are free 'to employ them upon some other object [types 
2 & 4], or upon an enlarged production of the same object [types 1 & 3]' (p296 
note). Ricardo likewise, quoting Smith's attestation of unlimited desires for all 
but food, brings the example where 'improved machinery, with the employment 
of the same quantity of labour' quadruples 'the quantity of stockings' [but] the 
demand for stockings were only doubled', leading to 'the production of some 
other commodity' (p387). In Malthus's version: 
… though the wills and means of the old purchasers might remain undiminished, 
yet as the commodity could be obtained without the expression of the same 




Based on this consumer surplus, demand could and would show itself 
elsewhere. 
 
In the classification above good Y could also be a new good, i.e. one not 
existing at the time of the efficiency increase but whose supply and 
consumption depends on that efficiency increase. Examples are legion – 
railways following better steam engines and cheaper steel, or emails following 
the more efficient use of electricity in data transmission. Transportation, milling, 
printing, and glass-making all count for Rae as consumption areas opened up 
by efficiency (pp116-117, 245-250, 291-292) while Hearn presaged Jevons' 
emphasis on new uses and products in observing that: 
In many districts the price of coal has been reduced from thirty to forty per cent; 
and the purposes to which it has been applied have consequently been largely 
increased. (p274) 
Jevons repeated this general point (pp141-142, 197) and named new uses of 
coal in metallurgy and transportation (see footnote 23). Martinez-Alier points out 
that instead of substituting for coal, electricity increased demand for it (1987, 
p88; also Jevons, p181) Sanne draws the exact parallel with new applications of 
electricity as it becomes cheaper due to increased efficiency of coal-fired plants 
(2000, p489). 
 
Jevons called this new consumption 'the reaction and mutual dependence of 
the arts' as when Darby's powerful-blast smelting oven required the substitution 
of coal for water (pp372, 385). And the fundamental phenomenon of 
productivity's opening up new markets had been sketched early on by Smith 
(I.xi.c.36) and filled out somewhat by Say (pp89-90) and Rae (pp245, 247, 253). 
But granted that 'many of the more important substitutions are due to coal' 
(Jevons, p134), what are the net effects? Coal's efficiency meant that fewer 
horses and oats were consumed due to railroads, just as today efficiencies of 
electricity production and use mean perhaps that fewer paper letters are sent 
due to e-mail. Again, how much of this new consumption should be booked 
under rebound is hard or impossible to decide, and while today it is implicitly 
subsumed under 'economy-wide' rather than either direct or indirect rebound it 
is ignored by all rebound studies. Fresh study is warranted of Babbage, von 
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Liebig (1851), Cipolla (1962), Rosenberg (1982, 1994), Clapp (1994) and 
Sieferle (2001). 
 
As for the direct rebound of the third case, where marginal consumer B 
purchases X, all writers observed that the efficiency-induced cheapening of X 
enables marginal consumers to buy it. Say writes, 
Suppose that… knit-waistcoats of woollen [cost] 2 dollars each;… those who 
should have but a dollar and a half left must… go without. If the same article could 
be produced at one dollar and a half, these latter also might all be provided and 
become customers; and the consumption would be still further extended, if they 
should be produced at one dollar only. In this manner, products formerly within the 
reach of the rich alone have been made accessible to almost every class of 
society, as in the case of stockings. (p288) 
How much of this demand is truly new, in other words not shifted from Y, 
however, is an open question. Malthus echoes Say, talking of 
such an extension of the demand for the commodity, by its being brought within the 
power of a much greater number of purchasers, that the value of the whole mass 
of goods made by the new machinery greatly exceeds their former value'. (p281; 
see also p314) 
In terms of I = PAT (that is, environmental Impact = Population x Affluence x 
Technology), (P x A)after > (P x A)before. Sismondi reminded these economists 
however that since the laid-off workers have no more purchasing power the 
market extension is inhibited (vol 2, pp316-317, 326-327, 251). We can 
moreover ask Say and Malthus what the marginal consumer had done with his 
one dollar and a half before the price of the waistcoat fell from 2 dollars. 
Whatever would have been consumed without the cheapening of the waistcoat 
is no longer consumed, constituting to some degree a win-lose situation after 
all. 
 
Also part of 'indirect' rebound is the fourth category where a marginal 
consumer's demand for X evidences some consumer surplus, leaving some 
purchasing power for Y. Taken together the four categories equal total rebound 
or the societal income effect. Today all rebound researchers acknowledge the 
difficulty of tracing these effects from direct rebound through indirect rebound to 
what really matters, namely total or economy-wide rebound. Wirl notes that 
excluding 'marginal consumers' gets around the 'conservation [or] energy 
paradox' but yields an underestimation of rebound (1997, pp19-32, 36, 112). 
Roy believes that there is 'a whole range of behavioral responses of the end-
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users that follow any technical efficiency improvement all of which may, 
however, not be traced empirically' (2000, p433).72 What then are we to make of 
Allan et al.'s assertion that 'rebound is an empirical issue… It is simply not 
possible to determine the degree of rebound and backfire from theoretical 
considerations alone…' (2006, pp21-22; see also pp3, 10)? 
 
Malthus already saw this. Assuming, he said, that latent demand in the affected 
sector was low: 
To what extent the spare capital and labour thrown out of employment in one 
district would have enriched others, it is impossible to say; and on this subject any 
assertion may be made, as we cannot be set right by an appeal to facts. (p286)
73
 
It is likewise doubtful whether we today have the data necessary for 
demonstrating that a given increase in one sector constitutes indirect rebound 
from efficiency in another sector. Direct rebound is apparently more easily 
estimated. Some sectoral studies calculate high direct or even total rebound 
(Dahmus & Gutowski, 2005; Allan et al., 2005; Herring, 2006; Fouquet & 
Pearson, 2006) while some, implicitly or explicitly offering support to the 
environmental efficiency strategy, show total rebound as low as 26% and thus 
real energy savings (4CMR, 2006, pp6, 9, 66).74 Other studies attest low 
rebound while however limiting themselves to direct rebound and moreover 
equivocating between direct and total rebound (Greening et al., 2000; Berkout 
et al., 2000). 
 
The fifth category, wherein leisure is chosen, is crucial: rebound can be zero if 
price elasticity of demand is vertical. As shown in the next section, only Malthus 
gave weight to this possible reaction, the others agreeing with Rae that 
'improvement [is] absorbed by vanity' (pp289-290) or with Jevons that children 
will continue doing as their elders did (p199). That is, humankind finds itself in a 
condition far from satiation. To attest rebound is merely to assert that, short of 
total consumer satiation, theoretical input savings are never fully realized, 
whereas backfire depends upon a strong low-satiation premise. The sixth 
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category of 'substitution' effects, which includes the effects of a fall in the input 
price relative to other prices, received little explicit attention in Jevons and the 
classical literature. 
 
The classical input metric was not always of labour, land area and mines, but of 
materials as well. Mill once observes that 'the tendency of improvements in 
production is always to economize, never to increase, the expenditure of seed 
or material for a given produce' (p99). And renewable energy resources concern 
him in his analysis of the invention of – nomen est omen – windmills and 
watermills (p28). Rae was more explicit: 
Every society possesses a certain amount of materials capable of being converted 
into instruments. The surface of its territory, the various minerals lying below the 
surface, its natural forests, its waters, [etc.]… are all to be regarded as materials, 
which, through the agency of the labor of its members, may be converted into 
instruments. The extent of the power, which the inhabitants of any state may 
possess, to convert into instruments… is however variable; and increases… as 
their knowledge of the properties of these materials and of the events [products], 
which in consequence of them, they are capable of bringing to pass, increases. 
[K]nowledge… gives… the power of constructing a much greater number of 
instruments out of the same materials. (p99) 
This leads to Rae's long chapter on invention, which always serves efficiency 
either by changing 'materials' or applying given 'materials' to new arts (pp258-
259, 224-229, 242-249). In Smith (I.xi.o.12), Say (pp89-90) and Rae (pp242-
244) the insight is that without inventions, water and wind are not used at all, 
but that once the right equipment is available, the energy is used more and 
more. The bridge from invention to efficiency is established by Jevons's closely 
related, ironic observation on the difference between Savery's coal-burning 
steam engine and those of Newcomen and Watt: Savery's 'consumed no coal, 
because its rate of consumption was too high' (p143). Once invention has 
occurred, the consumption of an input is positively proportional to the efficiency 
of its use – yielding rebound for sure but not necessarily backfire. 
 
Surplus and indolence 
 
Malthus threw a monkey wrench into the mechanism of output growth described 
by Smith, Say, Ricardo and himself: 
It has been supposed that, if a certain number of farmers and a certain number of 
manufacturers had been exchanging their surplus food and clothing with each 
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other, and their powers of production were suddenly so increased that both parties 
could, with the same labour, produce luxuries in addition to what they had before 
obtained, there could be no sort of difficulty with regard to demand… But in this 
intercourse of mutual gratifications, two things are taken for granted, which are the 
very points in dispute. It is taken for granted that luxuries are always preferred to 
indolence, and that an adequate proportion of the profits of each party is consumed 
as revenue. The effect of a preference of indolence to luxuries would evidently be 
to occasion a want of demand for the returns of the increased powers of production 
supposed, and to throw labourers out of employment. (p258; see also p9) 
Greater consumption following increased efficiency is not necessary but only 
what 'almost always happens' (p170). What if, he asks, 'after the necessaries of 
life were obtained, the workman should consider indolence as a greater luxury 
than those which he was likely to procure by further labour…' (p268)? 'The 
peasant, who might be induced to labour an additional number of hours for tea 
or tobacco, might prefer indolence to a new coat' (p283). In richer societies, 
likewise, it could be that the 'habits and tastes of the society prevent… an… 
increased consumption' and 'the demand for material luxuries and 
conveniences would very soon abate' (pp288, 191; see also Mill, p105) – the 
vision of today's sufficiency strategy (Alcott, 2007).75 Even for poorer societies 
like that of North American Indians, whose 'proverbial indolence' he attests, the 
rule is that 'to civilize a savage, he must be inspired with new wants and 
desires' (Malthus, pp103-104). 
 
Malthus's population essay already notes these limits to demand for produced 
goods (1798, pp95, 120). However, he knows that the 'laws of nature have 
provided for the leisure or personal services of a certain portion of society', and 
that the tastes and habits of this leisure class (Veblen, 1899), perhaps due to 
exposure to items of foreign trade, can sustain a good deal of luxury 
consumption (pp317, 284). The issue here is not 'Say's Law' – that 
overproduction is only temporary – but human psychology. Jevons explicitly 
maintained that we cannot count on consumption or reproduction desires 
subsiding, and even claims this to be 'the gist of the subject' (p194). He knew 
that his argument that fuel's very economy was part of the problem needed 
assumptions about desires, saturation and demand elasticities: the 'natural laws 
['of growth'] which govern… consumption' (pp25, 275) must be firmly assumed 
in our models of energy use. To be sure, he frames the classical view both of 
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population increase and the desire for greater and greater material wealth in the 
conditional: 
If our parents doubled their income, or doubled the use of iron, or doubled the 
agricultural produce of the country, then so ought we, unless we are changed 
either in character or circumstances. (pp193-194; see also pp232, 275) 
But nothing else is to be expected (p199). Similarly, many later writers have 
conjectured that if consumer saturation were a fact, or if we would value the 
leisure dividend of efficiency increases more, problematic overconsumption and 
high natural-resource rebound would be mitigated (Schor, 1992, 1999; Grubb, 
1990a; Sanne, 2000, pp489-490, 494-495). 
 
Although Say once for some reason writes cautiously that 'the productive 
agency thus released may be directed [peuvent être employés] to the increase 
of production' (p295, emphasis added), aside from Malthus only  took this 
possibility of non-consumption seriously: 
If the labourer's command over the necessaries and comforts of life were suddenly 
raised to ten times its present amount, his consumption as well as his savings 
would doubtless be very greatly increased; but it is not at all likely that he would 
continue to exert his full powers. In such a state of society workmen would not be 
engaged twelve or fourteen hours a day in hard labour, nor would children be 
immured from their tenderest years in a cotton-mill. The labourer would then be 
able, without endangering his means of subsistence, to devote a greater portion of 
his time to amusement, and to the cultivation of his mind. (pp167-168) 
Our epigraph shows the mainstream view that indolence is seldom chosen. To 
be sure, Mill attributes this 'less leisure' only partly to unlimited desires; rising 
population and diminishing agricultural returns to labour also figure (p12). And 
indeed if Malthus's own principle of population is taken seriously, and 
'multiplication…may be regarded as infinite', demand for more efficiently 
produced food and clothing is likely to dominate over the 'power to consume… 
in idleness' what has already been produced (Mill, pp154, 34). Smith's view also 
ran contrary to Malthus's: while the stomach is limited, our further willingness to 
purchase is not (I.xi.c.7), and in the end  himself seconded this without 
reservation (pp167-178; see also Petty, p307). The doctrine thus stood that 'the 
limit of wealth is never a deficiency of consumers, but of producers and 
productive power' (Mill, p68). 
 
For Rae, likewise, 'All instruments exist solely to supply wants' (p166). As proof 
he offers a psychological theory why indolence loses out to accumulation: 'The 
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increased facility of production has… in a great measure also been absorbed by 
vanity' (p289). While he takes leisure and indolence seriously, and regards 
labour as a cost (pp98, 118, 141, 209), display consumption wins out (p271); 
indeed his chapter 'Of Luxury' recounts in detail the human tendency towards 
display, competitive, or prestige consumption (pp265-292), presaging Veblen's 
famous 'conspicuous consumption' (1899, pp32, 110, 241; Sismondi, vol 2, 
p318). This relative consumption is by definition limitless (Alcott, 2004, pp776-
778). 
 
Unlike Veblen, Rae quotes extensively from other authors like Pliny, Smith, 
Heinrich Friedrich von Storch and Say's similar but less systematic analysis in 
his chapter 'Of Individual Consumption – Its Motives and Effects' (Say, pp 401-
411). In a nascent appeal for sustainability Rae praises care for 'futurity', 
'frugality' and saving in the interests of the 'social affections' (pp60, 265, 275), 
strongly seconded by Jevons in his worry for posterity over coal's depletion 
(pp3-6, 373, 412, 454-455). But these succumb in great degree to vanity: 
At length, in some quarter or another, an improvement began to be perceived. 
What do we find to have been the most prominent accompaniment of this change? 
Is it a diminished expenditure – and increased parsimony – a frugality before 
unknown? I believe not.' (p23) 
Mill even built this power of consumption over investment and indolence into his 
very definition of political economy, which 'makes an entire abstraction of every 
other human passion and motive; except those which may be regarded as 
perpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to 
labour, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences' (quoted by 
Bladen in Mill, pxxix). Our fifth (no-)rebound category stands as an extreme: at 
absolute consumer saturation every efficiency increase would bestow upon us 






Malthus was the economist most worried about market glut or an insufficient 
'extension of the market' (pp285, 288).76 But he too in the end attested high 
rebound and even, with regard to labour inputs, direct backfire – for instance in 
the case of cotton goods where 'notwithstanding the saving of labour, more 
hands, instead of fewer, are required in the manufacture' (p281). He accordingly 
defended himself against being 'classed with M. Sismondi as an enemy to 
machinery' (p282 note). Between the first and posthumous second edition of his 
Principles, 1820 and 1836, many writers had banned thoughts of consumer 
satiation, if they occurred at all, to the realm of theory.  recaps the story thus: 
Accumulation [of capital] and division [of labour] act and react on each other. The 
quantity of raw materials which the same number of people can work up increases 
in a great proportion, as labour comes to be more and more subdivided; and 
according as the operations of each workman are reduced to a greater degree of 
identity and simplicity, he has… a greater chance of discovering machines and 
processes for facilitating and abridging his labour. The quantity of industry [labour], 
therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase of the stock or 
capital which sets it in motion; but, in consequence of this increase, the division of 
labour becomes extended, new and more powerful implements and machines are 
invented, and the same quantity of labour is thus made to produce an infinitely 
greater quantity of commodities. (p96; see also Jones, pp237-244) 
Three points of note in this passage are as follows:  seems to be considering 
material rather than labour inputs. Next, circulating as well as fixed 'capital' is 
endogenized (see also pp94-95 and Mill, p63). Third, if material output 
('commodities') really grows as much as he says, then backfire is very likely. 
Babbage likewise discusses efficiency in material/energy as well as time terms, 
and regards the growing economy as too obvious to mention (pp100, 112, 222, 
273; see also Mill, p106). Rae concurs with McCulloch in almost the same 
words (pp67-68). 
 
If McCulloch were to visit us today, would he regard his term 'infinite' as an 
exaggeration? He would in any case see the understatement in his view that the 
'admirable machinery invented by Hargreaves, Arkwright, and others [enables] 
us to spin an hundred or a thousand times as great a quantity of yarn as could 
be spun by means of a common spindle' (p99). As Rae imagined, were 'some 
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one of the men of olden time, waked from the slumber of the tomb and raised 
up to us', to witness even a tenfold yield, 'he might well demand how the power 
had been acquired that had wrought so great a change' (p14). 
 
Let us take McCulloch literally: Without the efficiency granted us by the 
machines, we would make much less yarn requiring much less cotton. In 
Jevons's version 'economy renders the employment of coal more profitable, and 
thus the present demand for coal is increased… [I]t cannot be supposed that we 
shall do without coal more than a fraction of what we do with it' (pp8, 9, 141, 
190). This thought is radical. Today's environmental efficiency strategy claims 
that an input's more efficient use lowers its rate of consumption. The 
inverse/corollary of this is that were processes to become less efficient, we* 
would consume the input at a higher rate. Or had technological efficiency 
increase remained unchanged – stopped, say, around 1781 with 'the 
introduction of Watt's engine, the pit-coal iron furnace, and the cotton factory' 
(Jevons, p270) – we would according to the strategy's assumptions today 
consume an hundred or a thousand times as much – or infinitely more – labour 
or cotton or fuel than we do today after over two centuries of efficiency increase. 
To maintain that rebound is less than 100 per cent one must defend this 
conclusion. 
 
Jevons asks, 'Could we desire that Savery, Newcomen,…Darby,… Brindley… 
and Watt' had not increased our industrial efficiency (p457)? Say envisions the 
case of frozen technology in imagining that a given road exists still as just a 
path with much less transport efficiency. He says that we can't measure the 
'gain' to consumers of the road because with no road 'the transport would never 
take place at all' (p443 note). Malthus similarly wrote, 'If the roads and canals of 
England were suddenly broken up and destroyed… there would be immediately 
a most alarming diminution both of value and wealth' (p243) – and implicitly of 
input consumption. As seen above, Jevons's comparable example was that 
Savery's steam engine 'consumed no coal, because its rate of consumption was 
too high'… It was so uneconomical, that, in spite of the cheapness of coals, it 
could not come into common use' (pp143, 118; Rae, pp247-248). Marx would 
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later conclude that without machines for example '£2000 capital would in the old 
state of things, have employed 1200 instead of 400 men' (p393).** More drily, 
Mill takes division of labour as the proxy for improvement in efficiency and 
notes, 'Without some separation of employments, very few things would be 
produced at all' (p118). 
 
Say played further with this mental exercise. In connection with his example of 
printed pages as a case of direct backfire he writes of efficiency-induced price 
falls that 
sooner or later… cheapness will run away with the consumption and demand [and] 
in all the instances I have been able to meet with, the increase of demand has 
invariably outrun the increasing powers of an improved production (pp87, 302; 
emphasis added) 
That is, imagine the 'relative intensity of supply and demand', which determines 
price (Say, p290), as showing flat demand curves and steep supply curves. 
Now, he said, 
suppose… the charges of production are at length reduced to nothing;… Every 
object of human want would stand in the same predicament as the air or the water, 
which are consumed without the necessity of being either produced or purchased. 
In like manner as every one is rich enough to provide himself with air, so would he 
be to provide himself with every other imaginable product. (pp303-304) 
Would total, overall, absolute consumption of resources be lower, or higher, in 




Smith casts some doubt on this, writing that if a 'capital… was produced 
spontaneously, it would be of no value in exchange, and could add nothing to 
the wealth of society' (II.v.5); but this is only exchange value, and ‘wealth’ seen 
monetarily. In contrast Say takes the exercise in the opposite direction: 
By the rule of contraries, as a real advance of price must always proceed from a 
deficiency in the product raised by equal productive means, it is attended by a 
diminution in the general stock of wealth. (p302; Smith, I.xi.o.6) 
That is, is greater wealth even conceivable under conditions of decreasing 
efficiency? If we take time, material, energy and space inputs and assume all 
historically known efficiencies away, we most likely arrive at the population and 




Sarcasm also distinguished an anonymous 1826 article on the 'machinery 
question' of technological unemployment: 
If the use of machinery is calculated to diminish the fund out of which labourers are 
supported, then by giving up the use of the plough and the harrow and returning to 
the pastoral state, or by scratching the earth with our nails, the produce of the soil 
would be adequate to the maintenance of a much greater number of labourers. 
There are many labourers now in England, and the gradations of ingenuity and skill 
in machinery are numerous; but as the number of labourers and the funds for their 
support would be gradually increased in proportion as we fell back upon the less 
perfect machinery, so, at last, when we deprived ourselves entirely of its 
assistance, the produce and hence the population of England would be increased 
beyond what has ever been exhibited in any country upon the surface of the 
globe.... (Anon., 1826, p102; see also Brookes, 2000, p359)
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The writer is criticizing Mr. Wakefield and Dr. Chalmers, but also chides Ricardo 
for his change of heart on this question – of which more in the final section. 
 
Say twice frames his description of consumption growth in terms of inputs. 
Demand 'outruns' efficiency in a 
production, operating upon the same productive means; so that every enlargement 
of the power of the productive agency has created a demand for more of that 
agency, in the preparation of the product cheapened by the improvement… When 
the demand for any product whatever, is very lively, the productive agency, through 
whose means alone it is obtainable, is likewise in brisk demand, which necessarily 
raises its ratio of value: this is true generally, of every kind of productive agency. 
(pp302, 324, emphasis added; see also Brookes, 1990 and 2000, and Saunders, 
1992 and 2000) 
If the phrase 'ratio of value' refers to amounts of the input before, and after, the 
improvement, perhaps times their price per unit, Say is presaging Jevons's 
position exactly. Similarly, depending upon one's interpretation of Smith's term 
'fund', he too could be attesting rebound greater than unity when he claims that 
'Every saving… must increase the fund which puts industry into motion and 
consequently the annual produce of land and labour' (II.ii.25). 
 
As shown earlier Rae frequently frames his analysis in terms of materials rather 
than labour, but he seems usually to denote only the materials embodied in 
tools, machinery, and instruments, as when he speaks of 'the efficiency of… 
materials when formed into instruments' (p112). However, since fields and 
foods are also 'instruments' we can infer that efficiency in some cases implies 
increased inputs of things other than knowledge (pp112-113): 'Every society 
possesses a certain amount of materials capable of being converted into 
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instruments' (pp99; see also p187). For Rae greater efficiency of an instrument 
means it yields 'quickened' returns (p164) and in general 
the effect of improvement, to carry instruments into orders of quicker return…, a 
greater range of materials is brought within the reach of [the accumulative] 
principle, and it consequently forms an additional amount of instruments… All 
[improvements], therefore, place a greater range of materials within compass of the 
accumulative principle, and occasion the construction of a larger amount of 
instruments. (pp261, 131, 365)
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Furthermore, 'A multiplication of instruments is of no avail, unless something 
additional be given on which they may operate', and our 'instruments… draw 
forth stores' of materials; 'improvement in their construction… put additional 
stores within reach of the nation' (pp29, 19, 68). In addition 'The various 
agricultural improvements… with which invention enriched that art in Britain…, 
occasioned a great amount of material to be wrought up, which before lay 
dormant' (p261). 
 
Finally, with a rebound example familiar from today's debate, he notes of the 
macadamization of roads that 'the facility it gives to transport occasions an 
increase of transport…' (p114). Hearn similarly writes of invention that it 
'enables the labourer to work materials which… were previously beyond his 
reach' (pp181-183). Taken together these observations are arguably a 
description of backfire: ultimately, efficiency leads to higher rates of material-
input consumption. Since each instrument – a field, a steam engine – implies 
not only embodied but operating materials, we can infer little saving of material 
inputs from Rae's analysis. He continues by noting that improved instruments 
increased the amount of land under cultivation and that 'rocks were quarried; 
forests were thinned; lime was burned; the metal left the mine…' (pp261-262). A 
rise in Q entails rebound for sure and most likely backfire. 
 
A summary by Mill contains almost all of the concepts introduced till now. Recall 
that 'circulating capital' covers all the food, fuel and other materials fed into 
production. Just before considering the 'stationary state' and 'to what goal… 
economical progress' should be aimed (p752) he writes: 
It already appears from these considerations, that the conversion of circulating 
capital into fixed, whether by railways, or manufactories, or ships, or machinery, or 
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canals, or mines, or works of drainage and irrigation, is not likely, in any rich 
country, to diminish the gross produce or the amount of employment for labour. 
How much then is the case strengthened, when we consider that these 
transformations of capital are of the nature of improvements in production, which, 
instead of ultimately diminishing circulating capital, are the necessary conditions of 
its increase, since they alone enable a country to possess a constantly augmenting 
capital without reducing profits to the rate which would cause accumulation to stop. 
There is hardly any increase of fixed capital which does not enable the country to 
contain eventually a larger circulating capital, than it otherwise could possess and 
employ within its own limits; for there is hardly any creation of fixed capital which, 
when it proves successful, does not cheapen the articles on which wages are 
habitually expended. All capital sunk in the permanent improvement of land, 
lessens the cost of food and materials; almost all improvements in machinery 
cheapen the labourer's clothing or lodging, or the tools with which these are made; 
improvements in locomotion, such as railways, cheapen to the consumer all things 
which are brought from a distance. (pp750-751; see also p344) 
A few pages later our epigraph appears wherein Mill doubts that any labour had 
been saved by labour-saving devices. This fruit of classical thought fell to 
Jevons. 
 
The principle of population 
 
Since the classical era population size seems to have declined in importance as 
a dependent variable; yet the ten-fold increase of population in the last two 
centuries is surely an explicandum of the first order. No classical economist 
challenged productivity's causal role. Today by contrast this is for instance 
denied by Schipper & Grubb who, although they 'normalise… observations of 
absolute quantities to either population or GDP' see none of this 'significant' 
population growth as 'stimulated by the increases in energy efficiency' (2000, 
p368). Perhaps the OECD perspective of almost all studies, abetted by shyness 
in the face of the fact that people do die from lack of sustenance, has prevented 
the adoption of both agricultural and manufacturing efficiency as an 
independent variable. Yet if population rise is at least enabled by efficiency 
increase then the wholly exogenous treatment of population in energy-
consumption models is wrong (for example Schipper et al., 1996, p174; 
Howarth, 1997, p4; Lantz & Feng, 2006, p235). It also means underestimation 
of rebound. 
 
Presaging I = PAT, Jevons made the point that the 'quantity of coal consumed 
is really a quantity of two dimensions, the number of people and the average 
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quantity consumed by each' (p196). Malthus in both his major works 
endogenized 'number of people', his metaphorical phrase being that 'the 
necessaries of life, when properly distributed, [create] their own demand [by] 
raising up a number of demanders…' (pp113; see also pp114, 130, 181, 223, 
251). He then points out that if increased 'powers of production' were not 
necessary for increased population 'the Earth would probably before this period 
[mid-19th century] have contained, at the very least, ten times as many 
inhabitants as are supported on its surface at present' (pp288, 251). In 
explaining wealth, '[to] suppose a great and continued increase of population is 
to beg the question. We may as well suppose at once an increase of wealth…' 
(p252). (Ironically, countless modellers of rebound do exactly this, exogenize 
GDP, 'economic activity' or total output!79) As shown earlier, classical economics 
almost fully endogenized growth, attributing the size of the annual produce of 
land and labour partly to 'improvement' – as Mill's statement quoted above 
shows. Progress raises sustenance (in spite of diminishing returns in 
agriculture), increasing the extent of the market, which in turn allows more 
division of labour and larger, more expensive machinery, in turn enabling larger 
population (Mill, pp33, 129-131, 190, 712-714).  
 
Perhaps building on Petty (p255), Smith states simply, 'The number of workmen 
increases with the increasing quantity of food, or with the growing improvement 
and cultivation of the lands…' (Ixi.c.7). Building on Say (pp71, 292-295), 
McCulloch writes that 'there does not seem to be any good reason why man 
himself should not… be considered as forming a part of the national capital. 
Man is as much the produce of labour as any of the machines constructed by 
his agency…' (p115; see also Mill, pp40-41). Malthus talked of the 'cost of 
producing a poacher' compared to that of a 'common labourer or… coal-heaver' 
(p180; see also Jones, p196). Rae abstractly but explicitly named 'invention' as 
'the true generator of states and people' (pp31, 323). Sustenance includes not 
only food but warmth, housing and general health (Say, pp301 note, 373, 378; 
Mill, pp 154-159). The quantity of labour (and people) is a function of the 
quantity and quality ('human capital') of labour. 
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Starting with Petty's question as to how many Men the Land would feed, all of 
the old-timers embraced the principle of population, expressed by Malthus in 
terms of 'tendencies', sustenance, and the effect of prosperity on decisions to 
marry and have children (1798, pp20-26, 33-34, 41, 52, 70, 74-75).80 Jevons of 
course tied it empirically to coal: '[With] cheap supplies of coal, and our skill in 
its employment…[w]e are growing rich and numerous' (pp199-200). In terms of 
the I = PAT production function, we should  write I = f(P,A,T), A = f(T) showing 
our becoming rich and P = f(T) showing our becoming numerous. That 
population is not sui generis is also shown and recognized by recent 
investigators (for example Giampietro, 1994, pp680-681; Hannon, 1998, 
p215).81 Schmookler was one who consciously treated it both exogenously and 
endogenously (1966, pp104-106; also Rosenberg, 1982, p141). If moreover 
population and the scale of the economy are partially endogenous, the 
ubiquitous picture in the literature of a 'race' between a 'growth effect' and 
efficiency is incorrect (Levett, 2004, p1015).82 The question of backfire is 
begged when growth and efficiency are assumed to be rivals, but the race 
metaphor again shows the paradox: Do efficiency increases compensate for 
growth or cause it? 
 
Another population-related problem with most rebound analyses is the concept 
of the energy intensity of a given good, service or expenditure whereby 'energy 
costs are typically a… component of the total cost of owning and operating 
energy-using equipment' (Howarth, 1997, p2). '[T]otal energy costs are 
generally a few percent of GDP' and the size of any rebound or 're-spending 
effect [where] purchasing power is released for other energy-containing 
services' is proportional to this percentage (Grubb, 1990b, p784; see also 
Greening et al., 2000, p391).83 Or, in analyzing indirect rebound one compares 
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the energy intensity of the old and the new expenditure to help measure the 
change in energy consumption. As in Malthus's defence of the concept of 
natural price, this energy share and the other intensities, for example of labour 
or capital, add up to 100 per cent. (Malthus, pp66-67). 
 
However, as shown above in discussing Say's 'immaterial objects', buying 
labour also implies expenditures by the labourers on material and energy, in the 
older terms of 'reproducing' themselves. Kaufmann's rendering of this 'feedback' 
effect for capital as well as labour is that when these are substituted for energy, 
these also have energy costs, which 'offsets some fraction of the direct energy 
savings and reduces the amount of energy saved by price-induced 
microeconomic substitution' (1992, p49). Mill's detailed analysis of a loaf of 
bread for instance names bakers, ploughmen, plough-makers, carpenters, 
bricklayers, hedgers, ditchers, miners and smelters who share the price (costs) 
of the loaf (p31). Labour and capital, the more so when seen in the classical 
sense as previous embodied labour, entail energy consumption and are not 
energy-neutral (Costanza, 1980). Mill also incidentally rejected the implication of 
perfect substitutability in these analyses: 
When two conditions are equally necessary for producing an effect at all, it is 
unmeaning to say that so much of it is produced by one and so much by the other; 
it is like attempting to decide which half of a pair of scissors has most to do in the 
act of cutting; or which of the factors, five and six, contributes most to the 
production of thirty. (pp 28-29) 
In any event, the notion that 'non-energy' costs have no effect on energy 
consumption must be rejected: once the creation and support of population is 
included, attending a concert is not the environmentally friendly act it is alleged 
to be. The idea of decreasing marginal energy intensity as income rises – also 
due to the societal income effect – must be doubted. 
 
Global population, along with technologically achieved levels of affluence, 
entailing as they do human usurpation of the living space of plant and other 
animal species, engenders interest in possible rebounds in the use of a further 
productive input, namely space, or land regarded merely as m2 (λm2↑ → m2↑ 
where λ is an efficiency co-efficient). Not only agricultural efficiencies, but also 
transport and architectural ones, can be expressed in terms of amount of land 
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use, raising the question of whether for instance more efficient farming reduces 
the pressure on forests. (Jevons, p200; Pascual, 2002, p497) Whenever 
classical literature raises this question, the answer is that following agricultural 
improvement we do not take land out of cultivation.84 
 
The employment paradox 
 
Because they directly raise population, labour and energy efficiency increases 
thus indirectly raise the number of work-hours or employment, but given the 
limited length of the work day is this true when we hold population constant? 
Labour rebound would be smaller, but as Mill said most likely work-hours don't 
decrease. Recall that before Jevons economists, except at times Say and Rae, 
conceptualized all sorts of efficiency changes – not just technological ones – but 
asked explicitly only after the fate of labour inputs, not of material inputs. Their 
specific debate concerned whether machines caused long-term unemployment, 
that is, whether labour-efficiency rebound was less than 100 per cent. Jevons of 
course saw that with 'every… improvement of the engine… hand labour is 
further replaced by mechanical labour' and that in agriculture 'Labour saved is 
rendered superfluous' (pp152-153, 243); also institutional efficiency, through 
free trade, 'raises the economy of labour to its highest pitch' (p413). But he 
asserted that it was obvious that demand for labour thereby grew: 
As a rule, new modes of economy will lead to an increase in consumption 
according to a principle recognized in many parallel instances. The economy of 
labour effected by the introduction of new machinery throws labourers out of 
employment for the moment. But such is the increased demand for the cheapened 
products, that eventually the sphere of employment is greatly widened. (p140) 
He offers empirical proof with the examples of seamstresses, coal miners and 
iron workers (pp140, 130-131, 153, 213-218, 277-278) as his predecessors had 
with the examples of flour-milling, printing and cottons. As we shall see this 
result was not at all obvious for Marx (pp354-392), writing at the same time as 
Jevons, as it had not been for Ricardo and Sismondi. 
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The issue is the same as that concerning primary energy: Does an input-saving 
production system permanently lower, or raise, consumption of that input? We 
could even call this 'Say's Paradox', for after demonstrating that cheapened 
products create additional employment he writes: 
Paradoxical as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that the labouring class is of 
all others the most interested in promoting the economy of human labour; for that is 
the class which benefits the most by the general cheapness, and suffers most from 
the general dearness of commodities. (p89 note) 
The result that, out of 20 men at a flour mill, the 19 'unfortunate' ones laid off 
would find other work, was for him admittedly 'survenue' (1820, p63).85 But he 
claimed that in printing, even if machines had thrown 199 out of 200 copyists 
out of work, probably 20,000 people were working in the printing trade (p88). 
 
While many energy-efficiency increases cause labour-efficiency increases as a 
side effect – if only in the mining and distribution of the energy per unit of 
product – labour-saving changes like new machines, household gadgets or the 
factory system usually lower energy-efficiency per unit of output – say a cup of 
coffee –, if only due to the substitution effect. Such feedbacks between βM and 
αL – the efficiencies of use of matter and labour, respectively – have yet to be 
systematically investigated in complete models of either labour or energy 
consumption (Rae, p20; Marx, pp386-387; Binswanger, 2001, pp127-128). 
Again with the example of the ceramic stove's replacing the open hearth: 
heating requires less time cutting and stacking wood as well as less wood (also 
Jones, pp249-250; Mill, pp106-107; Martinez-Alier, 1987, p3). Hearn's 
generalized insight was both that 'labour and... time are free to be applied to 
other industrial purposes' and that 'the introduction… of natural forces in lieu of 
or in addition to human powers sets free a quantity of commodities' (pp183-185, 
271). But the Jevons Paradox concerns only M = f(βM), not M = f(αL) as well. 
 
By arguments from price falls, profitability and the income effect, a near-
consensus reigned concerning output growth and labour-input growth – 
epitomized by Mill's quip in our epigraph. Some years before the outbreak of the 
controversy over machines vs. men Smith claimed that: 
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the accumulation of stock must… be previous to the division of labour… As the 
division of labour advances,… in order to give constant employment to an equal 
number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock of materials 
and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state of things, must be 
accumulated beforehand. But the number of workmen in every branch of business 
generally increases with the division of labour in that branch… The increase in the 
quantity of useful labour actually employed within any society, must depend 
altogether upon the increase of the capital which employs it… (II.intro.3, IV.ix.36) 
Remembering that 'capital' is both fixed and circulating (in this case wages in 
the form of food and provisions during the period of production), and that fixed 
capital always entails heightened efficiency (Jevons, pp150, 155), Smith's view 
is that technological efficiency ('tools') and organizational efficiency ('division of 
labour') are the conditions for growth in the number of jobs. There is no hint that 
machines throw people out of work. 
 
However, the intuition that makes the economy of labour just as paradoxical as 
the economy of fuel, and the fact that visibly and locally machines do replace 
workers, had by 1820 spawned the theoretical positions of Say, Robert Owen, 
Ricardo, Sismondi and Malthus. Say first discussed the displacement of 
workers in his first edition in 1803 (ch IX), making important changes but 
keeping his conclusions in later editions as well as in the fourth of his Letters to 
Malthus (1820). Lauderdale also explicitly discussed machines that 'supplant 
labour', first agreeing with Smith that lower labour costs in textile manufacture 
had lowered prices and that machines generally increase wealth; but he at the 
same time attests a net loss for the supplanted 'unlettered manufacturers 
themselves' and sees good reason for the 'riots that have taken place on the 
introduction of various pieces of machinery' (pp168-171, 184, 189-192, 206). 
 
Reminiscent of much microeconomic work on rebound today, most participants 
traced the fate of the money amounts of capital or revenue saved by efficiency 
increase. Employment was gained by making and maintaining the machines, 
but lost when production processes needed fewer hands; it was gained when 
employers spent their higher profits on luxuries or servants, but lost if demand 
for other products failed. The monetary examples are found in Ricardo (pp16, 
388-391), Sismondi (vol 2, pp324-326), Say (1820, pp60-61, 65-67), Malthus 
(pp192-194, 282-283), McCulloch (pp179-182), and Marx (pp392-393). The 
parameters to observe are: 1) percentage labour-efficiency increase compared 
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to percentage price fall (usually seen as equal); 2) total fixed capital; 3) total 
circulating capital shifted between workers in different branches and between 
workers and capitalists; 4) the income effect of demand for further products; 5) 
labour demanded for making and tending the machinery; 6) duration of the 
machine; 7) demand for 'unproductive labour' or 'menial servants' whom these 
writers do not (usually) count as ‘labourers’; 8) foreign demand; and 9) the 
short-run deplacement of labour. 
 
Most of these appear in Ricardo's contradictory discussion. In the third edition of 
1821, without explicitly answering Say, he acknowledges a change of mind. 
Earlier he had believed that an increase of 'net income' (rents and profits) 
always entailed an increase of 'gross income' (including wages and implicitly 
jobs), arguing in Parliament against Owen's opposite view (Sraffa, 1951, plviii). 
But in 1821 in his new chapter 'On Machinery' he is thinks out loud: because the 
employer has less 'circulating capital*… his means of employing labour, would 
be reduced' (p389); but with increased profits after the introduction of the 
machine the 'power of purchasing commodities [of the 'net produce'] may be 
greatly increased' (pp389-390). In asserting that 'there will necessarily be a 
diminution in demand for labour [and] population will become redundant', 
however, his system boundary remains at the single factory or sector, in other 
words he forgets indirect rebound (p390); yet due to the necessary 'reduction in 
the price of commodities consequent on the introduction of machinery… there 
would not necessarily be any redundancy of people' (p390; see also p392). 
 
He then seems to forget price reductions, doubting the demand for instance for 
a greatly increased supply of cloth (p391). In the simple example of replacing 
men with horses he sees a case of 'gross revenue' falling while 'net revenue' 
rises (p394); yet even here, the income of the farm employer could be so great, 
or 'the produce of the land [so] increased, that all of the unemployed find jobs 'in 
manufactures, or as a menial servant' (pp394-395). On the one hand he states, 
All I wish to prove, is, that the discovery and use of machinery may be attended 
with a diminution of gross produce… injurious to the labouring class, as some of 
their number will be thrown out of employment… [A]n increase of the net produce 
of a country is compatible with a diminution of the gross produce… By investing 
part of a capital in improved machinery, there will be a diminution in the 
progressive demand for labour… (pp390, 392, 397) 
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On the other hand, he believes that 'the employment of machinery should never 
be safely discouraged in a State [and] that machinery should… be encouraged' 
– both because its introduction is slow and because otherwise, even jobs in the 
machinery industry would move overseas (pp396, 395). In the terms of today's 
debate, Ricardo is arguing that rebound is never greater than 100 per cent and 
tends to be quite a bit less. 
 
Say directly attacks the issue both in his Treatise (pp86-90) and in the fourth of 
the Letters to Malthus (1820). In the latter he explicitly bases his case first on 
large price falls and high price elasticity of demand (pp56-57), second on latent 
demand for other commodities that is satisfied by the income effect (which he 
unjustly accuses Sismondi of neglecting) (pp60-62), third on the fact that the 
machines can simply do more work than men (pp58-59) and fourth on the fact 
that after all is said and done, the factory produces the same amount of product 
available for consumption, and the laid-off workers, with this sustenance, will do 
something else (pp61-63). Mill echoed this last point in making the softer claim 
that 'if there are human beings capable of work, and food to feed them, they 
may always be employed in producing something' (p66; emphasis added). It 
seems also to be the case today that as well as labour, also natural resources 
not used for one purpose get used for another. 
 
Say goes on to convincingly show that Sismondi's monetary example contains 
some unrealistic assumptions, but himself makes two numerical errors (pp60-
61). He then appeals both empirically to the high and increasing employment all 
around him (p63) and to a historical overview: his 'model' predicts – accurately 
– that: 
if the arts still improve,… they will produce more at less expence [and] fresh 
millions of men in the course of a few ages will produce objects, which would excite 
in our minds, could we see them, a surprise equal to that which the great 




Two ambiguities mar the comparison of labour and material/energy inputs as 
well as the classical debate over the former. First, saving material is 
unmitigatedly good whereas saving labour, because people as opposed to 
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materials must eat, is not. Holding population constant and raising work 
efficiency, the same or greater employment than otherwise (rebound 100 per 
cent or backfire) guarantees livelihoods. Somewhat contrary to the view that 
labour is painful and irksome, rebound greater than unity is therefore good. On 
the contrary, while resource consumption is obviously good for affluence, its 
'over-consumption' and hence backfire is bad due to scarcity and pollution 
problems. 
 
Secondly, precisely the bookkeeping offered by the debate's participants shows 
that the social or livelihood or full-employment problem is soluble: The amount 
of output does not decrease! Or as Ricardo concedes from the point of view of 
income rather than production, if employers lay off five of ten men, they 
nevertheless retain the purchasing power to employ all ten (1820-22, p355). If 
the fully realized production possibilities of the society supported everybody 
before, it can therefore support them after all the great and small productivity 
increases taking place daily. Seeing this, even those who held that efficiency 
savings were in fact realized – that is, that unemployment resulted – placed 
blame on the 'factory' or 'capitalist' set of institutions which included neither 
shorter work hours nor guaranteed employment. Many such as Owen (see 
Sraffa, 1951, pplvii-lx; Berg, 1980; Greenberg, 1990, pp710-712) and Sismondi 
(vol 2, pp312-313, 317) thus mixed ethical or socialist arguments with economic 
ones. Even Marx maintained that not only in the short run 'in the hands of 
capital' labour-saving productiveness increase meant 'lengthening the working 
day', and wrote that: 
workpeople [should] distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, 
and to direct their attacks, not against the material instruments of production, but 
against the mode in which they are used. (p351; also 356, 374) 
In contradiction to this, though, his final doctrine is that machinery and men are 
in competition; although new capital can employ many of the newly unemployed 
and although indeed as much or more 'of the necessaries of life' are still 
produced, a sufficient rise of demand is uncertain (pp374, 384-386). 
 
The consensus that emerged, though, was that if the remaining work and/or the 
same or increased output is distributed equally, the problem of computing the 
66 
 
total-employment effects of employment efficiency would lose its social aspect. 
Again, all agreed with Say's point that even if a wind-driven flour mill does the 
work of eighteen persons, these 'eighteen extra [redundant] persons are 
[theoretically] just as well provided with subsistence' (p90; see also Rae, p259). 
The parallel to energy inputs is that after a machine 'does the work' of one out 
of two tons of coal, both the coal and the means to employ it remain. And Say, 
Malthus, McCulloch and Mill, although convinced that even more labour ensued 
(backfire), recognized that some measures to lessen the hardship of displaced 
workers are justified. Mill even imagines a 'benevolent government' assuring a 
just distribution of work, in other words of income (p67). Whatever the final level 
of employment, one must regard full employment as a social, not an economic, 
problem, as expounded by Edward Bellamy in his Looking Backward (1887). 
 
The result is that if produce stays at least the same, 100 per cent rebound in 
terms of work-hours – that is, full employment – is likely at no additional cost. As 
Malthus claimed, the 'net produce' could always employ 'unproductive 
labourers' such as 'menial servants, soldiers, and sailors' (p191). But the 
opposite is possible. In a difficult passage which earned him a reputation as an 
advocate of labour rebound less than unity, he says that even with increasing 
'exchangeable value of the whole produce' stable or sinking employment could 
result, namely when the production of 'luxuries and superior conveniences' rose 
at the expense of necessaries; but his more fundamental claim is to deny any 
proportional connection between either fixed and circulating capital, and thus 
efficiency, and demand for labour: consistent with his Essay on the Principle of 
Population, this depends only on 'the means of commanding the food, clothing, 
lodging, and firing of the labouring classes of society' (pp190-191). 
 
If production is higher, some combination of raised affluence and raised 
population results. If, however, we assume that before the efficiency increase 
every worker was working his maximum number of hours, then without 
population increase labour backfire is logically impossible (Malthus, pp62-63). 
(Analogous energy-rebound limits perhaps exist due to scarcity or 
thermodynamic limits.) Malthus in fact concludes that if the 'introduction of fixed 
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capital' is gradual and 'the funds destined for the maintenance of labour' 
somehow keep pace, the result is a 'great demand for labour and a great 
addition to the population [and] there is no occasion therefore to fear that the 
introduction of fixed capital… will diminish the effective demand for labour' 
(p193; see also pp281-289). By the early 1830s he accordingly defends himself 
against being 'classed [by McCulloch] with M. Sismondi as an enemy to 
machinery' (p282 note), also rejecting the doubts of Ricardo and the opinions of 
'M. Sismondi and Mr Owen' that labour-saving machines are 'a great misfortune' 
(p295 note). 
 
McCulloch was indeed just as convinced as Say that the 'extension and 
improvement of machinery is always advantageous to the labourer' (p165), but 
not only because more work hours result. His first original point is that if 
machinery would lower demand for labour by raising labour's productivity, then 
so would any 'improvement of the science, dexterity, skill, and industry of the 
labourer'; therefore 'M. Sismondi could not… hesitate about condemning such 
an improvement as a very great evil' (pp165-166). As seen above McCulloch's 
macroeconomic assumption of a tenfold efficiency increase would also allow 
more leisure (pp166-168; Mill, pp105-106). His result entails considerable 
rebound in material/energy consumption; there is no backfire in labour 
consumption but rather a real savings of labour inputs; and the imagined 
cornucopia would enable society to politically assure full employment.87 But he 
assumes no population growth. If population and/or work-hours increase, L-
backfire could ensue. 
 
Microeconomically McCulloch argues explicitly with the standard price falls, 
large price elasticities of demand and indirect rebound (pp176-180). In apparent 
contradiction to his vision of shorter working hours for all he then relies on both 
theory and observation to show that the machines of 'Hargreaves, Arkwright, 
and Watt' created employment for 'thousands and thousands of workmen' 
(p117). This raises our paradox again: According to Dolores Greenberg, 
Owenite John Brooks in 1836 calculated that machines in Great Britain and 
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Ireland were doing the work of no less than 600,000,000 people (1990, p711; 
Jevons, p411). Can we infer from this that therefore 600,000,000 people were 
out of work – perhaps even in the sense that they had starved or not been 
born? If the machines were doing the work of only 300,000,000 people, would 
employment be twice as high? 
 
Some of Jevons' statistics on population and substitution hint at these 
questions. 
In round numbers, the population has about quadrupled since the beginning of the 
19
th
 century, but the consumption of coal has increased sixteenfold, and more. The 
consumption per head of the population has therefore increased fourfold. (p196) 
Pertinent to today's 'renewables' discussion he computes, for instance, that 
since an 'ordinary windmill has the power of about thirty-four men, or at most, 
seven horses… the great Dowlais Ironworks… would require no less than 1,000 
large windmills!' (pp164-165; 203-205) And when he writes that 'it cannot be 
supposed that we shall do without coal more than a fraction of what we do with 
it', we may ask both how many are in this 'we' (p9) and how well-off we would 
be, since 'with coal almost any feat is possible or easy; without it we are thrown 
back into the laborious poverty of early times' (p2).88 
 
Say, Malthus and McCulloch do not show labour backfire with certainty. They 
show us not that more work hours must result, but that less work hours must not 
result. Even Sismondi saw cases when for instance workers were not 'rendered 
superfluous' due to the stocking-machine – but only because of the three 
exogenous factors 1) changes of taste, 2) increased population and 3) 
increased wealth (vol 2, pp316-317, 330-331).89 But in the normal case and 
contrary to Say's claims in ridiculing him (1820, pp 61-62) Sismondi does say 
that the stockings are cheaper and that demand can therefore rise due to the 
income effect in sectors having nothing to do with the one affected by the 
efficiency increase (here, stockings); but he treats the total purchasing power as 
no greater than that spent on the more expensive spats previously or even as 
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less: 'new demand will never have the same proportion as that thereby lost by 
the laid-off workers' (vol 2, pp317, 323-324, 322; see also McCulloch, pp186-
187) A further lack of certainty marks Say's empirical claims: perhaps backfire in 
cottons and printing is proven, given a demand function, but these are mere 
sectoral studies with no necessary economy-wide implications (p57). 
 
One of Sismondi's arguments for low labour rebound is that while a machine 
may lower labour costs by 99 per cent, since the price of stockings consists of 
more than just labour costs, the price cannot fall in the ratio of the laid-off 
workers (vol 2, pp323-324). Similarly, many argue today that since energy costs 
are only a fraction of GDP the efficiency elasticity of price is low (Howarth, 
1997, pp2, 3; Allan et al., 2006, pp18-19). Although this argument loses force if 
rebound is measured as a percentage not of total economic activity but only of 
potential engineering savings, its plausibility is a reason why Jevons' paradox is 
a paradox. If prices fall 50 per cent there is nevertheless more real purchasing 
power in the economy, whether the efficiency of a given input rises 51 per cent 
or 99 per cent; perhaps the concept of the efficiency elasticity of price, 
compares apples and pears.* 
 
Mill, finally, confronts the problem we named earlier that the purchasing power 
drawn to the cheaper, more efficiently-produced goods is lacking for the older, 
previously purchased goods, thus lowering employment in those sectors. On 
the one hand he attests that: 
Every addition to capital gives to labour either additional employment or additional 
remuneration… If it finds additional hands to set to work, it increases aggregate 
produce: if only the same hands, it gives them a larger share of it; and perhaps 
even in this case, by stimulating them to greater exertion, augments the produce 
itself. (p68; also p87) 
But he adds that the standard argument – greater employment through cheaper 
goods through more efficient production through applying fixed and circulating 
capital to this sector – 
does not… have the weight commonly ascribed to it…. [I]f this capital was drawn 
from other employments; if the funds which took the place of the capital sunk in 
costly machinery, were supplied not by any additional saving consequent on the 
improvements, but by drafts on the general capital of the community; what better 
were the labouring classes for the mere transfer? In what manner was the loss 
they sustained by the conversion of circulating capital into fixed capital made up to 
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them by a mere shifting of part of the remainder of the circulating capital from its 
old employments to a new one? (p96) 
Mill seems here to envision a zero-sum process, which indeed the economy is if 
measured monetarily with constant money supply. Perhaps his premise is 
wrong that the capital must be drawn from other, previous employments rather 
than from the real increased produce or 'returns' per unit of input. This is the 
answer Say would have given and that Rae gave (p118). Although Mill's 
subsequent attempt to counter his own argument is unsuccessful he then 
concludes with Say that employment is not threatened after all but in the end 
increased (pp133-134, 749-751, 119-120). 
 
Today no one either hopes or fears that labour efficiency increases do not 
backfire. It is accepted that for over two centuries such 'improvements' have 
been accompanied by rising employment and population. A causal connection 
is even often explicit: More efficiency of all sorts, such as free trade, lower 
transactions costs, restructuring for synergies in industry as well as everyday 
streamlining of work processes, is known to further the economic growth upon 
which an expanding job market depends. But material/energy inputs are 
perceived differently, with different goals and hopes. Just as the older debate 
was fraught with the ambiguity of 'labour' seen negatively as a cost and 'labour' 
seen positively as a proxy for 'income', today's debate contradictorily lauds 
efficiency of any sort as a tool for lower environmental impact as well as for 
growth and affluence. If however energy rebound is close to or greater than 
unity, environmental ends are better served by direct means such as taxation or 
rationing (Hannon, 1975; Brookes, 2000, pp363-364; Sanne, 2000, pp488, 491-
492; Fawcett, 2004; Simms, 2005).90 
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Jevons opened his seminal chapter on fuel 'economy' (his term for the efficiency 
ratio) by quoting Justus von Liebig, who wrote: 
Cultivation is the economy of force. Science teaches us the simplest means of 
obtaining the greatest effect [output] with the smallest expenditure of power [input], 
and with a given means to produce a maximum of force. The unprofitable exertion 
of power, the waste of force in agriculture, in other branches of industry, in science, 




Then, as now, force and therefore affluence and civilization lie in fossil fuel. But 
pollution and pending scarcity reveal the dark side of the prosperity that we so 
welcome. Roughly in the order of the sections presented above some 
conclusions can be drawn on whether more efficiency, ceteris paribus, achieves 
not only affluence and greater population but environmental relief. 
 
Efficiency is an attribute of humans and other natural agents as well as capital 
and organization, but is always an output/input ratio. Seeing efficiency increase 
as larger output, as the classical economists usually did, biases us to find high 
rebound plausible; seeing it as smaller input biases us toward low rebound and 
real savings. The term 'rebound' itself is a metaphor describing a bouncing ball, 
but a bounce all the way into the backfire zone unfairly implies perpetuum 
mobile or more. Furthermore, an analysis of energy consumption is possible 
without computation of engineering savings derived when one holds 
consumption constant, and thus without the concepts of rebound and backfire. 
 
In regression analysis, to explain increasing (rates of) energy consumption an 
independent variable 'technological efficiency' could be taken. But how is this 
measured for all sectors, all economies, over time and integrating new 
products? An adequate aggregate metric, whether in monetary, utility or 
physical terms, is hard to come by, but its absence makes empirical research 
difficult. The environmentally most relevant path of measuring output physically 
must seek a metric free of the anthropocentricity implied in terms such as 
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waste, usefulness, quality, service and value, for these conflate environmental 
with affluence criteria.92 Rather unscientifically, though, we all assume that 
technological efficiency continually increases. The classical economists also 
attested this and correlated it not only with growing production of wealth but 
sometimes with growing labour and material input quantities. Jevons for 
instance offers the empirical evidence for backfire that alongside great rises in 
coal consumption, population and affluence there were increases in the 
economy of fuel, for example in pig iron production by a factor of about seven in 
35 years (pp387-388, 145, 196, 261-271; see also Martinez-Alier, 1987, pp86). 
 
Fruitful empirical research must be at a scale large enough to capture not only 
indirect rebound in all sectors but also an economy's consumption of imported 
embodied energy (Jevons, p317). This need to ultimately cover all sectors and 
economies has been acknowledged.93 As McCulloch said we must investigate 
efficiency effects 'in a country surrounded by Bishop Berkeley's wall of brass' 
(p185), a good description of the whole globe. The more so since environmental 
problems are global, our studies should be both global and measure total rather 
than only direct rebound. 
 
But in the absence of hard empirical results we must resort to theory, and 
indeed both sides in today's debate over the environmental effects of efficiency 
claim 'counterfactually' what energy consumption would have been otherwise, in 
other words without efficiency increases (Khazzoom, 1980, pp22, 31; Howarth, 
1997, p3; Brookes, 2000, p356; Moezzi, 2000, pp525-526; Schipper & Grubb, 
2000, p370). Which model, then, better predicts this correlation? That of Jevons 
can perhaps be quantified as containing a technological rebound factor of 
slightly over 100 per cent, or an efficiency coefficient in a model of energy 
consumption of, say, 1.01. Holding all other variables constant, this model 
predicts the increase in energy consumption better than models assuming 
rebound less than unity which yield a large gap between predicted and real 
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consumption, a gap usually filled by exogenous GDP. Such models must 
moreover show what the causes of increased consumption then in fact are, if 
not efficiency increases.94 And these causes must be strong enough to 
overcome the alleged consumption-reducing effect of greater efficiency.95 
 
Efficiencies of all provenances have continually expanded the world economy's 
production possibilities frontier and thereby its consumption frontier. Grasping 
this physically – including the physical inputs into this consumption – can avoid 
some of the difficulties arising in microeconomic monetary analysis in terms of 
income effects and societal purchasing power. Yet while this immediately 
renders large rebound plausible, to directly infer backfire would beg our entire 
question; the Jevons Paradox must be taken seriously. In any case no answer 
can do without assumptions or empirical evidence concerning the (non-
)satiation of material desires and greater production's affect on population size. 
 
The policy situation is remarkable. The likelihood that theoretical and real input 
savings are identical is zero; some rebound is uncontested, and the lowest 
macroeconomic total-rebound estimates lie in the range of 25-40 per cent. It is 
therefore truly astonishing that with a handful of exceptions,96 government 
agencies and policy assessment companies do not correct for it,97 but rather, 
using a purely 'engineering' approach, set real savings equal to technologically 
possible savings. However, a rebound coefficient of 0.5, which is at the present 
state of knowledge justifiable, would significantly alter estimates both of 
efficiency's effectiveness and its cost-effectiveness. 
 
Remarkably, Smith's 'human stomach' passage – written about 230 years ago – 
contains practically all the concepts needed to approach our question: 
But when by the improvement and cultivation of land the labour of one family can 
provide food for two, the labour of half the society becomes sufficient to provide 
food for the whole. The other half, therefore, or at least the greater part of them, 
can be employed in providing other things, or in satisfying the other wants and 
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fancies of mankind. Cloathing and lodging, houshold furniture, and what is called 
Equipage, are the principal objects of the greater part of those wants and fancies. 
The rich man consumes no more food than his poor neighbour. In quality it may be 
very different, and to select and prepare it may require more labour and art; but in 
quantity it is very nearly the same. But compare the spacious palace and great 
wardrobe of the one, with the hovel and the few rags of the other, and you will be 
sensible that the difference between their cloathing, lodging and houshold furniture, 
is almost as great in quantity as it is in quality. The desire for food is limited in 
every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach; but the desire for the 
conveniences and ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and houshold furniture, 
seems to have no limit of certain boundary. Those, therefore, who have the 
command of more food than they themselves can consume, are always willing to 
exchange the surplus, or, what is the same thing, the price of it, for gratifications of 
this other kind. What is over and above satisfying the limited desire, is given for the 
amusement of those desires which cannot be satisfied, but seem to be altogether 
endless. The poor, in order to obtain food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies 
of the rich, and to obtain it more certainly, they vie with one another in the 
cheapness and perfection of their work. The number of workmen increases with 
the increasing quantity of food, or with the growing improvement and cultivation of 
the lands: and as the nature of their business admits of the utmost subdivisions of 
labour, the quantity of materials which they can work up, increases in a much 
greater proportion than their numbers. Hence arises a demand for every sort of 
material which human invention can employ, either usefully or ornamentally, in 
building, dress, equipage, or houshold furniture; for the fossils and minerals 




Here we find efficiency as 'improvement' and 'division of labour', greater output 
and an expanded production frontier as food surplus, greater population seen 
endogenously, the irrelevance of the energy proportion of a service, the 
reduction of quality to quantity, the limitlessness of latent demand, marginal 
consumers, the empirical fact of consumption's going hand in hand with 
efficiency and the derived large demand for material inputs including fossil fuel. 
 
Greater technological efficiency enables us to squeeze more useful material out 
of a given amount of input, or more non-work time out of the 24 daily hours 
(Sanne, 2000, pp487, 494). This is Jevons' state of 'happy prosperity' (p276). 
But if it simultaneously increases demand for natural resource inputs, we face a 
trade-off between affluence and sustainability. With the evidence at hand today, 
and given a certain urgency in finding an answer, good judgement is called for. 
If asked by policy-makers today whether we can count on greater energy 
efficiency to lower energy consumption, how many economists can answer with 
a whole-hearted 'Yes'? 
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Addendum to the Earthscan chapter for its submission for the PhD by 
Publication at NBS, UEA 
This work on the history of ideas relevant to the rebound question certainly 
helped clarify and flesh out some of the concepts. It also brought into focus the 
following chain of reasoning in estimating high rebound: 
1. technological efficiency increase itself, taken exogenously but including 
our reasons for doing it, entailing as it does certain costs; 
2. the effect of technological efficiency increase on economic growth, i.e. 
growth in the amount of goods and services; 
3. that this increase in society’s production possibilities frontier was in some 
sense for free; 
4. the effect on a natural resource’s price when it is used more efficiently; 
5. the result that such efficiency increase enabled population increase; 
6. the central question of how efficiency in using resource X, through the 
medium of economic growth, affects the amounts of resource X 
consumed; 
7. analogously, that labour inputs had been determined not to go 
‘unemployed’ when used more efficiently; 
8. and, mysteriously, that efficiency increases led to new products and thus 
perhaps to even more consumption of the input than before the efficiency 
increase. 
Of course this study was no more conclusive than any of the dozens of attempts 
to measure direct rebound; but several sceptics found it convincing, perhaps 
due to the hoary reputations of the studied ‘previous writers’. 
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I¼ f(P,A,T); and 2) Success in lowering any of the right-side factors does not necessarily lower Impact.
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lifestyle and technology changes towards more sufﬁciency and efﬁciency would follow the caps as
consumers and producers work to retain the greatest amount of welfare within the limits given.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Epigraph
Quantitative limits are set with reference to ecological and
ethical criteria, and the price system is then allowed, by auction
and exchange, to allocate depletion quotas and birth quotas
efﬁciently. The throughput is controlled at its input (depletion)
rather than at the pollution end because physical control is
easier at the point of lower entropy. (Herman Daly [1, p. 20])
2. Introduction
I¼ PAT, where unwanted environmental Impact depends on
Population size, Afﬂuence (consumption of goods and services per
person) and Technology, suggests a distinction between left-side
and right-side strategies for reaching a sustainable economic scale.
‘Strategies’ are simply sets of environmental policies, and the paper
assumes conventional deﬁnitions of ‘natural resource’, ‘pollution’
and ‘sustainability’. The left-side term, Impact, is both natural
resource depletion and biosphere pollution – a non-aggregable
term covering the loss of fuels, water, soil, space, ores, ﬁsh, biodi-
versity, favourable climate and other ecosystem amenities, etc. In
this paper Impact more restrictively means carbon-based energy
resource depletion with ensuing emissions.All rights reserved.Right-side terms and strategies include:
1) Population; policies achieving a lower number, ceteris paribus,
could lower Impact.
2) Afﬂuence (a ratio) is consumption of goods and services –
desired output – per person; ceteris paribus, lowering afﬂuence
either voluntarily in the sense of sufﬁciency, frugality or ‘living
lightly’, or through legal restrictions on what can enter the
market, could lower total Impact computed as PA.
3) Technology is an admittedly ornery term covering how an
economyproduces and consumes:withwhat legal rules, type of
organisation, chemicals and output–input efﬁciency. Consistent
with the deﬁnition of Impact above, this paper singles out efﬁ-
ciency (another ratio) inusing carbon-basedenergy resourcesas
the T term; accordingly, ceteris paribus, policies achieving lower
energy input per unit of output (goods and services) could lower
Impact deﬁned as the amount of energy inputs used up. Lower T
means lower (energy) intensity, i.e. higher efﬁciency.
Consumer efﬁciency is another right-side strategy proposed
within the current discussion of ‘sustainable consumption’.1
Taking the example of boiling water for a cup of coffee: more1 While policy interventions in this area are loosely subsumed under the concept
of ‘sustainable consumption’, there is in this research ﬁeld no consensus on deﬁ-
nitions and taxonomy. See [2, p. 1029–1032].
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technological change (T); doing without the odd cup of coffee, for
environmental reasons, is living more ‘sufﬁciently’ (A); boiling no
more than the amount of water needed for the cup of coffee, in
contrast, is consumer efﬁciency, here also classed under T.2 This
paper places environmental restoration activities or traditional
‘end-of-pipe’ measures (for example carbon capture and storage)
outside the I¼ PAT framework because their pollution reduction is
at the cost of some energy depletion.
Other strategies prominent in the sustainability discussion are
here taxed as ‘left-side’ because they directly lower Impact with no
reference to population, afﬂuence and technology, namely:
1) Reduction of carbon-based energy resource production, i.e.
a physically deﬁned cap on harvesting and mining; from this
‘upstream’ measure are then deduced rations per country.
2) Limiting energy consumption per person (quotas, rations); one
example of this ‘downstream’ measure is personal carbon
budgets.
3) Reduction of emissions – targeting pollution rather than
depletion – through physically deﬁned caps; one example is
the ‘Kyoto’ approach with derived country caps.
4) Taxes on depletion or emissions high enough to limit
consumption of energy inputs to the level perceived to be
sustainable (Pigouvian taxes).
These sets of policies do not attempt to inﬂuence number of
people, number of goods and services per person or efﬁciency, but
instead say: ‘‘These are the maximum allowed amounts. Each
country, ﬁrm and person must ﬁnd the combination of reductions
in population, afﬂuence and energy intensity that most suits them.’’
Section 1 describes the three right-side strategies intended to
indirectly lower Impact, identiﬁes their interdependencies (how
each ‘rebounds’) and shows that they are 1) not necessarily effective
and 2) taken all together, costly. Section 2 more fully describes left-
side strategies directly lowering depletion and pollution through
legal rules of resource use, whether through physically deﬁned caps
or taxes raising resource prices; these are necessarily effective and
require only one policy. Section 3 shows this taxonomy’s relation to
well-known literature and applies it to a typical impact-reduction
model containing both technical and lifestyle changes. Section 4
discusses policy simplicity and political acceptability.3. Section 1: right-side environmental strategies
I¼ PAT was introduced with policy in mind. As Faye Duchin
writes,
Ehrlich and Holdren (1974) identiﬁed the main factors respon-
sible for environmental degradation as population increase,
afﬂuence, and technology, providing three potentially important
‘handles’ for operationalizing the concept of sustainable devel-
opment. [3, p. 51]; [also 4] I have called each ‘‘handle’’
a ‘strategy’3
IPAT is sometimes incorrectly called an ‘‘identity’’. As one of its
ﬁrst applications shows, it is however a formula with which to
compute the amount of Impact, namely the amount of automotive
lead in the air. Paul Ehrlich et al. set all IPAT values at 1 for 1946 then2 Another example of consumer efﬁciency is carpooling, as opposed to more
efﬁcient cars (T) and cycling or staying at home (A).
3 Waggoner & Ausubel [5] offer a less parsimonious ImPACT identity whose C, C2,
T and T2 are the T of this paper and which offer four ‘sustainability levers’ for actors
to behave more efﬁciently and sufﬁciently.compared 1946 data with that of 1968 on population, number of
driven auto kilometres per person and the amount of lead emitted
per driven kilometre; impact increased 414% – i.e. aworsening from
the environmental point of view [6, p. 206, 214]. The reason the
formula is thus not an identity is that both the number of driven
kilometres and technical efﬁciency increase or decrease exoge-
nously to themodel, whereby T is deﬁned per unit of good or service
and A as total units of goods and services. In general total units
consumed does not stay constant after efﬁciency increases, but
rather increases, constituting ‘rebound’ consumption of the newly
more efﬁciently-used input. As illustrated by Fig. 1 [7], this partly or
entirely wipes out the theoretical ‘engineering’ savings that would
materialize had number of consumed units stayed the same.
This section argues that since each right-side strategy by itself is
followed by rebounds, i.e. environmentally worsening of the other
two factors, reduced Impact does not necessarily result. Given any
latent demand for more goods and services, and/or greater pop-
ulation, it is thus certain that no right-side set of measures is
sufﬁcient for lowering Impact. Therefore either additional,
complementary right-side measures are required, or resort must be
taken to left-side measures. Equally certainly, the difﬁculties of
enacting, enforcing and co-ordinating many simultaneous right-
side measures lowers their cost-effectiveness.4
First, before showing seven interdependencies among the three
right-side factors, some general observations on rebound (illus-
trated intuitively by Fig. 2). The literature is decisive that rebound
itself is proven,5 and a consensus has even emerged that rebounds
are ‘signiﬁcant’ or ‘relevant’ to environmental policy [19]. That is,
these rebounds or system adjustments – more people, more goods
and services, less efﬁcient or more ‘luxurious’ technology – mean
that environmental improvements on the right side cannot trans-
late one-to-one into lower Impact: some potential input savings
will be consumed.
What if all of the potential population, sufﬁciency or efﬁciency
induced savings are consumed? In that case right-side strategies
would, even if cleverly and simultaneously co-ordinated, have no
effect on Impact. A third possibility is that efﬁciency policies would
even environmentally ‘backﬁre’, the greater efﬁciency causingmore
energy to be consumed than if technology had stayed the same –
a thesis known as Jevons Paradox [8,17,19] or the Khazzoom–
Brookes Postulate [11,12], arguing that efﬁciency enables new
products, fuels economic growth and thus increases Impact.
While assuming, to be sure, that rebounds are large or signiﬁ-
cant (say 50% worldwide and longer-run [20]), this paper is
explicitly conceptual rather than empirical. It attempts only 1) to
identify and classify the various types of rebound, or right-side
interdependencies, and 2) show the major consequence for envi-
ronmental policy if rebounds are 50 or 100% – namely, that right-
side changes, while certainly fruitful in securing higher material
living standards and, for some societies, energy independence, are
either weak or futile in achieving the depletion and pollution
reductions necessary for environmental sustainability.
The general interdependencies between the P, A and T factors
are:
P) Lower population means lower impact only if afﬂuence and
factor productivity are held constant;4 Working Group III’s Summary for Policy Makers (IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report) lists no fewer than 25 right-side measures covering energy supply, trans-
port, buildings, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management, policies that
would be rendered superﬂuous were caps in place.





















= lower costs of production
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adapted from Khazzoom, 1980 [7]
Fig. 1. Khazzoom’s proof of rebound: Prices do not stay the same! Lower input use per
unit of output means lower production costs, enabling suppliers to offer the same
amount at a lower price or more at the same price: the supply curve shifts outward. For
any demand curve sloping as depicted, i.e. with any positive price elasticity of demand,
the lower price raises the quantity of good or service sold to a level above that previous
to the production-cost-reducing technological efﬁciency increase. This ‘rebound’
consumption of goods or services entails ‘rebound’ consumption of inputs (e.g. energy)
above the level it would have been had number of units consumed remained constant.
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voluntary frugality lower impact;
and T) using resources more efﬁciently lowers impact only if A
and P remain constant.
Put differently, impact is lowered only if there is complete
‘demographic transition’, full consumer satiation, and no decrease
of technological efﬁciency[18, p. 884].
Hopefully, the following seven interdependencies establish the
plausibility of system adjustments in any open economy.Fig. 2. Rebound visualized. During the post-efﬁciency-increase time period (‘‘following
year’’) an amount of energy equal to 20% of the previous time period’s consumption is
‘saved’. If the number of people and their consumption of goods and services stays the
same (the ceteris paribus condition), the rate of consumption of energy inputs remains at
80% of the previous level and theoretical savings become real. If however population
and/or afﬂuence increase, the rate of consumption rises again – probably to the same
level as before the efﬁciency increase. Society is free to use up the freed-up energy
resources or not. The disciplines of history, economics, psychology, anthropology and
political science must combine their efforts with a portion of wisdom to judge what
society does.3.1. Population change
3.1.1. A¼ f(P): per capita consumption as a function of total
population (‘more mouths to feed’)
For all natural resources, lower P enables higher A through re-
employment of the temporarily freed resources. If gross world
product (GWP) is like a cake, lower population enables each person
to consume a somewhat larger piece. Of course to the extent that
cakes are products of labour, lower population can mean fewer
work-hours and a smaller cake – but we are computing not total
cake but cake per person. Higher population inversely means that
area and natural resources per capita fall. Impact can remain
unchanged [21].
3.1.2. T¼ f(P): technology as a function of population size
(diminishing returns)
To the extent that lower population lessens demand for natural
resources it reduces the pressure to use them more efﬁciently.
Higher population density, inversely, is in itself an incentive to
produce more efﬁciently due both to increasing perception of
depletion/pollution and to diminishing economic returns from
‘land’ (soils, minerals, fuels). For instance coal and oil largely
replaced wood, as did synthetic ﬁbres much wool and cotton, and
incentives are strong to more efﬁciently process lower-grade ores,
oil sands, and soils [22].
3.2. Afﬂuence change
3.2.1. P¼ f(A): population size as a function of per capita
consumption
At lower incomes higher afﬂuence enables survival and often
higher population, while at the same time the higher levels of
education andwomen’s rights often accompanying greater afﬂuence
can lead to smaller families. At higher incomes birth rates drop – but
sododeath rates [23,24].Whetheroverall the signbetweenPandA is
negative or positive remains contested, meaning that policy
interventions are uncertain.
3.2.2. T¼ f(A): technology as a function of per capita consumption
(hybrid cars, combined heat and power, lasers)
Tracing inﬂuences on technology of the knowledge gains that
accompany per capita wealth is a tall order. While a wealthy
economycan afford to use resources less efﬁciently, it can also afford
to investmore inefﬁcient, cost-cutting technology (in the interest of
even higher afﬂuence). The capital junking accompanying techno-
logical innovations lowers efﬁciency, yet wealth enables research
and development for lower energy intensity, whether to cut costs or
alleviate local environmental impacts. Here, too, the overall sign of
the relationship is debatable.
3.2.3. A[3Px]¼ f(A[3Py]): the afﬂuence of one subset [3] of the
population as a function of (changes in) the afﬂuence
of another subset
Given limited amounts of labour and natural resources, a unit of
consumption by anyone with ability to pay excludes others from that
consumption. Relevant to environmental strategies is the fact that if
someone for environmental reasons voluntarily lowers his or her
afﬂuence, the system-wide result can compensate for this. Fig. 3 shows
how the frugality initially lowers energy demand, a demand-function
shift meaning lower energy prices; this in turn enables marginal
consumers to increase their demand, eliminating some or all of the
initial, frugality-induced resource saving. This ‘sufﬁciency rebound’
means that a net decrease of Impact does not necessarily follow from
voluntary frugality [25]. Although the size of this global rebound is
even less satisfactorily measured than the efﬁciency rebound, both
Fig. 3. Rebound after voluntary frugality. Doing without goods and services – either
voluntarily or in compliance with political decisions – lowers quantities consumed by
assumption, and constitutes a leftward shift of the demand curve. The resulting lower
prices attract other consumers who are not behaving ‘sufﬁciently’ in the interests of
the environment. This reaction raises quantities demanded above the level after the
‘sufﬁciency shock’. If suppliers can raise production at the new price level the process
is complete, and some rebound assures that for the whole system, voluntary frugality
does not result one-to-one in real input savings. Again, prices do not stay the same.
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that all freed resources would likely be snapped up.
3.3. Technology change
3.3.1. P¼ f(T): population size as a function of technology (green
revolution)
Increases for instance in agricultural efﬁciency have usually
caused population increase, with various effects on afﬂuence but
likely leaving Impact the same. Increased yield per hectare has
never meant that we take land out of production. This rebound
effect, which renders P partly endogenous in energy-consumption
models, has been largely neglected [26].
3.3.2. A¼ f(T): afﬂuence as a function of technological (fuel-)
efﬁciency (efﬁcient equipment)
Were the right side of I¼ PAT multiplicative (no interdepen-
dencies), lower T (higher efﬁciency) would automatically lower I.
But higher efﬁciency – either technological or organizational –
raises income, consumption, or wealth (PA). This uncontested
reboundmeans Impact cannot be thereby reduced to the full extent
of potential savings, computation of which multiplies energy input
per unit of goods-and-services by goods-and-services outputs
while holding the number of output-units constant. Unfortunately,
thirty years after Khazzoom’s proof of this, this naı¨ve, non-
economic view dominates not only political programmes,6 but
most academic literature researching cleaner production, efﬁciency
standards, barriers to cleaner technology, renewable energy, agri-
cultural productivity, etc.
To my knowledge only the UK government is beginning to
acknowledge rebound, in some sectors, when evaluating its6 In the past few weeks alone the author has collected around ten newspaper
items extolling the ‘holy trinity’ of greater efﬁciency, renewables and less waste –
either op-ed articles or reports of programmes by Barack Obama, Tony Blair, John
Podesta, McKinsey Inc., or the Chinese and Swiss governments – all in complete
ignorance of rebound.energy-efﬁciency programmes. Otherwise, as a representative of
the Swiss Energy Ofﬁce recently said to me, ‘‘Until we know exactly
how big rebound is, we treat it as zero’’ [27]. The jury to be sure is
still out on the precise relationship between per-unit efﬁciency
changes, per unit price changes and total units consumed; in fancy
terms, the efﬁciency elasticity of demand has not been micro-
economically computed [15]. Ignoring rebound altogether,
however, is scientiﬁcally inacceptable, analogous to postponing
acknowledgement of climate change until scientists unequivocally
prove that human activity will raise average temperatures by 2.78
degrees by June 2041.
For even a rudimentary case that rebound equals unity much
additional space would be needed. Brieﬂy, nevertheless, note only
that there are at least ﬁve lines of argumentation that the energy
resources temporarily freed by efﬁciency increases are fully used up
by world economic activity:
1. Time series show high correlation between increased produc-
tion efﬁciency – mainly business-as-usual attempts to save
costs, lower prices and increase sales – and increased energy
consumption [17,28,29,30, p. 243, 338] and [31]. Of course
correlation is not causality, yet the empirical data seems strong
enough to shift the burden of proof onto the position that
rebound is less than 100%.
2. A factor of production that becomes more productive thereby
enjoys, within substitutability constraints, higher demand
compared to other factors of production [9,11,15].
3. Two roles of energy efﬁciency increases are to date not well-
investigated: a) enabling new uses for energy and b) saving time
that is used for further production and consumption; these
would have to be booked under rebound [8,19,32].7
4. Popular models yielding relatively low rebound are methodo-
logically weak: often only direct rather than total rebound is
measured8; population and GDP are fully exogenous; marginal
consumption is assumed to be less energy-‘intensive’; mone-
tary metrics neglect that ‘income effects’ for the consumer are
counterbalanced by the necessarily lowered income of energy
sellers [34].
5. Labour input efﬁciency has risen constantly with economies of
scale, stable legal systems, trade, factory-ﬂoor re-organisation,
faster communication, transport infrastructure, etc. – yet no
one maintains that thereby less labour employment has been
the result [17].
Current evidence is thus such that the burden of proof can just as
well rest on showing what has never been demonstrated: that per-
unit input savings cause overall savings (i.e. rebound <100).
For clarity: high-rebound theory does not claim that energy
efﬁciency increase is the only cause of greater energy consumption;
labour efﬁciency increase, new energy sources, some exogenous
population increase or rising energy return on energy investment
(EROI) do their part. Note as well that an exogenous, increased
supply of energy from ‘renewable’ sources also rebounds, namely in
a way similar to the sufﬁciency rebound: lower prices of non-
renewables enable marginal consumers to increase their demand.
Thus at least in the longer run consumption of both types of energy
could continue to increase.7 It could be that ‘‘technology is [only] a catalyst, as it were, to induce the latent
ability of a resource to emerge.’’ [33, p. 43].
8 ‘Direct’ rebound follows from the increased consumption, post-efﬁciency-change,
of exactly the good or service newly more efﬁciently (cheaply) produced; e.g. the






5) MEANS: AFFLUENCE CHANGES OF SOME AFFECT AFFLUENCE OF OTHERS;
8) LIKEWISE FOR POPULATION; AND 9) LIKEWISE FOR TECHNOLOGY.
AT LEAST NINE SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS
ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF I=f(P,A,T)
1) A=f(P)
3) P=f(A)
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Fig. 4. Loop diagram of seven of the nine interdependencies. The arrows between the
terms P, A, and T stand for interdependencies where the signs are usually opposites and
represent rebounds. The arrows are numbered according to their appearance in the
text. There is no direct or guaranteed effect on Impact of changes in the right-side
terms.
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cost-cutting measures that enable individual households to save,
ﬁrms to increase proﬁts, and in general greater material comfort
and health – all non-environmental goals. As in Jevons’ day con-
cerning peak coal, though, efﬁciency has been co-opted by envi-
ronmentally concerned citizens and researchers in hopes that it is
a tool to delay peak oil or global warming. The existence of
rebounds, however, means that policies to reduce population,
afﬂuence and energy intensity are not sufﬁcient to reduce Impact.
Luckily, however, this ineffectiveness need not terribly worry us, for
right-side strategies are also not necessary to lower Impact. The
next section describes several alternatives that do guarantee
environmental success, all of which are ‘on the policy table’.
4. Section 2: left-side environmental strategies
Since any change in a factor on I¼ PAT’s right-side thus causes
changes in the other factors (ceteris paribus does not obtain) we
should replace I¼ PAT with I¼ f(P,A,T), expressing these interac-
tions as in Fig. 4. Sometimes, in fact, the literature accepts that
therefore right-side measures at best weakly affect Impact, for
instance when it is argued that too much effort has gone into the
design and implementation of production-side efﬁciency measures
and not enough into population reduction or into lifestyle changes
in the direction of sufﬁciency and consumer efﬁciency [2,3,19,35];
focus should shift from T to A (P receives little attention). The
conclusion drawn in this paper, however, is to shift attention to the
left side of I¼ f(P,A,T), to strategies that directly proscribe exceeding
maximum depletion and pollution rates.9
The Swiss forest law of 1876 aimed to maintain a given stand of
trees, and took the direct path to guaranteed success. Preventing
diminution of the number of trees was not pursued by trying to
reduce population, urging people to use less wood and convert less
forest to agricultural uses, or increasing wood’s efﬁciency in heat-
ing, building, or paper-making: it simply forbid it. Some overﬁshing
has similarly been stopped in recent years. The ‘Kyoto’ plan says
that nomore carbon-based energy resourcesmay be burned than is
consistent with, say, 450 parts CO2-eq. per million by volume in the
atmosphere. One could alternatively cap global production of the
troublesome substances oil, gas and coal. Andrew Simms for
instance quotes the claim that ‘‘80 percent of the fossil carbon that
ends up as man-made CO2 in the earth’s atmosphere comes from
only 122 producers of carbon-based fuels’’, enabling at low
administrative cost reductions to for instance half the 85 million
barrels oil-equivalent produced now per day [36, p. 177] and [37].
As in wartime Britain, national caps can be distributed among the
population in the form of rations. These policies or strategies are
sufﬁcient for the environmental goal, giving them a priori advantage
over strategies whose success is impeded by compensating reac-
tions in other parts of the economic system.
Two types of policies are now distinguished, both limiting
consumption at physically deﬁned maximum amounts: 1) taxing
the offending substances so that their prices are high enough to
prevent demand from exceeding the politically decided level; 2)
forbidding consumption above this level. The second policy is
straightforward while the ﬁrst is indirect (via ‘the right prices’), but
both achieve the same end.
The Pigouvian taxes limit quantity consumed through the price
mechanism, at given demand functions for ﬁrms, households and
individuals. The taxes can fall either on these entities or, through
‘excise’ taxes, far ‘upstream’ [38–40]. Perhaps it is a problem that9 Roughly, left-side caps and Pigouvian taxes are ‘supply-side’, while P, A, and T
measures can be called ‘demand-side’ strategies.the tax revenue then gets spent for, among other things, the taxed
substances; yet in theory raising the tax even higher would wipe
out this second-order demand or ‘eco-tax rebound’.
Bypassing the tax and price system can take several forms.
1. The production caps already mentioned can be enforced
‘upstream’, as they reach the surface of the earth. These are
routinely implemented by OPEC, for instance, for non-envi-
ronmental reasons; groundwater regimes have capped water
for the protection of aquifer levels for centuries. Such policies
can be measured and enforced purely physically, as can simple
import restrictions for countries not producing fossil fuels.
2. Consumption caps have a long tradition consisting of entitle-
ments to buy or physically distributed rations. Economic
analyses of ‘sale if and only if coupon’ abound.10 The number of
allotments and the amount of resource per allotment are of
course deduced from the global maximum but enforced
‘downstream’ – i.e. well after the energy resource has been
mined, reﬁned and embodied in goods and services, implying
the problem of measuring how much energy is embodied in
a given good or service [47, p. 1073, 1079] and [35]; alterna-
tively, only purchases of energy itself can be rationed.
3. Whereas production and consumption caps implicitly limit
emissions as well, the UNFCCC strategy, for instance, aims only
at lower pollution Impact, leaving aside the sustainability
concerns of declining resource amounts.
Please imagine these policies as global (to avoid free-riding
countries) and deﬁned on a country rather than individual basis (to
accommodate changes in population size). Current debate concerns
not the environmental effectiveness of these strategies, which is
given, but rather their relative economic costs. The threemain rivals
are: ‘‘domestic tradable quotas, upstream auction or a carbon tax
with lump sum recycling.’’ [40, p. 34] For instance taxes might be
preferred over consumption quotas because a tax system is already
in place, but rations without taxes could be seen as more equitable.
This is not the topic of this paper, however, and one can legitimately10 See references [41–49].
11 This environmentally bad effect is then contradictorily laid at the door of too
little efﬁciency improvement: pollution rises ‘‘not nearly as steeply as if no
corrective actions had been taken.’’ [3, p. 19]; also [52] Again, economic growth and
population are fully exogenous [53], and efﬁciency’s sign is ﬁrst negative, then
positive.
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economic efﬁciency and economic growth at all. Their main rele-
vance to environmental goals seems to be that economically more
efﬁcient schemes are more easily politically ‘sold’ to ﬁrms and
voters [40, p. 5, 10,11, 60,61]. But any left-side strategy renders
superﬂuous a plethora of right-side measures [40, p. 20]. What is
left in or on the ground is not yet consumed.
Thus, while causality does not necessarily operate from the right
to the left side of IPAT, in the reverse direction it does. Real input
limits must lead to large changes in population, afﬂuence and
technology since individuals, ﬁrms and political units would
autonomously and de-centrally adjust their behaviour to maximize
their welfare within those limits. Family size might decrease,
technology would undoubtedly become more efﬁcient, and
a measure of sufﬁciency would become not only necessary but
acceptable [47, p. 1077–79]. Right-side strategies thus actually ‘put
the cart before the horse’, whereas left-side caps wouldmotivate us
to get as much utility as possible out of the capped amount. Efﬁ-
ciency, for instance, is then correctly seen as a tool, not for
sustainability, but for afﬂuence maximization.
5. Section 3: a typical policy-relevant model
Sections 1 and 2 try to show that environmental goals can be
striven for directly or indirectly; that the indirect approaches on the
right side of I¼ f(P,A,T) have no necessary ‘impact’ on Impact; that
where rebounds are at unity they leave Impact untouched; that in
any case Impact falls less than the amount computed when I¼ PAT
is used as a multiplicative, static formula innocent of interdepen-
dencies; that co-ordinating right-side policies to counteract
rebounds is daunting and costly; and that alternatives are available
in the form of Pigouvian taxes and caps.
A critique of some well-established and well-funded strategies
and research programmes is now possible, and to apply the analysis
and integrate it into the more familiar discourse of technological
change, cleaner production and lower ‘ecological footprints’, this
section discusses the typical model of Duchin proposing policy
‘‘handles’’ explicitly based on Ehrlich’s IPAT equation [3, p. 51] and
[50]. In addition to the population strategy (P) it includes ‘‘twomain
avenues for bolder scenarios: technological change [T] and change
in the lifestyles of households [A].’’ [3, p. 20; also p 51, 60] The
former is largely the efﬁciency strategy, while the ‘‘lifestyle’’ cate-
gory subsumes both personal and community consumption
choices, e.g.
a dramatic reduction of reliance on private automobiles, which
could be made possible and desirable only through the
increased availability of nonmotorized and public transport and
mixed-use community design that satisﬁes requirements with
far less personal displacement. [3, p. 71]
This category, termed ‘‘conservation’’ as opposed to ‘‘efﬁciency’’,
also includes ‘‘practically costless improvements in ‘housekeeping,’
recovery of waste heat, and electronic controls for a variety of
processes’’ as well as ‘‘process improvements [and] cogeneration’’.
[50, p. 17, 91–96] Much of this falls under the structural change
strategy wherein levels of utility and expenditure do not fall but are
shifted to less ‘environmentally intensive’ goods and services
[35,51].
In Duchin’s structural economics model, one of the main
measures ‘‘leading to a contraction of factor inputs [is] improved
energy efﬁciency’’ [3, p. 55], and one such needed technological
change is ‘‘more fuel-efﬁcient cars’’ [p 20]. But in this and other
models there is no formal integration of system-wide effects like
more cars and more driven kilometres: rebound is zero. Actually,
Duchin identiﬁes macroeconomic rebound when she writes that‘‘more extensive recycling of materials andmore fuel-efﬁcient cars’’
cause the economic growth necessary for development; ‘‘as pop-
ulation and afﬂuence increased, pollution could also be expected to
grow’’ [p. 19]. This indeed seems to describe backﬁre, i.e. an increase
in Impact when T, as energy intensity, is reduced.11
With the analytical tool of I¼ f(P,A,T) two further criticisms of
this and similar models can bemade. First, one can in fact accept the
simple, multiplicative form of I¼ PAT as a static description of an
economy, showing Impact at any given time: Duchin’s ‘‘structural
economics. describe[s] changes in lifestyle and technology in
concrete detail’’ [3, p. 51]. But the model is intended to be policy-
relevant: ‘‘[A]n explicit focus on households [should not be] absent
from work about the restructuring of economies in response to
environmental pressures’’; ‘‘importance for policy’’ is generally
claimed [3, p. xiii, 60, 70]. For the step from environmental book-
keeping to environmental action to be taken, however, one needs
a dynamic treatment describing the relations between all four
terms.
Second, the efﬁciency and structural change claimed by the
model to reduce Impact are, and can only be, expressed in ratios.
Efﬁciency is an intensive variable for output/input, while structural
change is to be from a more environmentally intense sector to one
less so. But Impact is an extensive dependent variable, an absolute
number, e.g. of joules or tonnes of CO2, and thus cannot be deduced
from changes in an intensive variable without multiplying by
another whole number. Within IPAT, that is, the ratios A and T alone
yield no information about I [17]. In anthropomorphic terms, the
environment does not ‘care about’ ratios.6. Section 4: discussion
What rationing of carbon, once enacted, might mean in terms of
‘uses’ of equipment emerges, for instance, from the U.K. war
experience:
Between 1938 and 1944 therewas an enormous 95 percent drop
in the use of motor vehicles in the UK. Even in the United States
fuel was strictly and successfully rationed to eliminate unnec-
essary travel.. Across all goods and services consumption fell
16 percent but with much higher drops at the household level.
In just six years from 1938 British homes cut their use of elec-
trical appliances by 82 percent. [36, p. 159]
Statutory, economy-wide reductions in overall fuel consumption
preceded adjustments in production technology and ‘lifestyles’.
Similarly, during the period of high fuel prices in summer 2008
news media reported a shift in the US away from heavy, fuel-
inefﬁcient cars. If, on the other hand, the reverse is assumed, and
the reductions are thought to follow from some combination of rich-
world frugality and more efﬁcient production and consumption,
any resulting expansions elsewhere in the economy stand in the
way.
This simplicity of caps or Pigouvian taxation moreover enables
full focus on the set goal of changing the left-side term; after all
lower rates of reproduction, more frugal consumption and tech-
nological ‘progress’ in the form of greater efﬁciency are not the
(environmental) goals. I would suggest that while the debate
around ‘Kyoto’ is salubrious in making no bones about the radical
emissions cuts required, it would be even clearer to deﬁne these
B. Alcott / Journal of Cleaner Production 18 (2010) 552–560558cuts in terms of less carbon-based resources consumed – assuming
of course given levels of efﬁciency, techniques of carbon capture
and storage, etc. As one economist sceptical of the environmental
effectiveness of the technological ‘handle’ wrote,
[i]t would bemore straightforward to direct that there should be
reductions in ‘world economic activity’, of speciﬁc emissions, or
seek worldwide agreement to placing heavy taxes on the
offending fuels. [9, p. 201].
Further, ‘‘adjustments of efﬁciency are ‘‘oblique’’ and we would do
better to unabashedly ‘‘outlaw, ration, and tax.’’ [10, p. 363–64]
There are perhaps three main reasons why right-side strategies
are nevertheless widely preferred: 1) they are perceived as more
consistent with individual freedom; 2) they are seen as less painful
and thereforepoliticallymoreacceptable;and3)capsor taxesofferno
escape from the harsh fact of the planet’s (limited) carrying capacity.
Freedom: Right-side restrictions on biological reproduction,
afﬂuent lifestyles and technological inefﬁciencies can, of course, be
legislated. In the real world, however, China is perhaps the only
example of the ﬁrst, and perhaps the Soviet Union and Cuba
examples of the second. In contrast, mandatory efﬁciency
standards in buildings and machinery, or waste-minimization, are
well-known – yet often take the form of mere encouragement
through subsidies, tax breaks, energy-efﬁciency labels and volun-
tary agreements. With caps and Pigouvian taxes, however, there are
no voluntary agreements, just rules. The call is for mutually agreed
upon mutual coercion, for politics rather than individual behaviour
change, and for accepting the often-scorned but very human atti-
tude of ‘I will only if you will.’ [54, p. 147–156, 227–230] and [55].
Political acceptance: Caps and taxes are indeed unpopular,
partly due to this high value culturally placed on freedom.
Conversely right-side measures promise not only considerable
retention of such freedom but a win-win vision [25,49]: Doing
without some consumption will not only help the environment
but is good for you – e.g. bicycling and vegetarianism; or, less
consumption requires less income, less work and leaves more free
time. Producing more efﬁciently is said to double afﬂuence at half
the environmental cost [56] – a ‘lunch you are paid to eat’. Is the
choice then between popular, ineffective policies and unpopular,
effective ones?
Within the transportation sector Susan Owens and Richard
Cowell have similarly observed that because it is so difﬁcult to
reduce
the rate of trafﬁc growth. a view that policy should focus on
reducing pollution and congestion, rather than the volume of
trafﬁc per se, has prevailed, conveniently shifting attention
towards vehicle performance, trafﬁc management and selected
improvements in the road network. [57, p. 97]
The term ‘conveniently’ pinpoints the urgent problem of direct
strategies: contraction and economic shrinkage (‘degrowth’) are
taboo. The opposing discourse or rhetoric surrounding right-side
measures portrays them as painless: save energy and money at the
same time.12
Carrying capacity: What if preventing global warming is simply
not possible at today’s world-average level of material afﬂuence,
assuming population will grow by another two billion? What if
ethical decisions to leave considerably more exhaustible resources
for posterity must increase poverty today? Given that poverty
persists even at present levels of groundwater use, ﬁshing and fuel
consumption, what if reducing Impact to sustainable levels raises12 Caps are considered politically odious, but so are income tax, parking restric-
tions and military service, which we accept.this ‘opportunity cost’ (poverty today) to heights simply inconsis-
tent with our humanism? It is very painful to realize that for the
several billion poor in the world there arises a nasty trade-off
between sustainability and subsistence; a professed goal of the
relatively rich of material equity is put to the test.13 Framing the
environmental question in terms of amounts of resources used up
allows no escape from these ethical questions.
Finally, care should be taken not to conﬂate different policy
goals. For instance, lowering population and raising energy efﬁ-
ciency can indeed be said to be ‘good’ – good for afﬂuence or
personal material welfare, good for other species, or aesthetically
good. But they are good for lowering environmental impact only
indirectly:When right-side strategies demonstrate to us that ‘doing
without’ isn’t all that bad, and that technically, efﬁciency can be
increased enough to maintain a comfortable level of consumption,
we more readily vote for caps – they become politically more
palatable. Similarly, lowering the afﬂuence of the rich under certain
institutional conditions raises the afﬂuence of the poor. But this is
not environmental policy; logically, efﬁciency and sufﬁciency
contribute only to the ‘development’ part of sustainable
development.7. Conclusions
In terms of I¼ f(P,A,T), this paper argues for giving preference to
direct, left-side strategies over indirect right-side strategies to
reduce Impact, deﬁned as resource depletion and environmental
pollution. This judgment applies two criteria: 1) likelihood of
environmental effectiveness or success; and 2) simplicity or
parsimony. Concerning the ﬁrst, rebounds among right-side factors
sever any necessary connection between right-side improvements
and lower Impact, and a case can even bemade that these rebounds
are large enough to render them fully ineffective; the lack of
measurable success of standard strategies for efﬁciency and struc-
tural or lifestyle change is in any case shown by Fig. 5.
Concerning the second criterion, simplicity as invoked here has
less to do with lower transaction costs (economic efﬁciency) than
with conceptual parsimony, ease of policy design and political
clarity. In Tina Fawcett’s words:
One of the key beneﬁts of carbon rationing is that it provides
a framework for carbon reductions. No longer might it be
necessary to have separate government policies and pro-
grammes to promote everything from cycling strategies to
efﬁcient refrigerators. Under carbon rationing, the carbon
‘market’ should recognise the beneﬁts of renewable energy,
household insulation and low carbon methods of transport. [47,
p. 1077; also 54, p. 34]
Instead of building codes, demand management, product labelling,
work pattern change, urban design, food miles, individual ecolog-
ical footprints, progressive electricity tariffs and exhortations to
leave one’s wedding in a rickshaw, we would have one overall tool.
In summary and conclusion:
1. Policies or strategies are usefully classiﬁed under the four terms
of I¼ f(P,A,T). They either lower Impact directly, or attempt to
lower it by lowering population, afﬂuence (consumption of
goods and services per person) or the energy intensity of
producing goods and services.13 Even the environmentally and ethically sound strategy of contraction and
convergence (like the UNFCCC’s ‘common but differentiated responsibility’) must
leave open the carrying-capacity question of what the ecologically dictated level of


























Wealth = per capita GDP
Cabon intensity of GDP
Drivers of Anthropogenic Emissions
Fig. 5. Energy efﬁciency and energy consumption rise in lock step. The downward-
sloping line is carbon (for this paper, energy) intensity, merely the inverse of carbon
(energy) efﬁciency. The efﬁciency line is roughly the same as the depicted upward-
sloping lines, of which emissions pertain directly to this paper. Efﬁciency and emis-
sions are almost perfectly correlated. Contrary to standard interpretations, where
emissions rise in spite of efﬁciency rise, high-rebound theory says that efﬁciency rises
enable the emissions rises. In any case, these hard facts should give standard theory
pause.
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ordinated in order to change Impact; in contrast, left-side
policies (capping inputs or taxing them heavily) are single and
simple.
3. The interdependencies between right-side measures are
rebounds: reductions in one factor can result in compensatory
increases in others, perhaps leaving Impact even untouched;
left-side policies cannot, by deﬁnition, rebound.
4. Even when the rebounds are ‘low’ – say, between 30 and 50% –
they do not reduce Impact in the one-for-one way that multi-
plication of the three right-side factors would indicate; left-side
policies, on the other hand, need not be measured.
5. As right-sidemeasures becomemore numerous, and/or require
more co-ordination, or as rebounds approach 100%, they
become less cost-effective compared with left-side policies.
6. If rebounds are 100%, no reduction of Impact occurs, i.e. the
policies, even in combination, are ineffective; left-side policies,
in contrast, necessarily achieve the environmental goal.
7. Caps and Pigouvian taxes are therefore superior to right-side
strategies in terms of effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and
simplicity of design and enforcement.
8. Once energy-input limits are set, people’s desire to maintain as
much welfare as possible would lead to adjustments in
reproductive, consumer and producer behaviour, with little or
no need for policy interference.
A wide range of political parties, governments, editorials, NGOs
and academics advocates something of a standard set of policies to
ﬁght global warming or reduce energy consumption in the interests
of sustainability or energy independence: energy efﬁciency,
voluntary frugality, renewable energy, structural change, waste
reduction, clean production, recycling and consumer efﬁciency.This paper has sketched and classiﬁed theoretical reasons why
these policies do not achieve their environmental purpose –
whatever other virtues they may have. Empirically, to my knowl-
edge, there has never been proof that these measures or strategies
work. Indeed, in spite of efforts along the lines of these strategies,
energy consumption continues to climb. The trend is not even
broken. In this situation it behoves advocates of these approaches
to accept a burden of proof at least as strong as that resting on the
position that rebounds are 100% or more. I see no reason to prefer,
or continuing pursuing, strategies that are uncertain and neither
sufﬁcient nor necessary to reach the environmental goal of deple-
tion and pollution reduction.
Simms describes a meeting with UK government ofﬁcials
searching for ideas to take with them to Johannesburg in 2002. He
asked
[w]hy weren’t they honest with the British public and tell them
what life would be like if necessary emissions cuts were made.
Why not prepare public opinion now, by admitting the scale of
required action, so it would be possible to sell the appropriate
policies later? There was the sound of choking. Unlike the
forthrightness of public communications during the war, the
most the civil servants felt able to do now was ‘suggest’ that
people might like to make one less car journey a month. [36,
p. 163]
Similarly, forbidding old-fashioned light bulbs, as foreseen by
impending ‘cutting-edge’ Australian or Swiss law, is no more than
pussyfooting around.
Some decades ago political economists such as Kenneth
Boulding, Herman Daly and William Ophuls advocated rationing,
but this tradition within environmental and ecological economics,
while never eschewed, has fallen into neglect. Yet caps, either
directly or through Pigouvian taxes, would not only enable clear
discussion but guarantee policy success. Population, afﬂuence and
technological adjustments at the individual level will then help us
retain considerable welfare within the decided-upon limits, even if
we consciously decide to live to some degree unsustainably.Acknowledgements
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Employer of last resort
Right to work
Guaranteed income
a b s t r a c t
Degrowth should consider the right to work e a Job Guarantee (JG) e as a way of making a smaller
economy more just and socially sustainable. Economic shrinkage in richer countries is accompanied by
increased unemployment, a bad enough problem in itself but also a barrier to voters’ acceptance of the
degrowth path. Since being out of work is distinct from being poor, anti-poverty income policies should
be approached separately. The JG is one of several paths to full employment, including reduced working
time. This essay only brieﬂy mentions some real-world JG programs and some technical objections. The
main suggestion is to move employment from being a matter of economics, particularly economic
growth, to being a political right. A right to work is necessarily effective and would avoid sacriﬁcing the
ecological and social goals of degrowth on the altar of full employment.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Epigraphs
If a man has no chance of obtaining work he is in a desperate
position, not simply because he lacks an income but because he
lacks this nourishing and enlivening factor of disciplined work
whichnothing can replace. The very start of Buddhist economic
planning would be a planning for full employment, and the
primary purpose of this would in fact be employment for
everyone who needs an ‘outside job’: it would not be the max-
imisation of employment nor the maximisation of production.
—— E.F. Schumacher, ‘Buddhist Economics’, Small Is
Beautiful.
I got a job working construction, for the Johnstown Company,
But lately there ain’t been much work, on account of the
economy.
—— Bruce Springsteen, The River.
2. Introduction
In environmentally over-developed countries needing to degrow,
institutions are such that recession increases unemployment.
To make a smaller economy more socially sustainable, as well as to
make the degrowth project more attractive to voters, the problem of
potentially large-scale joblessness therefore deserves attention. Of
course the goal of full employment is a worthy one even ‘in the best
of times’e in a growing economye and the solution here singled out
has indeed a respectable pedigree among left-wing critics of the
mixed economy: the Job Guarantee (JG).
This essay e not a full-length academic work but rather
a piece of advocacy e deﬁnes employment conventionally as
work for which payment is received for goods and services
provided. However, the unemployment problem is not the
income problem and I assume that society provides ﬁnancial
assistance to the poorest or even that a guaranteed income (GI) is
in place. Those who opt against paid work are free to ‘work’
creatively for themselves or others. Rather, the focus is entirely
on the individual and social values of producing and earning,
socially embedded and with some sense of individual achieve-
ment and contributing to society (Karst, 1997, pp. 532e543).
That joblessness is distressing for many people is attested not
only by the underrated method of introspection but by empirical
meta-analyses (Veenhoven, 1994; Murphy and Athanasou, 1999)
and happiness studies (Argyle, 2001). The balance between work
and free time gets disturbed, one is a burden on society, and feel-
ings of uselessness arise. Social stresses range from sub-lower-class
exclusion to higher alcohol consumption (Wray, 2007), perhaps
epitomised by Karst’s observation that “Shrinking employment
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opportunity at any level is a seedbed for racial and ethnic scape-
goating” (1997, p. 529).
I am controversially urging degrowth research to take people
the way they are, whatever sea changes in attitudes towards ‘work’
may be worth pursuing, and whatever the mixture of socialism and
capitalism turns out to be. I believe we should start with the values
and institutions of our given societies even if many in the degrowth
movement ﬁnd them pathological. Firstly, these are the voters we
must convince, and secondly, the number of years remaining for
a managed, humane transition to a smaller economy preclude
waiting until deeper attitudes have been changed. In aworld where
‘the economy’ is virtually synonymous with ‘jobs’, how can
degrowth present itself as a job-killer?1
A ﬁnal obvious caveat: JG cannot causally help shrink the
materially rich economies; this requires policies addressing high
material and energy throughput itself, be they resource caps or
taxes, technical changes in equipment and infrastructure, fewer
goods demanded by greener consumers, or population reduction.
Sometimesworking time reduction is seen as ameans of preventing
the economy from exceeding sustainable scale (Spangenberg,
2010), but this is not relevant to JG. The employment challenge is
instead how to distribute an already limited amount of paid work
justly.
3. What is the Job Guarantee?
Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
“Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment.” (UN, 1948; Shklar, 1991) A guarantee means the
right to paid work, no longer contingent on the growth rate and
employer-employee details of a given economy. An unemployed
work force would for instance no longer be an instrument serving
either structural ﬂexibility or low interest rates. Job guarantor is the
state or ‘employer of last resort’ (ELR).2
The type of goods and services produced by ‘guaranteed’ jobs is
not restricted to public goods, presently unpaid services or ‘green’
infrastructure. Whether the state would produce in presently
private economic branches would have to be negotiated with
workers and businesses in these ﬁelds, but some degree of social-
isation of production might result. Concerning wage rates the only
assumption is that the wage, with or without GI, is at least
a socially-deﬁned minimum (Wray, 2007, pp. 10, 18) e superceding
minimum-wage laws and countering fears of inadequate wages
expressed by Tinbergen (1956, p. 192) and Sawyer (2005, p. 256).
Otherwise, contracts would be standard, there being for instance
no assumption that the ELR is a ‘soft touch’ e the “freedom to ﬁre”
(Gordon, 1997, p. 832) should be incorporated, especially since
ﬁnancial support for the non-working is assumed. A considerable
literature treats these three issues as well as inﬂationary danger
and anti-cyclical ﬁscal policy (e.g. Mitchell, 1998; Sawyer, 2003,
2005; Mitchell and Wray, 2005; Wray, 2007; Harvey, 2008).
A right, as a strong claim on society, can only be something the
honouring of which can cost something. Think of basic education,
criminal justice, national defence, the amenties of public space and
basic health care: nobody expects these activities to ‘pay their own
way’, and neither must JG. However, fretting about ‘how to ﬁnance’
JG often misses the point that the goods and services could and
should generate revenue for the ELR. They could be sold on the
market, or booked as public goods (beneﬁts), perhaps including ones
presently falling to voluntary and charitable efforts (Gordon, 1997, p.
831) Cost-beneﬁt analysis of JG would book administration and
physical overhead as costs covered by normal taxes, but would count
on the beneﬁts side income support payments no longer necessary
(Karst, 1997; Forstater, 1998; Harvey, 2008) Yet even beneﬁts must
not be quantiﬁed: in the words of Karst, “What I value most in the
state’s employment of these [mentally impaired] people is not that
the parks are clean and pleasant, but that the workers are afforded
the dignity of work. This is not a market calculation; rather, it is an
evaluation that gives weight to the inclusion of a group of Cali-
fornians in our community” (1997, p. 563).
4. Real-life attempts at JG
The United States’ experience during the 1930s with the Works
Progress Administration, on which an enormous literature exists,
fell short of a right to work but did offer a huge number of public-
sector jobs (Harvey, 2008)Most countries of the Soviet bloc knew
the right to a job, but I have no competence to describe or evaluate
that experience. Since however practically all countries that today
stand under the degrowth imperative function much less socialis-
tically, comparisons must be cautious. Hopefully, though, degrowth
researchers who lived in the Soviet bloc will subject JG to the hard
test of its fairness over against non-JG jobholders, the prospect of
a huge socialised sector, and more.
Three present-day trials, in Switzerland, India and Argentina,
can be brieﬂy mentioned. In Zürich, where I lived for 36 years, the
city government offers a subsidised job to any jobless person who
wants it and whose unemployment insurance payments have
ceased. Obligatory for these long-term unemployed is a 4-week
course to assess work capability. Some employment is by bespoke
‘social ﬁrms’ partly under state ownership and some is in the extant
private sector, employers in all cases paying a part-wage. As of June
2008, 30% of people targeted by the program were working at 531
jobs delivering goods and services. It is only a few years old and is
complementary to traditional policies of re-training and job
placement (Zürich, 2011).
A similarly small scheme,moreover embodying only a de facto but
not de jure right to work, is the UK’s alliterative ‘welfare-to-work’
program. Itpaysprivate companies suchasWorkingLinks for instance
£1500 per person successfully guided back into paidwork (Guardian,
2010). About 13,000peopleper yearover the last decadehavebeen so
placed, and one has the right to join the program. There can in such
schemes be ‘leakages’ such as non-additionality, replacing current
employees, and corruption (Wray, 2007, pp. 7, 14, 34).
In the Indian State of Maharastra the National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Act of 1965 (expanded in 2005 to include all of
India) enabled for instance in 1984e1985 the hiring of 600,000
rural workers for traditional public works. A study of the program
claimed it has universal support because it stems the ﬂow of
migrants to cities and furthers political peace generally and
concluded: “Employment becomes a political as well as an
economic issue, and the articulation of political demands becomes
a means of securing a livelihood.” (Echeverri-Gent, 1988, p. 1304)
Wray notes however that this scheme, like the similar Argentinian
Plan Jefes de Hogar program, is open only to certain poor people,
while he himself advocates universality. (2007, p. 10) A detailed
evaluation of the Argentine experience is in Tcherneva and Wray
(2011).
5. Other paths to full employment
Assuming a JG scheme is workable ethe proof is in the pudding
e one argument in its favour is that it by deﬁnition reaches its goal:
1 As a Greenpeace activist I often heard nuclear-industry employees, dragnet
ﬁshermen and woodworkers angrily asking us, ‘And our jobs?’ This deserves an
answer.
2 For a short treatment in German see www.degrowth.ch > gerecht.
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it is a direct policy, its effectiveness, if you will, guaranteed. In
contrast at least ﬁve indirect policies can be identiﬁed: 1) economic
growth; 2) deﬁcit or anti-cyclical spending; 3) job training and
brokering; 4) working time reduction (WTR); and 5) a laissez-faire
labour market.
1) Growth of production and consumption will raise the number
of jobs under present mixed systems unless work-hour
productivity outstrips labour supply. Neither the actual
success nor the theoretical merits of this path are relevant
because, in the absence of any decoupling of throughput from
the quantity of goods and services, it contradicts the essence of
degrowth.
2) When needed, governments can raise their borrowing, or
drawdown reserves, to hire people for public tasks, deemed
necessary when the jobless rate rises above some determined
level. That is, a certain ‘frictional unemployment’ caused by
structural change or geographical relocation of production is
traditionally accepted3 e as is an even higher unemployment
rate when the goal of price stability or the interests of powerful
employers are simultaneously pursued. (Karst, 1997; Sawyer,
2003, 2005; Mitchell and Wray, 2005) See Forstater (1998)
for an attempt within the JG tradition to resolve the need for
full employment with the need to avoid rigidity in the labour
market detrimental to economic efﬁciency.4 This path thus
does not necessarily lead to, or even strive for, full employment,
and speciﬁc programs are by nature ad hoc.
3) Most rich countries offer job training and brokering as a sort of
public service, whether paid out of unemployment insurance
funds or general taxes. They have at best dampened unem-
ployment, and do not regard jobs as a right. Some of this is
compatible with JG, but what JG/ELR is not is stop-gap. Small
programs such as the Shefﬁeld or Newcastle Employment
Bonds in the UK, or huge ones such as the U.S. Works Progress
Administration in the 1930s, are cut from a different cloth e
ﬁre-ﬁghting instead of ﬁre prevention; they are non-universal,
temporary and usually dripping with free-market rhetoric.5
4) In degrowth research the idea of each person’s working fewer
paid hours over his or her lifetime, theoretically increasing
the number of employed, attracts deserved attention
(Spangenberg, 2010) and accepts unemployment as a real
personal and social nuisance. (nef, 2010; O’Neill et al., 2010)
One real application of this is the famous French 35-h week, on
which an extensive literature exists. It does not speciﬁcally
treat paid work as a right, yet the pure maths show that full
employmentmust be the consequence. Like JG, many questions
of program design must be tackled, but unlike JG, policing
a ‘black market’ is needed. Comparing the pros and cons of the
two schemes is ripe for degrowth research.
5) Although a conceptual mineﬁeld, please consider that in theory
a totally libertarian, laissez-faire labour market would result in
work for all due to the tried and trusted laws of supply and
demand: lower price (wages) raises demand to meet supply.
Minimumwages, much less somewhat higher ‘living wages’, as
well as barriers to self-employment, would be abandoned.
(Rothbard, 1983, pp. 21, 43; Hayek, 1984, pp. 16e19) While no
purely laissez-faire economy has ever existed (except usually
the world economy) there are theoretical reasons why in
relatively private enterprise-oriented economies powerful
economic actors, including business-friendly governments or
even rival groups of workers, can restrict entry into the labour
market.
6. Job policy as politics, not economics
Once the goal becomes the just distribution of working hours
rather than the maximisation of their quantity, full employment
has moved from the economic to the political realm. I believe this is
an effective answer to the ubiquitous opinion in press, politics and
academia that growth is necessary ‘for jobs’. The JG moreover
locates full-employment policy at the extreme end of politics, as
a right derived from psychological and historical values in most
European societies which treat independence (for both men and
women) and earning (as opposed to receiving) as central to social
standing, distinguishing workers both from slaves and the idle rich
(Shklar, 1991, pp. 85e100).
Viewing work radically as a social rather than an economic
question means it is no longer necessary, for instance, to defend
‘green’ policies in terms of their employment effects e arguing
based on econometric models that investment in renewable
energy, equipment efﬁciency or public transportaion ‘creates’more
jobs than are lost in the fossil-fuel sectors. (Hueting, 2010) Envi-
ronmental policy appraisals would no longer have to include not
only effects on energy consumption, greenhouse gases and energy
security but also on ‘employment’ (Infras, 2003). Or as Green
Parties everywhere dubiously argue, there is allegedly no conﬂict
between environmentalism and the economy.
Similarly, one group of JG advocates argues for the Buffer Stock
Employment method of hiring through deﬁcit spending: “Unem-
ployment arises because the budget deﬁcit is too low. It is always
a macroeconomic problem.” (Mitchell, 1998, p. 553) The ‘buffer’
idea subordinates employment policy to booms and busts. On the
other hand, the group’s website reports exhaustively and usefully
on the political right to a job (Coffee, 2010). Sawyer likewise, while
raising the key question of the differences between JG and tradi-
tional pump-priming, only marginally enters this political realm of
discussion, talking moreover in terms of “cost of job loss” in terms
of income and lost output rather than psychological or social stress
(2003, p. 904).
An argument in favour of JG is that since it is deﬁned legally it is
directly successful, as opposed to the ﬁve alternative, indirect paths
outlined above. In general, once a goal is set why don’t we ﬁrst
research straightforward approaches rather than indirect measures
of uncertain effectiveness? The same issue arises when we weigh
proposals to reduce economic scale: we can start with what works,
by deﬁnition and by legal rather than economic means, such as
natural-resource caps or taxes, instead of oblique approaches such
as resource efﬁciency, ‘sustainable consumption’, population
reduction or renewable technologies (Alcott, 2010).
This discussion becomes clearer, moreover, if we don’t conﬂate
the issues of income and work. They can be mentioned in the same
breath if a ‘decent’, perhaps subsistence amount of purchasing
power is contingent upon a job, i.e. in the absence of ‘welfare
beneﬁts’ as in many poorer countries. The single Millennium
Development Goal #1, Target #2, thus calls for “full and productive
employment and decent work for all”, mainly to alleviate “extreme
poverty”. JG cannot replace the welfare safety net because some
people are 1) unwilling or 2) unable to work or 3) personally
unsuitable as employees (Wray, 2007). Guaranteed job and guar-
anteed income are distinct, yet our customary way of thinking
regards poverty as part and parcel of job loss.
3 JG is compatible with a separate, parallel unemployment insurance program.
4 It is doubtful that degrowth should worry about economic efﬁciency, which can
surely be left to economic actors within the prescribed scale limits.
5 Evaluation of such programs moreover consistently ignores the opportunity
costs of such investments, or in Frédéric Bastiat’s (1850) clearer formulation: what
is not seen as well as what is seen.
B. Alcott / Journal of Cleaner Production 38 (2013) 56e6058
Author's personal copy
The broad lesson is Tinbergen’s rule that at least in the ﬁrst
analysis the number of policy “instruments” should be equal to the
number of policy “targets”, and he in fact illustrated this by means
of the two targets “full employment and monetary equilibrium”
(1956, pp. 55e56, 63e68). Unfortunately the advent of ‘Keynesian’
anti-cyclical spending did cause the problem that ﬁnancing jobs
could be inﬂationary, and the tendency grew to conﬂate just these
two goals. A case of their intermingling, if not their conﬂation, is in
fact the debate between Sawyer (2003, 2005) and Mitchell and
Wray (2005) over JG. The lesson for us now, though, is that being
involuntarily idle poses different problems than being poor, each
deserving separate policy instruments.6
7. More pros and cons
The best presentation of JG I have found offers a summary of the
argument up till now:
The UN World Summit in 2005 and the ECOSOC Ministerial
Declaration of 2006 stressed. that employment can no longer
be considered a derivative of economic policies. An ELR is
a direct job creation programme that provides employment at
a basic wage for those who cannot otherwise ﬁnd work. It is not
meant to be an emergency programme or a substitute for
private employment, but rather a permanent complement to
private sector employment. No other program can guarantee
access to jobs at decent wages (Wray, 2007, pp. iv, 1).
He rejects Keynesian pump-priming and covers issues like
potential conﬂicts with labour unions, the possible stigmatisation
of ELR jobs, decentralised administration and earmarking the
program to ‘good’ public works.7
Several additional arguments for JG can be culled from the
literature. In its role as employer society would gain increased say
over the type of goods and services delivered. A high demand for JG
jobs might bring socialisation of some recently privatised public
services such as post ofﬁces or railroads. Job security would remove
fear of job loss in the same sense that compulsory pension schemes
offer a relaxed view of old age. Greater self-conﬁdence in normal
jobsmeans one couldmore easily quit obnoxious employment and/
or employers (Mitchell, 1998, p. 551).
In a challenge to the proposals of Wray and Mitchell, Sawyer
argues for traditional or “mainline. public-sector employment
programs” when “private sector demand is inadequate to generate
[high] levels of employment.” (2003, p. 882; 2005, p 257) Jobs are
thus for him not a right; programs can come and go. In his words, JG
has at least seven major weaknesses:
1) Are there enough jobs, enough things to do, suitable for Job-
Guarantee jobs?
2) Do such jobs match the skills of the unemployed e or would
the job-takers be overqualiﬁed and thus ‘underemployed’?
3) Could jobs be offered in the places where the unemployment
is?
4) Are the types of work really of public value, i.e. would they be
productive enough in the usual sense to warrant their cost?
Would they prolong ‘structural’ obsolescence?
5) What effect would low ELR wages have on similar jobs in the
private sector?
6) What becomes of capital investments and administrative staff
when, in boom times, such jobs are not in demand?
7) What would a JG program cost? (2003, pp. 882, 884, 891, 894)
Mitchell andWray (2005) replied to these objections, eliciting in
turn a response from Sawyer (2005), followed up by Wray’s
manifesto for the ILO (2007). I ﬁnd these criticisms by Sawyer
salient,8 but dealing with this degree of detail is beyond the scope
of both this paper and my expertise. A few political comments
might nevertheless be worthwhile.
All three authors write of a “buffer stock” of labour, close to the
related “industrial reserve army”, concepts with histories that seem
unnecessary for this discussion. JG’s insistence on the right to work
is after all designed to counter exactly these dangers of disciplining
workers by fear of unemployment. Also, should labour productivity
fall as a result of extreme job security, degrowth should to some
extent be able to live with this. On the other hand the effect of JG on
wages of similar height in the non-JG sector seems a serious
question, perhaps answerable only by experience. Finally, there
seems no good answer to the fear that JG jobs would carry low
social prestige ea stigma e except that being on the dole is also
stigmatised.
Open questions, if not criticisms, concern JG’s relation to the
“maintenance economy” which cares for both the natural world
and our social relationships and “where the ‘wage’ of the work is its
very product” (Jochimsen and Knoblauch, 1997, p. 109; also Karst,
1997, pp. 562e569; nef, 2010, p. 16). Also needing attention are
gender differences in perceptions of ‘work’, including the
commodiﬁcation of (traditionally female) house and voluntary
work and the general societal preconditions for conventional paid
work. (see Mellor, 1997, pp. 131e132, 134e137) Finally, where does
the clearly socialist JG stand in relation to minority degrowth
thought advocating action less reliant on national government and
that rubs shoulders with a more localist anarco-libertarian tradi-
tion (Bookchin, 1991, pp. 54e62, 82e86)? Perhaps JG or other
institutions protecting social rights would be better at sub-national
level, say in communities between 200 thousand and 2 million
people.
8. Conclusions
This paper is a tool for further research in three ways:
1. It gives a working knowledge of the Job Guarantee e a deﬁni-
tion and its place in relation to other policies with the same
aim.
2. It identiﬁes important theoretical literature and some cases
where JG has been practiced.
3. It treats full employment as an example of an area deserving
separate conceptualisation, namely the social marketing of
degrowth e how to increase its acceptance among voters. We
are after all always faced with the threat: economic growth, or
else!
Work is both fun and irksome, good and bad, wish and duty. Its
social psychology includes identiﬁcation with a skill, a relatively
broad social network and assuming responsibility for one’s
6 Similarly, when high ‘eco-taxes’ on fuel are opposed because they burden the
poor, the answer is rather to simultaneously employ anti-poverty policies rather
than abandon the environmental ones.
7 Wray is associated with the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability at
the University of Missouri, Kansas City.
8 One can on the other hand answer some of his more minor criticisms, e.g. that
a JG worker can simply leave the job without notice (2003, pp. 892, 896; 2005, pp.
256, 260), or that the system must be able to create jobs on short notice (2003, p.
883); work contracts would be normal, and unemployment insurance would offer
the ELR time to react. The specter of “punitive workfare” (2005, p. 256), as well,
addresses income support issues rather than the problems of those who want to
work.
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sustenance. It seems at most a half-truth, therefore, to say that what
we ‘really’ want is the wage, not the work (Shklar, 1991, pp. 91e93).
Since economic shrinkage means less resource depletion and
pollution, it in turn means lower afﬂuence at any given population
level. Social peace and sustainability are thereby threatened. In
decoupling jobs from economic growth the Job Guarantee
addresses, and by deﬁnition solves, one such social problem.
Resistance to planned degrowth ismoreover loweredwhen a policy
is in place guaranteeing all who want to work a paid place in
production.
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It is an axiom of ecological economics that resource depletion and environmental pollution depend on the
number of people and how many goods‐and‐services each consumes, modiﬁed by the technological efﬁciency
of production. The paper reviews some studies quantifying the contribution of human numbers to environmental
impact. It warns against playing this factor off against that of high consumption in rich countries. It asks whether
from the environmental point of view complacency about either present or predicted population size is
warranted. The answer depends both on fertility and mortality assumptions and on constraints such as resource
and food availability. The concept of cultural carrying capacity would aid societies in determining their optimal
population when account is taken not only of subsistence, but of quality of life. A population-control toolkit for
both rich and poor societies is sketched, and some controversial, ‘coercive’ policy possibilities analysed.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Epigraphs: “I was born in a family of 11, so after the death of my
father, because we were many, my mother could not help us all.
So, everybody has to go and look for his own life. So that's how I
came to Kibera.” — Joseph Djemba “I've never seen a problem that
wouldn't be easier to solve with fewer people.” — Sir David
Attenborough
1. Introduction
Ecological economics seeks ways to lower environmental impact to
sustainable rates of resource consumption and pollution, necessitating
analysis of the factors contributing to the impact. For this it has for four
decades applied the formula I=PAT: amounts of natural-resource con-
sumption andpollution (Impact) are a function of number of people (Pop-
ulation), how many goods-and-services the average person consumes
(Afﬂuence), and the amount of natural-resource input or pollution per
unit of goods-and-services (Technology as efﬁciency).1
I=PAT is more accurately written I= f(P,A,T) to indicate that a
change in any of the three right-side factor affects the other two
(Alcott, 2010). For instance higher population, ceteris paribus, means
lower afﬂuence (Boserup, 1981, pp ix, 4–5; Cohen, 1995, p 6). Higher
afﬂuence lowers mortality and can both raise and lower fertility (Lin,
2010, pp. 260-261).2 By increasing resource scarcity, higher P×A
increases pressure for greater resource efﬁciency (lower T) (Boserup,
1981; Simon, 1996).3 Lowering T – raising efﬁciency, e.g. in cars or
steel production – in turn enables more goods-and-services to be
produced (higher A, the rebound effect) (Alcott, 2005). Due to this
interdependence, autonomous reduction of any right-side factor
does not necessarily result in lower impact.4
Concerning population reduction, the lesson is that after its ﬁrst-
order effect of freeing up resources, it enables higher afﬂuence.
Should a community decrease in numbers whilst the supply of
resources remains the same, the smaller number of people can then
use the resources for further economic activity; in this case this
rebound effect raises present afﬂuence (hopefully reducing poverty)
but does not affect impact. Lower P is thus not a sufﬁcient condition
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1 Reﬁnements of IPAT include MEPAT (Myths and Entitlements) (Swaney, 1991),
STIRPAT (Stochastic effects) (Dietz and Rosa, 1994, 1997), I=PACT (Culture) (Durham,
1992), and IHAT (Households) (MacKellar et al., 1995). Each right-side factor can also
be endogenous. Note also that I=PAT is not an ‘identity’ but a formula, since each
right-side factor is independently measurable (Ehrlich et al., 1973), and that the nu-
merator of A is not I but goods-and-services.
2 The demographic transition model shows a stage of relative poverty with high
death and high birth rates, followed by decreasing mortality as living standards rise,
in turn followed by decreasing fertility as income, education, and female autonomy
rise, and ﬁnally population stabilisation. Researchers however sometimes observe fer-
tility decline before mortality decline and fertility increase when afﬂuence rises
(Abernethy, 1993; Engelman, 2010, p 11; Haub, 2011; Sardon, 2006).
3 Boserup's position on limits to population size is not as extreme as Simon's (1996/
1981) and is reconcilable with Malthus' theory, as shown by Lee (1986), who sides
with Malthus against Simon.
4 Strictly, changes in the absolute number P cannot be compared with changes in the
ratios A (whose denominator is P) and T without further assumptions; e.g., higher A
means higher I only if P rises or stays the same or A rises faster than P falls. Elasticities
between the 3 right-side factors are not meaningful.
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for lower I. It is not even a necessary condition, because if A and T
decrease sufﬁciently, I could decrease even with rising P.
There are two main reasons why population size is nevertheless
relevant for ecological economics. (1) Any particular environmental
problem – e.g. overdrawn groundwater or toxic emissions into
groundwater – is easier to solve when there are fewer groundwater
consumers. To lower impact the required adjustments in afﬂuence
(greater frugality) and technology (greater efﬁciency) would be phys-
ically and psychologically less burdensome; the costs of the beneﬁts of
lower impact would be lower. (2) Even if no impact reduction results
from population reduction, it raises afﬂuence, and if accompanied by
policies for less economic disparity helps alleviate poverty — another
goal of ecological economics.
2. Population matters
Because dozens of studies have demonstrated the signiﬁcant role
of (change in) population size in (change in) impact severity, usually
by means of regression analysis,5 this section does not attempt any
further proof. It merely looks at several of these studies to show
their methods and quantitative results, concluding with challenges
to the positions (1) that population doesn't matter and (2) that we
must either reduce population or rich-world consumption.
Using I=PAT, Shi (2003) analyses CO2 emissions in 93 countries
between 1976 and 1995. After noting that A itself is partly a function of
P he submits evidence not only for the obvious result that impact rises
with population, but for the hypothesis “in the Malthusian tradition”
that impact rises disproportionately with population: using the further
variables GDP per capita, percentage of manufacturing in GDP, and
percentage of population in the work force, the population elasticity of
CO2 comes to 1.42 — moreover higher in developing than developed
countries.
Brown and Kane (1994, p 56) compare grain production inWestern
Europe and Africa from 1950 to 1993. Europe saw a 152% (2.5-fold) rise
in grain output, Africa oneof 118% (2.2-fold). Yetwhilst per capita output
in Europe more than doubled, in Africa it fell, “leaving millions of
Africans hungry and physically weakened.” Since the ratio of rates of
change of total production (2.5:2.2) is much smaller than that of the
rates of change in per capita production, Africa's higher population
increase is a strong explanatory variable.
For deforestation and water use McNeill likewise shows that
population size usually outstrips consumption per person (2011,
pp 185–187), and decomposition analyses by Bongaarts show that
population growth is a key factor in GHG emissions growth (1992,
pp 309, 316). MacKellar et al., covering the years 1970–1990 at world
scale, attribute roughly one-third of CO2 emissions to population, a
percentage that more than doubles when P is households rather than
individuals (1995, p 860) — although one could of course subsume
smaller households under the afﬂuence rather than the population
factor.
Engelman similarly deduces from the simultaneous decrease of
per capita emissions and increase of total emissions that the number
of emitters must be a signiﬁcant factor (2010, pp 12–13, 27). Raskin,
although emphasising large differences in per capita resource con-
sumption (afﬂuence), ﬁnds that the “impact of population growth in
the more developed regions, acting on much higher intensities, was
2.6 times greater than in the less developed regions.” (1995, p 230).
This in fact suggests that from an environmental point of view popu-
lation stabilisation in richer countries should take priority over that in
poorer countries (see Section 5, Fig. 1).
Some voices nevertheless play down the role of population.
Princen et al. for example claim that afﬂuence is the main driver of
depletion and pollution, boldly stating “It's not population.” (2002,
p 6). However, not only is there no evidence denying population's
contribution, a reductio ad absurdum invalidates this view: if ‘it's not
population’, then the next human being has no environmental impact
and neitherwould the 400-billionth. Other economistsmore explicitly
assert the compatibility of limitless growth in population with the
planetary resource base (e.g. Simon, 1996, pp 11, 579–580, passim).6
In fact Princen et al.'s empirical ﬁndings support neither their
extreme conclusion nor their vaguer claim that “increases in resource
use can only be explained in part, and often only in small part, by
increases in population.” (2002, p 6). Their own graphs show world-
wide increases between 1965 and 1995 in population compared with
(1) forest-products consumption, (2) meat, milk and ﬁsh consumption,
and (3) water withdrawals. Although regression results are lacking,
their own animal-food example shows thatwithout the 70% population
increase, and holding eating habits (afﬂuence) constant, much less
meat andmilkwould be consumed.7 For forest products and freshwater
as well, population change explains more than a “small part” of total
consumption change, and for the claim that afﬂuence growth is “eight
to twelve” times as strong a factor as population growth (p 4) no
proof is offered.
Satterthwaite similarly negates the population factor after noting
the low per capita greenhouse gas emissions of the world's two billion
poorest (2009, pp 545–548). He rejects IPAT in favour of ICAT (Con-
sumers) because the poorest purportedly consume nothing at all.8 To
do justice to the kernel of truth in this observation, one could differen-
tiate within I=PAT between various Ps: each additional person would
be given a co-efﬁcient proportionate to their likely (future) afﬂuence,
setting at 1 the co-efﬁcient of the poorest new-born child living at sub-
sistence, or “weighting” a country's population growth proportional to
its afﬂuence (Lucas, 1976, p 20). Both theory and empirical work indi-
cate, though, that playing off lower consumption among the rich against
lower fertility among the poor is illegitimate, if only because population
is also increasing in most rich countries, and the afﬂuence of the poor
born today is likely to increase (Engelman, 2010, pp 9–10; 26–27).9
5 See Commoner (1971); Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990); Smil (1990); Holdren (1991);
Ehrlich (1991); Bongaarts (1992); Hardin (1993); Brown and Kane (1994); Jørgensen
(1994); Dietz and Rosa (1994, 1997); Cohen (1995); Engelman (1995, 2010); Harris
and Kennedy (1999); Seidl and Tisdell (1999); Turner and Tschirhart (1999); DeHart
and Soulé (2000); Brown et al. (2000); Shi (2003); van Vuuren and Bouwman
(2005); Atkinson and Gundimeda (2006); Pimentel and Pimentel (2006); Pan et al.
(2007); Heinberg (2007); Gonzalez-Martinez et al. (2008); Timah et al. (2008); Feng
et al. (2009); Krausmann et al. (2009); McNeill (2011); Brown (2011); Fox (2011).
6 The journal Ecological Economics has published similar work. For Binswanger (1998,
p 10) a positive rate of consumption of a non-renewable resource is “sustainable”, with
the resource “lasting forever”. Turner and Tschirhart (1999, p 163) call ever-increasing pop-
ulation not absurd but merely “optimistic”. Bazhanov (2007, p 192) asserts that “long-run
consumption… can grow inﬁnitely.” Krutilla andReuveny (2006, p 264) seem to regard on-
ly “exponential” population growth as inconsistentwith a steady-state economy. Cheviakov
andHartwick (2009, pp 2969–2970) allow “never-ending population growth [even assum-
ing] a ﬁnite stock of the essential resource input.”
7 Population grew 70% from 3 to 5.1 billion, meat consumption 140%. If, say, 1965
meat consumption was 60 billion kg/year, it would thus rise to 144 billion in 1995.
Since per capita consumption rose from 20 to 28 kg/person (+40%), without popula-
tion increase total consumption would be only 84, not 144 billion kg (Princen et al.,
2002, p 7).
8 Apparently unaware of the overwhelming academic consensus, single-solution au-
thors include Monbiot (2009), who relies on Satterthwaite's article to claim that “Pop-
ulation growth is not a problem — it's among those who consume the least.” The New
Economics Foundation likewise disregards population because it is a “distraction from
tackling overconsumption in wealthy countries…— the real problem.” (nef, 2009, pp 2,
13) Pearce (2008, 2010a) weighed in with the claim that “green fascism” is
expounding “the overpopulation myth.”
9 Many emphasize one PAT factor without denying the others: e.g. Fox (2011) and to
some extent Commoner (1971, pp 133–136, 235) focus on technology; Durning (1992,
pp 58–60) and Engelman (1995) weight afﬂuence; Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990) and
Brown and Kane (1994) attribute much to population.
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3. Complacency versus quality of life
Evenwhen accepting that population size burdens the environment
to some extent, one can regard population growth with complacency:
either increased natural-resource efﬁciency or voluntary sufﬁciency
among richer people will free up environmental and literal space for
more people (or highermaterial living standards amongpoorer people);
or, however T and A develop, population growth rates are slowing and
population sizewill come to rest within sustainable scale without popu-
lation policies.10
One seminal contribution to the establishment of the IPAT paradigm
held that solutions should be sought in the realms of afﬂuence and tech-
nology rather than population, where we can count on “tendencies for
self-regulation.” (Commoner, 1971, p 237). Similarly, Schneider et al.
regard 8 billion people as sustainable and oppose “state-imposed popu-
lation control policies.” (2010, p 514). Petrucci's (2000) sanguinity is
due to his conﬁdence inMarxist environmental solutionswithout direct
attention to population, whilst Hartmann (1998) in like vein chastises
“the population lobby” (p 114) for regarding scarcity as biophysical
reality rather than an outcome of dominance by large corporations
and wealthy governments. Sen's “general case against coercion” in
family-planning matters derives from his view that “empirical issues”
around food availability and environmental scarcity are not particularly
severe, although in the future limits on “reproductive rights” might be
necessary on consequentialist, as opposed to purely rights-based,
grounds (1996, pp, 1036, 1051, 1039). The most vociferous advocate of
the complacency position, though, is Pearce, for whom “the population
‘bomb’ is being defused.” (2010b, pp 4, 170).
The argument is two-pronged: (1) Population will stabilise or
decrease without unacceptable loss of welfare and life. (2) The end
number is consistent with sustainable resource consumption (and
pollution). That is, either our numbers will increase less than usually
predicted, and/or the environment can produce more than usually
assumed — although nobody claims that Western-style afﬂuence is
possible for everybody.
(1) Although most technical aspects of projecting population are
beyond the scope of this paper, three parameters warrant
mention.
1. UN population studies are not clear concerningmortality trends.
A typical one mentions fertility far more often than mortality
(UNPF, 2011).11 It also assumes on the one hand stable crude
death rates (between 8 and 13 per thousand), but by 2050
inconsistently predicts an increase in average life expectancy
of ten years (see also UNDESA, 2009). Other studies note that
many now living could see their ninetieth birthdays.12 Yet
declining mortality per se weakens the case for complacency.
2. Whilst 2050 world population will be 8 to 11 billion (UNDESA,
2012), uncertainty marking assumptions about changes in
education, women's empowerment, and whether crude birth
rates in some richer countries will again rise to replacement
level seems to speak for caution rather than complacency. Whilst
demographic transition theory holds that in addition to contra-
ceptives themselves, ‘development is the best contraceptive’,
empirical data remain ambiguous. When does an additional
child become seen as a liability rather than an asset? (Cohen,
1995, pp 46–75, 371–378; also footnote 2).
3. UNprojections are to a large extentmathematical and demograph-
ical only, i.e. there is little input of environmental facts on resource
availability and tolerable pollution (Brown and Eckholm, 1975,
p 191; Cohen, 1995, pp 15, 110–111).
It is with environmental and technological facts, though, that the
second argument for complacencymentioned above (non-severe
environmental limits) must be addressed.
(2) On this issue of the human carrying capacity of either the planet
or of individual societies or countries, this paper limits itself to
some observations on food production, referring only in passing
to the planet-wide meta-analyses of Smil (1994), Cohen (1995)
or van den Bergh and Rietveld (2004) and to ongoing work on
global environmental footprints (EF) and human appropriation
of net primary production (HANPP).13 Food-production esti-
mates, upon which judgments of maximum sustainable popula-
tion depend, deserve special attention on both environmental
and humanitarian grounds.
Based on a survey of literature close to ecological economics,14 it
seems fruitful to group the parameters for judging food production
capacity around four questions:
1. What is the net change in the amount of arable land and pasture in
a given time period — counting loss to building-over, erosion,
salinisation, nutrient depletion and other soil degradation?
2. How productive is the remaining land — counting both input avail-
ability (fertiliser, water, pesticides, herbicides, and high-yield
seeds) and limits to input uptake of crops?
3. How sustainable is present, especially ‘green-revolution’, agriculture
compared to bio-organic agriculture that does not mine soil, water,
fertilisers and fossil fuels?
4. What are the logistics, politics and ethics of food distribution?
The agricultural economists surveyed believe yields per hectare
can in some places be raised (Brown, 2011, pp 169–170) but in others
will fall due to unsustainable systems. They point to sobering facts:
10 Pro-natalist values also play a role; vide religious groups and the analyses of
Satterthwaite (2009), Pearce (2010b) and Simon, who thought greater numbers would
increase the likelihood of geniuses who would solve environmental problems (1996,
pp 408, 559–560). Even mainstream demography often regards increasing populations
as a good thing (e.g. Sardon 2006, pp 198, 219).
11 The report mentions ‘fertility’ or ‘birth rate’ over 120 times, but ‘mortality’ or
‘death rate’ 8 times, and omits ‘crude death rate’ from its tables of demographic indica-
tors (pp 116–121). The relative inattention received by mortality stems perhaps from
its non-amenability to policy; in fact, for emotional and ethical reasons societies uni-
versally pursue mortality decline, ceteris paribus increasing population growth.
12 https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/Demo_Trends_For_Web.pdf
Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990), Pearce (2010b, p 286) and Royal Society (2012, pp 30, 42,
101) do treat mortality and fertility on equal footing.
13 www.footprintnetwork.org and http://www.ecoeco.org/pdf/2007_march_hanpp.pdf
or http://www.earthportal.org/?p=777.
14 Whittaker and Likens (1975); Brown and Kane (1994); Giampietro (1994); Smil
(1994); Harris and Kennedy (1999); Brown et al. (2000); Kates (2004); Pimentel
and Pimentel (2006); Brown (2011).
Fig. 1. Per capital consumption increase explains only part of total consumption
increase. Source: Worldwatch Institute, Worldwatch Report 183: Population, Climate
Change, and Women's Lives; www.worldwatch.org.
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• After intensiﬁcation of grain production in some countries, maxima
have been reached, e.g. for rice in Japan, Indonesia and South
Korea, at about ﬁve tons (Brown and Kane, 1994, pp 26–27).15
• Grain production per person rose until 1984 to about 346 tons, fell to
313 tons in 1993 and has continued to fall (Brown, 2011; Brown and
Kane, 1994).
• Irrigation water presents a limit already overstepped in hundreds of
river systems and aquifers.
• Productivity predictions must take into account today's dependence
on (decreasing) supplies of fossil fuels for fertiliser, machinery,
water-pumping and distribution.16
• Pesticides, herbicides and monocultures necessary for high-yield
agriculture degrade the broader environment.
• Arable land and pasture are continually lost to erosion, salinisation
and building-over for housing and infrastructure (Brown and
Kane, 1994, pp 24, 27, 105; Ehrlich, 1991, pp 221–224).
• Fertiliser inputs see diminishing returns (Brown and Kane, 1994,
p 164).
• Labour and energy costs of phosphorus supply are rising (Ashley
et al., 2011; Cordell et al., 2009; Smil, 2000).
• Marginal seed productivity has declined since the era of Borlaug and
the Green Revolution.17
• Between 1975 and 2005 the absolute number of hungry and starving
has increased in 50 least-developed countries (UNCTAD, 2008), as
did from 1950 to 1990 the number of “very poor” (Ehrlich and
Ehrlich, 1990, p 41; also Giampietro, 1994; Pimentel and Pimentel,
2006); worldwide the number has stayed constant for decades.
• The precarious state of ﬁsh stocks is common knowledge.
• Bio-engineering and water-desalinisation entail at present little-
known risks and costs.
Taken together, the above results caution against complacency,
and the agricultural task would obviously be easier were there fewer
people to feed. A healthy diet moreover doesn't consist of grain alone.
These facts as well as the widely accepted precautionary principle
strengthen the case for higher priority for population policies. In
her critique of complacency Kates (2004) adds that demographic tran-
sitions happen slowly, that population projections are statistically
highly uncertain, and that demographic momentum should not be
underestimated.
Aside from environmental or inter-generational considerations, it
is often argued that more equitable intra-generational food distribu-
tion deserves priority; after all, the numbers of the overweight and
the hungry are roughly equal. A practical consideration in answer to
this is offered by Ehrlich and Ehrlich: There is not time for “waiting
for the demographic transition” or for the rich to “change their
ways.” (1990, pp 214, 40; also Daily et al., 1994, pp 470–471; Blake,
1994). That is, can we wait for such re-distribution to occur, a process
that would involve widespread changes not only in ethical attitudes
but in eating habits?
A conservative conclusion to this section is that, concerning all
resources, lower population growth can only help to alleviate
poverty — regardless of one's estimate of (1) future population size or
(2) carrying capacity. If for instance world-wide no more than 10 tons
of GHGs per year is sustainable, the average allowed per person on a
contraction-and-convergence basis will be higher with lower popula-
tion (Engelman, 1995, p 124; Engelman, 2010, pp 10–13, 23). A parallel
economic argument is that public ﬁnance faces trade-offs between the
health and education infrastructure required by additional citizens
(Dillard, 2007, pp 29–31) and, for instance, the infrastructure needed
for renewable-energy technology. A complacent stance requires more-
over the belief that technology can prevent higher impact: population is
after all assumed to rise, with no fall in average world afﬂuence (Ekins,
1991).
4. Cultural carrying capacity: P= I/AT
This section derives from I=PAT a method by which a country can
calculate the population size it desires. To solve for P both sides of
I=PAT are divided by AT: P= I/AT. The method was formulated rigor-
ously by Penck (1925), an early physical “anthropogeographer”
(ecological economist), and used in China before implementing a one-
child policy: within the constraints of “economic development,… food
resources and the composition of the diet,… and ecological balance
and fresh water resources” the guiding studies arrived at a “desirable
population size” of 700 million (Song, 1981, pp 27–30).18
Penck derived this formula from the facts that total food production
is equal to both (1) the number of people times their average food
needs and (2) the amount of arable area times its average product.
The two right sides being thus equal, we divide both by average nutri-
tional need, and again, P=arable area times product per unit of area
divided by average nutritional need (1925, pp 331–332). Product per
unit area he calculated using the factors climate, natural soil productiv-
ity and technological efﬁciency; for arable area he had to subtract land
needed for clothes, wood, transportation and houses (p 347), but
he did not include above-average nutritional requirements or fur-
ther demands on productive capacity by other species and above-
subsistence consumption. The result was carrying capacity as a max-
imum number.19
The term ‘cultural’ carrying capacity20 is used to distinguish
between carrying capacity at subsistence level – sometimes called
the ‘giant human feedlot’ approach21 – and the sustainable number
at levels of afﬂuence and a style of public life higher than subsistence,
always assuming given technologies. That is, not only does desirable
carrying capacity depend on environmental givens and the efﬁciency
with which we use natural inputs, but society seeks quality as well as
quantity of life (Cohen, 1995, 263–267, 279–287, 317; Whittaker and
Likens, 1975). The A variable must be employed in the sense of life-
style and environmental amenities (Cohen, 1995, pp 165–167, 262;
Daly and Cobb, 1989, p 239). Instead of asking how many people the
earth can support, we can consider inter-generational justice as well
and ask how many it should support (Dillard, 2007, p 7). Fig. 2 shows
some categories upon which cultural carrying capacity depends.
To quantify impact we rely on biophysical sustainability sciences
and seek ever-more accurate estimates of resource supply, climate
change, etc. In terms of depletion we use the straightforward concept
of sustainable harvest of renewable resources, whereas since for non-
renewables there is no sustainable harvest, we can only politically
decide how long we want reserves to last.22 In terms of local pollution,
social optima seem tractable. Required are global cost–beneﬁt analyses
in terms of mitigation and adaptation, well-known to ecological
economics.
15 Also e.g. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/agr_cer_yie_kg_per_hec-cereal-yield-
kg-per-hectare.
16 Whittaker and Likes quantiﬁed the proportion of food depending on fossil fuels at
one-fourth (1975, p 318).
17 Borlaug himself in 1970 saw that higher hectare productivity merely gave us breath-
ing space because we are not “decreasing the rate of human reproduction.” http://
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1970/borlaug-acceptance.html Also Brown
and Eckholm, 1975, pp 140, 145, 179–196.
18 ‘Development’ in the Chinese study means greater resource efﬁciency, equivalent
to this paper's lower T in I=PAT; desired were 85 g protein per day.
19 Penck points out that the point is not Malthus's of the contrast between ‘arithmet-
ical’ or ‘exponential’ growth rates: due to physical limits, no growth rate is sustainable
(1925, p 342).
20 See Boulding (1964, p 135); Hardin (1991, pp 54–56) and Goodland et al. (1991,
pp 494–495) [both in Costanza, 1991]; Seidl and Tisdell (1999).
21 According to Ehrlich (1971, p 91) Colin Clark set the ‘human-feedlot’ maximum at
157 billion people; the Food and Agricultural Organisation later ﬂoated the relatively
sober ﬁgure of 33 billion [New Scientist, 9 August 1984, p 16].
22 The computations of Hotelling (1931) and Hartwick (1977) notwithstanding, the
dilemma is that it is just as ‘stupid’ to sit freezing on a pile of coal as it is to use it all up.
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The strength of the technology factor T is next estimated in terms
of the energy costs of harvesting and mining resources and the efﬁ-
ciency with which they are employed in production (food, transport,
buildings, etc.), always correcting for acceptable risk. The efﬁciency
parameter (metric: GDP/resource input) could be estimated using
historical trends. More difﬁcult but more important in the long run,
after deciding the rate at which we deplete non-renewables, is quan-
tifying T assuming no use of fossil fuels.23
To illustrate the meaning of this last constraint, it seems that were
the work required only for our present mobility to come entirely from
biomass, we would have little or nothing left to eat. Brazil, for example,
devotes about 10% of its farmland to sugarcane, each hectare yielding
about 109 GJ/year of ethanol and meeting about 14% of its vehicles'
needs. At the present ratio at which a cane plant is used for sugar and
ethanol, meeting all Brazil's vehicle demand would require 70% of its
farmland.24 Applying this to the more mobile UK, assume realistically
that ‘croppable’ land is 6,200,000 ha and unrealistically that ethanol
productivity equals Brazil's. All UK land could then deliver about
675 PJ/year for vehicles. Yet assuming 30,000,000 autos in the UK,
each moving 20,000 km/year, auto-mobility alone requires about
three times this much energy.
The third and last factor to quantify is A, the socially desired level of
afﬂuence. Remember that unless throughput is lower than sustainable
scale, any rise in A entails a carrying-capacity decline; we face trade-
offs between numbers of people and consumption per person.
The political discussion could start with an A of mere subsistence —
the level of per capita throughput consistentwithmaximumpopulation,
yielding brute carrying capacity. Estimates of population at this level
vary wildly (Cohen, 1995; van den Bergh and Rietveld 2004). A plausi-
ble maximum of around 10 billion has been argued (Martinez-Alier,
1987, pp 102–104). However, if we consider only water constraints,
and allow for no industrial water use, the ﬁgure is more likely between
4 and 7 billion (Cohen, 1995, pp 314–318). In deriving these numbers
one must only identify the nutritional level for health; the availability
of water, fossil fuels, fertilisers and arable soil has already been calculat-
ed under the heading ‘impact’.
After assuming perhaps 3000 kcal of food per day and starting
with such a maximum, we then begin to calculate the smaller
number, cultural carrying capacity, by making a series of deductions.
First, the society might want more animal protein and fruit in the
diet (Smil, 1994, pp 265–266). Under constant assumptions of agri-
cultural input availability and starting from a low plausible maximum
under a vegetarian, subsistence-level diet of, say, 6 billion, cultural
carrying capacity might then be as low as 2.5 billion (Ehrlich and
Ehrlich, 1990, pp 66–67). Another estimation using the same variables
yielded the corresponding ﬁgures of 5.9 and 2.9 billion (Cohen, 1995,
p 209; also pp 183–190, 200–205).25 It should not be forgotten that
all such estimates must be based on sustainable agriculture; Kates
reports an estimate that such a restraint would reduce the sustainable
population of the US from about 350 million to about 210 million
(2004, p 55).
We then make further deductions based on whether or not we
want to keep pets, or use some arable land for sports ﬁelds and
parks. Further, shall there be room for beauty for its own sake, e.g.
in museums and as landscape, and for wilderness and habitat for
non-human species? These were the factors, after all, that led Mill to
argue originally for a stationary-state economywith a stable population
(1848, Book IV, Chapter VI; see also Gowdy and McDaniel, 1995). How-
ever, this trade-off between human population size and such amenities
often remains unaddressed by conservationists. The International
Union for the Conservation of Nature for example cultivates 15 pro-
gramme areas, but none addresses human population size (IUCN,
2012).26 Whatever speciﬁc lifestyle a society might choose, it will
include not only some comfort and pleasure, but also some dignity in
its deﬁnition of the ‘good life’; Heinberg, for one, argues that in addition
23 On this under-researched question see MacKay (2009) , who tallies the land-area
and embodied-energy requirements of wind, solar, etc. installations. Also Smil (2008).
24 www.eoearth.org > ‘Growing plants for biofuel’.
25 FAO's website is largely silent on the population issue, focusing more on socio-
demographic structure than on size — a narrowing of the ﬁeld of ‘demography’ to ex-
clude size that afﬂicts much of the literature (Cohen, 1995, pp 12, 235–236); but see
also http://www.fao.org/docrep/U3550t/u3550t02.htm and http://www.fao.org/sd/
WPdirect/Wpre0085.htm.
26 I have not received replies from the IUCN to queries about its views on population size.
TheWorldWildlife Fund employs the concept of Human-Wildlife Conﬂict (HWC), offering
land-use planning andpayment for ecosystemservices as solutions but taking human pop-
ulation expansion as a given: “If we plan properly, there's room for everyone.” http://
www.worldwildlife.org/species/humanwildlifeconﬂict.html WWF's Population, Health,
and Environment (PHE) programmementions only in passing ‘voluntary family planning’
(http://www.worldwildlife.org/what/communityaction/people/phe/
populationhealthenvironment.html) but together with the Population Reference Bureau
may be increasing its attention to population stabilisation (De Souza, 2008; Royal Society,
2012, p 102). Conservationist and humanist approaches are contrasted in Bookchin and
Foreman (1991).
AFFLUENCE
CULTURAL CARRYING CAPACITY (numbers of people)
Subsistence
Subsistence + (meat, fruit)
Diverse and numerous non-humans
Parks, sports fields, wilderness
Theatres, concert halls, libraries
Large homes, second homes, roads
Research, space travel, medicine
Air travel, luxury consumer goods
Schools, hospitals
Other species & future humans
Fig. 2.Within sustainability limits, a society determines its carrying capacity after determining the lifestyle, or afﬂuence, it wishes; natural-resource efﬁciency could likewise be on
the vertical axis, but with efﬁciency in descending scale.
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to dignity, living together democratically in peace depends on a quite
low number for cultural carrying capacity (2007, pp 119–122).
P as cultural carrying capacity thus follows frommeasured or chosen I,
T and A. The method outlined here would clarify policy goals and re-
mind us that population size is not just an ecological given but also a so-
cial choice.27 It is moreover best applicable at the country rather than
the global level, with countries deciding on trade-offs between higher
population and higher afﬂuence (Kates, 2004, p 71). The approach
moreover overcomes objections that the concept of carrying capacity
is either too static or not subject to empirical investigation (Sayre,
2008). Ecological economics has the tools for doing thiswork. The ques-
tion can be re-framed: Under what assumptions of I, T and A can we be
complacent, or even happy, about P?
5. Policies
As seen in the Introduction, population policy is subject to the
caveat that isolated reductions of P, A or T do not necessarily reduce I
because rebound effects induce rises in the other right-side factors;
necessarily effectiveways to reduce Iwouldhave to be direct, i.e. capping
or taxing depletion and pollution (Alcott, 2010; Hardaway, 2008). Even
lower afﬂuence through voluntary sufﬁciency among the rich enables
higher afﬂuence among the poor, most likely neutralising effects on
impact (Alcott, 2008).
There are nevertheless good reasons for separate population poli-
cies. As already mentioned, demands on people to increase efﬁciency
and get by with fewer resources per capita are less onerous at lower
population levels. Locally, moreover, when rebounds are limited by
lack of capital and natural-resource imports, reduced environmental
pressure can result. However, lower or stabilised population mainly
serves humanitarian goals.
First, it is commonly estimated that 215 millionwomenwish to have
modern birth control technology but don't, meaning 50–70 million
unwanted pregnancies per year (perhaps 75% of annual population
increase) (Engelman, 2010, p 20; PRB, 2012). Second, at the local level
food andwater shortages, and thus illness and starvation, could immedi-
ately be ameliorated if natality fell (PACCAF, 2010; Royal Society, 2012,
p 92). Third, wherever throughput is unsustainably high additional
people can only, ceteris paribus, raise throughput and thus unethically
decrease thewelfare of future people (Fletcher, 1976, pp 58–62). Fourth,
it is likely that any international agreement capping fuel consumption or
GHGs on a per capita basis would freeze relative populations in the
permit-distribution equation, meaning that population growth among
the poorest signatories would lower afﬂuence painfully (Engelman,
2010, p 24).28 This mirrors earlier agreements between food donors
and recipients making aid contingent upon family planning (Fletcher,
1976, pp 57–59).
Consider next population policies for developed countries. It is
after all a fact that a UK child might consume 22 times as many
resources as one in Malawi.29 As shown in Section 2, it does not follow
from this that the elimination of capitalism or over-consumption are
sufﬁcient environmental solutions deserving exclusive attention — as
argued by Hartmann (1998), Petrucci (2000) or Satterthwaite (2009).
It would seem on the contrary to be an argument for population reduc-
tion in rich countries.30
Since in developed countries women's empowerment, birth-control
technology, low infant mortality and legal abortion have largely been
achieved, policy could start by removing subsidies for parenting, for
example:
• per-child deductions from taxable income per dependent child
(often several thousand Euros);
• employment contracts that include monthly supplements per child;
• rewards for births with a one-off payment31;
• incentives such as pre-school child care, parental birth leave and
relatively cheap housing for large families.32
By contrast, general tax and beneﬁt structures, including pensions,
could favour the childless or at least couples with fewer than three
children.33
Of course the interests of already-born children deserve priority,
even if there are real trade-offs between their welfare and the welfare
of those present or future people who would beneﬁt from a smaller
population (Blaustein, 1971, p 1860). But if subsidy cuts do lead to
unacceptable poverty, these should be addressed with anti-poverty
policies, not by rejecting environmentally and ethically sound popu-
lation policies (Engelman, 2010, p 24).34 Public money saved by
removing subsidies could moreover be combined with binding trans-
fers of purchasing power to poorer countries, perhaps tied to education,
health, family planning or broader environmental programs.
Many relatively rich people do desire to lower their footprint. In
choosing among various behavioural changes thought to reduce indi-
vidual impact, however, it helps to have a rough idea of relative effec-
tiveness, and the surprising result is that having one less child is
many times more effective than several other possible actions taken
together — such as cycling, recycling, insulating, avoiding ﬂights, etc.
(Hall et al., 1994; Murtaugh and Schlax, 2009). This is called the ‘off-
spring effect’ (Engelman, 2010, p 11).
The range of indirect population-control policies is well-known
and includes easy choices such as government propaganda and those
associated with the demographic transition such as better education,
reproductive health and income security. Sen relies on these – after
noting Malthus' underestimation of voluntary fertility reduction and
calling on empirical evidence from India and China – to justify his
complacent stance that no legal incentives or prohibitions are necessary
to limit fertility (1996 pp, 1045–1049, 1053). Cohen lists “six command-
ments: promote contraceptives; develop economies; save children;
empower women; educate men; and do all of the above!” (1995,
p 69; also 17, 371).
Common to all thesemeasures, aswell as to direct ones such as free
or cheap medical pregnancy-prevention, is that they are desirable for
humanitarian reasons alone, having nothing to do with lowering
fertility (Cohen, 1995, p 374; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990; Raina, 1988).
They are also relatively cost-effective (Engelman, 1995, pp 116–117;
Hardaway, 2008, p 993; Population Matters, 2012) and have been con-
tinually discussed.35 Considerably less discussed in recent years, and
absent from Cohen's list, are a range of binding policies:
1. ﬁnancial incentives and disincentives inﬂuencing family size, including
taxes on third-plus children, payment for sterilisation, and devolving
full ﬁnancial responsibility for children onto parents
2. rules foreseeing sanctions for non-compliance, including a higher
legal age for marriage and child quotas (tradable or non-tradable)36
27 Brown et al., 2000, pp 127–128, 169–170.
28 Hardin reports that Chinese “production groups” received rice rations with no pop-
ulation inﬂator (1993, p 269).
29 Population Matters (2012) http://populationmatters.org/2010/press/climate-
change-process-ultimately-fail-populations-stabilised/.
30 In the words of Ehrlich & Ehrlich, “The world can't afford more Americans.” (1990,
p 64; also pp 42–44, 132–134, 193) nef, in contrast, claims that concern over popula-
tion means concern over it only among poor countries (2009, p 9).
31 See UNDESA (2009, Table 2) for a list of 36 countries with pro-natalist policies, 22 of
them in “more developed regions.” On current payouts, land plots and abortion restric-
tions in Russia see IHT (2011). Spain discontinued its 2500-Euro payouts on 1 January
2011.
32 Daily et al. (1994); Sardon (2006); Thévenon (2011).
33 See Brown and Eckholm, 1975, pp 189–190; Dillard, 2007, p 18.
34 That is, we should follow Tinbergen's rule of one problem, one policy (1956,
pp 55–68).
35 For completeness one must also name the Malthusian ‘positive checks’ and ‘misery’
such as war and sickness, as well as infanticide (Harris and Ross, 1987; Hill and
Hurtado, 1996; Hrdy, 1999).
36 Difﬁcult questions around the enforcement of such rules are beyond the scope of
this paper.
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Because procreation is inter-relational – it quintessentially affects
others, and not only offspring themselves – Dillard asks, “Is procreation
in all circumstances just… without being subject to law and regard for
others?” (2007, p 3). The next section explores more controversial
policies in a de-polarising way.
6. Political restrictions on procreative freedom
Today's placement of individual above societal or collective rights
has moved several birth control measures to the ‘politically incorrect’
end of the spectrum — quite obviously for example birth quotas. At
least since the 1994 UN International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo an absolute individual right to procreate
(‘reproduce’) dominates population politics (Kates, 2004, pp 56–57;
Royal Society, 2012, pp 12–13, 83). It is explicitly upheld for instance
by Commoner (1971, pp 234–235, 296), by the dissenting group of
most African Academies of Science (Jayaraman, 1993), by Simon
(1996) and by the New Economics Foundation (2009, p 10). Sen
offers two options – “a big dose of government bullying” and “leaving
matters to the responsible [sic.] reﬂection of the people themselves” –
and opts for the latter (1996, p, 1044, passim).
However, a serious problem attaches to this laissez-faire position:
Alongside freedoms and rights we also have responsibilities, the
more so as the present obese scale of the human economy means
the rights of people today conﬂict with those of people tomorrow.
This led Boulding to advocate tradable offspring quotas, arguing that
they combine “the minimum of social control necessary to the solu-
tion of the problem with a maximum of individual liberty and ethical
choice.” (1964, p 135).37 Daly and Cobb likewise do not shy away
from this policy, regarding reproduction in the “full-world economy”
no longer as a “free good” (1989, pp 236–237, 244–245). For further,
more general defences of the rights of society and the future that coun-
terbalance absolute procreative freedom, see Engelhardt (1976), Lee
(1995), Kates (2004), Heinberg (2007), Dillard (2007) and Brown
(2011).38
This issue ﬁts neatly into ecological economics' paradigm of the
‘commons’ (Blaustein, 1971, pp 1904–1911; Kates, 2004, pp 56, 65).
If reproduction is an absolute individual right we have “open access
reproduction and [a] second tragedy of the commons” (Cohen,
1995, pp 257–258), and it is uncontested that commons problems
cannot be solved without limiting access. We limit for instance the
number of cows on an alp or GHGs put into the atmosphere, freedom
taking a back seat so that one person's rights are not at the expense of
another's. But directly limiting the number of people born at all,
touching as it does on human intimacy and evolution, is a stark
limitation of freedom. Since there are cogent arguments for rejecting
anti-natalist measures that intrude upon the physical body, such as
forced sterilisation and abortion, or insertion of intrauterine devices
(Abrams, 2000), this paper excludes these from consideration.
Nevertheless, the relatively recent severity of global pollution and
resource scarcity leads to both rights-based and consequentialist
arguments for derogating at least the claimed right to have as many
offspring as one wishes (Blaustein, 1971, pp 1891–1893; Lee, 1995,
pp 339–340). Justiﬁcation for limiting this individual freedom closely
resembles that for taxation of environmental ‘external costs’. Whether
seen as a “liberty interest” or a “fundamental right… procreation is
inherently interpersonal, and without limitation becomes injurious
to others, [involving] limiting duties, and thus countervailing state
interests” (Dillard, 2007, pp 11, 20, 24, 49–51). Not least the interests
of the yet unborn, under conditions of poverty-inducing environmental
constraints, alter the social utility function away from absolute procre-
ative freedom. (ibid. pp 11, 19, 41–42; Mainwaring (2004).
Suppose, though, a society does deﬁne its cultural carrying capacity
as a political goal, but that society adheres to voluntarism in as many
realms of life as possible.
How will the often-asserted right of couples and individuals to
control their fertility be reconciled with national demographic
goals if the way couples and individuals exercise that right
happens not to bring about the demographic goals? (Cohen, 1995,
p 378)
Even in terms of their own children, alongside parents’ procreative
rights stands parental responsibility to support them, a responsibility
harder to fulﬁl as resource supply decreases (Dillard, 2007, p 7;
Engelhardt, 1976; Fletcher, 1976; Hardin, 1976).
If procreative rights are absolute (non-derogable), policy options
are restricted to education and propaganda or cajoling. One might
consider some combination of subsidies and tax rules that inﬂuence
productive decisions, as mentioned in Section 5, but it would be
argued that these, too, abrogate the individual right as much as
birth quotas (Abrams, 2000). On the other hand such incentives, as
well as cultural norms, today in fact constrain our actions in a
pro-natalist way, and subsidies could be removed without violating
voluntarism (Blake, 1994; Blaustein, 1971, p 1870).39
Thus, before deciding between indirect (‘soft’) and direct (‘hard’)
policies, societies must decide whether individual reproductive rights
are absolute or derogable (to be balanced over against the rights of
others or society).40 Arguments for inalienability can be based on
principle – either on religious beliefs or a strict laissez-faire, individu-
alist philosophy. More contingent arguments could on the other hand
be made on the basis of how much society values amenities and the
welfare of other species and future humans (see Fig. 2).
Also affecting the decision on whether to curtail individual behav-
iour are empirical estimates of just how severely society is exceeding
environmental limits. Even those relatively sanguine on this point,
however, concede that signiﬁcant scarcity is soon quite conceivable
(Sen, 1996, pp 1036, 1051). At some point, that is, the rights of future
people, whether to resources or procreation, compete with those of
present people (Dillard, 2007, pp 57–60; Lee, 1995, p 339). Moreover,
as claimed in Section 3, even intra-generationally each addition person
impedes the ﬁght against poverty— themore so if norms do not change
considerably towardsmore distributive justice. But because they under-
lie the entire concern with sustainability, it is inter-generational ethics
that should carry great weight speciﬁcally within ecological economics.
In terms of present political decisions, moreover, the fact comes into
play that neither other species nor future people have any voice, perhaps
strengthening the case against unfettered procreative freedom.
The idea of material social justice, however, is still conceptually and
emotionally rooted in the present, in the suffering and injustice we can
see.When Bookchin, for instance, talks of “social ecology”whilst denying
any conﬂict between “insatiable needs [and] scarce natural resources”
(1994, pp 21–24), future humans are not in the equation. Foreman's
inter-generational and non-anthropocentric answer to Bookchin is that
his “biggest worry about the limited perspective of a socially-oriented
ecology is that it can all too easily become overwhelmingly social and
37 Proposals to restrict procreation to licensed parents seek to protect the welfare of
children rather than limit population size (Eisenberg, 1994).
38 On our sacred freedoms Ehrlich and Ehrlich note, “The cost [of deciding for sus-
tainability] would include giving upmany things that we now consider to be essential
freedoms: The freedom not to consider society's needs when planning a family, free-
dom to drive gas-guzzling cars,… freedom to use and discard huge amounts of non-
biodegradable plastics, and… the freedom to consumemore andmore” (1990, p 181).
39 In an earlier, similarly pronatalist context the rebellious ‘neo-Malthusian’ reaction
of sexual intercourse without offspring — by means including illegal contraception and
abortion, was of course ‘voluntary’ and has been called ‘bottom-up’, although it did ad-
vocate the repeal of some laws (Encyclopedia of Ecological Economics, 2012). For a
deﬁnition of ‘neo-Malthusianism’ see Kates, 2004, p 72).
40 Cohen for instance questions a land-owner's ‘right’ to degrade soil, positing
society's right to prescribe agricultural practices (1995, p 294).
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insufﬁciently ecological” (Bookchin and Foreman, 1991, p 118). Howev-
er, since an egalitarian society could still step beyond biophysical limits,
the concept of social justice cannot be co-opted by the present.
As with all commons goods we are dealing with an exclusive public
good and must decide whether other species and future human beings
have rights of access. If and whenwe ﬁnd ourselves at an unsustainable
level of throughput, we face a trade-off between intra-generational,
intra-species individual freedom and inter-generational, inter-species
justice. “At issue is how to balance the reproductive rights of the current
generation with the survival rights of the next generation” (Brown and
Kane, 1994, p 207).41
Alongside the issue of whether policies legitimately abrogate or at
least derogate individual freedom is the political question of how the
policies are decided, on a spectrum from authoritarian to direct-
democratic. Our debate over regulationist versus voluntary approaches
is however hindered because key terms such as ‘coercion’ and ‘compul-
sion’ are used ambiguously. In Sen's discussion, for instance, especially
when speaking simply of “the Chinese example”, the issues of the
policies themselves and how the policies are decided are conﬂated
(1996, pp, 1044, 1054). The same ambiguity plagues the terms ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ (also Hardin, 1993, p 274). The unhappy result
is that one can for instance reject ‘coercion’ by a dictator, or ‘top-down’
rule, yet be in favour of measures that ‘coercively’ restrict freedom if
decided by popular majority.42
Ehrlich for example writes, “We must have population control at
home, hopefully through changes in our value system, but by compul-
sion if voluntary methods fail” (1971, pp xi–xii). Population Matters
“opposes coercive population restraint policies.”43 All laws, however,
‘coerce’ or ‘compel’ – if left free we would act otherwise – including
laws for taxation or compulsory schooling and against bigamy or driv-
ing on the wrong side of the road. Since anti-natalist rules are by deﬁni-
tion coercive, the anti-coercion position would preclude anything but
educational measures and perhaps eased access to contraceptives
(Abrams, 2000; but see Lee, 1995; Dillard, 2007, pp 48–49).
But what do the terms ‘compulsion’ and ‘coercive’mean? Dillard's
analysis of restrictions on procreative freedom, drawing on U.S. court
practice, international law and Locke's theory of government, sees a
spectrum of subjective deﬁnitions as well as disagreement over
when coercion, manipulation, and incentives are unacceptable on
human-rights grounds (2007, pp 32–34, passim). On the spectrum
are the legal policies mentioned at the end of Section 5 (ﬁnancial
incentives and rules such as birth quotas) and intrusions into the body
(e.g. sterilisation) which we are rejecting. Even the hoary concept of
‘mutual coercion, mutually decided upon’ misleads because it implies
unanimity rather than majority rule. The concept ‘coercion’, therefore,
whilst useful in distinguishing political decision-making regimes, is not
useful in discussing population-control policies themselves (Dillard,
2007, p 37; Lee, 1995, pp 335–337).
The equally ambiguous terms ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ likewise
have validity only concerning the rule-making process. The rules
themselves could perhaps always be taxed as ‘top-down’ – the more
so since a government enforces them – but if they are wished and
voted in by a majority of the people, the process is ‘bottom-up’ in
contrast to imposition by a non-elected elite. Finally, the hackneyed
example of the ‘tyranny of themajority’ – that not even a 95%majority
of voters can legitimately condemn red-heads to jail – reveals that
whatever the decision-making regime, society's rights are likewise
not unlimited. Again, it is here assumed that surgical intrusions (e.g.
forced abortions) fall into this category.44
It can be safely assumed that most ecological economists would
rather ‘go to hell democratically’ than to heaven autocratically; the
‘green authoritarian’ option of purely ‘top-down’ decision-making is
not on the table. Consider however for instance large popular major-
ities for incentives for sterilisation, disincentives for people already
having two children,45 banning trade in sperm and eggs, or closing
borders to immigration on environmental grounds? (Löpfe and
Vontobel, 2011) The question of which particular (coercive) popula-
tion policies are out of bounds in a democracy remains wide open.
7. Discussion
In the early years of ecological economics analysis of population
size was often explicit, including advocacy of population-reducing
policies (Boulding, 1964; Brown and Eckholm, 1975; Daly, 1974;
Ehrlich, 1971). The topic has since diminished in importance. Despite
a number of articles, albeit analytical as opposed to policy-oriented
ones (see footnote 5), the journal Ecological Economics has published
more on technological resource efﬁciency, renewables and sustain-
able consumption than on population. Furthermore, to my knowledge
no ecological-economics conferences have held sessions on popula-
tion until the European Society's meeting in Istanbul in 2011.46 Two
Ecological Economics textbooks likewise mention population size
only brieﬂy and analytically,47 whilst the seminal anthology of that
title (Costanza, 1991) featured among its 32 contributions only one
speciﬁcally on human numbers (Hardin), two others attesting a
positive connection between people and resource consumption (Daly;
Goodland et al.), and one adopting a complacent stance towards popu-
lation growth (Fig. 3) (Cavalcanti).48
Neglect of human population size is indeed wider-spread:
Despite its key contribution to climate change, population plays
little role in current discussions on how to address this serious
challenge, particularly at the governmental level. Although many
policymakers would welcome slower population growth, there is
a concern that policies to slow growth will violate the right of
couples to determine their own family size. Moreover, population
is associatedwith sensitive issues including sexuality, contraception,
abortion, migration, and religion. As a result, the debate on climate
change tends to focus on the role of human technologies and their
economic foundations, rather than on critical human numbers and
behaviours. (Engelman, 2010, p 5).
To be sure, current deliberations of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change on responsibility for historic emissions have re-
vived earlier discussions over the roles of both population and afﬂu-
ence (Agarwal and Narain, 1991; O'Neill et al., 2010). However, the
development/environment discussion since the UN Cairo meeting in
1994 has been largely silent on population size (Kates, 2004, pp 57,
68–69; Kysar, 2003, p 727), the topic for instance ﬁnding no place
41 I have framed the possible trade-offs in population ethics in terms of rights; they
are treated in terms of interests or utility (well-being) in the ‘positional utilitarianism’
of Mainwaring (2004, p 354).
42 Blake observes that “The historical record does not allow us to equate economic
and social inﬂuence with ‘voluntarism’ and government policy with ‘coercion’.”
(1994, p 176).
43 http://populationmatters.org/documents/ethical_implications.pdf Also Royal Soci-
ety (2012, pp 8, 102).
44 Max Frisch on Swiss radio in 1989 imagined nine people on a cable car from a
mountain-top restaurant to the valley station. Seven are drunk and ﬁnd it great fun
to rock and sway the cabin. The two sober passengers are frightened to death. Does
the majority have the right to do whatever it wants?
45 Dillard posits a limited right to self-replacement, congruent with society's interest
in perpetuating itself, but not to unlimited numbers of offspring (2007, pp 44–45).
46 Even for the Istanbul conference the 20 pieces on its website sketching environ-
mental problems in Turkey contained only two peripheral mentions of population —
in a republic whose population has quintupled since its founding.
47 Daly and Farley (2004); Common and Stagl (2005).
48 For coverage of population issues one must turn e.g. to the journals Population and
Environment and Population and Development Review or the organisations Population
Council (2002, 2012), Population Reference Bureau (2012), Population Matters
(2012), Worldwatch (2012) and – for those with a sense of humour – Voluntary Hu-
man Extinction Movement (2012).
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in the report of the Millennium Summit in 2000 (Hardaway, 2008,
pp 987–988; Royal Society, 2012, pp 12–13, 83).
To re-open the population debate one can imagine a conference or
special issue on the population views of people and governments of
poorer countries. Many developing-country women have long
wished fewer children,49 and there is recent renewed demand that
the issue be given priority both locally and in international aid
budgets.50 In the least developed countries “…population growth
will increase vulnerability to many of the most serious impacts of
climate change”, leading 37 of the 49 countries to “explicitly make
linkages between climate change and population” for their National
Adaptation Programmes for Action (Hardee and Matunga, 2010,
pp 115, 118).
One could also revisit controversies over responsibility for envi-
ronmental stress that arose in New Delhi in 1993, where the scientiﬁc
academies of 56 developing countries called for zero population
growth whilst a majority of the African ones dissented (Jayaraman,
1993; New Delhi Science Summit, 1994).51 One could learn from
China, whose ofﬁcials routinely cite the demands of a huge popula-
tion when analysing their ﬁght for instance against desertiﬁcation.52
Finally, pro-natalist incentives in rich countries could be rigorously
researched.
Emotional and political reasons not to look closer at population
size are beyond the scope of this paper. Warranting brief mention,
though, is the history of links between population control and eugenics
(Bookchin, 1994) as well as opposition to food charity and immigration
(Lucas, 1976) — despite the fact that contemporary arguments for
reduced population maintain neutrality over which groups ‘should’
reduce. Feminist opposition to low-fertility policies, as well, raised
manifold gender issues relating to reproduction (Kates, 2004,
pp 58–64). Finally, the issue touches the fact that our humanistic
hopes must conform to planetary limits.53
8. Conclusions
Six main conclusions of this paper are:
(1) Using the I= f(P,A,T) formula, both population and afﬂuence
contribute to the size of impact. Instead of playing these two
factors off against each other, research is better directed at
measuring their relative contributions with regard to speciﬁc
impacts.
(2) If it is the case that at desirable levels of afﬂuence (A) and realistic
increases in resource efﬁciency (T) the present population is not
sustainable, it is unwise to complacently ignore population size
and/or rely on its natural peaking in several decades. Limits to
food production, the precautionary principle and declining
death rates all argue against complacency.
(3) Whatever the net effect on impact of lower or stable population,
it substantially eases the task of alleviating poverty.
(4) There is a method with which individual countries can approach
decisions on optimal population size (‘cultural carrying capaci-
ty’): After determining sustainable and desirable levels of impact
and the desirable level of afﬂuence – including the welfare of fu-
ture humans and other species – a realistic level of technological
efﬁciency increase in the use of resources can be estimated.
49 Farley and Leavitt (1971, p 31).
50 Also Daly and Cobb (1989, p 242); UNPF (2011, pp 34–35); PACCAF (2010), a joint
statement of NGOs from nine countries in the Horn of Africa, where at the time of
writing a new famine is reported. ( http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
africa/starvation-returns-to-the-horn-of-africa-2306001.html).
51 One document (BBC, 2009) illustrating the need to shift away from Western per-
spectives asks African focus groups where they place blame for environmental degra-
dation and climate change. The interviewees emphasised deforestation, localised
pollution, and overpopulation, generally regarding themselves as responsible and not
supporting the researchers’ hypothesis that developed-country consumers are to
blame. Yet the document's ‘Conclusions’ avoid population policy, calling principally
for teaching the Africans about the guilt of the rich.
52 Guardian, 5 January 2011, p 20; Engelman (2010, p 22).
53 In the experience of this writer, it is moreover depressing to research the facts of
human hunger and crowdedness in the context of dwindling natural resources, dis-
appearing non-human creatures, deaths during childbirth, overﬁshing, and topsoil
degradation — alongside obesity and SUVs.
With the kind permission of Tim Newcomb.
Fig. 3. With the kind permission of Tim Newcomb.
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Using P= I/AT the number of people compatible with these as-
sumptions can then be derived.
(5) When population stabilisation or reduction policies are debated,
it should be remembered that they pertain to rich aswell as poor
societies, and that all policies ‘coerce’ us, even ‘soft’ ﬁnancial
(dis-)incentives.
(6) Societies should confront the debate between procreative rights
and procreative responsibilities to decide whether reproductive
behaviour falls within the realm of activities legitimately con-
trolled by democratic majority.
Ecological economics is well-equipped for many speciﬁc tasks:
1. measuring the relative contributions to I of P, A and T analytically,
using biophysical units;
2. comparing the cost-effectiveness of the marginal impact-reduction
investment, again in terms of P, A and T;
3. rejecting high estimates of maximum human population, often
based on ‘huge feedlot’ standards, whether on grounds of ecology
or present utility;
4. deﬁning sustainable agriculture andmeasuring its yields per hectare,
as well as sustainable fuel use;
5. computing realistic estimates of national cultural carrying capacity
so that society can formulate population-size goals;
6. identifying and re-evaluating pro-natalist subsidies;
7. recognising that humans compete with other species for space and
resources;
8. answering ethical questions surrounding policies for population
constraint within the frameworks of inter-generational justice
and the dangers of open-access commons; and
9. applying the principle of multi-disciplinarity by explicitly discussing
legal and rights issues.
Whilst any given policy to reduce population, afﬂuence, toxicity,
or inefﬁciency can unfortunately be compensated by expansion in
other human-ecological realms, negotiating political paths to sustain-
ability requires clear decisions on desirable population goals.
To close with a concrete issue, consider some questions raised by
EU efforts for a biological corridor from Orkney to the Black Sea, or
American efforts for one from Guatemala through the Darien Gap.
Do the EU and the Americas have a moral obligation to use these
entire areas agriculturally in order to feed undernourished humans?
Are these corridors harder, or easier, to establish if human population
grows?
Finite resources imply that populationmust eventually stabilise. Our
only choice is to control it consciously, humanely and democratically or
to wait for real limits to do it for us. The intent of this paper has been to
make room within ecological economics for fresh discussion of our
sheer numbers.
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a b s t r a c t
The environmental structural change strategy claims that by shifting our expenditures to economic
sectors with lower environmental intensity, absolute resource consumption and environmental impact
can be lowered. Environmental InputeOutput methodologies for computing these intensities attribute
no resource consumption to labour or households because these are not classiﬁed as sectors. The
suggestion that service sectors entail less environmental impact, however, loses force if a unit of labour
contains embodied energy, and attributing these inputs to labour drastically reduces intensity variation
between sectors. Relative growth of service sectors has furthermore not been accompanied by decreased
resource consumption; thus models whose intensity computations cover not only inter-ﬁrm payments
but also labour earnings and household expenditures may have superior predictive power. If moreover
natural-resource and labour inputs to product are incommensurable, intensity ratios themselves have
perhaps only monetary, rather than real, signiﬁcance.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Epigraph
Some writers have raised the question, whether nature gives
more assistance to labour in one kind of industry or in another;
and have said that in some occupations labour does most, in
others nature most. In this, however, there seems much confu-
sion of ideas. The part which nature has in any work of man, is
indeﬁnite and incommensurable. It is impossible to decide that in
any one thing nature does more than in any other. When two
conditions are equally necessary for producing the effect at all, it
is unmeaning to say that so much of it is produced by one and so
much by the other; it is like attempting to decide which half of
a pair of scissors has most to do in the act of cutting; or which of
the factors, ﬁve and six, contributes most to the production of
thirty. (John Stuart Mill, 1848, 28e29)
1. Introduction
The environmental structural change strategy holds that when
keeping expenditures at a constant level but shifting them to
economic sectors deemed to have relatively low environmental
intensity, depletion and pollution can fall (Costanza, 1980, 1222).
There is however no empirical evidence that structural change
towards services or tertiary sectors has been accompanied by lower
environmental impact if imports, air travel and shipping are
rigorously measured (Brookes, 1972; Rothman, 1998; Jackson and
Marks, 1999; Vringer and Blok, 2000; Torras, 2003; Helm et al.,
2007; Peters, 2008; Ausubel and Waggoner, 2008; Miller and
Blair, 2009, 421e423; Holm and Englund, 2009). The strategy
thus relies on theory, in particular on methodologies for attributing
resource consumption to certain sectors of the economy that omit
labour from the analysis. Yet since shifting from resource-intensive
sectors means shifting to labour-intensive ‘service’ ones, depletion
and pollution can fall only if labour-hours themselves require low
or no environmental inputs. This paper re-opens a debate that was
truncated around 25 years ago over the environmental conse-
quences of buying a unit of labour.
The search for explanations of levels of pollution and natural-
resource consumption has yielded mature methods for counting
the material and energy embodied in physical products such as
cars, plastics or bottles, but no clarity on the same things embodied
in the labour that is bought with every expenditure: Does an hour’s
work have zero environmental impact, or must we count the
worker’s metabolic and muscular needs, plus perhaps the energy
costs of his or her physical workplace, clothes and commuting, or
even all of the energy, either directly utilised or embodied in goods
and services, that the worker’s hourly wage purchases?
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The paper combines literature review and conceptual analysis to
argue for attributing natural-resouce consumption not only to
goods, processes and ﬁrms, but to individuals as labourers and ﬁnal
consumers. In light of strong evidence that if this is done the
environmental intensity of expenditures is virtually constant
among sectors (Costanza, 1980), the methodological decision of
where to draw system boundaries is of central importance for
structural-change hopes within sustainable consumption.
Concerning terminology, please accept four simpliﬁcations:
1. When characterising inputs and intensities ‘environmental’,
‘natural-resource’ and ‘energy’ are used synonymously; the
more speciﬁc ‘energy’ is often used, but the analysis pertains to
any natural-resource input into production.
2. For brevity, and since many co-efﬁcients exist for converting
amounts of resource consumption into emissions, the paper
speaks of natural-resource depletion rather than pollution,
species loss, climate change, etc.
3. The term ‘labour’ as both a physical and an income category
subsumes not only wages but categories such as capital and
entrepreneurial services, proﬁts, and rent. For any given
expenditure it is contrasted with payments for goods and
services or raw materials delivered by ﬁrms as taxonomised in
National Accounts.
4. The paper uses ‘EIO’ or ‘EIO(-LCA)’ (Environmental Input-
Output(-Life-Cycle Assessment)) for any environmental accoun-
ting using National Accounts sectors, inputeoutput co-efﬁcients
and cradle-to-grave summation.
Section 2 describes the environmental structural change
strategy. Section 3 describes the direct and indirect natural resource
inputs or ‘costs’ entailed by any expenditure, loosely within the
framework of Life Cycle Assessment. Section 4 presents arguments
for including the natural-resource costs of labour in environmental
accounting. Section 5 presents two objections to including these
costs. Section 6 points to several open questions and lists the far-
reaching repercussions of drawing wider boundaries.
2. The environmental structural change strategy
Holding expenditure level constant, a given consumer or an
entire economy can alter its “spending patterns” so that a greater
percentage of expenditures goes to sectors or economic activities
deemed to be less environmentally harmful (Vringer and Blok,
1995, 901). The analysis upon which the strategy rests “only
explores the effects of changes in patterns of consumption without
any change in the level of consumption” (Alfredsson, 2004, 517).
This ‘dematerialisation’ is by the same token however a ‘labour-
isation’: holding total outlays constant, the less spent on physical
goods, materials and energy the more spent on labour. The strategy
is one of several indirect environmental strategies including pop-
ulation reduction, lower afﬂuence, and greater technological and
consumer efﬁciency.
The call is for shifting expenditures
Obviously, different consumption activities differ very much
with regard to their environmental impact, and in principle it is
easy to imagine a continuous growth in economically deﬁned
consumption without a corresponding growth in the
consumption of resources. if the population used income
increases to buy labour-intensive goods and services: theatre
and music performances, courses in new skills, lectures on
interesting topics, art objects, high quality clothes and houses
made as handicrafts, child care, and massage treatments.
(Røpke, 1999, 401).
This paper analyses such an “art object”, a new painting, to show
that buying such a “labour-intensive” product causes signiﬁcantly
lower environmental impact only if the resource consumption of
the painter is ignored.
In terms of Material Input Per unit of Service (MIPS), if we buy
from sectors with smaller “ecological rucksacks”, input could fall
while units of service rise; the two ratios MIPS þ LIPS (labour input
per unit of service) add up to unity; since we spend the same
amount we must not “do without” (Schmidt-Bleek, 1994, 21e24,
115e119, 184e185).1 In EIO terms the “value-added” portion of an
expenditure can rise, “diluting” its greenhouse-gas intensity and
recommending itself to environmentally responsible consumers
(Suh, 2006, 6559).
“Structural economics” describes the strategy in terms of “change
in the lifestyles of households” (Duchin, 1998, 2, 20, 51). Using the
methodology of counting energy inputs from all sectors into any
sectorwecan thus identify “more sustainable consumptionpatterns”
by households (Kerkhof et al., 2009, 1160e1161) and reduce expen-
ditures in those “consumption clusters activating the most resource
ﬂows throughout the product life-cycle” (Spangenberg and Lorek,
2002, 134). We can compute emissions intensities for say 27
consumption sectors, yielding a sector ranking (Common and Stagl,
2005, 132e133). In Brazil for example the “food” sector is
computed to use 10.1 MJ per $, “recreation” 8.7, “clothing” 6.4, and
“communications” 3.6 (Cohen et al., 2005, 557). “Ecological struc-
tural change” is when “material-intensive sectors shrink, others
grow” (Hinterberger et al., 1996, 101). LCA’s role is in society’s
“dematerialisation and substitution” (Robèrt et al., 2002).
Let us deﬁne the strategy as follows:
1. The economy’s structure is the portions of monetary exchanges
(GDP) spent in economic sectors numbering from three highly-
aggregated ones (agriculture, manufacturing and services) to
around 1000.
2. The environmental inputs into each expenditure, sector, or GDP
are the natural resources (N) in inputeoutput processes
measured in either monetary or physical units; as in all
economy-wide EIO monetary units are unavoidable, and using
natural-resource prices one can derive physical quantities.
3. The environmental intensity ratio is the amount of input in
physical or monetary units per unit of output (Q) in monetary
units.
4. All other inputs into Q purchased by the expenditure are
subsumed under the generic term ‘labour’ (L) e paid work
time; for a $1000 expenditure, $-value of N/$1000 plus $-value
of L/$1000 ¼ unity.
5. If sectors have different intensities, shifting a given level of
expenditures to less N-intensive ones would reduce N-
consumption.
6. To enable commensurability between expenditures the
strategymakes no assumptions about the relationship between
expenditures and psychological satisfaction or utility (Ròbert
et al., 2002, 200e206).
4) and 5) together mean that after shifting, the consumer is
purchasingmore units of labour than before. The strategy is distinct
from that recommending purchases within a sector of goods with
less natural-resource input but the same utility e e.g. a wooden
1 Also Kaufmann, 1992, 38e39; Hinterberger et al., 1996, 84e97; Ritthoff et al.,
2002, 9.
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instead of a metal table (Hannon, 1982, 271). Not only would the
wooden table be cheaper, but product comparisons do not yield
intensities since the denominator is simply ‘a product’. Like the
strategy, and unlike process analysis, this paper compares expen-
ditures, not products.
3. Indirect energy inputs into an artist’s work
The inconclusiveness of empirical work and the fact that many
variables determine resource-consumption levels renders it
necessary to turn to theory. As a start suppose that we abide by the
structural-change strategy and use our earnings for a new $1000
painting instead of a $1000 plane trip. The artist we buy the
painting from, however, could use the proceeds for a plane journey,
and oil is consumed merely by a different person (Lloyd, 2007,
5815e5816).2 While we don’t know that the artist would board the
plane in our stead, the assumption is legitimate that the environ-
mental intensity of his or her expenditure is society’s average.
Again, if a given expenditure is responsible for less natural-
resource consumption than another of the same size, it is respon-
sible for more labour consumption, and the amount of the theo-
retical decrease in N-inputs due to the shift thus depends on
whether the purchase of these additional labour units entails zero,
or some, embodied natural resources e and if not zero, how much.
Conventional EIO ignores labour, entering the environmental
intensity of a pure service, e.g. Herendeen’s sectors “domestic
service” and “auto registration and fees”, as zero (1998, 173; also
Wright, 1974, 309; Spreng, 1988, 138e140; Graedel, 1997). This
holds equally for physical inputeoutput analysis (PIOT) if it traces
only inter-industry transactions, without ﬁnal demand (Miller and
Blair, 2009, 399). An early diagram showed the inputs and outputs
of an oil reﬁnery: extraction energy, energy costs of tankers,
materials, plant, and fuels used for organic chemicals, but nowhere
a human being able and willing towork (Chapman,1974, 100). Even
if the output-denominator metric is physical, the issues are
whether labour is a sector at all and whether inputs to labour
include household consumption (Spreng, 1988, 7, 136).
This section describes the contrasting method of accounting
total household consumption, leaving for Section 4 some argu-
ments for it. Middle positions are also tenable whereby the energy
cost of labour-hours “offsets some fraction of the direct energy
savings” e reducing, but not eliminating, variation in sector
intensity (Kaufmann, 1992, 49e54). One could count only energy
use over and above what an unemployed person would consume
(Hall et al., 1986, 106e108). Appendix I shows a spectrum of
consumption enabling the production of labour, some or all of
which could be counted.
It is universally accepted that in energy accounting energy
inputs for metabolism and muscular movement differ in no way
from the energy needed to run a car factory. Since EIO counts the
energy embodied in steel reaching the factory, consistency would
mean counting the parallel category of that embodied inworkers e
yet even basic metabolism cannot be counted if labour is not
a category in inputeoutput tables. From the beginnings of energy
accounting it was seen that there is “some arbitrariness” in what to
count:
[I]s it the physical energy contributed by the labourer to the
production process, or the energy content of the food he eats, or
the primary energy needed to produce all the goods and services
he enjoys?. Excluding [labour] is appropriate to [regarding]
people enjoying consumption for its own sake rather than to
facilitate their contribution to the production process. (Wright,
1974, 309e310; also Chapman, 1974, 93; Gilliland, 1975, 1052)
The course was set for recognising that labour is produced, yet
ignoring it.
Supporting the arbitrariness of choosing system boundaries,
Smil asks:
Once the decision is made to account for the energy cost of labor,
which approach is more rational: the minimalist choice of
counting just the thermodynamic equivalent of the invested
muscular exertion or the maximalist option of ﬁnding the total
existential energy requirements?. These challenges have no
satisfactory solutions. (2008, 273e274)
This paper nevertheless argues that the ‘maximalist’ solution is, for
the purposes of environmental policy, satisfactory. If our research
question covers the entire energy system, why draw boundaries at
all?
To be clear what is meant by the indirect natural-resource costs
of or inputs into labour, Table 1 analyses a hypothetical purchase of
a $1000 painting requiring 30 h of labour.
Following conventional EIO, this product from a purportedly
low-impact sector entails environmental inputs beyond the paint,
frame, canvas and gallery wall (Cell 1); the expenditure entails
further the ‘ecological rucksack’ or natural resources embodied in
or required for the production and delivery of the paint, frame,
canvas, etc., plus the atelier’s amortisation (Cell 2).3 The painter’s
time requirements are similarly divided into the hours we are billed
for (Cell 3) and those previous to these without which the artist
would be incapable of painting (Cell 4). Returning to the environ-
mentally relevant natural-resource inputs, there is the metabolism
of the painter while actually painting plus less obvious inputs like
protective clothing and coffee breaks (Cell 5). Finally we have our
bone of contention, the inputs into the daily life of the artist that are
necessary because, were the wages part of our expenditure not
large enough to buy them, the artist would not work (Cell 6). Cells 4
and 5 thus supply the time and energy for the capacity (ability) to
work while Cell 6 constitutes the consumption necessary for the
willingness to work.4 Cells 2, 4 and 6might also include the physical
and institutional support labour receives from the community,
similar perhaps to a study suggesting the inclusion of government
because its resource use is “an upstream part of household
consumption” (Spangenberg and Lorek, 2002, 135).
A rough quantiﬁcation of the amounts of energy included in
Cells 5 and 6 shows that choosing system boundaries makes a large
difference. Basic metabolic consumption is about 0.5 MJ h1 (Fluck
and Baird, 1980, 101e105; Odum, 1995, 265; Smil, 2008, 124e131)
and approximately ten times this amount is embodied in the food
enabling this metabolism (Hall et al., 1986, 107). Taking total
primary energy consumption of 160GJ/European/year (Smil, 2008,
258) and assuming 2000 working hours per year, roughly 80 MJ is
attributable to an hour’s work. Cells 5 and 6 are a percentage of
lifetime energy consumption proportional to the percentage of the
30 h in this example to total labour-hours.5
Some research does address the hidden energy requirements of
labour beyond basic metabolism (moving from Cell 5 to Cell 6)
using the example of the service “a day in a hospital”: To compu-
tations for the hospital’s buildings, machines and transport, and the
2 The alternatives “holidays abroad” and “works of art” (Druckman and Jackson,
2009, 2067) are common in the literature.
3 Ratios between Cells 1 and 2 could be in tonnes/tonne (Robèrt et al., 2002).
4 Hall et al. reject maximalist accounting because they emphasise ability, rather
than willingness, to work (1986, 40, 107e108).
5 Assuming 45 working-years, or 90,000 h, also yields 80 MJ h1.
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utilisation matter-energy in heating, electricity, laundry, etc., the
analysis breaks convention by adding “the education, further
training and maintenance of the hospital employees” (Schmidt-
Bleek, 1994, 185e187). Although “maintenance” could be inter-
preted in a minimalist or maximalist way, it is here at least ‘on the
map’ and raises this paper’s question, as did another conventional
study identifying “energy used in acquiring and maintaining
knowledge” and arguing that “ignoring. the energy cost of labor is
a deﬁciency” (Stern, 1999, 388e393).
Maximalist analysis is distinct from the result, using conven-
tional EIO-LCA, that so-called service sectors, “whose own product
is actually immaterial, e.g. banking, consulting, trade and transport,
[are] responsible for about one-fourth of all material movements”
(Hinterberger et al., 1996, 96). The insight is rather that these
service sectors are deﬁned by the (large) percentage of expenditures
in them going to employee compensation or entrepreneurial
income and that this part, whatever its size, is left out of embodied
natural-resource calculations.
One rare study of the environmental intensity of service sectors,
for example, notes that although wages make up 45e80% of costs,
they “were assumed not to cause any material or energy ﬂows”,
leaving the entire environmental burden on ofﬁce premises, busi-
ness travel, ofﬁce equipment, etc.; although personnel income has
environmental impact through private consumption, wages are
given zero intensity in spite of the fact that even “expanding the
system boundary” to include commuting would result in the
‘wages’ sector having the second highest impacts of all measured
sectors (Junnila, 2009, 424, 428, 431).
Table 2 monetarily compares a new painting with a plane trip,
the metal sculpture illustrating that products in any sector lie on
a spectrum of conventionally-tallied intensity. At one extreme in an
‘art objects’ sector would be an Andy Goldsworthy work consisting
of only natural objects, labour receiving perhaps $990 with $10
going for photographs of the work. Carl Andre’s 144 Magnesium
Square, consisting of metal ﬂoor plates, would be even less labour-
intensive than Table 20s sculpture. Note that there are approxi-
mately 2,000,000 artists in the US (ﬂorists, news announcers,
singers, dancers, writers and architects) each earning yearly on
average $34,800 (Tages-Anzeiger, 2008). Is the environmental
impact of these professional groups, whose livelihood is supported
by purchases in these sectors, zero?
The maximalist method can be cast not only in terms of the
‘downstream’ expenditures of wage recipients but also the
‘upstream’ acquisition of a consumer’s purchasing power in the ﬁrst
place. In terms of time the artist’s ﬂight looks forward, while the
analytical boundary can be expanded backwards to the precondi-
tion of the purchases made by the addressee of the structural
change strategy: productive activity entailing natural-resource
consumption. Consistent with the normative tenet of consumer
responsibility, the observation is that the consumer chose to work
and earn, and it seems justiﬁable to assume that the material-
energy implications of the economic activity are the average of
the economy. Conventional analysis, however, considers the past
history of labourers/consumers to be “outside the domain of the
analyst” (Ayres, 2004, 431). EIO excludes as a matter of principle
“investments made in the past”, even in “capital goods” (Tillman
et al., 1994, 22).
4. Including indirect resource costs of labour
Two arguments have thus emerged for including the entire
natural-resource consumption of the labourer:
1. The logic is no different from that behind LCA’s widest possible
computation of ‘ecological rucksacks’: “Just as a machine tool
must be manufactured and have an end of life, a worker must
have a childhood and an end of life” (Zhang and Dornfeld, 2006,
190). The natural-resource costs of labour input should include
non-working hours.
2. Our painter must be willing to work. The condition for non-
slaves is a wage proportional to their lifetime consumption of
energy, etc., for hygiene, housing, cooking, clothes, transport,
entertainment, further education, hobbies and holidays e
consumption induced by his or her wages.
This section also examines the arguments that labour is in
reality produced, and that the incommensurability of labour and
natural resources prevents the computation of real intensities in
the ﬁrst place.
4.1. A double standard?
Counting only metabolism is analogous to counting the uti-
lisation but not the embodied energy of a car e a battle won long
ago by conventional energy analysis. Buying a car is buying also the
steel entering the car factory, the energy embodied in the steel, and
so on, and just asmetal, glass and rubber cross the boundary into an
automobile factory, so do the workers. It must be tractable to
measure the energy embodied in a hour of their work e if we cease
focussing only on physical objects and materials e since well-
developed analytical tools can be used for any factor of produc-
tion. However, evenwriters who in principle accept the energy cost
of labour as a category of indirect inputs often in the end ignore all
but metabolism: For Spreng, for instance, “proper accounting”
excludes energy input into labour unless “a special camp has to be
built to house workers. or where travel to work is exceptionally
long.” (1988, 138e140, 260e261).
Researchers of social metabolism, as well, have attested the
soundness, in principle, of explicitly counting the the wages sector:
Typically, only the technical infrastructure. is considered as
material stocks [and thus within the accounting system] and not
Table 1
Six categories of inputs into a painting. The direct and indirect labour-time and natural-resource preconditions for the production of a painting.
OUTPUT
(Q)a painting
Natural-resource INPUT (N) Labour INPUT (L) N-INPUTS into L
direct inputs Cell 1
weighable canvas, paint, frame;
utilisation energy during painting for light & heat etc.
Cell 3
time (hours) actually painting the painting
Cell 5 (direct)
artist’s food, water, etc. during painting;
required for metabolism, comfort
& muscular exertion
indirect inputs Cell 2
natural resources ‘cradle-to-grave’; N embodied in
atelier; ‘ecological rucksack’; transport; waste
Cell 4
time spent for ability to paint: health, education,
inspiration, rest; commuting
Cell 6 (indirect)
N-inputs for Cell 4 and during commuting;
lifestyle, afﬂuence, entertainment; willingness
to paint
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the. human and livestock populations. From a strict inpute
output perspective, this results in inconsistencies, and theoret-
ically this shows an ‘industrial’ bias that is hard to justify.
(Fischer-Kowalski and Hüttler, 1998, 116)
One must apparently not infer, though, that counting them renders
sector intensities more or less equal (Giampietro, 2006, 179).
Only one recent study, however, makes a full attempt to attri-
bute part of society’s primary energy supply to labour, counting
moreover much more than work-hour metabolism:
We argue that the energy associated with human labor must
include the energy of infrastructure in addition to that of food,
where infrastructure includes housing, transportation, health
care, etc. If deﬁned in this way, the energy use of labour can be
a signiﬁcant contributor to manufacturing energy use. (Zhang
and Dornfeld, 2006, 189e190)
Even after subtracting speciﬁcally industrial energy supply, the
authors must adjust the energy intensities of labour-intensive
processes upward: standard “process-based LCA would in fact
grossly underreport the environmental costs of a service or an
entirely handmade product” and exaggerate sector variance (192).
Only by applying a double standard can one count the utilisation
and embodied energy of the machine tool with which a machinist
works but not the (larger) amount of the machinist (189e190).
Before moving to further arguments for the maximalist position
please note that we must not re-invent the wheel. Classical
economics was well aware of hidden material inputs into services,
deconstructing the notion of ‘immaterial products’: doctors,
teachers, musicians or prostitutes require not only tools or places of
work but also material investments in themselves for upbringing,
education, housing, and entertainment.6 Furthermore, just as EIO-
LCA shows how services presuppose physical inputs, Mill listed the
labour inputs into a physical loaf of bread: bakers, millers, sowers,
reapers, carpenters, bricklayers, hedgers, ditchers, miners, smelters,
and transporters “so back to the origin of things” (1848, 31e32; also
Chapman,1974, 92). The inversequestionarises:Werewecomputing
the indirect labour inputs into goods,wouldwe ignore the labour put
into the transformation of rawmaterials and the fashioning of a ﬁnal
consmer object? Surely not, since transformation through labour is
a condition of a good’s or service’s price. Just as goods are not purely
material, neither are services pure labour.
We can also refer back to Leontief, in whose inputeoutput
matrices labour was endogenous (in monetary units as “wages and
salaries”/“capital and entrepreneurial services”) e an industry like
any other because the economy of households is like “the produc-
tion of an enterprise” (1936, 106e107; Table 5; 1951, 41e42). Only
the 1970s and 1980s departed from this practice, inﬂuenced
perhaps by the search for engineering responses to oil-supply
shocks, and the norm today is the full exogenisation of labour
and households as value added and ﬁnal demand (Wright, 1974;
Bullard and Herendeen, 1975; Hannon, 1982; Miller and Blair,
2009). To be sure, two workshops of the International Federation
of Institutes for Advanced Study in 1974 and 1975 debated exactly
which natural-resource costs of labour might be counted, but
without resolution (Spreng,1988,126). The default position became
to ignore them.
4.2. Hiring labour induces energy consumption
One early study retaining Leontief’s personal-consumption
column and employee-compensation row argued that individual
expenditures as well as inter-business ones “induce” energy effects
(Penn et al., 1976, 664e665). This is of course the most basic
argument for doing any embodied energy analysis at all, as
expressed clearly by Spreng who, after comparing energy
accounting in the 1970s to a gamewithout any rules, formulated an
abstract rule that “all the energy requirements necessary for the
operation of [an economic] activity” be counted, i.e., if the
“economic activity otherwise would not be done” (1988, 125e126,
137, 155). Since labour, and the activities of households/consumers,
are undeniably ‘economic’, and since full wages are a necessary
condition for labour’s being done, it should follow that we count
total rather than only intermediate expenditures. We should
furthermore attribute these energy requirements to labour. Again in
terms of willingness to work, would the labour be brought to
market had the labourer not commuted, had a good night’s rest,
pursued hobbies and looked forward to a holiday?
Another early study (Fluck and Baird, 1980, 100e105) was
maximalist in counting lifetime “lifestyle support energy., that
energy sequestered in the goods and services purchased by the
wages earned by working.” In contradiction to Wright (1974,
309e310) but in line with Cell 6, Table 1, the authors believe we
work for family members and leisure, not merely for muscular
energy, and counting only the exosomatically-powered machines
used by the worker is also not enough. For them the strengths of
this position outwiegh the danger of possible double-counting.
Røpke recently sympathised, suggesting that “the consumption of
food, shelter, education etc. could just as well be seen as interme-
diate products, and then the concept of ﬁnal consumption disap-
pears” (1999, 400). Consistent application of LCA logic would seem
to entail treating the consumer/earner as part of the analysed
system (Boustead, 1996, 150; see Appendix I).
In more economic terms the claim is that the energy used up
when a worker is hired to do X hours of labour is a proportion of
his or her lifetime energy consumption equal to the proportion of
these X hours to the worker’s total lifetime working hours. A
plausible proof of this is that if these costs were omitted, output
would be signiﬁcantly cheaper than it is. Using Puntí’s example,
counting metabolic energy per working hour but not even the
energy costs of producing food for this metabolism masks large
differences between, say, Andalusian manual/animal agriculture of
the 1940s and U.S. mechanised/fertilised agriculture of the 1970s
(1988, 80e83). Energy analysis of service sectors is in principle
difﬁcult with conventional EIO, and “if wages earned in the service
sector are the same or higher, then there is no reason to expect
a decrease in energy consumption” (82). Socio-economic context
matters.
Finally, it is an unrealistic result of EIO’s exclusion of induced
energy costs of labour that there is little or no environmental
Table 2
Three consumer choices. A breakdown e ﬁctitious but consistent with real intensity
estimatesae into the part of the $1000 going in the ﬁrst analysis of natural resources
and labour.



























Total price $1000 $1000 $1000
a Wright, 1974; Costanza, 1980; Hannon, 1982; Spreng, 1988; Druckman and
Jackson, 2009.
6 Say, 1803, 119e127, 301e319, 373; Mill, 1848, 154e159.
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difference in buying, at going wages, a painting from a Ghanan
artist and a U.S. artist; process analysis and to a lesser extent EIO
would yield similar material intensities. What’s more, the curious
policy implication is that for environmental reasons we should shift
our expenditures from, say, Ghana to the US, since richer countries
have lower MJ/$ ratios.7
4.3. Labour is produced
Herendeen succinctly sums up the two arguments above: just as
in the energy analysis of a car, “the energy consequences of the
labor force’s spending of its wages is as important as the energy
needed to make the steel” (1981, 616). The next concept deserving
separate attention is labour as a product: following Leontief, each
household is a factory producing (among other things) labour. This
requires, however, a consistently ecological approach to the human
economye inclusion of humans in the environment rather than the
separation associated with neo-classical economics.
Recalling the double standard discussed above, Ayres similarly
argued that if we regard “human labor as an independent primary
input e not an intermediate input”, an inconsistency arises:
if a handloom is replaced by a power-loom (capital), the energy
required to operate (and also to make, or replace) the power-
loom. is taken into account explicitly [but] economic theory
does not count the food, clothing, housing, and other
consumption byworkerse nor their education and traininge as
part of the cost of production. (2004, 431)
An EIO matrix including labour as an industry, and not separating
ﬁnal and intermediate demand, might well resolve this
inconsistency.
Assuming we do choose, supported by the above three argu-
ments, an expanded system, what then are the consequences of
shifting outlays to categories otherwise deemed to be more envi-
ronmentally friendly? In reality, since expenditure size is held
constant, the shift means buying more labour (or capital), and
Costanza’s (1980) empirical exercise conﬁrmed that therefore energy
consumption remains much higher than predicted by the narrower
matrix. Adding government and labour/household sectors to the 90
intermediate supply-and-demand sectors of the 1967 US economy
and correspondingly re-attributing energy inputs vastly reduced
intensity variationbetween sectors. Taking sector energy input as the
independent and sector dollar output as the dependent variable, the
measure of correlation R2 rose from about 0.55 to about 0.99.
4.4. Mill’s scissors e monetary vs. physical economics
Let us identify at least brieﬂy some apparent anomalies in the
use of monetary metrics in analysing physical impacts of produc-
tion and consumption. To draw environmental consequences from
structural economics by comparing sector intensities, one must
measure the relative sizes of L and N, requiring aggregate metrics
for them as numerators e a task known as Petty’s Problem.8 Yet
common physical units for labour and natural resources (as well as
for ‘goods and services’ in the output denominator) are impossible.
Forming and comparing intensities must therefore rely on prices e
monetary metrics e enabling quantiﬁcation of labour-hours/GDP
and natural-resources/GDP. Moreover, joules per dollar, or labour-
hours per dollar, cannot be added to input-dollars per output
dollar (Gilliland, 1975, 1051; Miller and Blair, 2009, 406). For this
reason Mill (Epigraph) denied that Petty’s Problem, in real terms,
makes sense.
Wright (1975, 34e35) noted the further problem for energy
accounting that although labour and proﬁts are not included in
counting energy inputs, because they are excluded from the total
requirements matrix, they are part of commodities’ prices. Another
anomaly arises concerning a $1000 gift. Similar to our earlier ques-
tions concerning a Goldsworthy artwork involving only the re-
arrangement of natural objects, it would be counted in the GDP
income accounts but would not fall into any industrial sector e no
product or material is bought from the recipient. Environmental
impact is implied, however, in the fact that the $1000 was earned by
productive activity. In both these examples, in any case, it should be
clearerwhat is exogenous andwhatendogenous. It is even ironic that
the structural change strategy begins with consumer responsibility
for household expenditures, a category outside the intermediate
matrix.
Further analytical difﬁculties arise concerning the primary
energy sectors. When tracing environmental ﬂows through
monetary proxies the energy intensities of primary energy sectors
themselves are so high they must be treated, unsatisfactorily, as
outliers (Costanza, 1980; Spreng, 1988, 146). What’s more,
payments for primary energy at the wellhead, say, actually consist
fully of payments to people as wages, proﬁts and rents. These of
course eventually appear exogenously as household income or
value added, but natural resources themselves have no bank
account and literally receive nothing, entering the physical trans-
action matrix with positive values but the monetary matrix for free
(Gilliland, 1975, 1053). Purchases from these sectors would thus
logically belong to value added and fall outside the boundaries of
the conventional EIO matrix.
For illustration let us pursue Suh’s observation that while
services are allegedly material-free, each dollar spent in the U.S. in
service sectors includes about twenty-ﬁve cents for purchases from
the non-service sectors manufacturing, utilities, transport (2006,
6560). These $0.25 expenditures in the manufacturing sectors
would in turn contain a percentage going to labour, and so on until
we see that an expenditure is entirely attributable to personal
income. But if all are ultimately wages, proﬁts and rents, and
natural resources and labour-hours are physically incommensu-
rable, how can one establish that a given good-or-service costing
$1000 is caused to certain percentages by labour or nature? All is
nature, all is labour or: with his scissors analogy Mill was sug-
gesting that we cannot compare labour and natural-resource
intensities at all.
5. Arguments against including labour
Why, then, should the consumer be responsible only for the
environmental consequences of the non-labour, inter-industry
parts of an expenditure? Two reasons have emerged in the litera-
ture: reluctance to regard labour, and thus people, as produced; and
the intricacies of double-counting.
5.1. People are produced
It seems at least internally consistent to regard output bought by
households as input into the members of the households, and thus
into their hours of labour. To accept this analytical framework,
however, one must be willing to regard people themselves as sus-
tained and even produced by economic processes, presuming
7 In $ of purchasing power parity (PPP), a Bolivian (8.8 MJ/$) should spend in
Argentina (5.0 MJ/$), a Chinese (8.4/$) in Germany (5.9/$), a Togoan (12.6/$) in
Switzerland (4.2/$), a Bulgarian (10.9/$) in the U.K. (4.6/$) and a Jamaican (15.5/$) in
the U.S. (8.0/$) (IEA, 2010; EIA, 2010; CAIT, 2010).
8 Classical economics‘ standard example was a watch spring, the price of which
was perhaps 90% labour, 10% metal. Finding an aggregate physical unit for all
natural resources is a separate problem.
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a normative or cultural judgement on the “propriety of removing
humans from their ‘controlling’ position outside the economy and
making them endogenous.” (Costanza and Herendeen, 1984, 157).
When treating households exactly as any other industry, Leontief
had similarly urged us to discard our “psychological resistance to
this type of approach e due to memories of ill-conceived subsis-
tence cost theories of wages.” (1951, 41).
As Puntí observes, this is Marx’s uncontested concept of the
reproduction of the labourer, who had to be produced, physiolog-
ically maintained and, for example, trained e entailing natural-
resource costs (1988, 81e82; also Hall et al., 1986, 107). Labour
does not fall exogenously from heaven but is a function of previous
labour and natural resources. The classical concept was the ‘natural
price of labour’ in terms of real physical inputs.9
While this perspective is out of fashion in economics, it is not
fully unknown within environmental accounting, e.g. in Kauf-
mann’s concept of energy “used to produce and support factors of
production (e.g., labor and capital)” (1992, 53e54). The basic
principle has also re-emerged more recently in the concept of the
environmental consequences of having a child (Hall et al., 1994; Shi,
2003). Murtaugh and Schlax (2009) even performed an environ-
mental impact analysis for the act of reproduction, estimating
natural-resource consumption induced throughout several gener-
ations. Another recent study used the Japanese EIO category of
a “labor coefﬁcient vector [representing] the number of workers
needed for a unit of total output” e analogous to a vector showing
per sector amounts of MJs (Nansai et al., 2007, 882). In the study
treating labour thus as produced led to the unique ﬁnding that
shifting to low-environmental-impact commodities would reduce
employment, in contradiction to the usual view that shifts in
spending to low-impact sectors help combat unemployment.
(883e884) In sum, endogenising households/labour requires
a normative break with current philosophy.
5.2. Double-counting
Agreement reigns on how much energy a nation consumes,
measured either physically or by its price; it is only accounting
systems that are in dispute. Therefore Costanza (1982) answered
Huettner’s (1982) objection that including labour must double-
count energy by noting that the additional labour and govern-
ment sectors required merely a bookkeeping redistribution of
energy e in the case of labour proportional to the proportion of
employee compensation to total ﬁnancial outlays. The number of
industries or sectors varies anyway among national accounts
systems, requiring redistribution done successfully without
double-counting. Similar criticism by Herendeen (1981) led to
a joint paper by Costanza and Herendeen (1984) showing that the
two new endogenous rows (sectors) received joules no longer
attributed to the conventional sectors; the system, not the amount
of energy, had been expanded.10
While not as sanguine about double-counting as Leontief (1936,
111) or Ayres, for whom it is “a no no” only occurring in the ﬁrst
place only because economics regards labour only as an input but
not an output (2004, 431e432), this paper can only hint at formal
solutions. Within EIO, one could partition each conventional inter-
industry cell into 1) wages and salaries and 2) all eslse paid on to
other ﬁrms. This parallels the treatment of “secondary production”
where each cell contains information on two “products” (Miller
and Blair, 2009,140e143; Wright, 1974, 309; Bailey et al., 2004).
In his endogenous labour services row Leontief analogously debi-
ted each industry with wages and salaries (1936, 112, 126). Alter-
natively, Zhang & Dornfeld merely deduct already-counted
industrial primary energy supply from total consumed joules,
implying perhaps that conventional EIO must under-count (2006,
189e190).
Other possible templates include the “by-product correction
method” (Strømman et al., 2009) and “disaggregating industry
sectors” by subtracting energy values in the non-labour part to
avoid double-counting (Suh and Huppes, 2005, 691e692) e the
opposite of Leontief's “consolidation of accounts” (1936, 108). For
example $30 for a meal in a restaurant buys not only physical food
prepared in a physical kitchen and served at a table on plates, but
also the services of the cook, dishwasher and waiter. “When more
than one product is produced, the environmental loadings are
distributed among the product studied and its by-products or other
secondary functions, according to certain rules of allocation”
(Tillman et al., 1994, 23). We must only be willing to perceive
working hours as produced. Appendix II shows rudimentary
construction of such tables.
6. Discussion
Evidence referenced in the Introduction points to a shift in many
economies to more labour-intensive service sectors; since 1992 for
example the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors have on
average grown respectively 1.0, 2.6 and 3.0% per year (OECD, 2008;
alsoHannon,1982, 276). However, several studies taking this change
in consumption patterns as the independent variable, while holding
expenditure level constant, have found no correlated reduction in
resource depletion or pollution (Wright,1974, 314; Vringer and Blok,
2000; Alfredsson, 2004). Brookes (1972) even showed cross-country
correlation between high services proportions of GDP and high
energy/GDP ratios; energy/GDP ratios were moreover higher than
energy/industrial-output ones. Holm & Englund similarly found for
up to 139 nations a positive correlation between “per capita energy
use and the proportion of GDP that can be attributed to the service
sector.” (2009, 884; also York et al., 2005,150). General time trends
show moreover no dematerialisation, neither absolutely, nor per
unit of GDP, nor per capita under roughly $26,000 (Luzzati and
Orsini, 2009; also Smil, 2008, 243, 338; DOE, 2009). Since these
correlations are necessarily inconclusive, all that can be said is that
the theory that natural-resource consumption is a function of the
size of expenditures, not their type, better explains the data. At least
it seems incumbent upon EIO-based theory to name the factors that
do drive resource consumption, counter-acting the claimed
conservation effect of structural change.
Perhaps the language of EIO-LCA should be revisited, employ-
ing as it does a discourse largely in physical terms: material inputs,
products and processes, goods, commodities, equipment, tons of
steel or chemicals. While this is appropriate for product or process
analysis, it seems lacking for comparison of expenditures of
constant size and analysis of whole socio-economic systems (see
Tillman et al., 1994, 21, 28). Even if the vocabulary of structural
change shows a bias towards treating services as somehow
immaterial it is to be welcomed that energy accounting is
“changing focus from commodity to services” (Robèrt et al., 2002,
200) e services deﬁned in the ﬁrst place by their high percentage
of labour costs.
Finally, if including labour is realistic and if, correspondingly,
environmental intensities of sectors or expenditures do not
signiﬁcantly vary, there are far-reaching consequences in research
areas depending on environmental-intensity concepts as
9 Ricardo, 1817, 93e94; Malthus, 1820, 130, 113e114, 177e182, 250e252;
McCulloch, 1825, 115; Mill, 1848, 33e35, 245.
10 Herendeen later puzzlingly decided that “Labor and government services are
assumed to have zero energy intensity relative to the consumer”, the justiﬁcation
being “to avoid double-counting” (1998, 172). The issue haunts the debate.
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conventionally computed. In addition to the structural change
strategy these include:
1. speciﬁcally targeting consumption ‘clusters’ in the ﬁeld of
sustainable consumption (Spangenberg and Lorek, 2002;
Druckman and Jackson, 2009);
2. shifting taxes revenue-neutrally onto natural resources from
labour (Common and Stagl, 2005, 419, 434);
3. computing, on the basis of an income effect, relatively low
energy-efﬁciency rebound because marginal expenditures will
likely be less energy intensive (Binswanger, 2001, 126);
4. bookkeeping for UNFCCC country inventories that takes the
energy intensities of exports and imports into account (Helm
et al., 2007, 20e21; Peters, 2008);
5. the European Communities’ Integrated Product Policy (Kerkhof
et al., 2009, 1167).
In light of these implications it is hoped this paper will draw
critical examination.
7. Conclusions
We are led by conventional methods of quantifying implied
natural-resource consumption per expenditure of a given size to
believe that $1000 spent on a concert or painting impacts the
environment less than $1000 spent on a ﬂight or a set of cast-iron
garden furniture. This paper’s analysis of the alternative method of
regarding labour as a product requiring natural-resource inputs
casts doubt on this. Perhaps no such expenditure is less environ-
mentally intensive than another. Keeping in mind Environmental
InputeOutput (EIO) analysis’s goal of reducing natural-resource
depletion, the paper argues for adding labour as an inputeoutput
category and holding consumers responsible for the natural-
resource consumption entailed by labour’s total wages.
For environmental strategy it matters greatly whether the
inputeoutput bookkeeping system attributes no natural-resource
consumption to a work-hour, as in conventional EIO, or pro-rates
one’s total lifetime consumption to that hour, as here suggested.
Since shifting expenditures to sectors computed to have higher
labour intensity entails correspondingly greater indirect resource
use e for households to produce labour-hours e the case is
strengthened for consuming and producing less, rather than merely
differently. While it is widely accepted that at least metabolism,
working-clothes, commuting and energyembodied in theworkplace
could be atttributed to labour as such, this cannot be done if the EIO
system used to rank economic sectors according to their environ-
mental intensity lacks a labour sector in theﬁrst place. An alternative
matrix, with a labour sector receiving its share of resource
consumption, reveals that the economic sectors of national accounts
differ practically not at all in energy intensity (Costanza, 1980).
Indeed, since labour and resource inputs are commensurable only if
monetarymetrics are adopted,Millwasmoreoverprobablycorrect in
saying that labour or resource intensities cannot, in real terms, be
compared at all.
While much empirical evidence shows strong correlation
between GDP and resource use/pollution, there seems to be none
between observed structural change to environmentally ‘less
intense’ sectors and lower resource use/pollution e results better
explained by amodel wherein hiring labour at the rate necessary for
the labourer to bewilling towork entails consumption at the average
level of the society. The paper has therefore pursued a debate trun-
cated in the 1980s over exactly which indirect resource inputs into
production should be included to best guide conservation strategy
and concludes that wemust choose between the painless strategy of
shifting expenditures and the tougher one of less absolute resource
consumption, achieved either voluntarily or by caps or taxes.
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Appendix I. Countable inputs to labour
If we accept labour (row) and households (column) as additional
sectors or industries in an inter-industry matrix, what embodied
natural-resource inputs could we count? Imagine a pure ‘service’
(labour) sector of receptionists or masseurs. Most items are taken
from the literature, and the list moves from the minimal to the
maximal ends of a spectrum.
1. Basic metabolism (desk job)
2. Physical exertion (carpenter, athlete)
3. Workplace: building, heating, lighting, water
4. Commuting
5. Special (e.g. protective) clothing
6. Education and training
7. Sleep in a house
8. Bodily repair and care (teethbrushing, haircut, medical care,
holiday)
9. Fun, psychological repair and care (games, books, art, religion)
10. Furniture, cutlery, briefcase
11. Beauty (clothes, body, landscape, ﬂowerbeds)
12. Tools (hammer, laptop)
13. Offspring
14. Institutions (physical infrastructure, laws, government, charity)
Part of any payment recorded in EIO goes directly for wages and
salaries; for the same reason that steel entering a factory is
‘accountable for’ its embodied energy, paying a wage entails
a worker’s total embodied energy. How many of the listed items
should be counted? A reasonable rule is that if what a wage
purchases is a necessary condition for an hour’s work to be done, it
should be counted andmoreover attributed to thewages part of the
expenditure.
Appendix II. Incorporating a labour sector into inputeoutput
tables
Tables 3e5 show radically simpliﬁed transactions matrices with
inputs andoutputs inenergyunits. Table3 isa conventional tablewith
only 2 sectors. Table 4 divides each cell (arbitrarily) in half, the lower
ﬁgure attributed to labour and the upper to all other deliveries to or
inputs into the sector and measuring embodied energy convention-
ally. Parallel to standard treatment of joint products, this treats joint
inputs and applies Herendeen’s insight that “every economic sector
pays wages. and these expenditures are a large fraction. of the
total”. (1981, 617). Table 5 alternatively attributes these quantities to
thenewrowandnewcolumnentitled ‘labour’whosecells canbeseen
as quantities previously exogenous e the ‘employee compensation’
part of value added and the ‘household consumption’ part of ﬁnal
demand. Energy outputs equal energy inputs; they are re-distributed
rather than counted again. If the treatment of primary energy sectors
can be resolved, future work should update Costanza’s (1980) simi-
larly expanded matrix e where net output is not GDP but capital
formation e using real, international data.
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There has always been something rather refreshing in the view that we should live 
like the birds, and perhaps posterity is for the birds in more senses than one; so 
perhaps we should all call it a day and go out and pollute something cheerfully. As 
an old taker of thought for the morrow, however, I cannot quite accept this solution; 
and I would argue, furthermore, that tomorrow is not only very close, but in many 
respects it is already here. 
                                                              -- Kenneth Boulding (1966) 
 
Part 1   Development of my work 
1.1   Introduction 
   My academic interest in what turned out to be ecological sustainability arose 
slowly as I engaged in ‘green’ political action from about 1980 onward. Locally the 
issues were less traffic, better air, more recycling, preservation of old houses and 
the de-sterilisation of public green. As a Greenpeace activist I worked on over-
fishing, nuclear waste and danger, air quality, sustainable forestry, less transport, 
and weaning off fossil fuels. I became aware that sooner or later individuals and our 
productive economic system will have to adjust to a state of increased resource 
scarcity and a steady-state (non-growing) economy. 
   The writings of Herman Daly put my crude perceptions into an overview. I had for 
instance asked myself, ‘What if 1.3 billion Chinese lived (materially) like even I do, a 
relatively low-income Swiss person?’ Daly conceptualised the quantitative limits to 
natural resources and natural pollution sinks; limits to technological efficiency 
increases; protection of non-human animals; limits to human population size; 
poisons in the environment; the distinction between renewable and non-renewable 
resources; quality of life; the rights of future people; and the material-energy 
throughput of the human economy, i.e. its inputs plus its outputs, including what we 
anthropocentrically call ‘waste’. See Table 1. 
   I soon chose to define ‘sustainable’ to characterise human (economic) activity that 
can continue forever – in Aldo Leopold’s phrase “in the longest run”. At the end of 
the 1980s Daly, Kenneth Boulding, Joan Martinez-Alier and like-minded scientists 
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chose the name ‘ecological economics’ for this new school of thought, but ‘human 
ecology’ would have done just as well. 
input good-or-service output 
rubber, plastic, cloth, leather, 
metal 
sneakers stuff in landfill or incinerator 
“cog” (coal, oil, gas) heated room high-entropy heat 
silicon, energy glass waste heat, waste water, shards 
fertiliser, water, sun food dispersed (e.g.) phosphorus, 
straw, excrement  
iron, coal steel beam rust, scrap, waste water 
metal, grease, fuel engine noise, waste heat, scrap, fats 
wood, bricks, mirror, metal haircut hair, light, heat, waste water 
 
Table 1: Input + output = throughput; inputs deplete, outputs pollute, goods-and-services 
provide utility. It is the scale of current throughput that can be too big for the planetary 
biosphere and for preserving resources for future humans and other species. It is 
throughput that must ‘de-grow’, not utility or even GDP. 
   Future people who cannot now vote, and other species, are the essence of the 
ethical concept of sustainability. Preserving resources and a productive natural 
environment is the pre-condition of future well-being. At current economic scale 
present people must therefore limit some combination of their numbers and their 
throughput per capita. While it might be just as stupid to sit freezing on a pile of coal 
as to use it all up, in light of its exhaustibility and our ethical obligation to bequeath a 
sufficiently good world to future people, we must do without some of this resource 
input. If we grasp this principle and prepare for a life with fewer ‘energy slaves’, for 
instance, we will be emotionally and technically ready at the onset of either 
politically-decided or naturally-occurring scarcity.1 
   It appeared that many or perhaps most people behave according to some 
combination of not caring that much about future people (or non-human animals) 
and caring about a comfortable, even prestigious, high-throughput lifestyle. A row of 
questions thus emerged: 
                                            
1
 The Transition Town movement does exactly this. 
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1. What do psychology and anthropology tell us about the human actors who are being 
asked to live sustainably? What are the chances for a voluntary shift to greater 
frugality? 
2. Does the more efficient consumption of resources really contribute to less resource 
consumption and throughput? 
3. How can human population size be kept no higher than a sustainable level, and 
what is that level? 
4. Do lower fertility and living more frugally require political action over and above 
voluntary efforts of living by example, explaining and cajoling? 
5. Must we politically and democratically agree to let ourselves be legally forced – as 
with for example the income tax and sending our kids to school – to reach a 
sustainable number of people times resources consumed by each? 
The formula I = PAT says that the quantity of (negative) environmental impacts I 
(depletion and pollution, i.e. throughput) depends on (1) the number of impacters P 
(population), (2) their average per capita goods-and-services consumption A 
(affluence), and (3) throughput per unit of goods-and-services as an efficiency ratio 
T (technology). Table 2 classifies my submitted papers accordingly. 
paper # Impact Population Affluence Technology Politics 
  1 Rae & Veblen   X   
  2 Jevons’ Paradox    X  
  3 Sufficiency Strategy   X   
  4 Classical Economics    X  
  5 Rebound methodology    X  
  6 Caps vs indirect paths X     
  7 Job Guarantee     X 
  8 Mill’s Scissors   X X  
  9 Population Matters  X   X 
10 Spaceship Earth X    X 
11 Rebound Germany    X X 
 
Table 2 Classification of submitted papers. Shows the main topic(s) covered by each paper 
classified according to I = f(P,A,T) and an added ‘Politics’ column. Papers 10 & 11 are in 
German; see ‘Additional work…’ above, p 5. 
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1.2   Evolutionary psychology (paper 1, ‘Rae and Veblen’) 
   I read quite a bit of evolutionary psychology mainly in order to solve problems in 
my personal life, e.g. relations with others, attitude towards work and play, feelings 
of guilt, generosity, envy or self-esteem. It seemed that our evolutionary endowment 
– more or less hard-wired yet amenable, within limits, to our surroundings – enables 
us to predict certain environmentally relevant behaviours such as: 
 procreation as an individual choice 
 high levels of material consumption 
 need for cosmetics 
 meat-eating 
 a short time horizon in making practical and ethical decisions. 
Tribalism and wars between tribes are also relevant to throughput because they 
constitute production and destruction (consumption), yielding a perverse kind of 
utility and requiring repeated production or replacement. On the other hand we 
seem to have inherited inclinations towards: 
 intra-human co-operation 
 love and aesthetic appreciation of nature (including other animals) 
 workmanship 
 giving our offspring a beautiful and productive world 
 Kant’s ‘moral law within’ (a desire to in some sense be good). 
From this large pile of topics I chose to look more closely at consumption over and 
above that necessary for a life that is physiologically sufficient and even 
comfortable. 
   Out of this came paper 1, distilled out of a long treatise covering everything from 
bower birds to trophy wives and huge, shiny public works. I looked first at previous 
work on ‘prestige’, ‘competitive’, ‘conspicuous’ or simply ‘over-’ consumption – 
relevant to today’s subdiscipline of ‘sustainable consumption’. This led to Thorstein 
Veblen (1899), John Rae (1835) and, some time after writing the paper, Jean-
Baptiste Say (1803). 
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   The meta-issue of the value of such history of thought is beyond my ken, except 
that it seems one way of clarifying concepts and finding the logic necessary to 
approach questions. Paper 1 is thus either literature review or intellectual history. 
(Papers 2 and 4 are likewise histories of thought.) 
   Paper 1 looked at tendencies in our evolved behaviour for (1) survival/comfort and 
(2) procreation, leading directly and indirectly, respectively, to a higher-consuming 
lifestyle. While the question of why we seek status in the first place seems under-
researched, I built on or at least described the specific, almost universally observed 
sociological tie between status and visible, verifiable wealth (hence Veblen’s 
phrases conspicuous consumption and conspicuous waste). The unsurprising 
phenomenon of lifestyles that are opulent rather than ‘sufficient’ is however the 
driver of high per capita throughput. I myself never undertook empirical 
measurement of people’s motivations for what I came to call, under the influence of 
the peacocks, colours, antlers, bowers and rich human males, display consumption. 
One under-used framework for this researched is that of Darwin’s (1871) inter- and 
intra-sex sexual selection. In general, if people are to be convinced to vote for 
painful cuts in their affluence, we need better understanding of the evolution of our 
emotions. 
1.3   The efficiency cure-all (paper 2, ‘Jevons’ Paradox’) 
   As embodied in the book Factor Four (von Weizsäcker et al., 1997), it became 
axiomatic for politics, journalism, green thinking and academic writing to propound 
policies for increasing such input efficiency or, alternatively, finding substitutes for 
scarce or harmful inputs (e.g. windmills instead of oil, amounting as well to an 
increase in oil efficiency). In 1998 during a period when I attended ecological 
economics conferences as an interested layman I met Christer Sanne, whose article 
two years later, in a special issue of Energy Policy on the rebound effect, caught my 
eye. It mentioned Jevons’ Paradox: the more efficient consumption of a natural 
resource (a higher output-input ratio in any process requiring it) might even lead to 
more consumption of that resource than would be the case without the efficiency 
increase. This counterintuitive insight seemed well worth pursuing, and I turned to 
Jevons’ 1865 book. 
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   Research on Jevons’ Paradox and energy-efficiency rebound remains to this day 
largely theoretical. Empirical research has been mostly micro-economic, limited to 
certain sectors and countries, and thus mournfully inconclusive; researchers for and 
against ‘Jevons’ heatedly resorted to counter-factual formulations when depicting 
the macro-economic results of technological efficiency increases, and many micro-
researchers publicly declared it impossible to trace demand changes in all sectors 
following increases in efficiency in any particular sector. 
   Under the sway of the dominant sociological-academic paradigm which assumed 
that engineering (per-unit-of-output) savings must be real, the research entailed the 
study of marginal consumers, price elasticities of supply and demand, and the 
efficiency elasticities of prices. The paradigm required that rebound, rather than 
resource savings, be demonstrated. However, I’ve since concluded that the reverse 
would be correct: observable, uncontested technological efficiency increases have 
for decades been accompanied at macro level by observable, uncontested resource 
consumption increases, a prima facie empirical situation that shifts the burden of 
proof onto the anti-Jevons position. But perhaps because of the strong and 
seductive hope that efficiency offers a painless road to conservation, hundreds of 
researchers started with the plausibility of the theory that theoretically possible 
‘engineering’ savings would actually be realised by human economic actors 
themselves constantly increasing in number. 
   I only later realised that Jevons’ opinion – that rebound is greater than 100%, i.e. 
that efficiency increases ‘backfire’ in terms of conservation – is not relevant for 
environmental policy: as rebound reaches even say 80 or 90%, efficiency policies 
become cost-ineffective. Thus Jevons’ very difficult paradox, while fascinating, 
diverted research from policy relevance. 
   Figure 1 shows the rebound research question from a broad social-science view. 
Through technological efficiency increase2 an amount of the newly more efficiently 
used natural resource lies temporarily fallow – temporarily: for oil in the international 
                                            
2
 Taking a simple natural resource, labour production function Q = f(N,L) the analogous situation 
holds for labour (work-time) inputs: if economies of scale, factory-floor rationalisation or machine 
power and knowledge raise labour efficiency, a certain amount of work-time lies for one instant 
fallow; we could save this input by working less and consuming the same amount of goods-and-
services. But we usually choose to work the same length of time and consume more goods-and-
services. For labour inputs all analysts and historians agree with Jevons. 
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market for perhaps one instant, in the case of somebody’s private wood-lot perhaps 
a few months. If the cost of supplying the resource – the supply function – remains 
constant, and if the price of the resource doesn’t fall enough that it lowers profits so 
much that some suppliers quit supplying, the same amount of the resource as 
before remains for sale. Economic history shows that some combination of more 
people and more per capita goods-and-services has meant the ‘fallow’ amount has 
been snapped up. But must it be? Paper 6 also contains an elaboration of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Fallow resources  Does an increasing world population desiring comfort, 
perhaps luxury, or just to rise out of poverty, leave the fallow resource untouched?  
   To answer this question we should look not only to economics but also to 
psychology, anthropology and history. We should not look to engineering science, 
which can only calculate the per-unit changes in the efficiency ratio but not the post-
efficiency reactions of consumers. An empirical route is also open, but, due to 
globalisation and the ‘leakage’ of embodied imported material and energy, only at 
world rather than sector or country or group-of-countries scale. (Alcott & Marangi, 
under review) Only recently, more than thirty years after Brookes’ and Khazzoom’s 
work,3 is a consensus emerging that not only is it invalid to assume a one-to-one 
proportion between theoretically possible ‘engineering savings’ and real savings, but 
that rebound is high enough to warrant measures to ‘counteract’ rebound, namely 
necessarily effective resource caps and/or taxes. (Madlener & Alcott, 2011) 
                                            
3
 Not referenced here because ubiquitously referenced in my papers. 
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   As searches for policy advice Papers 2, 4 and 5 were thus questionable: policy 
tools have always been on the table (caps and taxes) that are by definition effective, 
raising the question of the rationale for efficiency policy and the painstaking, 
methodologically difficult calculation first of efficiency increase, then rebound. That 
is, for effective policy there is no need to compute rebound, and studying efficiency 
is relevant only for the task of showing voters that possible increases are large 
enough to save a considerable amount of our material standard of living. (Similarly, 
showing the potential of renewables tells the voter: within the newly restricted fossil-
fuel budget renewables are capable of delivering a certain level of goods-and-
services.) It is scientifically non-controversial that caps and taxes do the 
‘sustainability job’. It is only the hope that efficiency might also be a sufficient 
condition for real input savings, and a much less painful one than caps, that lends 
the study of rebound any apparent policy relevance. 
1.3.1   My MPhil dissertation4 looked at some governments’ evaluations of their 
energy policies, including efficiency policy. With very minor exceptions rebound was 
at most briefly acknowledged in principle but treated as zero. In 2009 I asked a top 
employee of the Swiss Bundesamt für Energie about this; I’d just had to point out to 
him the distinction between direct and total rebound. He replied that until they know 
an exact percentage for rebound, they will ignore it. I argued that this is scientifically 
irresponsible and suggested we enter a co-efficient of 0.5 for total (macro-economic) 
rebound (real savings = 50% of engineering savings). To my mind this was a 
reasonable bridge between academic uncertainties and the exigencies of lowering 
depletion and pollution. 
 
1.4   Sufficiency rebound (paper 3, ‘The sufficiency strategy’) 
   To the extent that sufficiency – voluntarily doing without a certain amount either of 
a natural resource or of goods-and-services – temporarily lowers demand and thus 
price, there is also a sufficiency rebound. Marginal consumers and an increasing 
population replace the environmentally-motivated ones who, for the sake of a 
sustainable economy, lower their ecological footprint. Even if people would change 
                                            
4
 2006, http://www.blakealcott.org/pdf/Masters%20Dissertation.pdf  
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their high-consumption behaviour – some difficulties of which were investigated in 
paper 1 – the problem remains that if the supply schedule remains unchanged, 
latent demand springs into the breach, consuming the temporarily fallow-lying 
resource. Paper 3 describes this rebound in economic terms and criticises other 
aspects of the currently en vogue ‘sustainable consumption’ discourse, primarily the 
alleged disjunct between happiness and consumption. At any rate, the path of 
sufficiency does not necessarily lead to lower impact, and one can again with good 
reason ask how this discourse is at all relevant to the environmental task. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Consumer Society  The sustainable-consumption strategy assumes over-
consumption as both a societal and a personal ‘bad’. 
 
1.5   Efficiency rebound again (papers 4 & 5, Earthscan and Energy) 
   Also dealing with rebound are paper 4 (book chapter on classical economics’ 
bearing on Jevons’ Paradox) and paper 5 (methods for measuring rebound). 
Concerning the former, the study of pre-Jevons political economy was rewarding to 
a degree I can’t overstate, and enabled me to identify the basic chain of concepts 
needed in rebound discussion: 
 What is technological efficiency (productivity)? 
 What is output? 
 What are the price effects of efficiency increases? 
 What is the ‘societal’ income effect? 
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 What general preconditions are conducive to high rebound? 
 What would satiation and indolence mean for rebound’s size? 
 What is backfire (rebound > 100%), what new products can efficiency 
increase lead to? 
 What effect does technological efficiency increase have on population size? 
 What does the study of labour-efficiency rebound tell us? 
The writers from Sir William Petty through John Stuart Mill were not concerned with 
overall resource conservation or with pollution but with overall growth and 
entrepreneurial profit. If we identify two sources of profit in classical economics – 
‘expansion of the market’ and ‘productivity’ increases – it seems that the new 
paradigm of sustainability means an end to the former source. Under great tension, 
a fundamental shift is also perceptible from an economics focussed on macro 
growth and micro profit, in markets as free as possible, to one subordinating both 
producers and consumers to collective regulation of throughput (caps, taxes, or 
sector-wide standards). Jevons understood this fully; bitter-sweetly, Britain’s days of 
greatness would have to end. 
 
Figure 3: The Coal Question  William Stanley Jevons in 1865 predicted increased coal 
production alongside increased efficiency in using coal. 
   Concerning paper 5, in contemporary rebound research I found the lack of 
definitions alarming and the focus on direct rebound limiting. The smaller literature 
adopting the macro approach used econometric models not open to inspection, or 
for instance incorrectly treated population and GDP as exogenous, causal variables. 
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But extensive reading also shows that the final word has not been spoken. I suspect 
the metaphor of a ‘race’ between efficiency and GDP is misleading because it 
implies that efficiency increase’s causal arrow does point towards less input 
consumption. At any rate, much better models of energy consumption are needed: If 
efficiency increase does cause real net savings, what opposing factors do cause the 
uncontested rise in consumption? They must even be strong enough to compensate 
for efficiency’s alleged consumption-reducing effect. 
 
1.6   I = f(P, A, T) (paper 6, ‘Impact caps’) 
   I am aware of criticisms of this formula for quantifying environmental impact. I 
defend it, however (see Section 1.10), as a powerful way to taxonomise 
environmental approaches, strategies, and policies as illustrated by Table 2. A key 
development in my work is that I saw that while left-side policies must work, right-
side ones might not, due to interdependencies, due to simultaneous equations 
whose results, because of rebounds, most likely cancel each other out. See Figure 
4. Thus a process of elimination led to the conclusion that academic energy would 
better be invested in describing, designing and arguing for the left-side measures 
that are by definition environmentally effective: caps and/or taxes. 
   Paper 6 sketches six inter- and three intra-factor dependencies among P, A, and 
T, and concludes that computing each one and designing policies to counteract 
each rebound is cost-ineffective in terms of intellectual and labour effort compared 
to direct left-side measures. The paper also criticises the bottom-up/top-down 
dichotomy common in the literature (pursued in paper 9) – and suggests that we 
move away from individual, voluntary approaches at the level of firms and 
households towards an institutional or political approach whereby a majority of 
voters decides whether to change laws. (van den Bergh, 2010, p 542) The motto is 
‘I will if you also have to’ or, catchier, ‘I will if you will’. Both producers and 





Figure 4: Classification of strategies  Starting with right-side policies only might be the 
tail wagging the dog. For structural change see paper 8. 
 
1.7   Unemployment (paper 7, ‘Job Guarantee’) 
   A steady-state economy is consistent with full employment (paid work for all who 
want it) because the employment rate is a social, political decision, not (only) a 
function of market forces or the size of the economy or its growth, stagnation or 
shrinkage. Lack of paid work is not synonymous with lack of enough purchasing 
power to live well, and the two should not be conflated; it is a psychological and 
social problem in its own right. Societies adopt various indirect policies to decrease 
unemployment: job brokering, abolition or lowering of legal minimum wages, 
retraining, deficit spending (usually for public works), etc. However, a direct policy is 
available (and existent in India and Argentina): a Job Guarantee with the state either 
as employer of last resort or as subsidiser of private-sector jobs. This role for the 
state has far-reaching and largely uninvestigated effects on the private sector and 
its job market. But it boldly delivers full employment. 
   The general issue is the economics not only of sustainable scale but of social 
justice. (Daly, 1992) On their interrelations my work is unfortunately mostly silent. 
For instance, is the availability of a continually growing supply of cheap labour a 
necessary condition for the increasing scale of throughput?5 Or, are disputes over 
                                            
5
 Gratitude to my supervisor, Giovanni Baiocchi, for reminding me of this and other related issues. 
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the just distribution of river and aquifer waters, for instance in historic Palestine, 
perhaps drivers of their unsustainable use – not to mention the demographic race in 
that same country.6 Returning to jobs – once one arrives at the opinion that a 
steady-state economy is good and/or eventually unavoidable, and that reaching it 
requires degrowth (economic shrinkage or ‘contraction’), and that in most 
economies degrowth means loss of jobs, this issue becomes acute for reasons of 
justice and psychological well-being. To convince voters to accept a degrowing 
economy, moreover, an answer to the problem of jobs is essential. Paper 7 
suggests a paradigm shift rendering the employment rate no longer dependent on 
the growth or size of the economy but rather on social decisions. 
 
1.8   The structural-change strategy (paper 8, ‘Mill’s Scissors’) 
   We can distinguish between two types of economics. One is intra-human, dealing 
with the just and economically (Pareto) efficient distribution of resources and 
purchasing power once goods and services have been produced. It deals with 
capital, interest, wages, transaction costs, social justice and poverty alleviation. The 
other deals with production, with the interface between the human and natural-
resource spheres. Some call it ‘biophysical’ economics. 
   Paper 8 surprised me, over the three years of its writing, by raising a question: 
Can biophysical economics be done quantitatively at all? Re-reading the classical 
economists while researching papers 2, 4 and 6, I kept running into Petty’s 
Problem, a conundrum that has repeatedly plagued the history of economic thought. 
About 8 people reviewed the paper, some of whom were outraged, some of whom 
rejoiced. The questions the paper tries to answer have to do with basic economic 
theory after the decline of classical economics in the last decades of the 19th 
century. The paper’s conclusion, that expenditures of the same amount do not differ 
in environmental impact, has far-reaching consequences. 
   The structural change strategy falls into the A category of I = PAT, urging changes 
in consumer, rather than producer, behaviour; because it does not ask us to 
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consume less, just differently, there is to be no decline in affluence. As with 
efficiency, impact is to painlessly fall. Buy a ticket for a tennis tournament (see 
Figure 5) instead of an airline ticket, and voilà. On a hunch that this might not be 
right, and encouraged by an earlier, ignored macroeconomic paper (Costanza, 
1980), I started deconstructing the strategy’s underlying concept of the resource 
intensity of an expenditure. In sum, if one includes the natural-resource inputs into 
labour, the differences in natural-resource intensity between ‘sectors’ seem to 
disappear.7 
 
Figure 5: Spend differently, not less  Does a ticket to a tennis match have a lower 
‘environmental intensity’ than for example a car journey? 
   What’s more, again in the same prima facie sense as in the rebound discussion 
above, the empirical evidence did not support the strategy: alongside universally 
attested structural change towards sectors alleged to be less environmentally 
intensive there has been no decrease in depletion or pollution rates. Again, only a 
full model of impact and the appropriate multivariate regression analyses could 
show whether without structural change impact would have been even greater; but 
the burden of proof would seem to fall on the strategy. 
   Models of environmental impact that endogenise population change, include 
feedback from impact to the right-hand factors, and study the impact-GDP 
relationship add to our understanding of policy choices. However, I suggest that 
they should not lose sight of the fundamental sustainability goal of reduced fossil 
fuel consumption, sustainable levels of which are based on ecological sciences; 
                                            
7
 Ironically, Leontief himself did this for some decades! 
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models of GDP itself, by contrast, serve other purposes. We should also observe 
the rule of choosing from among rival theories the one that best explains what is 
empirically observed, in this case the one claiming significant environmental impact 
for labour inputs. 
   Mill had gone even further, claiming that comparing natural resource inputs with 
other inputs into any good or service of monetary value X is absurd; that is, Petty’s 
Problem is not coherent and thus not a problem. Mill’s analogy was with a pair of 
scissors, about which it is absurd to ask which blade does more cutting. 
Furthermore, contemplating the distinction between labour and natural resources 
leads to the realisation that economics’ hoary distinction between goods and 
services can only be defined by reference to the relative amounts of labour and 
natural resources are in whatever is bought, yet these are incommensurable. Joan 
Robinson (1956) had also chuckled about the undefined and perhaps useless 
phrase ‘goods and services’.8 
 
1.9   Population (paper 9, ‘Population matters’) 
Mini-epigraph: We were looking for Turkish bananas in Istanbul but found only 
Chiquitas, so we asked the store-owner why. He answered, “Başka ülkelerden muz 
almamιz lazιm, bizdeki yetmiyor. Ҫünkü nüfus durmadan artιyor ve baksana, her 
yere bina yapιyoruz.”9 
   Beginning work on the P factor in I = PAT, I assumed that interdependencies 
meant that lower population is likely compensated for by greater affluence. I know of 
no research asking specifically this question, only a number of studies I cited or 
quoted in paper 9 that regressed impact on population. I still assume that population 
reduction does not necessarily, or perhaps only in the short run, cause impact 
reduction. Smaller population size seems however advisable for humanitarian 
reasons in poor societies where an increase in affluence is exactly what is needed. I 
discovered that the topic is a taboo in richer countries but not in poorer ones where 
                                            
8
 Consider the concept of ‘energy services’, which becomes meaningless when we realise that every 
so-called service requires energy input. Just as every ‘good’ requires labour input, every service 
requires water, but we don’t speak of ‘water services’. There is no way to rigorously define this 
ubiquitous concept. 
9
 “We have to sell imported bananas, we can’t grow enough here. The population grows constantly 
and we keep building.” 
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poverty and resource scarcity render it obvious that problems are easier to solve 
with fewer people. 
   Two of the insights of paper 9 are (1) a society can use P = I/AT to set itself an 
optimum population goal, and (2) to talk about population policy we need to clarify 
concepts like ‘coercion’, ‘compulsion’, ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’, inherited from 
earlier debates on overpopulation, mandatory sterilisation, eugenics, immigration 
and eco-dictatorship. A normative conclusion emerged as well, namely that rich 
countries should cease subsidising child-bearing, if only on intra-generational ethical 
grounds. I also noticed that the literature mentions fertility twenty times more often 
than mortality – at a time when life expectancy is unprecedentedly rising. 
Demographic transition theory, itself not fully substantiated by empirical evidence, 
should in any case pay careful attention to mortality development. 
 
1.10   I = f(P, A, T) itself 
[Sections 1.10 – 1.13 cover topics in my ‘in-tray’ to which my work has led.] 
   I = PAT is parsimonious – a scientific blessing but at the ‘cost’ of lacking formulas 
for P, A and T. These formulas must include each of the other three factors and all 
sorts of other factors with exogenous lives of their own. Examples of its flexibility: (1) 
Co-efficients for each factor can be determined, e.g. A = f(I, P, T plus cultural 
attitudes, Gini co-efficient, life expectancy). (2) Apparently non-subsumable factors 
can be added, e.g. culture in IPACT (Durham, 1992), where perhaps an 
individualistic society shows high A due to display consumption. (3) Renewable 
energy sources would affect T whenever T is defined as the efficiency of non-
renewable energy sources. 
   That I = PAT is a formula rather than an ‘identity’ is seen in its original exposition 
by Ehrlich & Holdren (1971), where I is lead exhaust and one can measure each 
right-side factor independently. Given coefficients, we can determine desirable I 
then derive combinations of P, A and T yielding this result; or we can start on the 




1.11   Caps 
 
Figure 6: ‘Contraction and Convergence’  A graphic vision of the stabilisation then 
reduction of total worldwide emissions (contraction) and an equalisation of per capita 
emissions (convergence). www.gci.org.uk  
   When thinking of fossil-fuel caps it is useful to use the simpler model of an aquifer 
being overdrawn. Its users can choose paths of drip-irrigation, garden-hose bans, a 
higher water price, growing less, or general belt-tightening. Or they can just cap 
withdrawals and let each part-owner of the commons decide how to allocate his or 
her newly-lowered aquifer-water budget – an effective solution with low transaction 
costs. Figure 6 shows one proposed scheme; permits could be grandfathered, 
auctioned or given away, and could be tradable or not. 
   I’ve only just arrived at the point where study of real caps systems is next on my 
research list. My submissions contain only a few paragraphs focussing on their 
(necessary) effectiveness, how they can be made politically more palatable, and 
how they compare with the allegedly equal but alternative route of (sufficiently high) 
resource taxes. (See Tickell, 2008.) Pertaining to the tax alternative, I’ve at least 
asked whether taxes do not also suffer from rebound: Since the government spends 
the tax revenue, even at the higher price of the taxed resource, isn’t this equivalent 
to an amount of the resource at no cost for the tax collector? If so, the same amount 
of the resource might be used, simply by the government rather than the taxed 
subjects, meaning it is still necessary to… cap. 
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   I unsuccessfully submitted a paper on a related issue, an epistemological analysis 
of the concept of ‘cap and trade’ showing that this phrase is a misleading conflation 
between the environmental tool (cap) and the economic efficiency tool (trade). One 
refers derivatively to ‘carbon trading systems’, removing all focus on the caps and 
permits that do the environmental work. If we accordingly categorise ‘caps-and-
trade’ as an ‘economic’ or ‘market-based’ instrument, we simply make a mistake: 
caps are a legal, regulatory instrument, not an economic one – they are pre- or exo-
market, and moreover conceivable without trading. The way of distributing permits 
(grandfathering, auction, per capita) arises, but this, again, pertains to the intra-
generational realm of justice, irrelevant to the ecological issue of scale. (Daly, 1992) 
   Since the reviewers readily conceded my main epistemological points, I am now 
working only on why the discourse developed in the market-centred way it did. Free 
markets and individualism have for instance dominated the discourse of the last few 
decades. Perhaps, though, the ‘market’ language aids caps’ political acceptance. 
But if less impact is the goal of our research, we should probably focus on the caps, 
not their tradability or their price. Otherwise we risk neglecting the level of the overall 
cap, exhibit A being the European Union Emissions Trading [sic.] System. I came to 
agree with a sizeable literature in the field of environmental law calling for ‘revisiting 
the language’ of environmental regulation. (Macrory, 2001; Rittberger & Richardson, 
2003; Lee, 2005)10 
 
1.12   Production functions 
   For anyone studying human ecology it is unsettling to see a production function 
with capital instead of natural-resources as the term next to labour: Q = f(K,L) 
instead of Q = f(N, L). Unless one subsumes natural resources under ‘capital’ the 
function implies there can be product without environmental inputs, which since at 
least the writings of Aristotle has been recognised as an absurdity. Sociology of 
science is needed to explain this bizarre development in post-classical economics. 
(Ryan, 2002; Czech, 2009) After neo-classical moves to add resources (R) to the 
                                            
10
 The lack of interdisciplinarity between ecological economics and environmental law seems to 
constitute myriad missed opportunities. 
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K,L function (Solow, 1970, pp 33-38), ecological economics developed K,L,E,M 
functions adding energy and materials. 
 
Figure 7: Nature, Labour, Capital  Three factors of production as depicted by Mill Stream, 
John Constable (1776 – 1837) at the time the classical economists wrote. 
   Classical economics insists that this is wrong: the two basic factors of production 
are labour (L) and natural resources (N); capital (K) is a subset of Q.11 A person 
might usually use tools and machines to transform raw materials into something with 
perceived utility, but only a person acting on materials, without tools, can make the 
first tool. In the original version stated precisely by Cantillon (1755), which survived 
through Marshall (1890) and, barely, Schumpeter (1912), product depends on 
quantities of land and labour and their productivity: 
Q = f(L, Q/L; N, Q/N) 
Productivities depend partly on the capital subset of product and partly on 
knowledge, skill and organisation. 
   In unpublished work I’ve recorded the development of this function since Petty and 
the various related debates; I would relish testing it against rival functions in spite of 
the necessity of quantification using monetary units (see Section 1.8). Forgive my 
apodictic tone, but it is tempting to start again with a production function that is 
epistemologically impeccable: the land, labour function. As with the right-side terms 
                                            
11
 James Mill proves the reducibility of capital by arguing ad absurdum: the first tool would assume 




in IPAT, the four elements of land and labour and their productivity co-efficients 
could then be endogenised. 
 
1.13   Scale, allocative justice, allocative efficiency 
   Another paradigm, or taxonomy, has turned out to be indispensable for me, 
namely Daly’s (1992) tristinction between the economy’s scale (throughput’s 
‘Plimsoll Line’), ethical decisions about the initial distribution of economic product, 
and welfare decisions about the overall level of utility or the size of the pie to be 
distributed. Something known as the Tinbergen Rule says that policies must fit 
specific goals: If we’re after greater affluence, we have to do X, if we want to 
conserve resources we have to do Y, and if we want more economic equality we 
have to do Z. We otherwise for instance vote down a petrol-tax increase because it 
hurts the poorest. Only later should we discuss serendipitous policies that kill 
several birds with one stone. 
 
1.14   Conclusion of Part 1 
   My main interest has always been policies for the conservation of natural 
resources. Even allowing for efficiency increases, we must eventually abandon the 
‘cowboy economy’ for the ‘spaceship economy’ – in the terms of Kenneth Boulding’s 
beautiful and seminal 1966 essay. It is more humane to degrow to a steady-state 
economy in an organised, relatively slow, democratic manner. Developed out of this 
interest and these assumptions: 
1. That space and natural resources are limited is axiomatic, but also limited are 
increases in the amount of goods-and-services to be gotten from a given 
amount of resources. Only in a metaphorical sense can efficiency increases 
be regarded as ‘equivalent’ to finding more resources. Moreover, the energy 
investment in energy production – EROI or ‘energy return on (energy) 
investment’ – should be foremost in our minds. 
2. Resource efficiency is merely a ratio, with resource amounts in the 
denominator and physically defined output (lumens, ton-kilometres) in the 
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numerator. A change in this ratio tells us nothing about the amount of 
resources consumed – because it tells us nothing about the number of units 
or output. Yet this is the environmentally relevant magnitude. 
3. Social scarcity is different from natural scarcity (always taking account of 
increases in EROI and production-process efficiency increases). It is a 
deliberate, legal capping of the yearly extraction of a resource (or type of 
pollution). Examples: planning laws, restricted parking spaces, restricted 
fishing, caps on fossil fuels. 
4. The I = PAT tool is indispensable for categorising and prioritising policies 
aimed at controlling the scale of the economy defined in terms of space and 
material-energy throughput. 
5. Sustainability requires many disciplines: biophysical sciences first and 
foremost, then economics, psychology, anthropology, history and aesthetics. 
My little research corner neglects most of these areas. 
6. The most important ‘development’ of my work has been from the 
individual/household/firm approach to the political approach. Sustainability 
requires rules, laws, democratic political decisions. Even worse: unless we 
rescind globalisation, the phrase ‘Think globally, act locally’ should make way 
for ‘Think globally, act globally’. 
7. Due to the difficulty of getting agreement on global action, combined with an 
unavoidable population size of around 10 billion, my faintly optimistic feelings 
have changed into pessimism. 
Turning away from my work’s development, Part 2 criticises and comments on the 




Part 2   Detailed corrections and emphases 
   I would like to go through some mistakes, omissions, open questions, strong 
points and links between the papers; the papers’ page numbers precede the comments. 
2.1   Rae & Veblen (paper 1) 
   Paper 1 seems to be an original contribution to the field, but it’s a tiny field even if 
Mandeville, Smith, Say, Rae, Bellamy, Foley and Veblen find room on it. The last 30 
years have seen a lot of literature on the sociology of consumption, and the insights 
do, I believe, shed light on environmentally problematic over-consumption. Some 
recent literature, however, has not realised it was re-inventing the wheel. 
1) 766t (top)  Rae’s analysis of capital or ‘instruments’ deserves more space. He 
assumes that products or ‘events’ are commensurable in labour hours, then 
distinguishes between the efficiency and durability of a capital good or ‘instrument’. 
His third factor is the events embodied in the capital good, again measured in labour 
units. A machine wouldn’t be made at all if it could not, before it wore out, produce 
more ‘events’ than went into its making; the machine would not be ‘brought to 
market’ at all. 
   We can measure all three things: How much labour or equivalent events, 
measured in labour units, was consumed by the instrument’s making? How many 
years pass before it produces twice this amount (its ‘payback time’, to use one of 
today’s equivalent terms)? The ratios of these two quantities for each instrument are 
then found and ranked. A ‘quickly’ returning instrument would produce in 1 year 
double what it cost to make it. These are Category A instruments, and so on up to 
‘slowly returning’ Category Z machines needing 26 years to double the amount of 
events embodied in them. Instruments can wear out (be ‘exhausted’) before they 
double the investment, so the number of years of their durability must be controlled 
for; the ratio for its ranking could however still be worked out by measuring how long 
it would take to double its investment even if it wears out beforehand. 
   Rae compares France and England. The former likes luxury, ‘mode and fashion’ 
while the latter sticks to ‘comfort and convenience’. He describes this by saying that 
England has ‘wrought its instruments up to orders’ approaching category Z. The 
middle term of this syllogism is that it shows the English are not so frivolous as to 
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avoid making instruments that embody a whole lot of labour and material inputs, 
instruments lasting a long time; the French don’t bother. 
2) 767t  Rae is normatively on the side of low social discount rates, against too much 
frivolity, and loves capital goods. One society decides to macadamize its roads, 
another does not; but macadamization is good. He is on the side of inventiveness, 
caring not only for oneself but one’s children, and caring not only for one’s children 
but one’s grand-children – sentiments akin to the reasons why sustainability has 
become an issue. 
   So we have a relationship between profitability (produced events/invested events) 
and productivity (produced events/time). (Rae 118-119 & 766m,b) And we can explain 
a society’s desire for more slowly returning instruments only in terms of morals and 
psychology. (Rae 118-129) We have a glimpse of why J.S. Mill, Eugen Böhm-
Bawerk, Joseph Schumpeter and many others have praised him. 765 Such detail is 
missing from paper 1. 
3) 769b (bottom) - 770t  This is the hypothesis most relevant to understanding the quest 
for affluence over and above mere needs that is at war with sustainability, and thus I 
should have referenced Low & Heinen, Morrison and Jackson (see the paper’s 
bibliography) to illuminate the concept of sexual selection. I should also have 
paraphrased Darwin’s theory of sexual selection – intra-sexual selection akin to 
natural selection and inter-sexual selection akin to artificial selection – in two 
sentences. 
4) 770b & 779tm (top-middle)  It would be good to cross-reference these two passages, 
which mention the same theme, the desire for novelty for its own sake, which I 
moreover wrongly call ‘nonexplanatory’. 
5) 771m  I should have explained why the concept ‘market failure’ can be seen to 
apply to conspicuous consumption, even if today I doubt its applicability to this case. 
6) 772m  I should have given Bellamy’s list of items of societal waste: the military; tax 
collecting; ‘judiciary, police, sheriffs and jailers’; the ‘criminal class’; the ‘lame, sick 
and debilitated’; ‘financial operations of all sorts’; small households; transporting, 
distributing and repeatedly handling goods; ‘private enterprise’ in general entailing 
‘competition’ like on a ‘battlefield’; ‘mistaken undertakings’; business crises (cycles 
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of 5 -10 years); idleness of a lot of capital; advertising (cf. Veblen’s hate of 
advertising). 
7) 772mb  The ‘organized matter’ Darwin is talking about (in 1871) seems to be 
simply food described in terms of the 2nd Law of thermodynamics. 
8) 773m  Cronin’s detailed treatment in The Ant and the Peacock should be 
referenced here. The passage at ‘status-driven pecuniary utilities’ is not intelligible. 
It means only that we have to look at (often dire) costs as well (see Figure 8), never 
only at benefits (‘utilities’), and then at cost-benefit ratios. 
 
Figure 8: Bowerbirds  Inter-gender sexual selection explains some consumption. 
9) 774m  p 97, not p 96. 
10) 774mb  It is good, I think, that paper 1 points out there is a deeper, entirely 
different question outside the scope of economics, namely why we want status at 
all. Perhaps even sociology takes this more as an axiom than an explicandum. 
11) 775b  Bellamy (pp 97ff, 126-128) was as explicit as Rae on display, but gives a 
much shorter rendering. Veblen took more from Bellamy than I indicate. 
12) 776b  I should have footnoted that Veblen here uses ‘accumulation’ as 
consumption – acquiring goods that advertise one’s wealth – whereas Rae uses it 
as capital formation, making ‘instruments’. 
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13) 779tm,m  I should have made it clearer that Rae is identifying three distinct types 
of utility: ordinary survival/health/comfort; beauty or pleasure; and prestige or what 
derives from ‘rarity’ (Veblen’s ‘pecuniary superiority’). 
14) 781m  In aesthetic theory neither Rae and Veblen were subjectivists, or 
‘positivists’, like Santayana. They look behind both economic purchases and beauty 
rather than taking them as the starting point of the disciplines of economics resp. art 
theory. 
15) 782t  To manage Veblen’s use of as many synonyms as possible for one and the 
same thing (his conspicuous production of words), I should have referenced 
‘ornamental’ and ‘ceremonious’ as well – the more so as the secondary Veblen 
literature often chooses the latter as the key one for this half of Veblen’s basic 
dichotomy between the useful and the merely ostentatious (which motivates robbery 
and fraud). 
16) 784tm  I should have pointed out that Tilman is wrong in not seeing that Veblen 
was laughing at himself in using the ‘latinates and mordant wit’ for their 
‘ceremonious’, non-functional beauty.  
   What makes this paper important to me is that most writing in the field of 
sustainable consumption remains within the discourse of systems and -isms: 
capitalism, consumerism, growth fetishism, advertising, individualism, and 
infrastructure systems, all of which are said to stand in the way of people’s 
voluntarily downsizing to sustainable scale. We must change the system or the -ism. 
I am convinced that such social or sociological categories are fatally shallow. Until 
we quit treating them as sui generis (Kroeber, 1915, 1917; Geertz, 1984), and ask 
why these systems and ideologies exist and dominate (Bloch, 1977; Barkow et al., 
1992; Brown, 1992), how can we work for political majorities to change them? 
Society, culture, or learning are said to cause behaviour, but what causes society, 
culture, and what is learned? 




2.2   Jevons’ Paradox (paper 2) 
   In the 1860s Jevons dealt with Britain’s perceived looming coal scarcity, refuting 
the popular position that ‘economy’ (efficiency) in using coal in production will avert 
shortages. The same issues returned in the 1960s. Jevons’ methodological 
contribution is that it is pointless to approach the relation between efficiency and 
consumption (of an energy resource) from a geological or engineering perspective: 
What matters are P and A in I = PAT. The policy world is finally accepting 
Khazzoom’s 1980 proof that input consumption cannot decrease proportionately 
with input intensity. Because we desire painless solutions we place the burden of 
proof on demonstrating rebound rather than demonstrating savings. Due also to lack 
rigorous definitions and microeconomic methods, estimates of total rebound today 
vary by more than an order of magnitude. The Coal Question contains wisdom. 
1) 9 r (right column) b  The opening paragraph’s assertion that “greater efficiency… must 
raise… environmental impact” misleads by failing to distinguish between Jevons’ 
backfire position (rebound > 100%) and the more modest conclusion that post-
efficiency-increase demand for the more efficiently used resource is equal to or just 
below 100%. Of course, modelling the observed increase in energy consumption is 
a valid academic pursuit that can profit from Jevons’ insights, but the backfire 
paradox, however fascinating, is a wild goose chase that has tied up research 
interest.. 
2) 10 l (left column) b footnote 2  Sanne’s definition of rebound includes organisational 
(labour) as well as technological efficiency, and like most researchers I missed the 
opportunity to broaden the discussion to cover labour and total-factor efficiency. 
Nobody doubts that demand for labour and capital increases as their productivity 
rises, yet with natural-resources the opposite is expected or hoped for. Another topic 
for the sociology of science thus crops up. Paper 4 has a fuller discussion of fears 
that labour-efficiency rebound is less than 100%, i.e. that unemployment chronically 
rises. 
3) 10 l tm  I should have more precisely written that it is energy input consumption that 
I was regarding as proportional to or equal to impact in I = PAT, not the goods-and-
services consumption that is the numerator in the A and T-efficiency factors. 
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4) 10 l b footnote 4  Like too many others I relegated the efficiency elasticity of supply to 
a footnote. I touch briefly on this in paper 3 but only recently has this gaping hole in 
rebound theory been better investigated. (Turner, 2009; Wei, 2010) 
5) 10 r mb  Again, is it backfire or merely very high rebound that is being attested? 
The phrase ‘more people consume more’ is misleading. The rebound literature in 
general often similarly fails to distinguish between ‘more than’ before the efficiency 
increase (rebound > 100%) or ‘more than’ what engineering calculations and some 
micro-economic extrapolations lead us to believe (rebound 0 – 100%). 
6) 10 r b-11 l t  The sentence beginning ‘If the ratio…’ seems accurate, but too dense, 
and the word ‘demand’ in economics is ambiguous: it can be either the quantity 
demanded X (in physical units) or X times price per unit (in monetary units). Here it 
means the former. An example would have helped: Say the pre-change output-input 
ratio is 100 ton-kilometres (tkm) per 10 megajoules (MJ) and 1000 tkms are 
‘consumed’ worldwide pre-change. Pre-change MJ consumption is then 100. Say 
the post-change output-input ratio is 100 tkm/9 MJ and the post-change amount of 
tkms is 1,111 tkm. Input consumption then remains 100 MJ. The possible 
‘engineering savings’ were 10 MJ, but they were not realised; the ‘direct’ (sector-
specific) rebound was 100%. 
7) 11 l b footnote 7  There are misprints, mainly in the sentence beginning ‘Now, the 
decline…’, where A’ should be simply A, and just after that I’’ should be I’. The 
journal editor declined to print a Correction. 
8) 12 r m & 13 l m  Given his thought context (see paper 4), Jevons thought his 
“paradox” easy to resolve. It now fascinates me that it was ironically the ‘marginal 
revolution’ of Jevons himself that led to today’s focus on micro-economic 
approaches and in turn rebound research’s penchant for trying to build total rebound 
on the initially zero rebound of the non-economic, engineering approach. Without 
better energy-consumption models that identify the direction of the causal arrow of 
energy efficiency, macro-economic approaches to rebound remain difficult. 
9) 13 l mb, 15 r t   I should have explicitly covered Jevons’ insight that only absolute 
indolence, consumer satiation and population stabilisation could result in zero 
rebound. The first two are advocated by ‘sustainable consumption’ advocates within 
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ecological economics for richer societies. Jevons would have found this (and 
population non-growth) unrealistic – as we also should today, especially when we 
include poorer societies in the investigation. 
10) 13 r m, r b & 14 l mb  Jevons’ mention of “new activity in most other branches” is 
sketchy, yet this is what could explain backfire (the ‘Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate’) 
as opposed to rebound of only 100%. For this subject we need the concept of 
society’s production possibilities frontier. See Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Litter  Litter is a luxury enabled by expanding production possibilities frontiers, 
with aesthetic consequences. 
11) 14 l tm  Here Khazzoom is arguing not for backfire but for indirect rebound, which 
Jevons likewise clearly describes. This should not be conflated with the backfire-vs-
rebound distinction. 
12) 15 l m & 15 r mb  Again, although Jevons’ backfire theory is the best and most 
parsimonious explanation of the enormous increase in input consumption during the 
last 200 years, the assumptions about consumer insatiability and reproduction 
above replacement rates should be made more explicit. Efficiency’s effect on 
population, in particular, is sorely neglected (see 17) below). Rebound theory 
depends crucially on the concept of the efficiency elasticity of demand (for the more 
efficiently used resource), implicit in Jevons and explicit in Sorrell & Dimitropoulos 
(2008, p 637). Yet without behavioural assumptions we cannot know either of the 
two components, the efficiency elasticity of price (the supply-function shift) and the 
price elasticity of demand. 
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13) 15 r b footnote 14  Veblen was saying that consumption does not even decline at 
higher incomes – challenging any macro-economic Engel curve. As laid out in 
paper 1, this behavioural assumption supports the high-rebound hypothesis, but I 
missed the chance to continue the links from Mill (the only author Veblen cites in 
400 pages) through Jevons to Veblen. Almost no rebound research today finds it 
necessary to consult earlier geniuses; econometric tools are everything. 
14) 17 l mb  Not even in paper 4 did I give this insight of Say the place it deserves in 
explaining both economic growth and input-consumption growth – even if Say’s 
argument concerns the other irreducible factor of production, labour. 
15) 17 r m  The phrase “pounds of coal per horse power per hour” is perhaps more 
understandable if it reads “MJ per kWh”. Or: How many energy joules does it take to 
produce a certain amount of work joules for sixty minutes? 
16) 18 l m  It is amazing that in the debate, such as it was, between Mundella and 
Jevons practically all of today’s rebound concepts and methodologies are there. 
17) 18 r t, tm  Jevons himself noted that with coal & increasing efficiency the English 
were growing “rich and numerous”, so I should have written “… to consume more 
and multiply.” The endogenisation of population size attested by Jevons remains 
under-researched (Giampietro, 1994); population’s exogeneity and its status as a 
taboo subject are closely related. Paper 9 tries to reopen these issues. 
18) 19 r t  That “costs” are down a mere 1% is incorrect; it should be “prices” (of the 
goods, under perfect competition). 
19) 19 r mb  In the debate over caps vs taxes this ‘eco-tax rebound’ means perhaps 
merely free resources for the tax-collecting entity, in which case caps (on 
government consumption of the resource) would still be necessary. Then we might 
as well just cap in the first place. 
20) 19 r b  The interdependencies I nebulously noted led to paper 6. 
The bittersweet subtext of Jevons’ book is the author’s knowledge that the party 
can’t last. The book’s epigraph is Adam Smith’s words on the gloominess of the 
stationary and declining states. In linking coal to our feelings, the book is an 
important cultural document. 
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2.3   The sufficiency strategy… (paper 3) 
      In a world with two people, if one voluntarily decided to lower his or her 
consumption of coal from a commonly-owned coal pit of limited size, what would 
happen? The coal momentarily left in the ground would stay in the ground only if the 
other person made no change in his activities – was warm enough, heated enough 
rooms, didn’t want to use any steam engines or small smelters for new economic 
activity, and didn’t reproduce. The first person’s ‘sufficient’ behaviour is thus a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for conserving coal. 
   The sub-discipline of sustainable consumption addresses the few wealthy, not the 
billions desiring to avail of fossil fuels to raise their health and living standards. 
Millions of people in Turkey can now afford to fly, and they fly. I believe that before 
paper 4 the sufficiency rebound had not been identified, yet a voluntary leftward 
shift of the macro demand function must move fuel prices downwards. 
1) 770 r b footnote 1  Reducing sinks to sources would be parsimonious, but whether it 
is accurate is a delicious question for the future. 
2) 770 r b  Technological efficiency is the ratio of goods-and-services to input – inputs 
which are the same as impact. I should have noted the larger problem of 
aggregating both I and T in I = PAT. Turvey (1966, pp. 48-49) and Ekins (1991, p. 
244) for example offer partial lists of impacts whose aggregation in physical terms is 
impossible. One should neither skip over this problem nor unquestioningly adopt 
monetary metrics. 
3) 771 l t  The depiction of IPAT is fuzzy. P x A gives the total of goods-and-services, 
e.g. 10 people at 5 tomatoes per person per week = 50 tomatoes; the A factor is a 
quantity of goods-and-services over the denominator of 1 (one person). T then 
shows X litres of water per (one) tomato (intensity, the inverse of efficiency which 
would be one tomato over X litres of water). Taking intensity, 10 people x 5 
tomatoes x 3 litres = 150 litres, the impact. 
4) 771 l m (also 772 l m & 778 l t)  It muddles the issue if we don the hair shirt, use the 
imprecise terms ‘North’ and ‘South’, and somewhat arrogantly claim without proof 
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that “Third World” countries are “imitating” the north. These criticisms of the 
sustainable-consumption literature deserve more attention than I gave them.  
5) 771 l mb, 775 b, 776 r m  I need to do much more work on the effects of shifts of 
demand curves on shifts of supply curves. It is for instance probable that lower 
prices render initially steep supply functions more elastic (flatter) over time. Supply 
curves of any slope moreover might shift rightward only after a delay, entailing some 
lowering of the rate of consumption of the resource used more efficiently or 
sufficiently. 
6) 772 l t, mb, 772 r t, mb  Goodland and Daly’s phrase “impact of each unit of 
consumption” made me ask the question of the coherence of this ratio, and I started 
toiling on paper 8. 
7) 772 l m  The normally undefined term ‘overconsumption’ (exception: Princen, 1999) 
raises many questions, mainly whether the consumption is ‘too much’ for an 
ecologically sustainable society, or for the individual (Figure 10), as when it is 
claimed that the marginal utility of consumption levels off to zero, after which it is 
‘over’-consumption and individually harmful if only because it means more work 
effort. 
 
Figure 10: A small, good thing  Quality vs. quantity of life. 
8) 772 l m, 779 r tm  That “affluence and overconsumption do not increase welfare” is an 
early example of the literature’s overstatement of the case that money can’t buy you 
happiness. The literature abounds with sloppy renderings of the Easterlin Paradox, 
which as Figure 11 shows only says that marginal benefit decreases. Furthermore, 
why we keep working, earning and consuming when the benefit/cost ratio is so low 
39 
 
raises the questions ‘Why are we so stupid’ addressed in paper 1. Or perhaps the 
premise equating utility and happiness is challengeable. 
 
Figure 11: Still positive elasticity As of a certain income, marginal increases in happiness 
decline, but they do not disappear. (Source: http://www.sd-
commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/prosperity_without_growth_report.pdf , p 33) 
9) 773 r m  I once again conflate backfire and 100%-rebound. 
10) 774 r b  Much sustainable-consumption literature deals with conspicuous 
consumption, or what the psychological limits to consumption might be, issues 
raised in paper 1. 
11) 775 l m, r tm  Here I again conflate growth in input consumption and growth in the 
consumption of goods-and-services. 
12) 775 r tm  Like most research, this paper lamentably focuses on energy inputs to 
the neglect of water, space, phosphorus, other species, and human labour. 




14) 775 r m  That the consumers must “work less” is not always the case; I should 
have said that they by definition spend less, so they could also bury this income and 
use it later. Over time they would probably work (produce) less. 
15) 776 r mb  I can’t explain why I inserted “(despite?)” into the sentence. 
16) 777 r b  The paragraph’s cryptic last sentence is trying to say that the equivalent 
of the sufficiency rebound is widely recognised at the international rather than 
interpersonal level: if a country voluntarily reduces its fuel consumption (within 
‘Kyoto’ or the EU ETS for example), then others increase theirs, leading to 
competitive advantage12 and ‘leakage’ of emissions to more profligate nations. The 
phrase “democratically mutually coerced” is also muddled, a question I treat more 
rigorously in paper 9. All laws coerce, so the term “mutual” is redundant. 
17) 778 l m, r tm, r m  “Traditionally ethical reasons of human equity” means 
intragenerational ethics: fairer material-welfare distribution, fair start in life, feeding 
and housing the poor through charity or the welfare state, remaining within the 
calculus of present people rather than the ‘longest run’ that includes all future 
people. The intergenerational calculus is here called “the newer ethical grounds of 
environmental concern”. The quotation from Brown & Cameron similarly struggles 
with this vocabulary. At 778r m I think I got the vocabulary more or less right. 
18) 778 r t, m  If I transfer some of my purchasing power to a poorer person, this is 
unmitigatedly good in terms of intragenerational ethics; but if concerted efforts in this 
direction lead to population increase some unintended consequences must be 
faced. See paper 9. 
19) 780 l m, r mb  This distinction between exhortation from the green pulpit and setting 
the goal at winning 51% of voters has become central for me. The theme reappears 
in papers 6 & 9. 
20) 780 r b  I = PAT is not an “identity”. 781 l tm  A2 and A1 are in the wrong order. 
21) 782 l t  Friends have objected to the assertion that the concepts of North and 
South are not relevant to the consumption discussion. I was trying to say that the 
                                            
12
 Unless the WTO is scrapped or one otherwise restricts trade between voluntarily frugal countries 
and the rest. 
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relevant concepts are ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, and that ‘North’ and ‘South’ are only code, a 
misleading shorthand. 
The Zeitgeist went against government regulation and towards voluntarism at the 
same time environmental problems rose into consciousness. The sufficiency 
strategy aims at individual and firm-level change in a-political contradiction to the 
political, ‘commons’ nature of the problems. 
 
2.4   Rebound in classical economics (paper 4) 
   I suppose the only lesson from this paper is that our choices of environmental 
policies, and even methods, depend on current dominant economic theory, or even 
political ideology. Hotelling came at the end of another era: 
The method ordinarily proposed to stop the wholesale devastation of irreplaceable 
natural resources, or of natural resources replaceable only with difficulty and long 
delay, is to forbid production at certain times and in certain regions or to hamper 
production by insisting that obsolete and inefficient methods be continued. (1931, 
137, emphasis added) 
 
Hotelling thus accepted without question that rebound is 100%, but it is hard for us 
to move from ‘economics’ back to the ‘political economy’ still extant in 1931. We 
innocently ask, How big is rebound? But our definitions and initial approaches are 





2.5   Rebound concepts and methodology (paper 5) 
   This article doesn’t succeed very well in disentangling the three variables 1) 
technological efficiency, 2) energy consumption (throughput growth) and 3) 
economic (GDP) growth. The problem is that economic growth, i.e. an increase in 
number of goods-and-services, is often treated as an independent, causal variable. 
Of course there are causal economies of scale, but an exogenous ‘wealth of 
nations’ factor would have been inconceivable to classical economists; it was the 
thing to be explained.13 
   It is at any rate inefficient to first investigate efficiency’s effect on economic growth 
then measure the degree of ‘decoupling’ of economic growth from input-
consumption growth. Within this same 3-factor paradigm we have suffered endless 
tests of the Environmental Kuznets Curve postulate – a discourse that doesn’t even 
put absolute quantities on its vertical axes, but instead the environmentally irrelevant 
metrics of impact per capita or per unit of GDP. 
1) 370 r mb  Showing that increased technological efficiency increases the number of 
goods-and-services begs the question of whether it increases the amount of inputs 
into this increased quantity of goods-and-services (the environmental question). For 
this we need a full model. The literature likes the picture of a race between 
efficiency and scale effects. This passage is not written precisely enough. 
2) 371 l m  This argument from the ‘income effect’ isn’t this simple. We should 
perhaps rather think in terms of Figure 1, where there is a societal 
(macroeconomic) income effect, or in terms of an outward shift in the production 
possibilities curve. The fallow amount of the resource is like an increase in our 
resource budget, or an increase in goods-and-services we can ‘purchase’ with the 
same budget. This is reasonably coherent. But in terms of money there is a trap: 
Whatever money is left in the consumer’s pocket at the end of the month is no 
longer in the supplier’s pocket, and the effects even out. Suppliers, after all, also 
spend and demand in the form of salaries, profits and investment, all entailing 
resource-input consumption. (See also papers 4 and 6.) 
                                            
13
 Petty treated population and infrastructure density exogenously, not absolute size, though they are 
related, and the concept of the extent of the market flirts as well with exogeneity. 
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3) 371 l m  If we ask after consumers’ marginal expenditures, we see that they can be 
for anything, not just more of the goods-and-services now rendered cheaper (direct 
rebound). However, the notion that rebound is low because the marginal 
expenditure tends to be in a less-resource-intensive sector (one doesn’t drive the 
Prius much more, but rather buys more books or concert tickets) is criticised in 
paper 8. 
4) 371 l mb  Again, the key to the rebound puzzle has something to do with the energy 
“freed”, enabling Jean-Baptiste Say’s additional output that ‘nobody pays for’ quoted 
at 372 l t. 
5) 371 l b  I do not now agree with our assertion that capital costs affect the size of 
rebound. Rebound measures only the percentage of the fallow resource that we 
consume but that could be saved if we were lazy and satiated and didn’t reproduce. 
This is not dependent on the energy costs of the technological efficiency change 
itself, energy combusted before the arrival of the rebound question, which begins 
after the technological efficiency change. The embodied energy costs of the new, 
more efficient equipment must be deducted from engineering savings, not rebound. 
Our term ‘cost-neutral’ in the last sentence at 371 r b somewhat corrects our false 
statement. The physically-measured average efficiency change over the entire 
equipment park is all that is relevant for reboundology. 
6) 372 r mb  The ludicrous estimate of 0% rebound for residential-appliance direct 
rebound is found in Greening et al. (2000). This is ludicrous because only direct 
rebound is considered, ignoring sources of rebound such as 1) purchases of more 
white goods and 2) purchase of white goods with greater size or cooling (freezing) 
capacity – omissions that must be criticised in the strongest terms. Similarly, the 
‘nano-study’ of de Haan et al. (2006) measures the number of cars in the fleets of 
households who recently bought a Prius, but not the number of kilometres driven. 
Such limited studies have no scientific value. 
7) 373 l m, 373 r mb  Contrary to the claim here, the numerator in the efficiency metric, 
GDP, seems after all to be a good proxy for total physical goods-and-services 
produced and consumed, in spite of the fact that only those are included that are 
sold and bought. We could add some percentage to it, perhaps 10%, for producer-
consumed goods and those given away or bartered. But since a global time series 
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would regress change in energy consumption on change in GDP/energy, this is not 
a drawback. (Alcott & Marangi, under review) 
8) 373 r m  In the meantime I think TPES is the relevant metric, if only because 
environmental policy has an interest in reducing energy consumption of both sorts, 
renewable and non-renewable. Whether to include nuclear fission, non-human 
animal work and food for human metabolism is still debated. 
9) 374 l t  It is now widely accepted that in some sense energy (any natural resource 
or ‘ecosystem service’) contributes a much larger percentage to economic growth 
than its percentage of the monetary values in the national income accounts and 
input-output tables (Cleveland et al., 1984; Kümmel et al., 2002), but I now doubt 
that this vexing question is relevant to natural-resource rebound study, which takes 
energy consumption, not GDP, as dependent variable and motivation. See Figure 
12. 
 
Figure 12: Combustion, energy slaves  The dependent variable of environmental-impact 
research and the major dilemma of human ecology. 
10) 374 r m  Item 3) touches on the sorely neglected effect of technological energy-
efficiency increase on energy prices (rather than goods-and-services prices) in the 
rebound literature. Of course much else affects energy prices, so teasing this out is 
difficult. 
11) 374 r m  Items 3) & 4) include the view that “Ultimately, what consumers want…” 
is energy services. But the concept of energy services makes no sense since every 
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service as well as every product needs energy inputs. One does buy energy, either 
literally or embodied. 
12) 374 r m  Item 5): The question of direct rebound’s relevance in measuring total 
rebound deserves a separate paper. Can one ‘build on’ individual direct-rebound 
amounts, adding indirect-rebound amounts, or is total-rebound estimation 
impossible using microeconomics? 
13) 374 r mb  Item 7) is a crass understatement of the problem of using country rather 
than world data. If country or country-group data are taken, either leakage must be 
measured using environmental input-output analysis (see paper 8), or – in my 
opinion more reasonably – energy consumption must be treated as strictly 
proportional to GDP. At world level these problems don’t arise. 
14) 374 r mb  The attempt in items 8) and 9) is once again to point to the necessity of 
measuring consumers’ reactions; these depend on their degree of saturation with 
goods-and-services, their cost-benefit ratios (e.g. work vs enjoyment of purchases) 
and other things. We need psychology, history, and anthropology.   
15) 375 l t  The arguments made in paper 8 would refute the sentence 
“Unfortunately,… resource-intensive…”. See also 3) above. 
16) 375 l tm  I delved into the analogous study of labour-efficiency rebound in paper 2 
and in more detail in paper 4. 
17) 375 l m  Item 12) and the last paragraph are trying once again to comment on the 
psychology of how economists, engineers, historians and anthropologists look at 
efficiency. The sociology of science (‘psychoscience’) would study philosophical and 
emotional assumptions made by all of us that bias our approach and outcome. 
Given the lack of clarity on definitions and methods, and given that only total 
rebound is environmentally relevant, I was not motivated to do empirical research in 
this dominant tradition.  
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2.6   Caps (paper 6) 
   Paper 6 makes the embarrassingly simple point that to save a resource a polity 
can do it directly, putting legions of academic policy-designers out of work. Think of 
river and aquifer water, and alpine meadow grass, that have been capped and 
distributed for centuries. Wartime energy rationing gives us further experience. 
   But wiping out half of fossil-fuel production has obvious consequences for 
affluence unless there are simultaneous and successful efforts to increase efficiency 
and the use of solar-based energy, and decrease population. These consequences 
are fruitful areas for academic study.14 Scale issues are by definition solved by the 
caps, and affluence-retention will happen decentrally as people enact the Holy 
Trinity of efficiency, renewables and sufficiency, the indirect strategies located on 
IPAT’s right side. Academic work should compute how much affluence is 
salvageable (at what population level) under a halving or more of the throughput of 
various biophysical subsystems. 
1) 553 l t  The categorisation of consumer efficiency is not as clear as I make out, but 
I would still lodge it within T because it is not frugality, not ‘doing without’; there is no 
loss of utility except that one must alter some habits. 
2) 553 l tm  Whilst end-of-pipe measures do not affect depletion, but only emissions, T 
can also be expressed with an emissions metric. 
3) 554 l m  I write that lower A lowers I only if P and T stay the same, but should have 
also mentioned the topic of paper 3: A1 = f(A2) where A1 and A2 are two different 
sets of people. I do describe it better in Section 3.2.3. 
4) 554 l m  I should have defined “demographic transition” theory which holds that 
rising affluence causes lower mortality (raising population size) and somewhat later 
lower fertility (lowering population size), population’s ending up lower and more 
stable than before. As I note in paper 9 the theory does not yet integrate current 
and predicted falling mortality well enough. 
                                            
14




5) 554 r tm  The ceteris paribus condition is important to the claim that higher 
population lowers affluence; it probably holds for very poor countries in the medium 
run. The second-order effect where higher population lowers T (raises efficiency), 
attested by Simon (1981) and less universally by Boserup (1981), is criticised in 
paper 9. 
6) 554 r mb  “inefficient” should of course be “in efficient”! 
7) 555 l m  Greater hectare productivity has enabled us to take some land out of 
agricultural use for golf courses, shopping centres and nature reserves. Thus the 
more accurate claim is that we don’t take land net out of food production, but this 
lacks empirical support requiring a model of hectares in food production regressed 
on both agricultural productivity and population. 
8) 555 r m  Item 1): Work under review (Alcott & Marangi) starts with world data on 
efficiency defined as GWP/joules and TPES as joules, then attempts various 
regression analyses. We note, though, the epistemological situation: Time series 
show a very high coefficient of correlation, as shown in the two graphs in Figures 
13a and 13b. Should policy-makers wait for academics to find perfect models for 
multi-variate regression analyses? The precautionary principle would advise not 
thus waiting. We only need to know the direction of the causal arrow, and perhaps 
no Granger causality is what is predicted by the hypothesis that rebound is 100%.  
 
Figure 13a: Efficiency and consumption in lockstep  The black and blue lines – 





Figure 13b: The input-efficiency/input-consumption race  A generic graph 
showing world GDP in grey, energy consumption in red, and energy intensity in 
blue. If not efficiency increase, what does, then, cause consumption increase? 
9) 556 l t  It helps me to return again and again to the epistemological distinction 
between necessary and sufficient conditions. What are we to do once we see that to 
solve the environmental problems of depletion and pollution, the Holy Trinity are not 
necessary? 
10) 556 r mb  Here I at least identify the choice between upstream and downstream 
caps; upstream caps (at the mine- or well-head) entail lower measurement and 
enforcement transaction costs. But this issue needs another whole paper. (See 
Tickell, 2008.) 
11) 556-557  It might even be original to ask whether environmental policy must 
concern itself with economic efficiency at all. On the level of gaining political 
acceptance, yes; but in the world of cause and effect, no. Discuss. 
12) 557 l t & 558 r b  This cart-and-horse question likewise needs better exposition. 
13) 557 l b  The criticised model includes the structural change strategy, examined in 
paper 8. 
14) 557 r b footnote 11  I should have included these points in the main text: the 
criticised model is not clear about the direction of the causal arrow starting at 
exogenous efficiency increase; it makes the counter-factual, hypothetical, purely 
























efficiency increases. What’s more, it is in my opinion mistaken to treat GDP and 
population exogenously. See paper 5. 
15) 558 l-r  Calculating the effects of caps on affluence and population seems 
important in the intragenerational, political sense, to give a realistic idea of the mix 
of population reduction, efficiency, renewables, and sufficiency or even poverty that 
is required. There would be some originality in work on the ethical dilemma of 
present versus future material welfare, an extremely uncomfortable topic. See 
paper 9. 
16) 559 l mb  I make the unproven claim that the costs of left-side policies need not be 
measured because I believe they are low; I’m mainly wary of the transaction costs 
that would be necessary to implement and co-ordinate the various right-side 
policies. The task of ‘countering rebound effects’ (a phrase popping up more and 
more in the literature) can be approached both directly (caps, taxes) or indirectly (P, 
A, T). 
I suggest that sustainability research lacks policy focus to supplement its analytically 
central concept of biophysical limits, and that this can be provided by caps as in the 
Kyoto framework. 
 
2.7   Degrowth & Job Guarantee (paper 7) 
   The right to paid work would remove sentences containing the phrase ‘economic 
growth and jobs’ from public discourse. This issue is certainly relevant to the 
transition to the steady-state economy required by sustainability. Like the concept of 
property (private, state, commons, free access), rights are not an ‘economic’ issue 
but rather pre- or exo-market ones, so paper 7 is on the ‘political economy’ end of 
the spectrum ‘economics’. 
1) 57 l m  I should have put the Declaration’s relevant text in a footnote. Article 23.1 
reads, “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.” 23.3 adds 
the right to “favourable remuneration” sufficient for a family’s “human dignity”, but 
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since this conflates having a job itself with how much purchasing power the job 
bestows, I left it out. 
2) 58 l t  In item 1) [in the paper’s text] the sentence including “unless work-hour 
productivity outstrips labour supply” is cryptic. It merely intends to say that a growing 
economy might not entail more jobs in absolute numbers if labour productivity 
increases very fast, such that the economy does not absorb the net increase of 
people into the job market. But this is the labour-efficiency rebound question, and for 
this factor of production a consensus attests backfire. 
3) 58 l t  Also in item 1) I should have written “in the absence of absolute decoupling 
of throughput from the quantity of goods and services”, i.e. when not only GDP rises 
faster than resource consumption, but the latter actually decreases. Just as the 
phrase ‘absolute decoupling’ makes a category mistake (decoupling is a ratio), 
‘relative’ decoupling’ is redundant. Worse, the concept of decoupling is irrelevant to 
an economy’s sustainable size, which is a function only of the amount of throughput, 
whatever the (relative) developments in the realms of goods-and-services or utility.    
4) 58 l mb  Item 4) should stress that reduced working time (RWT) per person and JG 
are rivals. 
5) 58 l b  Item 5): Unless we throw out the laws of supply and demand, we have to 
concede that absolute laissez-faire is full-employment (non-)policy; the paper should 
have been less timid in stating this (I knew the editors were socialists). I should have 
accordingly framed the paper as: Unless the labour market is absolutely free, 
meaning wages low enough to ‘clear the market’, society needs either an economic-
growth or a social solution. See 7) below. 
6) 58 r mb  Because there are so few examples of JG we need a fuller description of 
its possible mechanics. 
7) 59 r b  The ‘dirty secret’ of this paper is that it is motivated by the need to sell 
degrowth politically. Degrowth is unavoidable for sustainability, but only if advocates 
of the steady-state economy can show voters that there is a solution to the 




The paper is an essay, a piece of advocacy, but it identifies the main questions and 
proposes moving the jobs issue from the economic to the political realm. 
 
2.8   Expenditures and intensities (paper 8) 
   Several times after realising that the ‘service’ of a haircut requires physical inputs 
– a barbershop, the barber’s chair, the scissors, razor blade and lighting – I quit 
thinking in terms of ‘services’ altogether. The term is not scientific. It had long been 
said that the ‘service’ economies of the richer world were ‘dematerialising’. This 
positively-connoted language promised some relief from environmental woes, but 
did it make sense? 
   The wisest thing I read doing my literature review was Martha Gilliband’s 
statement that natural resources don’t have bank accounts. (See 88 r m and 19) 
below.) I also came to the opinion that Costanza’s 1980 study is just as fatal for 
Environmental Input-Output analysis (EIO) as is Khazzoom’s 1980 study for the 
engineering approach to ‘efficiency savings’. 
1) 83 r mb  I believe the basic flawed premise of EIO is that buying labour does not 
raise throughput. Some EIO researchers have opened the door by including human 
metabolism during an hour’s work, and I build on that. 
2) 84 l tm, 84 l m, 85 r m, 86 l m  The term “system boundaries” is fancytalk for where to 
draw the line on the identifiable throughput of an hour’s labour. More narrowly it 
refers to the input-output tables where the categories of household consumption, 
government expenditure, employee compensation or ‘final demand’ are 
conventionally excluded. See 9) below. 
3) 84 l mb  I classify the (indirect, right-side, demand-side) structural change strategy 
under T because an expenditure shift to a sector with a higher percentage of 
‘service’ is claimed to enlarge the ratio of output to input, i.e. lower T in IPAT. 
4) 85 l mb, r t  The concepts of the production of labour and people were common in 
classical economics but are foreign to today’s discourse. But that might be the gist 
of the matter. 
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5) 85 l-r  The quotation from Wright and the cited passages from Chapman and 
Gilliland indicate that we need philosophy and epistemology to approach this issue. 
6) 85 r m, 87 r m, 89 l b  What are the conditions for an work-hour’s being ‘brought to 
market’? At what level of throughput per worker, in a given society, is the work-hour 
offered in the first place (labour’s supply function)? I should have tied this more 
closely to the ‘upstream inputs’ concept at 85 r mb. See 8) below. 
7) 86 l-r, 88 r tm  Extending the analysis to the throughput implied by the consumer’s 
purchasing power might be a bit shaky. It seems legitimate to ‘holistically’ observe 
that the consumer had to sell labour in order to get the purchasing power for the 
expenditure under examination. But there is danger of circularity. 
8) 87 r m, 88 l m  The concept of ‘intermediate expenditures’ describes the transactions 
normally counted in EIO. If we insert labour as an industry, wages would then seem 
to be intermediate. A follow-up paper would have to deal with several such technical 
issues. 
9) 88 r m  A dollar that is booked for a ton of steel or, further back, iron ore and coal, 
goes partly to wages and partly to owners and lenders, but in no part literally to iron, 
coal and steel. I’m still testing this idea, but it seems the buck stops at rent; 
Gilliland’s insight is that the phrase ‘buying natural resources’ is ambiguous. 
10) 89 l m  Nansai et al.’s finding that expenditure shifts to sectors with allegedly 
lower resource intensities lowers employment supports my thesis, and I will try to 
find out more about their approach. 
11) 89 r m  Perhaps this should have been the centre of the paper – the empirical 
starting point: natural-resource consumption’s rising along with the shift to 
purportedly less environmentally-intensive sectors (as percentages of GDP). As in 
the case of rebound, I believe researchers should concede that the burden of proof 
lies with the position that stands in contradiction to a first-order reading of the macro 
data. What are the factors that cause rising input consumption if structural change 
(or efficiency increase) are purportedly working in the direction of lowering it? Again, 
multiple regression models addressed to these specific questions are needed. 
If true, this paper has consequences for many areas of research and policy. 
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2.9   How many human beings? (paper 9) 
   Having read Malthus’ various editions of the Essay on population, like everybody 
else I mulled over the Population factor in IPAT and fretted over the fact that the 
topic was largely taboo. Is it possible to argue against the proposition that all 
‘environmental’ problems – ones caused by pollution or scarcity or the quality of air, 
soil, water, etc. – would be easier to solve were there fewer people? Why has the 
subject been taboo? Why are Malthus and ‘Malthusianism’ and ‘neo-Malthusianism’ 
so venomously attacked? Because one suspects Malthus was onto something? 
Malthus has been declared dead so many times there might be quite a bit of life in 
the old boy yet. I discovered that there is recent literature, but it leads a life of its 
own separate from the mainstream. What became clear is that to determine 
optimum population size we must first decide what quality of life we want. (Figure 
14) 
 
Figure 14: Do we want beauty?   Do we want to sustain, or let the devil take tomorrow? 
Do we want large human feedlots, or space for quality of life? 
1) 109 r b footnote 2  I forgot to cite the important article by Lin (2010, pp 260-261). 
2) 110 l mb, b  I am trying to show how absurd it is to totally sideline the issue of 
population size: Had Africa’s population risen less, the change in its per capita grain 
production might have been positive rather than negative. As in my criticism of 
Princen at 110 r tm, it is mathematically very easy to assume no change in P then 
calculate what affluence and impact would have been. As usual Engelman is 
succinct and to the point: If per capita impact falls, but total impact rises, P must 
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have risen. If I/P falls from 100 to 50 but I rises from 100 to 150, P must have risen 
by a factor of 3. 
3) 111 l m, 114-116  I yearn to attempt a paper on the emotions with which we approach 
environmental issues. Schneider et al.’s use of the term ‘state-imposed’ is a good 
example of the need to re-visit the language – and feelings – of population policy. 
The phrase is actually imprecise (ambiguous), as is Sen’s term ‘coercion’. My strong 
claim, to be explored, is that this is emotion, not science. I suggest that more 
research into ‘psychoscience’ would speed up academia’s process of delivering 
policy solutions. 
4) 111 r m  A model of food production based on the named parameters would be 
valuable, but first a literature survey is needed to avoid re-inventing the wheel. 
5) 111 r mb  In retrospect it seems that point 3) is almost identical to point 1). 
Modelling would increase rigour. 
6) 112 l b  The simple example using GHGs is an illustration of A = f(P) in paper 6. 
7) 112 r mb  The sentence beginning “Instead of asking…” conflates inter- and 
intragenerational justice. They are both involved in computing culturally desirable 
carrying capacity. 
8) 113l mb  This would have been the place to add that if intergenerational justice 
looms big in a society’s utility function, it constitutes a cultural value that would 
reduce current A – an example of endogenising A. 
9) 113 l b  The phrase “such a maximum” refers to the maximum (‘feedlot’) population, 
not kilocalories per person. 
   While defending this submission in light of reviewers’ comments I drew up this list 
of perhaps ‘innovative’ contributions: 
 an explicit method for deriving P using IPAT which obviously must place P as 
the explicandum (P = I/AT); 
 raising the issue of complacency (‘no population policies are necessary’), 
what speaks for and against it, and that there is non-complacent view; 
 rejecting the attempts on both sides to deny either A or P, with many 
references to this literature (see footnote #3 and throughout); 
 noting overemphasis on fertility as opposed to mortality; 
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 unpacking the concepts of ‘coercion’, ‘compulsion’, ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-
down’; 
 viewing the question from the standpoint of poor countries, documenting that 
they are less complacent than rich-country academics; 
 identifying pro-natality policies in rich countries that could be rescinded; 
 stressing the point that ceteris paribus each additional person lowers 
affluence – very pertinent when we leave our rich-world perspective; 
 mentioning that post-Durban UNFCCC agreements will freeze population per 
country when doing the bookkeeping on the amounts of allocated emissions 
rights; 
 the point that due to rebounds (factor interdependency on the right side of 
I=PAT) population policies alone do not necessarily affect impact; 
 a useful list of agricultural parameters; 
 briefly claiming that we should calculate what it means, exactly, to replace all 
fossil-fuel energy with ‘renewable energy’; and 
 discussing the issues of rights vs responsibilities in terms of access to 
commons. 
Mainly for reasons of justice rather than scale, the environmental policy discourse 
should break this taboo. 
 
2.10   Boulding’s 1966 masterpiece 
[Sections 2.10 and 2.11 briefly discuss two works in German, the first peer-reviewed 
and the second a contract study for the Enquete Kommission of the German 
Bundestag.] 
   Paper 10 would be a short analysis of Kenneth Boulding’s 1966 essay ‘The 
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth’. As there was no German version of the 
essay, a group of us put together a special issue of the German-language ecological 
economics magazine with a professional translation and three commentaries (one of 
them mine). It is homage to a seminal contribution and a great pioneer. Doing 
sustainability research is an ethical commitment with normative assumptions. But 




Figure 15: Spaceship earth is heating up  The Cowboy Economy model is obsolete, but 
growth still gets the votes. 
 
2.11   Rebound vs absolute decoupling [sic] 
   Paper 11 would be work for the German parliament on the topic of efficiency’s 
chances of achieving so-called ‘absolute decoupling’ of natural-resource 
consumption from growth in material welfare. We still plan to use some of its 
findings for a paper in English. Its literature review notes several trends in rebound 
research: 
 away from direct rebound to total rebound; 
 towards higher estimates of total rebound; 
 away from efficiency policies towards sufficiency advocacy within the broad 
demand-side approach; 
 towards the conclusion that direct policies must supplement efficiency, which 
either suffers from unduly high rebound or is inherently limited by engineering 
and thermodynamic limits; and 
 in other words, a shift towards supply-side thinking. 
Other relatively new aspects include: 
 detailed discussion of the conceptual differences between ‘absolute’ and 
‘relative’ decoupling; 




 consequences of caps for other resource substitutes, e.g., if fossil fuels are 
capped, caps on biomass combustion must be in place to prevent 
deforestation or land use change away from edible crops; and 
 challenge to the discourse of ecological modernisation that has for three 
decades focussed on efficiency and decoupling rather than absolute 
quantities of depletion and pollution per year. 
 
Part 3: Contributions to the field 
   It has been strange and tiring, writing about one’s writing. As if it were important, 
worthy of such scrutiny. It has at least helped me identify what I’d like to work on in 
the future. But the task is ‘even worse’ of claiming to have made contributions to the 
field: 
1)  I believe IPAT is better than its reputation; it is parsimonious and offers a chance 
to endogenise each right-side factor: I = f(P, A, T). 
2)  I try to shift academic focus to direct policies as our ‘first stop’. The reasons for 
first seeking indirect routes to lower depletion and pollution are emotional and 
political in nature, not strictly speaking part of a scientific approach to environmental 
policy. These aspects would I think better belong to later stages. 
3)  Since the caps tool is available, and in the absence of empirical evidence that 
efficiency increases have caused real savings, justification of the study of efficiency 
and rebound must from the point of view of environmental policy be based on further 
considerations, e.g. politically acceptability. 
4)  The term ‘economic growth’, central to the discussion of ecological scale, is 
meaningless if not defined. I believe the definition relevant to environmental policy is 
in terms of throughput, not utility or monetary GDP. I agree with van den Bergh 





Figure 16: Something new  Solving the scale problem is conceptually simple; academics 
will have to work less. 
5)  The literature often conflates affluence-raising and impact-lowering goals. 
Perhaps with one eye on political acceptability one seeks to kill two birds with one 
stone. I believe we should proceed scientifically: determine the ‘optimal’ scale where 
marginal costs exceed marginal benefits, then solve this relatively new problem first. 
Growth and welfare (justice) economics are older and more widely practiced. 
6)  Environmental policy draws on an insufficiently sophisticated picture of human 
psychology. It seems at a loss to explain why people are so resistant to 
intergenerational justice and why they seem even to act against their own self-
interest when remaining on the ‘treadmill’ of work-and-spend. Most of the literature 
on environmental psychology seems to go no deeper than sociology.  
7)  I seem to have successfully applied the rebound concept to sufficiency as well as 
efficiency. 
8)  Perhaps identifying the main three popular indirect strategies (the Holy Trinity of 
efficiency, renewables and sufficiency) is useful in contrasting demand-side to 
supply-side measures as well as highlighting how cultural norms affect approaches 
to policy-making. 
9)  Who can prove the usefulness of the history of economic thought? If one is so 
inclined, visiting our predecessors is its own reward, but whatever its relevance to 
environmental policy, I believe I have added something by looking at classical 
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economics through specific environmental-policy questions. Literature review is a 
means of avoiding ‘re-inventing the wheel’. 
10)  I believe the effectiveness of the ascendant ‘sustainable consumption’ doctrine 
needs to be challenged. Its target audience is small, it suffers from rebound, and its 
emphasis on the saintly-green, voluntary actions by individuals and firms diverts 
attention from political approaches. 
11)  I’ve tried to raise the question of the cart and the horse, the right-side of IPAT 
representing the cart. Laudably, the Transition Town movement, for instance, begins 
with the assumption of lower fossil-fuel availability, then asks what we can do to 
maintain our affluence without claiming that embracing the Holy Trinity causes less 
resource consumption. 
12)  I hope to have helped clarify definitions and methods of research in the 
efficiency-cum-rebound discourse. 
13)  The challenge to Life Cycle and Environmental Input-Output analysis is cheeky 
but has some merit; the idea that various sectors are more or less harmful to the 
environment pervades every corner of policy discourse. 
14)  I’ve added to the relatively small literature on population size. P = I/AT is useful, 
as is my attempt to de-conflate discussions of coercion (which all laws do within 
limits set by human rights) and how policies are decided (democratically or not). 
15)  I’ve tried to raise neglected questions about some basic concepts used in 
economics: ‘goods-and-services’, ‘the economy’, capital as an irreducible factor of 
production, confusion between ratios and absolute numbers (for which Malthus 
famously chastised Ricardo), the monetary nature of aggregate metrics, and our 
economy’s dependence on natural resources. 
16)  My work has raised some relatively new questions: 
 What would life look like were we to live without combusting fossil fuels? 
 Where lies the burden of proof when seeking policy effectiveness? 
 Why are direct, necessarily effective policies seemingly the last ones 
considered? 
 Isn’t social scarcity preferable to natural scarcity? 
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17)  I believe I am contributing to a move towards democratically-decided rules and 
away from voluntarism and reified, allegedly ‘free’ markets. As with defence, 
taxation, schooling, infrastructure, and general fair and truthful behaviour, we should 
accept the psychological necessity of the paradigm “I will if you also must.” 
18)  I’ve neglected the field of ‘environmental justice’, but am working on a study of 
freshwater in Palestine and Israel with Ramzi El Houry. 
19)  At least paper 1 mentions the criminally neglected environmental topic of 
beauty, aesthetics. Noise, sights and smells, landscape, visible stars, biodiversity, 
building shapes and materials, harmony between land and machine – a few 
examples of issues which, if explored more deeply, would probably strengthen the 
case that beauty’s utility can compete with that of throughput. Aldo Leopold advised 
us to simply ask what path has most ‘integrity’; we might also ask, with hope of 
consensus, what path is most beautiful. 
 
Figure 17: Daffodils in Perbioi  
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Part 4: Conclusions 
   My work has focussed on that part of economics that studies the sustainable scale 
of human production and consumption defined in terms of throughput. It only briefly 
considers other areas such as intra-generational distribution of wealth, broader 
welfare issues, and economic (Pareto) efficiency. Concern with scale presumes that 
economic growth in the sense of throughput growth must at some point end. While 
this proposition is logically unassailable, quantitative estimates of limits to growth for 
the multifold inputs into production and outputs from consumption have similarly 
only been touched on in my work. For example, my work on population scale starts 
with the assumption that 40 or 400 billion people cannot even subsist on earth, but 
does not try to quantify sustainable levels, only offering parameters for approaching 
the question for a given society. 
   My interest in rebound arises from the prima facie plausibility of the road of 
efficiency towards lower pollution and depletion. After nine years’ work I believe in a 
strong conclusion, namely that if research is normatively to further the goals of lower 
depletion and pollution, the study of technological energy-efficiency increases and 
their effects on overall consumption are not necessary: the goals can be reached 
with necessary effectiveness and low transaction costs by the well-known measures 
of caps or, with less certainty, high energy taxes. They are sufficient and, if rebound 
is indeed close to or at 100%, necessary. 
   Whether technological efficiency increases might be sufficient to reach the goals is 
the rebound question. If one suspects that this hopefully sufficient policy road is 
preferable to (less painful than) caps, the research must be undertaken. In my 
extensive reviews of the literature since 1980 (not counting Jevons’ study of 1865) I 
have however found a divergence in estimates of total rebound of an order of 
magnitude. There is often lack of unity on definitions, misuse of terms, and extreme 
difficulty finding water-tight methods – mainly concerning the vexing question of how 
to proceed if and when relatively accurate direct rebounds are known. One needs 
models (theory) before one can proceed, but there is no consensus on any energy-
consumption model. One can only say with certainty that rebound < 100% is highly 




   A further discovery has been that rebound research has taken place within a 
Zeitgeist, within various ideologies, within various dominant scientific discourses – 
not in a vacuum. The dominant paradigms have dictated that the burden of proof is 
on proving rebound, not real savings, i.e., the research question has not been 
whether real input savings have been achieved by input-efficiency increases, but 
rather what percentage of real savings are wiped out by the additional consumption 
enabled by input-efficiency increases. One has started with zero rebound and tried, 
without reaching anything near consensus in 30 years, to work up to an evidence-
based percentage of engineering savings. 
   However, while waiting for economic science to produce models of energy 
consumption that name its drivers aside from Jevons’ main candidate, input-
efficiency increase, and guided by the crass observable correlation between energy-
efficiency increase and energy-consumption increase, the policy tool of caps could 
have been used. We have lost many years in braking depletion and climate 
warming. Khazzoom (1980) already pointed to this bias towards an ‘engineering 
approach’ to the question, but due to the Zeitgeist and perhaps also to a natural 
desire to have our cake and eat it, too, he was not heeded. 
   Concerning my work on voluntarily restricting one’s consumption I’ve identified the 
sufficiency rebound and the discouraging fact that huge numbers of poorer people 
are already involuntarily consuming ‘sustainably’. Whether in order to advocate 
voluntary frugality or to market resource caps as a solution, our model of human 
behaviour should include insights from evolutionary psychology. There is strong 
evidence that our evolutionary past influences not only our bodies but our feelings 
and social relationships. Fortunately, some sustainable-consumption literature is 
shifting the focus away from sociology towards evolutionary psychology. 
   While most of my work is literature review, it is at least extended farther into the 
past than most other contributions. Although I have contributed a small amount to 
the history of economic and environmental thought, I cannot show any proof that 
knowledge of previous writers is a necessary condition of good policy analysis. 
   For my research focus, the prices of natural-resource inputs are of only derivative 
importance. While prices might be exogenous for firms and individuals, for 
macroeconomics they must be explained – yet to what purpose? Since the socially-
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decided resource scarcity that is necessary for sustainability can be achieved 
without reference to prices, i.e. with laws physically defining limits alone, their 
importance seems limited to the intragenerational social sphere. Unless price 
controls are enacted, caps necessarily entail price rises with consequences for ‘fuel 
poverty’, mobility, health and the alleviation of poverty worldwide. To solve these 
(non-environmental) justice problems we must then resort to policies of income 
distribution. My work has led me to conclude that these problems should be strictly 
distinguished from the ‘environmental’, sustainability problems. 
   My work is thus relevant to the productive and commercial sectors only in its focus 
on socially-decided scarcity and population stabilisation. Once scale and distribution 
issues are decided, firms, households and individuals would decide decentrally, 
without government interference, how best to react through some combination of 
sufficiency, renewables, and greater efficiency. The government interference or 
‘regulation’ has already occurred in setting overall caps. Innovation programs would 
be superfluous, and socio-economic problems would be dealt with by socio-
economic policies. 
   Using IPAT, I’ve identified some interdependencies needing more study: How 
does population size influence labour supply, on the one hand, and how does this 
influence both affluence and impact defined as the amount of fossil fuel taken out of 
the ground? Is a supply of labour at subsistence wages a necessary condition for 
present levels of impact, or would consumption for comfort and prestige achieve the 
same levels? How does technological efficiency in agriculture and building-heating – 
obviously raising affluence ceteris paribus – influence population size? How much 
can technological efficiency increases, including the ‘free’ use of solar energy, raise 
affluence in the future? Such study should, however, in my opinion be aimed not at 
finding impact-reducing policies – we already have caps and/or taxes at our disposal 
– but at describing to voters the costs and benefits of a reduced-throughput 
economy. 
   My work has tried to analyse the effectiveness of environmental strategies usefully 
classified according to the I = PAT formula, according to which the amount of 
problematic depletion and pollution is determined by population size, good-and-
service consumption per person, and depletion or pollution per unit of goods-and-
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services. Through regulation, society can control the three right-side factors, but 
interdependencies make it highly uncertain that impact is thereby reduced. Caps, on 
the other hand, constitute impact reduction. If we decide to move towards a 
sustainable economy, we must shift our research focus to the political conditions for 
the democratic acceptance of caps and to solving social issues that arise due to 
economic shrinkage such as unemployment, income disparity, absolute poverty, 
possible limits on reproductive freedom, and probably even international tensions. 
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